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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/30/2015 - 07/01/2015
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Part 21 |
Event Number: 50900 |
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: EAST FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 03/17/2015
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION |
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI) |
Event Text
INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL TEST INDUCED DEFECT IN A 0867F MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVES
The following report was received from Curtiss - Wright via email:
"This letter provides interim notification of a potential test induced defect in a 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) manufactured and supplied by Target Rock (TR). The information required for this notification is provided below:
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
William Brunet
Director of Quality Assurance
James White
General Manager
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.
Target Rock 0867F Series of Main Steam-Safety Relief Valves Manufactured by Target Rock. This is a 3-stage piloted valve consisting of a main valve (the 'Main') with an actuator mounted to it (the 'Topworks'). The 0867F is the latest generation of the 67F line of MS-SRVs, including the original 3-Stage and 2-Stage designs, and this product line has over 40 years of plant operational experience. Only the 0867F is under investigation. This is due to the differences between the 0867F design and the other designs.
"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
As we understand it, the Pilgrim Station recently manually opened the Target Rock Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) as part of cooling down the reactor following a loss of offsite power. One of the four installed MS-SRVs may not have fully opened. As-found steam testing of the affected MS-SRV did not duplicate this failure; the valve opened on demand. However, the valve did not re-close as expected. Internal inspections found damaged parts in the main stage subassembly that could potentially affect the ability of the MS-SRV to operate as designed.
We are investigating potential root causes for this damage. However, we are still unable to determine if a specific defect exists. GE SIL-196, Supplement 17 determined Main Spring relaxation was caused by 'extreme dynamics encountered during limited flow testing . Valve dynamics under full flow conditions (i.e. discharge not gagged) are much less severe than those under limited flow conditions.' These extreme dynamics, under limited flow test conditions, are the focus of our investigation. Specific areas of investigation include;
a) Testing of materials to verify they are consistent with our material specifications,
b) evaluation of differences between the 0867F and earlier designs, and
c) evaluation of the differences between different limited flow test loop configurations and test procedures
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
The Pilgrim event occurred on January 27, 2015. As-found testing occurred on February 2, 2015.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12
The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The root cause of the potential test induced defect has not yet been confirmed as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Problem Report 080 will document the corrective actions when they are determined and complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation of the potential test induced defect. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
We are working with all three (4) sites to identify appropriate precautions.
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
Not applicable.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1355 EDT ON 5/1/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state that their root cause analysis is still in progress and they anticipate completion within 60 days.
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Gray), and R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1256 EDT ON 6/30/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state their root cause analysis findings and corrective actions. Corrective actions are estimated to be completed within 12 months.
"The following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
FitzPatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped = 24, Quantity on order= 12
"The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"Valves Currently Installed
"Target Rock recommends valves currently installed be inspected to ensure the main piston shoulder has contact with the main disc stem shoulder. These inspections should be scheduled based on plant-specific indications of the potential for fretting. These inspections can be performed by removing the base assembly from the main body and physically measuring for shoulder-to-shoulder contact.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Dimitriadis), and R2DO (Suggs). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation |
Event Number: 51126 |
Rep Org: DIABLO CANYON
Licensee: PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
Region: 4
City: AVILA BEACH State: CA
County: SAN LUIS OBISPO
License #: SNM-2511
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-26
NRC Notified By: JEREMY COBBS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 13:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT |
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI) |
Event Text
NOT MEETING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO OMISSION IN PREVIOUS LICENSE AMENDMENT
"On June 4, 2015, plant personnel notified the Diablo Canyon shift manager that three casks loaded during the current ISFSI campaign were not in verbatim compliance with Technical Specification (TS) 2.3. These three casks utilized regionalized loading. TS 2.3 (Alternate MPC-32 Fuel Selection Criteria) specifies fuel assembly selection criteria based using information from corresponding Tables 2.1-7 (uniform loading) or 2.1-9 (regionalized loading). However, the associated formula in TS 2.3 refers only to using the values in Table 2.1-7 (uniform loading).
"Engineering has performed an evaluation and determined there is no impact on the fuel stored in the three casks. Table 2.1-9 is described as being acceptable in Technical Specification 2.3, although omitted from the formula in TS 2.3.
"It appears that the inconsistency in TS 2.3 was due to an error of omission in the previous License Amendment Request, which did not appropriately add the reference to Table 2.1-9 to the formula presented in TS 2.3 as originally intended.
"This concern did not result in any adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1728 EDT ON 06/30/15 FROM DARRELL JOHNSON TO STEVE VITTO * * *
"The fuel assembly loading of the three casks discussed in the original event notification has been re-evaluated. This evaluation was performed to determine that compliance to ISFSI Technical Specification 2.3.b was maintained using the uniform loading values of Table 2.1-7. The calculation revision demonstrates that the fuel placed in region 1 and 2 of the regionalized casks loads complied with the ISFSI Technical Specification requirements as written.
"Therefore, the requirements of TS 2.3 were met for the subject casks and this event notification is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector, R4DO(O'Keefe), and NMSS Events (via email) have been notified. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51169 |
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NUCOR-YAMATO STEEL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: BLYTHEVILLE State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0722-0312
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SUSAN ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA |
Notification Date: 06/22/2015
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2015
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR FIXED GAUGE DAMAGED
The following report was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health via email:
"Nucor-Yamato Steel Company, Arkansas Radioactive Materials Licensee Number ARK-0722-03120, notified the Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, via phone on Friday, June 19, 2015, at 1000 [CDT], of damage to one of their fixed gauges, manufacturer Ronan, Model #SA-1-F37, Serial #1224CG with a 5 Curie CS-137 source. The event occurred on June 18, 2015 at approximately 1230 [CDT]. Licensee reported a wash-out of liquid steel which came into contact with the gauge. There was approximately 30 tons of molten rock (2800 øF) flowing onto the floor of the plant which caused a fire. Surrounding gauges were not affected.
"The Licensee immediately closed the shutter, but was not sure if it was completely shut. The RSO indicated the only radiation levels were from the top of the gauge, nothing was measured on the sides. A steel plate was placed on top of the gauge to reduce radiation levels. The area was roped-off at 2 mR/hr to prevent public exposures. Chase Environmental Consulting was notified of the damaged gauge and arrived on Friday, June 19, 2015 to investigate and remove the gauge out-of-service.
"The gauge is currently in storage awaiting the manufacturer (Ronan) to arrive to package for shipment on Friday, June 26, 2015.
"The State is awaiting a written report from the licensee and will continue to investigate this event. The State will update this event as more information becomes available.
"Arkansas Event Number: ARK-2015-008" |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51172 |
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: PROFESSIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, INC.
Region: 4
City: OKLAHOMA CITY State: OK
County:
License #: OK-27064-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 06/22/2015
Notification Time: 23:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2015
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of Oklahoma via email:
"PSI (Professional Service Industries, Inc.) has reported the theft of a Troxler Model 3430 portable [moisture density] gauge from a truck located at a gas station in El Reno, OK about 1730 [CDT on 6/22/15]. The gauge was removed from the shipping container. A report has been filed with the Oklahoma City Police and a $500 dollar reward has been offered."
The serial number of the gauge is 67614. The State of Oklahoma will be conducting a reactive inspection and submitting an NMED report on this event.
Troxler Model 3430 typically contains 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sources.
* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1445 EDT ON 6/23/15 * * *
The following information was obtained from the State of Oklahoma via email:
"Professional Service Industries, Inc. (PSI) has informed [the State of Oklahoma] that a Troxler 3430 portable gauge was stolen from a road construction site in Oklahoma City, OK on June 22, 2015. The technician finished his work about [1600 CDT], secured the gauge in the truck, then went to talk to the road construction workers. He returned to the truck and drove to a nearby gas station/convenience store where he went in for a few minutes, then drove back to the PSI office. He then went to unload the gauge and discovered that the case was unlocked and the gauge missing. The calibration block needed to use the gauge was not taken. The case was secured with two chains and two padlocks. When the theft was discovered, one padlock was missing, the other was undamaged and appeared to have been opened with a key. The case was also undamaged. When last seen, the source rod was locked in the retracted position. The investigation is on-going.
"NMED # OK150007"
Notified R4DO (Campbell), NMSS (email) and ILTAB (email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51175 |
Rep Org: NC DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SVCS
Licensee: EAS PROFESSIONALS INC
Region: 1
City: Greensboro State: NC
County:
License #: SC 849
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID CROWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS |
Notification Date: 06/23/2015
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2015
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ADAM TUCKER (ILTAB) (EMAI) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received via email:
"[The State of North Carolina] is writing to provide notification of a stolen portable moisture/density gauge from a reciprocal license in NC [North Carolina]. Below are the current details:
"The licensee is EAS Professionals, Inc. - SC [South Carolina] Radioactive Material License No. 849. They entered the state under an expired NC reciprocity approval.
"The gauge was stolen 6/22/15 between 1700 [EDT] and 2230 [EDT] from a hotel parking lot in Greensboro, NC. Licensee contacted SC about the stolen gauge on 6/23/15 at about 0930 [EDT], SC immediately notified NC.
"The stolen gauge is an InstroTek Model 3500, Serial Number 1360. Sources contained include 11 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241/Be.
"The Greensboro Police Department was called by the licensee and performed an investigation that included taking fingerprints and looking for hotel surveillance footage. There was evidence that bolt cutters were used to free the case from the truck. Another note, there was a separate police report filed for a different vehicle break-in around the same time and hotel location. This suggests the thief did not target the radioactive gauge, but rather a perceived value in the locked up container.
"NC notified various other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
"There is no mention of a press release at this time, but [The State of North Carolina] will encourage the licensee to publish a statement and possibly a reward to motivate the device's return.
"Please do not hesitate to contact [The State of North Carolina] should you have additional questions. [The State of North Carolina] will update NMED with any additional details as they unfold."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51176 |
Rep Org: WASHINGTON STATE DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Region: 4
City: SEATTLE State: WA
County:
License #: WN-C001-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG LAWRENCE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS |
Notification Date: 06/23/2015
Notification Time: 19:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2015
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL UNDER DOSE
The following was received from the State of Washington via email:
"This appears to be a medical event. Eleven Y-90 TheraSphere infusions were performed on eight patients. Five of the infusions involved the use of a smaller catheter, and for all five of these infusions the full dosage was not administered. This was determined when the nuclear medicine physician - who was the authorized user for all of the infusions - determined the percentage of dose delivered to the patient was less than 80 percent of the prescribed dose. The percentage of dose delivered calculation was performed in accordance with the procedure provided in the package insert. Waste for all five infusions was imaged using PET/CT and it was determined that a large amount of radioactive material was present at a hub in the catheter. The radiation safety officer was informed, who informed the hospital health physicist. The referring interventional radiology physicians were notified that the percentage of dose delivered was less than 80 percent, and that further investigations were underway. For these five infusions, the difference in prescribed dose and delivered dose for the organ (liver) exceeded 0.5 Sv; and the total dosage delivered differed from the prescribed dosage by 20 percent or more. The licensee is investigating this matter further and will provide a written report to the Washington State Department of Health within 15 days as required."
WA Item # WA150003
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51194 |
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY SIPIORSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO |
Notification Date: 06/30/2015
Notification Time: 20:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2015
Event Time: 16:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN INJURED EMPLOYEE TRANSPORTED TO HOSPITAL
"This notification is being made in accordance with NUREG-1022, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 Section 3.2.12, News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.
"On June 30, 2015 at 1256 [CDT] an employee was injured while conducting a work activity and a non-contaminated hospital transport was completed.
"29 CFR 1904.39(a) requires a report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), US Department of Labor within twenty four (24) hours after the in-patient hospitalization of one or more employees as a result of a work-related incident. At 1635 CDT, it was determined that this is a 24-hour OSHA reportable occurrence."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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