| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/02/2015 - 04/03/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 50299 | Rep Org: SOR INC.
Licensee: SOR INC.
Region: 4
City: LENEXA State: KS
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELANIE DIRKS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/23/2014
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NRR PART 21 (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE PRESSURE & TEMPERATURE SWITCHES
The following information was originally received in NRC Region IV on July 16, 2014 via email. Relevant portions of the submittal are provided below without graphs, tables or pictures.
"SOR is a supplier of basic components to the nuclear power industry. The components of concern for this notification are SOR nuclear qualified Pressure and Temperature switches with TA housings manufactured from 2004 through 2009.
"The defect being reported is a potential out of tolerance condition concerning the machined sealing surface for an environmental seal on the SOR nuclear TA housing. Other switches with a similar defect have the potential to not meet their intended safety function.
"Summary: SOR Inc. began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 6/4/14 upon receipt of three SOR pressure switches, model number 5TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ (SN's 041100627, 041100628, and 041100629). These were returned from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY) due to inspections which questioned the suitability of the sealing surfaces on the face of the housings where the cover O-ring seals.
"The product evaluation was concluded on 6/24/14 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. If the switch housing has an inadequate machined sealing surface, the potential exists for steam permeation into the switch housing during accident conditions. This could result in an increase in set point as well as allow moisture into the housing potentially causing electrical consequences such as current leakage or a short. It is anticipated that the above noted condition represents a small percentage of the total number of housings from this batch of castings. Also, the potential risk is thought to be small due to a second redundant seal on the cover. This condition is being reported as a conservative measure.
"Evaluation: There are 2 (redundant) environmental seals on the cover of the nuclear TA housing. One O-ring seals on the undercut of the cover threads (151 O-ring). This seal is not in question and is not part of this evaluation. The other O-ring seals between the face of the enclosure and the O-ring groove on the cover (042 O-ring). This is the seal that is the subject of this evaluation.
"Redundant O-ring seals are used on the SOR 'TA' cover to minimize steam permeation into the housing during LOCA or HELB conditions. The consequences of permeation are that it can result in an increase in the set point and also allow moisture into the housing which could have electrical consequences. The returned switches have a suspect sealing surface on the face of the housing where one of the two O-rings (the 042 O-ring) is intended to seal. For the purposes of this Part 21 evaluation, consideration needs to be given to whether this suspect sealing surface could result in increased permeation into the switch enclosure.
"Switches #041100627 and 041100628 both have an area on the face of the housing where the casting did not have sufficient material for cleanup when the housing was machined. This area was characterized by use of the SOR CMM and measuring the area where the O-ring is expected to seal.
"Switch #041100629 was different from #041100627 and 041100628 in that it had one small indentation in the sealing surface which was immeasurable but does not meet surface finish requirements.
"The TA housings on the returned switches are clearly out of tolerance. It is SOR's position that the environmental seals on any switch with a similar defect has the potential to not meet its' intended safety function. . .
"Evaluation of Previous Shipments: SOR has validated shipments for a quantity of 56 pressure and temperature switches with the subject TA housing.
"Potentially affected customers/utilities include: TVA/Watts Bar, TVA/Browns Ferry, TVA/Sequoyah, Entergy Nuclear/Vermont Yankee, Entergy Operations/River Bend, Southern California Edison, Third Qinshan Nuclear/QSNPP-3-A (TQNPC), Fairbanks Morse Engine, STP Nuclear Operating Co., Hydro Quebec /Gentilly II, Progress Energy/Shearon Harris, Control Components Inc./Korea Hydro Nuclear Shin-Kori & Wolsong, Control Components Inc./KHPN Shin Kori 3 & 4, Korea Hydro & Nuclear/KHPN Yonggwang NPP #5, Konan Engineering/Yonggwang Nuclear, and First Energy/Davis-Besse Nuclear. (Total Potentially Affected = 56.
"Root Cause: The returned TA housing castings did not meet print and therefore did not allow enough material for cleanup of the machined sealing surface.
"Permanent Corrective Action: SOR internal documentation is being changed to require 100% inspection of the raw casting height. Also, the 1/8 [inch] minimum finish dimension is being added to the housing machining drawings.
"Action by Nuclear Power Plant: SOR recommends that the application for each switch noted in the above table be reviewed to determine if it is being used in a LOCA or HELB application. If so, SOR recommends an inspection to visually check for an adequate sealing surface of the housing . This inspection is also recommended for switches that have not yet been installed. The minimum required sealing surface is 1/8 [inch] (0.125 [inch]). After inspection, all units should have the 042 and 151 O-rings replaced if the units do not exhibit the deviation.
"SOR will send replacement O-rings at no charge upon request. If units are found that do not meet the acceptance criteria, they will be replaced free of charge by SOR. Contact SOR Director of Customer Service, Greg Barber for the replacements:
"Greg Barber
"913-956-3059
"gbarber@sorinc.com"
* * * UPDATE FROM MELANIE DIRKS TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/2/15 AT 1421 EDT * * *
The following information was excerpted from a facsimile:
Korea Hydro Nuclear power plants were added to include Shin-Kori 1 & 2; Shin Wolsong 1 & 2.
Notified the Part 21 Reactors Group via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50922 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: MOTIVA ENTERPRISE LLC
Region: 4
City: CONVENT State: LA
County:
License #: LA-4668-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/25/2015
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2015
Event Time: 08:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER WOULD NOT CLOSE PROPERLY
The following information was received via fax:
"On 03/17/2015, the RSO for MOTIVA ENTERPRISES called in a preliminary report about a shutter that would not close properly on a gauge installed on a process. The shutter could not be closed or locked out. This situation reoccurs periodically due to the corrosive operating environment of this gauge or device. Routine maintenance was performed by BBP Sales and the device again functioned as designed.
