| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/3/2018 - 12/4/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53755 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RMA GROUP
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 8054-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN ROOK
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 11/26/2018
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OR THEFT OF MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of California via email:
"On November 26, 2018, at approximately 1015 [PST] .., [the] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of RMA Group, Radioactive Materials License #8054-37, contacted RHB [Radiologic Health Branch] Brea concerning the moisture/density gauge, Troxler 3430, Cs-137 serial #750-4104, Am-241 serial #47-26740 (Cs-137, 0.333 GBq, Am-241, 1.6 GBq) that had been found missing during a semi-annual inventory of the radioactive gauges possessed at the permanent storage facility at 6976 Convoy Court, San Diego, CA 92111. [The RSO] will contact local law enforcement in San Diego and will fill out a police report with them. A copy of the theft report will be forwarded to the RHB Brea office to be included as part of this report. [The RSO] will contact local newspapers to attempt to retrieve the stolen radioactive gauge as well as notifying local servicing vendors of radioactive gauges to be alert for the serial number of the stolen gauge in case it turns up for service. The investigation will continue to determine if the radioactive gauge can be found and determination can be made on how it was lost at the permanent storage location. This is being reported to the NRC Operations Center as a 24-hour report under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) since the radioactive gauge has been lost and it can not be determined what condition the sources are currently in."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53756 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: T. W. GATES
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA | Notification Date: 11/28/2018
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text INOPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FOR CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE
"At 2130 CST on 11/27/2018, Division 1 Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) was declared inoperable because of a leaking check valve that caused excessive cycling of the associated air compressor.
"Division 2 MS-PLCS had been declared inoperable on 11/27/2018 at 1400 CST when a pressure control valve in the system exceeded the maximum allowable stroke time.
"Because MS-PLCS supplements the isolation function of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) by processing fission products that could leak through the closed MSIVs, both divisions of MS-PLCS inoperable at the same time represents a condition that could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function of an SSC [Structures, Systems and Components] that is needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The station diesel air compressor is available to supply backup air to the safety relief valves as required by the Technical Requirements Manual." [This is associated with operability of the safety relief valves, due to the inoperable MS-PLCS air compressor.]
The unit is in a 7 day shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 1-TS1-18-Div 1 & 2 MSPLCS-685, for the two divisions of MS-PLCS being inoperable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/03/18 AT 1551 EST FROM TIM GATES TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"This event was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) from fulfilling its safety function to control the release of radioactive material. Division I was declared inoperable due to a failed component. Division II was declared inoperable due to a pressure control valve in the system exceeding the maximum allowable time to close by 0.50 seconds. An engineering evaluation has since been performed and concluded that the 2 second maximum allowable time to close was based on the pressure control valve being classified as a rapid closure valve and was established from the original baseline data of 0.50 seconds. This baseline data is an administrative target value per the In-Service Testing Program. There are no technical specification requirements associated with the 2 second closure time.
"The engineering evaluation also determined that the volume of air supplied through the pressure control valve during the extra 0.50 seconds of valve closure would have an inconsequential effect on the pressure within the volume of leakage barrier between the Main Steam Isolation Valves associated with the MS-PLCS pressure control valve or have any effect on containment over-pressurization.
"Based on the information provided by the engineering evaluation, the Division II MS-PLCS has been declared operable-degraded non-conforming since time of initial discovery. Consequently, this event is not reportable as a condition that could have prevented the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) from fulfilling its safety function.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified via e-mail."
Notified the R4DO (Gaddy). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53767 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: KAREN COTTON | Notification Date: 12/03/2018
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | Event Text ACTUATION OF BLACKOUT SEQUENCERS DUE TO LOSS OF ONE OFFSITE POWER SOURCE
"At 0315 [CST] on 12/3/18, the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant experienced a loss of 138 KV transformer XST1. Unit 1 is currently at 100% power. Unit 2 was subjected to actuation of both blackout sequencers causing an automatic start of both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps as well as the turbine driven AFW pump.
"No emergency diesel generators started as per design. Train A and B motor driven and the turbine driven AFW pumps have been returned to automatic. All other safety systems functioned per design.
"The loss of power to 138 KV transformer XST1 resulted in loss of power to both safeguards busses on Unit 2. The busses performed a load-shed and slow transfer to power supplied from 345 KV transformer XST2A as designed and were re-energized and loads sequenced back onto the busses. The emergency diesel generators are not required to start unless the busses are not re-energized by the alternate offsite transformer. All electrical power related actuations functioned as designed. There was no impact on Unit 1.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Non-Power Reactor | Event Number: 53771 | Facility: REED COLLEGE
RX Type: 250 KW TRIGA MARK I
Comments:
Region: 0
City: PORTLAND State: OR
County: MULTNOMAH
License #: R-112
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000288
NRC Notified By: MELINDA KRAHENBUHL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
| Notification Date: 12/03/2018
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
GEOFF WERTZ (NRR PM)
WILLIAM SCHUSTER (NPR) | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION
Violation of Technical Specification 6.1.3, which requires the minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured to be a licensed reactor operator, and another individual.
The key was inserted at 1316 PST and removed at 1325 PST and reinserted at 1327 PST and removed at 1331 PST on December 1, 2018. The reactor operator was trying to complete the reactor startup checklist, but was alone. No rods were withdrawn during this period. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53772 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL ANGOVE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 12/04/2018
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2018
Event Time: 09:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2019 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 82 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER FAN BRAKE INVERTER FAILURE
"At 0935 EST on December 4, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Fermi 2 is in a 14-day LCO for inoperability of HPCI and a 72-hour LCO for UHS inoperability.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/30/19 AT 1605 EST FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 53772 made on December 4, 2018. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and site Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed further. An evaluation determined that TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.9 for barriers could be applied to the MDCT fan brakes. As a result of applying TS LCO 3.0.9 to the MDCT fan brakes, it was not necessary to declare the UHS inoperable. With the Division 2 UHS operable on December 4, 2018, the HPCI system was also operable. With HPCI operable, there was no event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Therefore, EN 53772 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Cameron). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53775 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVID PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 12/04/2018
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"On 12/4/2018 at 1340 [PST], Columbia entered a planned evolution to replace the seismic monitoring system. Use of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale has been implemented as a compensatory measure per station procedures. The expected duration of the replacement activity will exceed 72 hours, therefore, this is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Compensatory measures will remain in place until the seismic system replacement has been completed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |