| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/17/2015 - 04/20/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50970 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/09/2015
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2015
Event Time: 05:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
| Person (Organization):
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ALADAR CSONTOS (NMSS)
| Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ON-SITE EMPLOYEE FATALITY
"On April 9, 2015, a NOG-L [Nuclear Operations Group - Lynchburg] employee passed away shortly after arriving to work. The employee arrived to work at 0534 [EST]. He proceeded to his work center and collapsed at 0540 while clocking in. CPR was administered to the employee by a co-worker who was at the scene and the site Emergency Team was called. The Emergency Team arrived in three minutes and used an AED to attempt to resuscitate the employee. At 0555, the Emergency Team transported the employee in our onsite Advanced Life Support ambulance to Lynchburg General Hospital (arrived 0623). CPR was maintained in transit to the hospital. The employee was pronounced dead at the hospital from an apparent heart attack.
"NOG-L reported this event to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at 1110 on April 9, 2015."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the NRC Regional Office. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50971 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: PALATKA State: FL
County:
License #: 1391-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RENO FABII
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 04/09/2015
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED INDUSTRIAL GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Florida via email:
"The RSO for Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Palatka, Florida called to report a fixed Cesium-137 source installed on a tank has the shutter stuck open. The device is 936 mCi [Cesium-137], Kay-Ray Sensall Model 7063P. It is located in the overhead in an isolated area.
"They were in the process of conducting an inspection and leak test of the device when it was discovered. The last time the shutter was cycled was last year. The RSO reports there is no over exposure of personnel, no leaks. The location of device prohibits access to personnel so there is no chance of accidental exposure.
"The area has been posted and a work order has been submitted to replace/repair the device."
Florida Incident Number: FL15-035 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50972 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: LYNN State: MA
County:
License #: NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA E. DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/10/2015
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIUM-226 SOURCE FOUND IN LOAD OF SCRAP METAL
The following report was provided by the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:
"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] provided an on-site response to Turner, Inc., Lynn, MA, a scrap metal facility that had previously received a source back from Prolerized, another scrap metal facility in Everett, MA.
"The source was originally detected by a radiation detector at the Prolerized site where the dose rate of the source, shielded by scrap metal in a truck, was measured to be 0.1 mrem/hr inclusive of a background of 0.05 mrem/hr.
"The Agency surveyed the source at the Turner, Inc. site with a multi-channel analyzer and identified the source to contain radium-226 with a contact dose rate of 113 mrem/hr. The detector of the analyzer was approximately 1 cm from the source. Based upon the survey performed, the source contains approximately 15 microCuries of radium-226 and therefore is immediately reportable in accordance with 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1).
"The source is rectangular and measures approximately 7.5 mm length by 2.5 mm width and height and is without any observed marking or serialization. The source might be of type used for calibration of a liquid scintillation counter.
"The source is in a plastic bag, inside a container that is segregated, secured and shielded from workers at the scrap metal facility.
"Turner, Inc. had obtained the services of a radiation safety consultant who had originally isolated the source from the truck and secured the source at Turner, Inc. Exposures, if any, to the public and workers from the source are negligible due to the storage location and interposed shielding.
"The Agency continues to investigate and considers this event to be open."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50978 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT. SCOTT CHRISTOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/12/2015
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2015
Event Time: 12:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED OFFSITE DUE TO HEAT EXHAUSTION
"On 4/12/2015 at approximately 1230 CDT, an Xcel Energy employee performing activities in the drywell (currently shut down for a planned refueling outage), experienced heat exhaustion. Upon discovery, the plant emergency medical team was dispatched to aid the individual. The individual was immediately transported, via ambulance, to a local hospital for treatment without verification that no contamination existed. Accompanying the individual were two (2) radiation protection individuals. The individual was transported out of the Protected Area at approximately 1250 CDT. Because the potentially contaminated individual could not be surveyed prior to being transported offsite, the individual was considered potentially contaminated. As such, this event is being reported as an 8-hour prompt report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii).
"On 4/12/2015 at approximately 1340 CDT, the radiation protection personnel that accompanied the individual to the medical facility reported that the individual, ambulance, gurney, hospital travel path and exam room were determined not to be contaminated. As a result, no follow-up status report is planned.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee will be notifying the State Duty Officer. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50994 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/19/2015
Notification Time: 23:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2015
Event Time: 17:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
AARON MCCRAW (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO NON COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 50 APP R
"On April 19, 2015, it was determined that in the event of an Appendix-R fire in the Control Room/Relay Room, fire induced circuit damage can potentially result in Reactor Coolant Pump's (RCP) restarting. Procedure F5 APP B does not take actions to open RCP DC knife switches as required per Appendix R calculation GEN-PI-026, GEN-PI-054, and GEN-PI-055. Neither unit is currently susceptible to this condition due to the installation of improved RCP seals which allow adequate time to restore seal cooling prior to seal failure. However, the condition has occurred within three years of the time of discovery and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The Appendix R analysis requires that manual actions are taken to ensure that the RCPs are tripped and actions are taken to prevent restarting of the RCPs. The RCPs breaker must be verified open at the associated bus and DC knife switches located in the breaker cubicles are to be opened. These actions are required due to fire induced, loss of remote trip (spurious breaker closure) and loss of RCP seal cooling water and loss of Component Cooling (CC) water to the thermal barrier heat exchanger. These actions are required to achieve and maintain Mode 3, Hot Standby in the event of a catastrophic fire that results in the functional loss and/or evacuation of the Control Room/Relay Room.
"Current procedures verify the RCP breakers are open; however, they do not open the DC knife switch and therefore a hot short could result in a RCP restarting. This procedure omission meets the reporting criteria for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The protection of the health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector." | |