| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/28/2015 - 08/31/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 51120 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED FIRE
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.
"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.
"In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205.
"In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.
"2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (HAAG).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.
"CR 10088142"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).
* * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.
"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved.
"CR 10108999."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Nease).
* * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48c (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment.
"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408.
"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.
"CR 10113740, CR 10113745"
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Rose).
* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.
"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105 is assessed to impact cables which are required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of HPCI (SSD Path 2), which is the credited form of high pressure injection in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.
"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1104 is assessed to impact a cable required for the RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation MOV, 1E51-F105, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure operability of the RCIC turbine if RCIC is required to stop and restart. Failure of this valve to remain open could cause a siphon that would impact the operability of RCIC, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 1 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1104.
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.
"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203 is assessed to impact a cable required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure steam flow to the HPCI turbine. Failure of this valve to remain open would isolate steam to the HPCI turbine, which would disable HPCI, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.
"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Outboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F017B, to remain open. This valve is required open to support RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited lineup for Path 2 Safe Shutdown Decay Heat Removal. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203.
"3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2E41-F104, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.
"CR 10115432, CR10115473, CR10115436, CR10115446, CR10115444"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51331 | Rep Org: INTERNATIONAL ISOTOPES
Licensee: INTERNATIONAL ISOTOPES
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27680-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE LAFLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/20/2015
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2015
Event Time: 09:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
PATRICIA MILLIGAN (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
| Event Text PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE
"At about 0900 MDT on Thursday August 20, 2015, [the CEO of International Isotopes] was informed by our area manager that one of our technicians had been exposed to a 'flash' of radiation while handling a Co-60 source drawer. They reported his electronic dosimeter was reading 5.62 Rem. [The CEO of International Isotopes] immediately went to the work area and verified the Co-60 source (approximately 4000 Curies of Co-60) was in a secure shielded position and interviewed the technicians involved. All of the other technicians in the area reported their pocket or electronic dosimeters were reading normally (e.g. doses in the range of 1 to 5 mRem). The initial investigation indicates there was only one technician performing the work and in the immediate vicinity of the cask and source drawer at the time of the exposure.
"The technicians were preparing to transfer the Co-60 source drawer into another shielded container (a therapy head). A special handling tool had been bolted to the end of the source drawer for positioning the source drawer within a therapy head. This special handling tool needed to be removed from the source drawer in order to transfer the source back into the therapy head. The technician attempted to move the source drawer just enough to expose the bolts on the special handling tool so it could be removed. The technician stated that the drawer was sticking and when he pulled harder on the drawer it slid out of the cask about 9 inches, bringing the source to within an estimated 2 inches of the cask external surface. The technician immediately pushed the source drawer back into the cask into a fully shielded position. The technician then noted that his electronic dosimeter was reading 5.62 [Rem] and he left the work area."
The electronic Dosimeter reading was at 26 inches from the source. The TLD was approximately 15 inches from the source and a dose calculation resulted in a whole body dose of 16.9 Rem. Dose calculations for the hand (extremity) is 237 to 950 Rem depending on various assumptions. The technician was not wearing any finger rings. His dosimetry is being sent off for emergency reading. The technician is being restricted from work on radioactive materials.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE LAFLIN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1135 EDT ON 8/22/15 * * *
"The follow-up investigation continues at INIS. We have completed several simulated walk-throughs of the event and compared to personnel statements and descriptions of the event.
"We have been able to retrieve security camera footage of the event as well from two different angles. The security video footage reveals that the technician did, in fact, momentarily completely remove the source drawer containing the cobalt source from the shield. This video is being used to carefully model estimated exposures to both the individuals extremity and whole body.
"Dosimetry results were obtained from Landauer and indicated whole body readings of 201.875 Rem. Blood sampling from the individual does not support this high of an exposure and a review of the security video indicates the individuals TLD (on a lanyard around his neck) swung out away from his body, very near the source drawer, and was not in a position to accurately represent whole body exposure. Additional modeling using the security camera footage and additional data obtained from the electronic dosimeter will be used to estimate a more accurate whole body dose to the individual.
"The exposed individual has been providing blood samples at the local hospital per the sampling protocol prescribed by the DOE Radiation Emergency Assistance and Training Center. All blood samples are normal with no indication of radiation exposure. This sampling will continue through today (August 22) until a 48 hour period of testing from the event has been completed.
"Closer modeling to more accurately determine the individuals extremity dose are still in progress. This modeling is using both security camera footage as well as video footage from the mock-up of the event. While this modeling is not complete it appears that extremity dose may be closer to 50 Rem or less rather than the 250 - 950 Rem initially estimated.
"Daily photographs are being taken of the individuals hands and lower extremities to monitor for the development of any edema or signs of radiation damage to tissues. At this time there are no indications of radiation effects to any extremity.
"Additional data was extracted from the electronic dosimeter worn by the individual. This dosimeter was the device that initially read 5.62 Rem after the event. Analysis of the dosimeter data indicates it was exposed to a peak dose rate of about 3,739 R/hr. This is significantly less than the 10,166 R/hr initially estimated to have caused the 5.62 Rem ED reading at an estimated 2 seconds of exposure time. Using dose and dose rate information from this ED it appears the actual exposure time was about 5.4 seconds and this correlates with the security camera video time stamp.
