Event Notification Report for June 12, 2020

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
6/11/2020 - 6/12/2020

** EVENT NUMBERS **

 
54584 54736 54737

Part 21 Event Number: 54584
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT HOBBS
HQ OPS Officer: SILAS KENNEDY
Notification Date: 03/12/2020
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
Person (Organization):
PATRICK FINNEY (R1DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text



EN Revision Imported Date : 6/12/2020

EN Revision Text: INTERIM PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DEFECTIVE SOLENOID VALVES

The following is a summary of information that was obtained from Flowserve via facsimile:

On January 13, 2020, and January 14, 2020, two Flowserve Model 38878-8, 3-way, 2-postion solenoids valves supplied to Seabrook Station for use on the feed water isolation valve actuator failed bench testing. The failed solenoid valves were returned to Flowserve for evaluation. The evaluation of these solenoid valves will be completed by June 11, 2020.

Point of Contact: Matt Hobbs, PE Engineering Manager Office: 919-334-7127 MHobbs@flowserve.com

* * * UPDATE ON 6/11/20 AT 1235 EST FROM MEGAN STRONG TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

The following is a summary of the information provided by the vendor via fax and email:

Testing at Flowserve determined that valves did not reposition when actuated and were failed. Disassembly determined that one valve had unidentified foreign material that was preventing valve from actuating, and the other valve had been partially disassembled and then reassembled, resulting in damage that caused the valve to not actuate.

Flowsever determined that these conditions would have caused failure of the assembly and test performed at Flowserve before the valves were shipped and therefore occurred after Flowserve shipped the valves. Flowserve concluded that these two solenoid valve failures are not defects or deviations that occurred at Flowserve that would be associated with substantial safety hazards.


Notified R1DO (Jackson) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (by email).

Agreement State Event Number: 54736
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: Twining Inc.
Region: 4
City: Sacramento   State: CA
County:
License #: 7782-34
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. Arunika Hewadikaram
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Notification Date: 06/04/2020
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2020
Event Time: 09:41 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
- CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the California Department of Public Health Radiologic Health Branch via email:

"On 06/04/20 [PDT], California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) contacted the Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) to report a stolen moisture density gauge (CPN Model MC2, S/N 07226, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241). The gauge belonged to Twining Inc. and was stolen out of a technician's truck while parked overnight at a Marriott hotel located at 2970 Lakeside Drive, Santa Clara, CA. The RSO [(Radiation Safety Officer)] was aware of the fact that the technician was working at a jobsite away from the permanent storage location. An immediate notification was made to Santa Clara Police Department (Report # T20001625). The RSO will be posting a reward for the safe return of the gauge. The RHB will be following up on this investigation."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Agreement State Event Number: 54737
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: Belt Railway Co. of Chicago
Region: 3
City: Bedford Park   State: IL
County:
License #: NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Notification Date: 06/04/2020
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2020
Event Time: 01:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE RAILCAR FIRE

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA; the Agency) via email:

"At approximately 0700 [CDT] on 6/4/2020, the Agency was contacted by the Texas Radiation Control Program to advise that a rail car containing radioactive material had caught fire at the Belt Railway Co. of Chicago (BRC) located 6900 Central Ave., Bedford Park, IL. The Texas program had been contacted by the railway. IEMA staff contacted BRC and was informed that a lidded gondola (car WP-9241) transporting a load of UN2912 LSA-1 was found to be smoldering at approximately 0100 on 6/4/2020. The shipping manifest listed contents as 'solid oxides' with 4.13 mCi of Co-60, Cs-134, Cs-137, U-234, U-235 and U-238. BRC staff agitated the railcar and continued to observe until approximately 0300. At that time, flames had engulfed approximately 10 percent of the car and the Bedford Park Fire/Hazmat team arrived on scene. There is no indication of arson. The fire was monitored and the car separated from an adjacent car also containing LLRW [(Low Level Radioactive Waste)] (WP 9124). At approximately 0630, the fire burned itself out. At 0837, IEMA staff contacted the Response Management Team for the shipper and the General Manager for Alaron/Veolia to get shipping manifests (received 0920). Indications at that time were that the fire was rekindling and soil was added atop the fiberglass lid to help smother.

"Agency responders arrived on scene at approximately 1040. Bedford Park Fire/Hazmat was on scene as well as the railway's emergency response team. AreaRays had been deployed by the hazmat team and were reporting background exposure rates. Based on conversations with the shipper, the subject load contained un-irradiated zirconium fuel cladding and other debris enroute from Alaron Nuclear Services in PA to Waste Control Specialists in TX. The cladding at one point contained enriched fuel, so there is approximately 1.3 mCi of uranium present (predominately U-234 at a concentration of 41 pCi/gram and U-235 at 3 pCi/g. Load contains approximately 44g of SNM [Special Nuclear Material]). It is believed that the friction due to transport created pyrophoric zirconium dust which reacted with the surrounding building debris and combustible waste. This debris and combustible waste was also contaminated with radioactive material - approximately 0.8 mCi of Co-60, Cs-134 and Cs-137 each.

"At the time Agency staff arrived, the lid had been covered with soil and only a small amount of smoke was escaping. This was air sampled for any volatile radioactive contaminants by on site IEMA staff. Areas impacted by smoke, including adjacent cars, were wiped to check for surface contamination. On site measurements did not indicate any deviations from background and there is no indication that the radioactive material within the suspect load impacted personnel or the environment. Lab analyses will supplement this assessment. Impacted areas on the ground were surveyed and exposure rate measurements (reportedly maximally 400 microR/hour on contact with the railcar) documented for any first responder dose recreations. Modeling efforts are underway to provide bounding numbers on potential environmental impacts - albeit unexpected. Temperature of the car was recorded as approximately 400 degrees F and falling. Local Fire/Hazmat was still on scene and the shipper's radiological expertise was expected to arrive at approximately 1530.

"In the initial fire response, approximately 1000 gallons of water was added to the railcar. A hydrant was not accessible. The bulk of this water impacted the fiberglass cover and ran off. This drip line was assessed for contamination and none identified. The car was also moved approximately 2000 feet to distance it from the second car of LLRW. Both sites were evaluated by inspectors and no indications of radioactive contamination identified. Agency staff will continue to monitor the situation, especially if the shipper intends to uncover or repackage the shipment. The incident was reported to the National Response Center under Incident Report 1278842 by the Railway Police Department. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IEPA and USEPA notified and briefed. This matter is also reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ops Center for Emergencies under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(c)(4)."

Item Number: IL200010

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