"This situation is reoccurring about every 11 to 14 months. The corrosive and caloric operating environment is the source of this operational problem. The problem with the shutter function is corrected by cleaning and lubricating the mechanism. The equipment/source holder is not broken, just in need of preventive maintenance.
"There was no removable radiation detected in the leak test results and the rotor moved freely when the top plate was removed for the maintenance. BBP Sales was called to perform the maintenance to correct the problem. The gauge/source holder was 'fixed.' The repairman/technician was never exposed to a radiation field greater than 3.0 mR/hr.
"The Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] considers this item closed and the records will be reviewed during the next inspection."
Gauge is an Ohmart Vega S/N 3211CO with a 175 Ci Cs-137 source.
Louisiana Report: LA 15-0006, T162348 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50923 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP INC.
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: L063369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 03/25/2015
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTREMITY OVEREXPOSURE WHILE OPERATING A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On March 25, 2015, the licensee reported that on March 15, 2015, one of its industrial radiographer trainees had experienced a possible overexposure to his right hand while using a QSA Model 880 camera that contained a 54.5 curie iridium-192 source. Initial information reported by the licensee: Following the 10th and final exposure of the day, the radiographer trainee climbed a ladder to the first deck and approached the camera from the rear with a survey meter. He performed a 360 degree survey of the camera and full length of the guide tube noting a zero reading on the survey meter. He then attempted to disconnect the guide tube by attempting to rotate the outlet port cover. When it would not rotate, he looked at the back of the camera to ensure the selector was in the correct position, and then attempted to disconnect the guide tube a second time. Again, the outlet port cover would not rotate and he looked at the back of the camera and noticed the slide bar of the lock was showing red, indicating the source was not in the fully shielded and secure position. He climbed down the ladder and informed the radiographer trainer what had happened.
"The radiographer trainer exposed the source approximately 1/4 turn and forcibly retracted it to its fully locked and shielded position. They checked the survey meter (battery function check) and determined it was not working properly. The meter was disassembled, battery terminals were adjusted, and the meter functioned properly.
"The radiographer trainer surveyed the camera and determined the source was fully retracted. The radiographer trainee stated he did not hear his alarming rate meter due to the noise level at the job site. The radiographer trainer did not receive any additional exposure as a result of this event. The radiographer trainee's pocket dosimeter was off-scale. His dosimetry badge was sent for processing and from the results the licensee determined he had received 384 millirem whole body dose from this event. Calculations will be made following a re-enactment of the event on 03/30/2015 to determine the dose to his hand.
"Exposure Device: QSA Model 880D SN: D1123, Source: 54.5 curies iridium-192 SN: 14191G"
The State of Texas is continuing to investigate the issue.
Texas report ID #: I-9291 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50946 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAGE KEMP
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/02/2015
Notification Time: 06:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2015
Event Time: 04:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE
"On April 2, 2015 at 0426 EDT, the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped while operating at 100 percent power due to a failure of the main generator voltage regulator. This also resulted in a turbine trip. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified."
There was no effect on Unit 2 as a result of this trip. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50947 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/02/2015
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2015
Event Time: 01:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL SYSTEM DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
"At 0149 CDT on 4/2/2015, Cooper Nuclear Station received an alarm indication that the primary and backup Meteorological System (MET) had gone off-line as a result of a lightning strike on the MET tower. This resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. Technicians responded to the plant and restored the system at 0418 CDT. Loss of the MET system is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50948 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN SEILHYMER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 04/02/2015
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2015
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SEISMIC MONITOR NOT AVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY PLAN ASSESSMENT
"Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) has completed a review of seismic monitor performance at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) over the past 3 years. The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency action levels (EAL) HA1.1 (Seismic Event Greater Than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by 'OBE Exceedance' alarm on Seismic Monitoring Panel) or HU1.1 (Earthquake felt in plant as indicated by Valid 'Event' alarm on Seismic Monitoring Panel). Contrary to that requirement, this review identified 6 unplanned instances where the seismic monitor was non-functional that were not previously reported, and 3 planned instances where the seismic monitor was non-functional for greater than 24 hours that were not previously reported. Since there was no compensatory measure that could be credited when the seismic monitor was non-functional, an emergency classification at the ALERT or UNUSUAL EVENT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation for a seismic event.
"The seismic monitor is currently functional, however it was determined to be non-functional on the following dates:
Unplanned out of service:
1. August 14, 2012
2. November 16, 2012
3. November 18 2012
4. November 21, 2012
5. December 5, 2012
6. January 16, 2013
Planned greater than 24 hour out of service:
1. December 14, 2012
2. September 3, 2014
3. September 30, 2014
"The unplanned non-functional conditions of the seismic monitor have been corrected and were entered into the NSPM Corrective Action Program.
"The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery.
"Corrective actions are in progress to address the missed reporting of seismic monitor unavailability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50949 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN VESELY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 04/03/2015
Notification Time: 01:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2015
Event Time: 21:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 20 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO STEAM LEAK
"On April 2, 2015 at 2133 CDT, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 1 following discovery of a steam leak in the Turbine Building at the D-ring, near the Turbine Bypass valves. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately -2 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). The steam leak was isolated by manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with cooldown in progress. Reactor water level is in the normal level band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power."
Operators reduced reactor power to 20 percent before initiating a SCRAM. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is shutdown and stable. The electrical supply is in a normal shutdown lineup. The reactor is being supplied by normal feedwater, and decay heat is being controlled by use of the ADS valves. The licensee is currently cooling down and depressurizing the reactor in preparation for repair of the steam leak.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois Resident Inspector. | |