| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/08/2015 - 04/09/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 49230 | Rep Org: ABB INC.
Licensee: ABB INC.
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAY LAVRINC
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/31/2013
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - DEVIATION OF HK CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSE LATCH SPRING
ABB identified a deviation with close latch springs provided since 1/20/2010 used in medium voltage HK circuit breakers. These close latch springs are used on new legacy HK circuit breakers, replaced during HK circuit breaker refurbishment activities, and provided in HK refurbishment kits and as component items. The ABB part number for the close latch spring is: 162374A00. The nature of the deviation is a reduced spring force. There is a potential for an aged HK circuit breaker with hardening grease and this reduced spring force not to close.
The following is a list of affected customers:
Detroit Edison Fermi 2
Dominion VA
DTE
Duke Catawba
Duke Energy - Seneca
Duke Energy - Cataw
Duke Huntersville
Duke McGuire
Duke Oconee
Entergy River Bend
Exelon Limerick
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Peach Bottom
Exelon Point Beach
First Energy Beaver Valley
Georgia Power Plant Vogtle
Nextera Point Beach
Nextera Seabrook
Prairie Island Nuclear
Progress Energy Brunswick
Progress Energy Crystal River
PSEG Alloway Creek
Southern Cal Edison
STP Nuclear
TVA Sequoyah.
* * * UPDATE AT 1715 EDT ON 04/08/15 FROM DAVID C. BROWN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information is excerpted from a fax/email submitted by ABB, Inc.:
"This letter amends the previous 10CFR Part 21 Notification of 31 July 2013 to encompass a wider time period during which the close latch spring (P/N: 162374A00) was sold for use in medium voltage HK circuit breakers. The initial time period of concern reported was January 2010 to July 2013. Revision 7 to the print was issued in January 2010 and it was determined during the initial investigation that this was the start of the deviation because the free angle was incorrectly shown. Our [ABB, Inc.] corrective actions in 2013 corrected this mistake.
"In February 2015, a licensee notified us [ABB, Inc.] of springs from 2007 that have the same improper free angle. The order of springs received just prior to it had the proper free angle. We [ABB, Inc.] have narrowed the start time of this issue to the lone batch of springs purchased in 2007 as they were received shortly before the order identified by the licensee was released."
Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Azua) and NRR Part 21 via email. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50831 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/19/2015
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 03:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BUILDING DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO VENTILATION SYSTEM TRIP
"At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation [a freeze protection feature].
"The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition.
"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *
"After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System.
"The Fermi 2 accident analysis for a LOCA does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum throughout the duration of an accident and contains conservative leakage assumptions to bound the effects of a postulated ground level release. The accident analysis credits the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS); both divisions of SGTS were operable at the time of the event. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable due to exceeding the Technical Specification value for secondary containment vacuum, the structural integrity of the secondary containment was not degraded at the time. Upon receipt of an accident signal, SGTS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment vacuum to within the bounding analyses of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Research Reactor | Event Number: 50927 | Facility: OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
RX Type: 1100 KW TRIGA MARK II
Comments:
Region: 4
City: CORVALLIS State: OR
County: BENTON
License #: R-106
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000243
NRC Notified By: TODD KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/26/2015
Notification Time: 15:23 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
KEVIN HSUE (E-MAIL) (NPR)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NPR)
SPIROS TRAIFOROS (NPR)
MICHAEL BALAZIK (NPR)
| Event Text RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION
"We would like to report a potential violation of our Technical Specifications, section 6.7.2.a.8 which states an observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls such that the inadequacy causes or could have caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition with regard to reactor operations. The details of the event are as follows:
- January 14, [2015,] the Reactor Supervisor submitted paperwork for license renewal of an SRO [Senior Reactor Operator] to the director for signature. The director signs the paperwork. It was then assumed that the paperwork would be routed to the NRC for license renewal. The paperwork was signed but not sent to the NRC.
- March 10, [2015,] the license for the SRO expires.
- March 19, [2015,] the SRO completes the control room portion of the startup checklist. This includes manipulation of console controls and placing the reactor in 'OPERATING' condition. The SRO does not perform the reactor startup.
- March 25, [2015,] staff determines that the reactor was placed in an OPERATING condition without a licensed operator at the console on March 19. No other staff was present in the control room during the performance of the startup checklist.
- March 26, [2015,] reactor operation was suspended.
"It has been determined that the SRO did not perform any other license duties after his license had expired. The SRO will not perform license duties until his license is officially renewed."
* * * UPDATE AT 1905 EDT ON 04/08/15 FROM STEVEN REESE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"On March 26, 2015, the Oregon State TRIGA Reactor staff self-reported a potential violation of Technical Specifications, section 6.7.2.a.8 which states 'an observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls such that the inadequacy causes or could have caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition with regard to reactor operations.' The report was submitted due to the fact that the license of an SRO had expired on March 10, 2015, but that the operator performed licensed duties including placing the reactor in the 'operating' state on March 19, 2015. This individual did not perform any other license duties between the date his license expired and the date that a new license was issued. The initial notification e-mail sent by the reactor staff on 3/26/2015 (event notification 50927) informed the NRC of the event.