"Additional information will be reported as it becomes available."
Notified R4DO (Hay), NMSS EO (Habighorst), and NMSS (McIntosh), NSIR (Milligan), and NMSS_Events_Notification via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE LAFLIN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2129 EDT ON 8/22/15 * * *
The following update was received from International Isotopes via email:
"Blood testing for the technician involved in the exposure event has been completed and all results are normal. Complete documentation is to be provided to the company by the medical provider on Monday and an additional follow-up discussion will be held directly between the company and the physicians at REAC/TS [National Nuclear Security Administration - Radiation Emergency Assistance / Training Site] on Monday, 8/24 to see what additional, if any, testing is recommended."
Notified R4DO (Hay), NMSS EO (Habighorst), and NMSS (McIntosh), NSIR (Milligan), and NMSS_Events_Notification via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1309 EDT ON 8/23/15 FROM STEVE LAFLIN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Dose modeling of the technician's extremity (left hand) and whole body exposures have been completed. These models estimate 49.1 Rem to the left hand. The whole body dose has been calculated to be 7.245 Rem. Both models were completed using micro shield and based upon a 3664 curie source in a 5.5 second exposure period. The whole body model assumed 3 worker positions and all times and distances are based upon our observations of the security video and supplemented by the mock-up of the event. Additional modeling will be performed of the lower extremities to confirm whether the left hand was likely to have been the most exposed extremity. The whole body model will also be validated by repeating the calculations and assumptions used against the known position of the electronic dosimeter and comparing calculated results of this modeling to the 5.62 Rem indicated on that dosimeter after the event. Over the coming weeks the company plans to acquire an expert in this type of dose reconstruction and have them independently verify the company's models and exposure calculations.
"The completed report of all lab work on the exposed technician is expected to be obtained on Monday, August 23. The company also plans to contact DOE's REAC/TS on Monday and confer with them on all blood test results and discuss whether any additional precautionary sampling or testing is advised.
"Visual examination of the exposed technicians hands and lower extremities will continue to be performed daily at least through August 28 unless REAC/TS recommends a longer monitoring period. At this time there are still no indications of radiation effects to any extremity of the exposed technician."
Notified the R4DO (Hay), NMSS EO (Habighorst), IAEA Contact (Milligan & McIntosh via e-mail), and NMSS Events Resource (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 1220 EDT ON 08/24/15 FROM STEVE LAFLIN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"REAC/TS has been contacted to discuss and review the results of laboratory work of the exposed technician. [The] Associate Director, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site confirms that all blood work appears normal. [The Associate Director REACTS/TS] recommended that we continue CBC once daily through Friday this week and continue to forward them the results. She also agreed with our plan for continued daily examination of extremities through 8-28 but recommended further that we continue this examination every other day for up to 3 weeks post event (Sept. 10).
"The company has contracted with [the] Associate Dean for Idaho State University, to perform an independent dose assessment of the event. This work is expected to begin this week with a goal of including this report with the formal 30 day report on this event."
Notified the R4DO (Campbell), NMSS EO (Habighorst), IAEA Contact (Milligan & McIntosh via e-mail) and NMSS Events Resource (via email). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51332 | Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 3
City: WARREN State: MI
County:
License #: 21-32838-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN MCGUIRE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/20/2015
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2015
Event Time: 15:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST/STOLEN U.S. ARMY RADIOACTIVE CHEMICAL ALARMS FOR SALE OR SOLD ON EBAY
The U.S. Army TACOM Radiation Safety Program Manager in Warren, MI was notified via email of what appeared to be U.S. Army material containing radioactive sources were for sale on eBay. The program manager was not able to find the listing but the information received indicated that the material was already sold or the listing expired. When the program manager contacted eBay about the material and the seller, eBay was uncooperative, citing privacy of the individuals selling/buying the material.
The program manager contacted the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command in Troy, MI and provided them with all the information pertaining to the material. Since the material was not recovered, the U.S. Army considers the material lost/stolen.
The materials are two M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarms each containing nominally 300 microcuries of Am-241.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51336 | Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Region: 1
City: MCAS CHERRY POINT State: NC
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIK ABKEMEIER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/21/2015
Notification Time: 13:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST/MISSING AIRCRAFT ICE DETECTOR
"On 31 July 2015, Fleet Readiness Center East (FRC East) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified that an H-53E ice detector probe was missing. The ice detector probe contains a solid 50 microcurie source of Strontium 90 (Sr-90) sealed within a metal casing. The RSO was notified about the missing probe by the H-53 Task Manager. The last known date and location of the ice detector probe was 4 November 2014 in the Aircraft Line Fiberglass Repair Shop. It is believed the probe has departed FRC East and MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station] Cherry Point as scrap/trash.
"To prevent future recurrence, the following actions will occur:
a. The aircraft line will include a mandatory task line to remove the ice detector probe from the duct any time the duct is removed from the aircraft.
B. A training course will be established to distribute throughout the facility for proper identification, handling, and disposal instructions of all radioactive components. Prior to this incident, training was tailored to specific shops which process these parts. A need for broader training has been recognized and will now include those areas which would not normally receive a radioactive component."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | |