| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/28/2018 - 11/29/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53267 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DREW MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD | Notification Date: 03/16/2018
Notification Time: 22:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION AFFECTING RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
"At 1604 [CDT] on March 16, 2018, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Engineering reported an unanalyzed condition affecting the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers in a postulated fire event. It was discovered that the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) heat exchanger piping associated [with] the credited heat exchangers in the NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Analysis (NSCA) could experience water hammer damage.
"Fire damage to the cables for the RHRSW outlet motor operated valves could cause the valves to spuriously open and drain the RHRSW piping. Subsequent starting of the RHRSW pumps on the affected header could cause water hammer loads and damage the piping.
"Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables associated with this condition are routed in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16 and 23. There are 11 cases where the deterministically credited heat exchanger could be affected.
"Compensatory fire watch measures have been established.
"This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"CR 1139620 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION AT 2215 EST ON 11/29/2018 FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"NRC notification 53267 was made to ensure that the eight-hour non-emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when the licensee discovered an unanalyzed condition with the potential to significantly degrade plant safety.
"On August 22, 2018, an independent analysis was completed which determined that the RHRSW system would remain functional during the postulated scenario. Based on this analysis, a revised functional evaluation was performed by BFN which determined that the condition did not constitute an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For credited RHR heat exchangers for fire events in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16, and 23, the RHRSW piping will remain intact and the valves will operate manually after a water hammer event. This condition did not significantly degrade plant safety and is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"On November 16, 2018, TVA canceled the 60 day report which had been submitted for this condition.
"TVA's evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 53746 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
| Notification Date: 11/20/2018
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL | Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
EDWARD HARVEY (NMSS DAY)
FUELS GROUP (EMAIL)
GRETCHEN RIVERA-CAPELLA (NMSS EO) | Event Text CONTAMINATED WORKER REQUIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT
"On November 19, 2018, at approximately 1130 [EST], a conversion area worker was cleaning up a spill of liquid uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) that can contain hydrofluoric acid (HF). During the cleanup effort, some amount of this solution was able to come in contact with the worker's clothing potentially impacting their skin on the legs above the ankle. Appropriate treatment for exposure to HF was provided by onsite medical response staff. When the operator attempted to exit the chemical side of the plant, radioactive material contamination was detected on both hands. The contamination on both hands was above free release criteria and was unable to be removed by normal decontamination methods. The worker was transported to an offsite medical facility accompanied by plant health physics personnel. The worker was sent to the hospital for observation due to the potential chemical exposure.
"The Columbia plant is a licensed Part 70 facility subject to 10 CFR 70 Subpart H. Spills within the conversion area of the plant are evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis and Summary. This issue does not challenge the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.
"Operations staff finished cleaning up the spill. At the time of this notification, the employee reported to management that they are awaiting discharge from the hospital. This issue has been entered into the facility's corrective action program.
"24-Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3), 'An event that requires unplanned medical treatment at a medical facility of an individual with spreadable radioactive contamination on the individual's clothing or body.' Also applicable to this issue is a 24-Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c), 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification.' This issue requires notification to the South Carolina (SC) Department of labor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health."
The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53747 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: COLLEGE STATION State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED | Notification Date: 11/20/2018
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LIQUID SCINTILLATION COUNTER SENT TO RECYCLING CENTER
The following information was received via e-mail from the State of Texas:
"On November 20, 2018, the licensee reported that a Liquid Scintillation Counter (LSC) (LKB -WALLAC 1410), potentially containing an internal source and also H-3/C-14 standards, was surplused on November 8, 2018. Surplus staff informed that the unit had gone to metal recycling. On November 19, 2018, radiation safety retrieved broken glass standards (approx. 100,000 dpm each vial, November 1987) from metal recycling [Madison Metals in Bryan TX]. This particular model WALLAC 1410 was known to contain approximately 12 microCi Eu-152. The activity currently could be as low as 2.45 microCi. Neither the source nor shielding was found. A contamination survey was completed with probes and the wipes were counted in an LSC, and nothing was found over background. The metal recycling center is closed for the holidays and no one is expected to receive an exposure. More information will be forwarded once it is received. The investigation is ongoing."
Texas Incident Number: I-9639
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53748 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: THE HEART AND VASCULAR CLINIC, LLC.
Region: 1
City: WEST PALM BEACH State: FL
County:
License #: 4000-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW SENISON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED | Notification Date: 11/20/2018
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISADMINISTRATION OF SODIUM PERTECHNETATE
The following information was received via e-mail from the State of Florida:
"On Friday, November 16, 2018, [the licensee] called to report a medical event involving licensee 4000-1. A patient was administered 150 milliCi of Sodium Pertechnetate that was originally intended to be used to calibrate a machine. The critical organ dose was less than 50 rem; the effective dose was 7 rem."
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53754 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN FRIESE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 11/26/2018
Notification Time: 08:31 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2018 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
CATHY HANEY (R2 RA)
HO NIEH (NRR)
BILL GOTT (IRD MOC) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED FOR EXCESSIVE SMOKE IN CONTAINMENT
At 0816 EST, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared for Unit 2 under Emergency Action Level H.U.4 for excessive smoke in the lower level of containment with a heat signal. Onsite fire brigade is responding to the event. A command post is established. Offsite support is requested by the fire brigade. No flames have been observed as of this report.
The NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local government agencies will be notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/26/18 AT 1036 EST FROM BILL HARRIS TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *
At 1036 EST, Sequoyah Nuclear Station Unit 2 terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. The licensee determined that the source of the smoke in containment was oil on the pressurizer beneath the insulation, that heated up during plant heatup. The licensee did not see visible flame during the event. The licensee is still working to determine if there was any damage to the pressurizer.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose), R2RA (Haney), NRR (Nieh), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/26/18 AT 1337 EST FROM STEPHEN FRIESE TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *
Following declaration of the Notification of Unusual Event, TVA media relations communicated with the local media regarding the event.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/26/18 AT 1551 EST FROM STEPHEN FRIESE TO DONG PARK * * *
"At 1036 EDT, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) terminated the Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to initial report of heat and smoke in Unit 2 Lower Containment.
"At 1000 EDT, it was determined that no fire had occurred. Due to difficulty of access to some of the areas being searched, the source could not be identified prior to 1000 EDT. No visible flame (heat or light) was observed.
"The source of the smoke was determined to be residual oil from a hydraulic tool oil in contact with pressurizer piping. The pressurizer piping was being heated up to support Unit 2 start-up following U2R22 refueling outage. Once the residual oil dissipated, the smoke stopped. It has been concluded that no fire or emergency condition existed.
"Unit 2 is currently in Mode 5, maintaining reactor coolant temperature 160F-170F and pressure 325psig-350psig with 2A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in service in accordance with U2R22 refueling outage plan."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/29/2018 AT 1358 EST FROM FRANCIS DECAMBRA TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *
"Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification:
"Following a full Reactor Building inspection, it was concluded that a fire did not exist. The source of the smoke originally reported was later determined to be residual oil from a hydraulic tool in contact with pressurizer piping. Once the residual oil dissipated, the smoke stopped. The source of heat originally reported was normal heated conditions associated with the pressurizer commensurate with plant conditions. SQN reported initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Shaeffer). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53756 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: T. W. GATES
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA | Notification Date: 11/28/2018
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text INOPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FOR CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE
"At 2130 CST on 11/27/2018, Division 1 Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) was declared inoperable because of a leaking check valve that caused excessive cycling of the associated air compressor.
"Division 2 MS-PLCS had been declared inoperable on 11/27/2018 at 1400 CST when a pressure control valve in the system exceeded the maximum allowable stroke time.
"Because MS-PLCS supplements the isolation function of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) by processing fission products that could leak through the closed MSIVs, both divisions of MS-PLCS inoperable at the same time represents a condition that could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function of an SSC [Structures, Systems and Components] that is needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The station diesel air compressor is available to supply backup air to the safety relief valves as required by the Technical Requirements Manual." [This is associated with operability of the safety relief valves, due to the inoperable MS-PLCS air compressor.]
The unit is in a 7 day shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 1-TS1-18-Div 1 & 2 MSPLCS-685, for the two divisions of MS-PLCS being inoperable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/03/18 AT 1551 EST FROM TIM GATES TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"This event was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) from fulfilling its safety function to control the release of radioactive material. Division I was declared inoperable due to a failed component. Division II was declared inoperable due to a pressure control valve in the system exceeding the maximum allowable time to close by 0.50 seconds. An engineering evaluation has since been performed and concluded that the 2 second maximum allowable time to close was based on the pressure control valve being classified as a rapid closure valve and was established from the original baseline data of 0.50 seconds. This baseline data is an administrative target value per the In-Service Testing Program. There are no technical specification requirements associated with the 2 second closure time.
"The engineering evaluation also determined that the volume of air supplied through the pressure control valve during the extra 0.50 seconds of valve closure would have an inconsequential effect on the pressure within the volume of leakage barrier between the Main Steam Isolation Valves associated with the MS-PLCS pressure control valve or have any effect on containment over-pressurization.
"Based on the information provided by the engineering evaluation, the Division II MS-PLCS has been declared operable-degraded non-conforming since time of initial discovery. Consequently, this event is not reportable as a condition that could have prevented the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) from fulfilling its safety function.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified via e-mail."
Notified the R4DO (Gaddy). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53757 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF HUMAN
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 11/28/2018
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION
"At 0752 CST, on November 28, 2018, Dakota County inadvertently actuated their sirens while performing a scheduled weekly [Emergency Planning Fixed Siren Test]. All seven (7) Dakota County sirens actuated for approximately 9 seconds before Dakota County Dispatch canceled the activation. This 4-hour non-emergency report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification [which was made to Dakota County Dispatch]. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during this time. All Emergency Notification sirens remain in service. No press release is planned at this time."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53759 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRANDON LONG
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 11/28/2018
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF A CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION
"On November 28, 2018, while performing an engineering review of the bases for environmental qualification (EQ) requirements for the Atmospheric Steam Dumps (ASDs), it was determined that applicable EQ requirements had not been applied to a key component of each of the ASDs. The result of this issue is that it the availability of the ASDs for a controlled plant cooldown following a postulated steam line break outside containment cannot be assured.
"Callaway is developing a compensatory action temporary plant modification to install insulation that will protect the affected ASD components from the post Main Steam Line Break temperature.
"This condition is reportable 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (B) remove residual heat, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The issue places the plant in a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO), 3.7.4.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53760 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSH GREENE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH | Notification Date: 11/29/2018
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
"At 0147 [EST] on October 1, 2018, Seabrook Unit 1 was in Mode 3 shutdown, when an invalid Reactor Protection System actuation occurred due to a high Source Range detector.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into Seabrook's corrective action program for resolution.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The Source Range detector which gave the invalid input has been replaced. | |