"In retrospect, we [Oregon State University] believe this event falls well below the threshold that would constitute a violation of Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.8. The individual has been a licensed operator of the Oregon State TRIGA Reactor for six years. None of the activities he [the operator] performed during the short period that his license was expired could realistically be construed as 'development of an unsafe condition with regard to reactor operations.' All duties that were performed during the event were reviewed by a licensed SRO as part of the daily start-up checklist.
"A new license was issued on April 2, 2015 (SOP-70794, Docket# 55-70933). The staff currently tracks all licensee due dates and it has been emphasized that maintenance of one's license is the responsibility of each licensed operator as well. The staff intends to add a tracking item to verify that 1) a license renewal is submitted at least 2 months prior to license expiration and 2) a license renewal is received at least one month prior to license expiration. It is expected that this information will reviewed during our [Oregon State University] next normally scheduled NRC inspection. No other follow-up or remedial actions are planned.
"This letter serves to retract the initial self-reported potential technical specification violation. Since it is deemed that a violation did not actually occur, there will be no subsequent 14-day written report."
Notified NRR PM (Adams) |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50940 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: McGEORGE CONTRACTING COMPANY, INC.
Region: 4
City: NORTH LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0785-0312
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/30/2015
Notification Time: 15:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2015
Event Time: 06:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT -TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM TEMPORARY JOB SITE
The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email:
"On March 30, 2015, at 0703 [CDT], McGeorge Contracting Company, Inc., Arkansas Radioactive Material License Number ARK-0785-03121, reported a stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge has been stolen from a temporary jobsite on Interstate 40, near North Little Rock, sometime between 1600 [CDT] on Friday, March 27, 2015 and 0625 [CDT] on Monday, March 30, 2015.
"The gauge is identified as a Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Model 3440, Serial Number 25959, with original source activities of 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be and 8 millicuries of Cesium-137.
"The gauge was stolen along with other engineering equipment utilized by the licensee.
"The Arkansas State Police has investigated and the Arkansas Department of Health has issued a press release.
"The Radioactive Materials Program is monitoring this event under Arkansas Event Number AR-2015-002."
* * * UPDATE AT 1137 EDT ON 04/08/15 FROM ANGELA HILL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following was received from the Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health received a telephone call approximately at 1245 [CDT] hours on April 7, 2015, in regards to the stolen gauge near North Little Rock, Arkansas.
"The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] verified the Troxler gauge and there appears to be no damage. The Cs-137 source rod lock was confirmed to be locked, secured and not tampered with. There was minor physical damage to the transport package. The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] verified exposure surveys of gauge, identifying no areas of concern. The licensee confirms leak tests prior to use and/or transferring the gauge. The licensee took possession and transported the gauge to the authorized permanent storage location.
"It appears that there are no radiation exposures to the members of the public.
"The Department will issue a press release on April 8, 2015.
"The Department considers this event closed."
Notified the R4DO (Azua), NMSS Events Notification (Email) and the ILTAB (Totterer) via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50941 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MD ANDERSON CANCER CENTER
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00466
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 03/31/2015
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2015
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRRADIATOR STUCK SOURCE
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 4, 2015, the licensee [University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center] reported that a malfunction had occurred involving its JL Shepherd Mark I, Model 30, self-contained irradiator. Device source: 10,000 curies [Cs-137], June 25, 1986, Cs-137, JL Shepherd Type 6810, SN 85CS26; Device mounting: JL Shepard Mark I Model 30 Irradiator, SN 1039. The source would not fully raise nor would it lower into the fully shielded position. The interlock system functioned as designed and the irradiator door remained locked in the source shielded position. The manufacturer was contacted and a service representative will be servicing the irradiator. This is the second incident with this device within the past month (see EN 50862). Investigation ongoing, file open."
Texas Incident # I-9294 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50942 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: WESTLAKE LONGVIEW CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: LONGVIEW State: TX
County:
License #: 06294
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 03/31/2015
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 31, 2015 the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the radioactive materials reciprocity coordinator that it received a notice of an engineering company scheduled to complete work on a nuclear source stuck shutter. The licensee [Westlake Longview Corporation] was called without contact. A message was left on voicemail. The engineering company was contacted and stated that it was hired to complete work on a sealed source gauge for level measurements due to a stuck shutter. The item is a Ronan Model 4F6S, Cs-137, 40 mCi, Serial Number M7352. The investigation into this case is ongoing. Further updates will be provided in accordance with SA 300 guidelines."
Texas Incident # I-9293 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50944 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: KRAZEN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: BAKERSFIELD State: CA
County:
License #: 8028-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/01/2015
Notification Time: 13:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2015
Event Time: 11:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL OF MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of California Department of Public Health via email:
"This is to report a nuclear gauge was 'lost' by the licensee, but was found by the licensee within a couple of hours at the jobsite where it was being used. The gauge was not damaged.
"At 1334 PDT on March 30, 2015, the Department [State of California Department of Public Health] was notified by the corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] that a nuclear gauge (Troxler model 3440, serial number 18204, containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241:Be) could not be found by the licensee. The gauge user reported he had driven from a job site at the corner of Fairview Road and Walkabout Drive to the McDonalds at 1607 Panama Lane in Bakersfield which is about 1 mile away. When he returned to his truck, he noticed the tailgate was down and the gauge/transport case were missing. The gauge user drove back to the jobsite and looked to see if the gauge had fallen off of the truck when he had driven to McDonalds. He did not see it on the roadside. He returned to the jobsite and found the transport case with no gauge inside. He looked around the jobsite and did not see the gauge near where he had been working. He asked others on the jobsite if they had seen the gauge, but no one had. The gauge user drove back to the McDonalds one more time and still did not see a gauge along the roadside. The Bakersfield police and the Department were notified that they had lost a gauge.
"At 1452 PDT on the same day, the Bakersfield police emailed [the Department] stating the licensee had found the gauge. [The Department] confirmed this with the licensee. The RSO had gone to the jobsite himself and had found the gauge in a culvert on the jobsite. At this point no one knows how the gauge ended up in the culvert. The gauge is now back in the possession of the licensee and does not show any damage. The gauge user was counseled for not keeping control over the gauge and retraining will be given to all gauge users regarding control and security of the gauge when in use and when it is not in use."
California Report Number: 033015
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50957 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG HARNOIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/06/2015
Notification Time: 09:09 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2015
Event Time: 08:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On 04/06/2015, planned preventive maintenance activities are being performed on the Braidwood Generating Station Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System. The work will be completed within approximately 42 hours. This activity includes preventive maintenance on the TSC condensing unit which affects the TSC ventilation. During the planned maintenance, the TSC condensing unit will be rendered non-functional.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff as necessary. This planned maintenance will not impact the emergency filtration capability of the TSC.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The planned maintenance will not be able to restore the TSC condensing unit to service within the facility activation time specified in the emergency plan (1 hour) in the event of an accident. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM GREG HARNOIS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1013 EDT ON 4/8/15 * * *
"The TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation as of 0600 CDT on April 8, 2015.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50961 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN GENEVA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 04/07/2015
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2015
Event Time: 12:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text DUAL UNIT AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIPS DUE TO A VOLTAGE TRANSIENT RESULTING IN GENERATOR TRIPS
"A loss of Main Generator Load which caused a Reactor Trip on Units 1 & 2. A switchyard voltage transient from a highline occurred, which caused an undervoltage condition on both units' safety related 4KV buses.
"Unit 1 is on normal heat removal to the condenser.
"Unit 2 is on auxiliary feedwater and normal condenser bypass valves for temperature control. An Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) actuation occurred on Unit 2.
"The [Unit 2] 2B emergency diesel generator did not start and load on its respective 24-4 KV bus. The 24-4KV Bus was repowered from the alternate feeder breaker. Cause of the emergency diesel failure to start is under investigation.
"All safety functions are met for both units."
All control rods fully inserted. The site is in a normal shutdown electrical configuration powered from offsite. The site plans to stay in Mode 3 pending restart.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local authorities. A press release is planned.
* * * UPDATE FROM JAY GAINES TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0129 EDT ON 4/9/2015 * * *
"During post trip review, it was determined that the 21 saltwater pump had to be manually started. With the failure of 2B emergency diesel generator, there were no saltwater pumps running for approximately 12 minutes. Additional troubleshooting determined the 2A emergency diesel generator sequencer did not automatically start 21 saltwater pump. The 2B emergency diesel generator was returned to service on 4/8/2015 at 1730 [EDT]. The loss of saltwater [pump] and emergency diesel generator is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is also an unanalyzed condition."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas), IRD MOC (Grant), NRR EO (Morris). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50968 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: FARA J ORESHACK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/08/2015
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2015
Event Time: 03:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"At approximately 0030 [MST] on April 7, 2015, while performing planned routine visual examinations of Unit 3 components, the differential pressure instrumentation nozzle on the suction side of the 2A reactor coolant pump (RCP) was observed to have white deposits that appeared to originate at the nozzle penetration. At this time, no additional indications of leakage have been identified for other inspected reactor coolant pressure boundary nozzles.
"Following insulation removal, the piping was examined by qualified engineering personnel. At 0330 [MST] on April 8, 2015, it was determined, based on isotopic analysis, that the white residue is consistent with reactor coolant system fluid. Technical Specifications Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage and therefore, the discovery of leakage from the nozzle is a degradation of a principal safety barrier. This notification is being made for a degraded condition pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The unit had been shutdown for its 18th refueling outage on 4/3/15 at 0000 [MST]. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of this condition." | |