| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/29/2015 - 06/01/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51088 | Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ELEKTA, INC.
Region: 1
City: HAMPTON State: VA
County:
License #: GA-1153-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRANSPORTABLE HIGH DOSE RATE UNIT DAMAGED WHILE BEING UNLOADED
The following report was provided by the Virginia Department of Health via facsimile:
"On May 4, 2015, a transportable HDR [high dose rate] unit (Elekta microSelectron Model 106.900, serial number 14514) licensed for use by a Virginia licensee was damaged while being unloaded from its transport trailer. The source activity at the time was approximately 8 curies of IR-192. The damage appeared to be limited to the unit's covers. The licensee contacted Elekta, Inc., (which performs work in Virginia under reciprocal recognition of its Georgia license) and a field service engineer was sent to investigate. The service engineer found the head covers and collar cover were broken and other damages, but tests indicated the unit functioned properly. New covers were ordered. During the following week the source was uploaded into an emergency container while the covers were replaced. After the source was returned to the HDR it was found to be stuck in the safe. A kink was found in the cable and a new source was ordered. A source exchange was scheduled on May 19th, but the source could not be manually unloaded as before. Instead, it had to be removed from the back of the HDR. The frayed cable was cut and the source was placed in the emergency container by the service engineer. The source fell to the bottom of the emergency container and the service engineer could not retrieve it. The container was placed in storage at the Virginia licensee's facility after additional shielding was placed around it to reduce the exposure rate to 200 microR/hour. The dose received by the service engineer as a result of the event was estimated by Elekta, using a worst case scenario, as 327 mrem whole body. The service engineer's dosimeter was sent to the dosimetry supplier for an emergency evaluation. Elekta has contacted the source manufacturer (Alpha-Omega Services) [AOS] to assist in the retrieval of the source from the emergency container and to send it to AOS for further investigation. Elekta will provide additional information as it investigates the event.
"Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-15-06" |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51097 | Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB MALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 10:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - INABILITY TO COMPLETE EVALUATION REGARDING CRACKING IN KCR-13 STANDBY BATTERY JARS
The following was received via email:
"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.21(a)(2). On March 4, 2015, C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Entergy Nuclear Northeast that a KCR-13 battery installed at the Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center had developed a crack in the polycarbonate jar material. This is the second KCR-13 at this site that has experienced a crack in the jar material [see EN 49667]. The jar is a safety related component with the primary function of containing electrolyte. The battery has not been returned to C&D for analysis, and analysis of the previous issue was inconclusive.
"C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D KCR-13 batteries, of this Interim report, and is initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any US licensee using such batteries.
"KCR-13 Batteries manufactured in 2005, battery manufacturing date is on the label. Note: C&D has not completed its evaluation of the reported potential defect and whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard at any US licensee using such batteries.
"The cracked jar has not been fully evaluated and may or may not indicate a potential defect which could create a substantial safety hazard.
"KCR -13 batteries used at Nuclear Plants in 1E applications made in 2005:
"Utility/Plant Name/Battery Model/Quantity of Batteries
"Entergy/Indian Point /KCR-13 NUC/72
"Xcel Energy/Monticello/KCR-13 NUC/62
"Concurrent Actions underway to complete the evaluation:
"a) On receipt of the battery from Indian Point, C&D will perform a failure analysis with the intent of determining the root cause of the cracking issue. Maximum time 30 days from receipt of the battery.
"b) In conjunction with the licensees identified in Section VI, C&D will recommend maintenance assessment of all KCR-13 batteries at these locations to determine their status and specifically, the presence of any evidence of potential defects via visual examination. For any cells exhibiting the presence of potential defect, C&D shall further recommend that they be returned for analysis. Estimated completion date of analysis is thirty (30) days from the receipt of the returned batteries.
"U.S. Licensees using batteries possibility containing the alleged defect have been notified of the filing of this interim report with recommendations that they examine their batteries for any signs of problems. NOTE: A similar notification and advice was provided in December 2013 with the previous battery. C&D did not receive any reports of similar problems from other product users.
"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:"
Robert Malley
VP Operational Excellence
bmalley@cdtechno.com
(215) 619-7830
The similar notification and advice provided in December 2013 is EN 49667. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51103 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2015
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO DISCOVERED CONDITION
"This is non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"A condition impacting functionality of the TSC [Technical Support Center] Ventilation system was discovered on 05/29/2015 at 1230 [EDT]. The issue involves a loss of cooling capability of the TSC ventilation system due to a failed relay. Maintenance will begin repairs at 0700 [EDT] on 05/30/2015. Estimated time to repair is unknown at this time.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team will be notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51104 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/30/2015
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2015
Event Time: 04:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text RHR PUMP TRIP IN COLD SHUTDOWN MODE
"At 0458 CDT on 05/30/2015, with Cooper Nuclear Station Unit 1 in Mode 4 [cold shutdown], an inadvertent trip of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump B was experienced which resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling. The cause of the trip is currently not known and is under investigation. Shutdown cooling was restored with B RHR Pump at 0520 on 05/30/2015, and there have been no other issues with the system. During the loss of shutdown cooling, forced circulation of the core was not lost due to the Reactor Recirculation System remaining in service. Based on indication from the in-service Reactor Recirculation System A loop, reactor coolant temperature experienced a 7 (seven) degree Fahrenheit increase during the event. Reactor coolant temperature did not exceed 212 degrees Fahrenheit during the event.
"This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) - any event or condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: B) remove residual heat.
"The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51106 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/31/2015
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILURE OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 1600 [EDT] on May 31, 2015, [DC Cook] operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 1 to comply with LCO 3.8.1 Condition G, when the 14 day limit to complete Condition B Required Action could not be met.
"At 0010 [EDT] on May 18, 2015, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator was removed from service for planned maintenance. LCO 3.8.1 Condition B was entered which allows 14 days to restore diesel to operable.
"At 1049 [EDT] on May 21, 2015, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator tripped during post maintenance testing due to high bearing temperatures. Subsequent actions to repair and restore the diesel to operable status have been unsuccessful.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications, as a four (4) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified."
Unit 1 is expected to be in Mode 5 by 2030 EDT on June 1, 2015. There is no impact on Unit 2. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51107 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY HUMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/01/2015
Notification Time: 02:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2015
Event Time: 22:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TRIP OF CONDENSATE AND MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP
"On May 31, 2015 at 2220 CDT, the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped while operating at 100 percent power due to a lockout trip of 11 Condensate Pump followed by a lockout trip of 11 Main Feedwater Pump. Manual Reactor Trip is directed by the annunciator response procedure for the lockout alarm, C47010-0101, 11 Feedwater Pump Locked Out. This also resulted in a turbine trip. The crew entered the reactor trip emergency operating procedures and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip. The manual trip is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated to start the auxiliary feedwater pumps as designed on low narrow range steam generator level and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The auxiliary feedwater actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Steam generator levels have been returned to normal. Following the reactor trip, 15A Feedwater Heater relief lifted and failed to reseat. 12 Main Feedwater Pump was subsequently secured resulting in 15A Feedwater Heater relief valve reseating successfully. Steam generators are being supplied by 12 Motor Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. The cause of 11 Condensate Pump trip remains under investigation. There was no effect on Unit 2 as a result of this trip. The health and safety of the public and site personnel were not at risk at any time during this event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Unit 2 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power. | |