| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/04/2015 - 06/05/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 51117 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK CONLOW
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2015
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTIVATION.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Train B Phase A Containment Isolation at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
"At 1320 EDT on April 12, 2015, during planned performance of the Containment Isolation Train-A, Phase A Isolation Testing and Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) Cleanup System Test, the main control room received several Train-B annunciators. Upon investigation, it was determined that an invalid signal to the Train-B Solid State Protective System (SSPS) actuated the Train B, Phase A Containment Isolation. The invalid isolation signal was the result of a human performance error during the performance of the Phase A Isolation Test surveillance procedure. Operations personnel responded to the SSPS initiation, testing was aborted, ensured that all equipment operated as designed and restored affected systems in accordance with plant procedures. Approval to restart testing was obtained. All prerequisites were met and testing of the SSPS Train-A, Phase A Isolation was completed satisfactorily.
"As part of the prerequisite test alignment of the Train-A, Phase A, Unit 2 had entered a planned 7 day action for EGTS being inoperable. During the test when the Train-B of Phase A actuated, the suction dampers for Unit 1 supply to EGTS were closed per plant procedures. This prevented Train-B EGTS from aligning to Unit 1 and allowed Train-B of EGTS to remain operable for Unit 2. An SSPS Phase A signal can be generated automatically by a Safety Injection Signal (SIS) or manually. At the time of the event, plant conditions for an SIS did not exist; therefore, the Phase A actuation was invalid.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51119 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG GUGLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 08:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE
A non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51120 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED FIRE
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.
"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.
"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.
"In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205.
"In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.
"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.
"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51123 | Rep Org: NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC
Licensee: NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC
Region: 3
City: MOUNT VERNON State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM STERBIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 14:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
PART 21 (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF A TIME RELAY
The following was received via facsimile:
"Allen Bradley relay base model 700RTC contains an unevaluated CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device). This was an unpublished design change that did not result in a part number change from Allen Bradley. There was no change to the appearance of the relay that would identify any design changes made to the relay configuration. Allen Bradley has indicated that the change occurred in mid-2009 and that it was a rolling change with no specific manufacturing date to distinguish between the old and new configuration. Based on this information, all units manufactured during 2009 and later are suspect.
"Nutherm International, Inc. has concluded its review of all procurements of the 700RTC series relays and have found two (2) units manufactured during or after 2009 dedicated and shipped to customers. The following facility was determined to be impacted by this condition:
Utility: Exelon
Plant: Quad Cities
Purchase Order: 00447625
Part Number: 700-RTC11110U1
Nutherm Traceability Number: 11340-02R01 1/01, 11340-02R01 1/02.
"In a separate 10CFR Part 21 notification, Event Number 51095, reported to the NRC [on] 5/28/2015 indicated that the CPLD can be affected by electrical noise from operation of nearby relays which can reset the timing of the relay. The plant should evaluate whether the installed relays are subjected to unevaluated EMI/RFI [electromagnetic interference/radio-frequency interference] conditions when installed in the plant." |
| Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation | Event Number: 51126 | Rep Org: DIABLO CANYON
Licensee: PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
Region: 4
City: AVILA BEACH State: CA
County: SAN LUIS OBISPO
License #: SNM-2511
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-26
NRC Notified By: JEREMY COBBS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 22:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 13:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text NOT MEETING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO OMISSION IN PREVIOUS LICENSE AMENDMENT
"On June 4, 2015, plant personnel notified the Diablo Canyon shift manager that three casks loaded during the current ISFSI campaign were not in verbatim compliance with Technical Specification (TS) 2.3. These three casks utilized regionalized loading. TS 2.3 (Alternate MPC-32 Fuel Selection Criteria) specifies fuel assembly selection criteria based using information from corresponding Tables 2.1-7 (uniform loading) or 2.1-9 (regionalized loading). However, the associated formula in TS 2.3 refers only to using the values in Table 2.1-7 (uniform loading).
"Engineering has performed an evaluation and determined there is no impact on the fuel stored in the three casks. Table 2.1-9 is described as being acceptable in Technical Specification 2.3, although omitted from the formula in TS 2.3.
"It appears that the inconsistency in TS 2.3 was due to an error of omission in the previous License Amendment Request, which did not appropriately add the reference to Table 2.1-9 to the formula presented in TS 2.3 as originally intended.
"This concern did not result in any adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." | |