| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/03/2015 - 11/04/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51499 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5934-L01 A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 10/26/2015
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE POTENTIALLY DAMAGED DURING SHIPMENT
The following report was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email:
"On 10/26/2015, [The] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] / Technical Service Manager for QSA Global notified the LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] about an incident where a [common carrier] delivered a device containing radioactive material to their facility on Langley Dr., Baton Rouge, LA. When the receipt surveys were being performed, they noticed at one point on the surface they had a reading of 2 R/hr at the surface. It appears that one or more of the pull ties used to secure the shutters on the device broke causing a shift in the shielding. Part of the bracing material minimized the shielding shift.
"The device in question is a Texas Nuclear level/density gauge, Model # 5210, SN B1110, loaded with [approximately] 733 mCi of Co-60 sealed source. The origin of the shipment was Puerto Ordaz, EDO Bolivar, Venezuela. It came stateside via [common carrier] to Houston, TX and then to the QSA Global facility in Baton Rouge, LA by [common carrier]. The shipment arrived [at approximately] 1145 [CDT] on 10/26/2015. The activity is below Cat 2 quantities at [approximately] 733 mCi of Co-60.
"The device was surveyed and moved to a bunker on the QSA Global site. Re-enactments and calculations will be conducted on 10/27/2015 AM when [the RSO] is present. The LDEQ personnel will be on site for the measurements, calculations and follow-up information [dissemination].
"This is a preliminary notification of an incident reported to LDEQ [at approximately] 1530 [CDT]. After the source was secure, safe and locked in a bunker at the QSA Global Baton Rouge, LA facility. Possible exposure calculations will be determined from the reconstruction of events.
"The Baton Rouge facility is compliant for the IC [Increased controls] principles and Radiation Safety procedures/aspects for the receipt activities. The Department, LDEQ personnel will be on site for the corrective actions and calculations. The NRC, Region IV, was made aware of this situation on 10/26/2015. Follow-up information will be [disseminated] when available.
"This is being reported as a preventive and protection action under 10 CFR Part 30.50(a).
"Information will be updated when available. LDEQ considers this incident still open."
Event Report ID No.: LA-150019 |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51500 | Rep Org: ACUREN INSPECTION - WIT PIPELINE
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION - WIT PIPELINE INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: 42-27593-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS WEISS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/27/2015
Notification Time: 07:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2015
Event Time: 23:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
37.57(a) - ACT/ATTEMPT THEFT CAT 1/2 RAD MATL
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text ATTEMPTED FORCED ENTRY TO RADIOGRAPHY DARKROOM TRUCK
"On June 18th 2015 at approximately 1130 EDT while parked at a Hawthorn Suites in Meriden, Ct., an attempted breech of a darkroom containing a Sentinel Delta 880 Device Serial # D3582, with a model A424-9 Ir-192 source serial #17586G (100 curies). Operator 1 and Operator 2 were sitting on the back patio of the hotel when they heard the alarm chirp twice on a darkroom unit. Operator 1 ran to the unit to make sure everything was okay. When he got to the side of the darkroom he looked around the back and saw a black male standing on the bumper of unit # 1620 [truck] trying to break in with a screw driver. Operator 1 yelled for Operator 2 that someone was trying to break into the darkroom. The burglar was scared off, then the burglar came back to retrieve his budget rental van and he sped off. The Meriden Police Department was immediately contacted and dispatched to the scene, Officer took all statements and the police report # 15-004841 was filed. Unit was checked to make sure that security of all locks and that the alarm system was still operable.
"(RSO) was made aware of this attempted breech on 10/26/2015 at 5:03 pm by NRC auditor." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51512 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/03/2015
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2015
Event Time: 16:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED VALUE
"On September 22, 2015, with James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100 percent power, the Emergency and Plant Information Computer (EPIC) indicated a spike in Secondary Containment differential pressure during performance of a surveillance test associated with automatic initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Plant data systems recorded Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeding the Technical Specification allowed value. The Secondary Containment differential pressure was at or above zero inches of water for approximately ten (10) seconds, and then immediately trended negative following auto-start of one of the trains of Standby Gas Treatment. An operator was subsequently dispatched to the ventilation control panel, and verified that Secondary Containment differential pressure was more negative than the Technical Specification allowed value.
"This condition was entered into the Corrective Action Program, and subsequently, it was determined that the approximate ten second duration that Secondary Containment differential pressure was greater than the Technical Specification allowed value was reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Secondary Containment was Operable following reestablishment of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of water vacuum, and remains Operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |