| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/19/2015 - 03/20/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50881 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHANE HARVEY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 03/12/2015
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2015
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF THE SEISMIC MONITORING COMPUTER
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), this notification reports a loss of Emergency Preparedness assessment capability with the unplanned inoperable condition for the Byron seismic monitor. Specifically, the seismic monitor was declared non-functional at 0345 CST on March 7, 2015 following an unplanned loss of the seismic monitoring central computer. This condition adversely impacted the capability to perform an ALERT EAL (HA4) assessment in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Plan Annex. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of the discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)
"The seismic recorder was reset by Plant Engineering at 0440 CST on March 8 2015, which restored the seismic monitoring system to full capability.
"The unplanned non-functional condition of the seismic monitor was entered into the Byron CAP [Corrective Action] Program when the condition was discovered. Initially it was determined that the condition did not meet the requirements for an ENS notification as it was concluded that it did not substantially impair Byron station's emergency assessment capability in the event of an earthquake. Upon further review, at 0900 CDT on March 12, 2015, it was concluded that an ENS notification was warranted because the monitor was specifically Cited in the Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA4 threshold for identifying an ALERT due to an OBE (Reference procedure EP-AA-1002, Addendum 3, 'Emergency Action Levels for Byron Station').
"A follow-up written notification is not required for this notification under 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The State of Illinois Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1144 EDT ON 3/19/15 FROM BRIAN CURRIER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Upon further review of this event for the time period of 3/07/12 through 3/17/15, Byron Station has identified six previous occurrences where the Seismic Monitor was declared non-functional, which impacted the capability to perform an ALERT EAL (HA4) assessment in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Plan Annex. These occurred on November 6, 2014; April17, 2013; January 2, 2013; October 10, 2012; July 18, 2012 and July 9, 2012.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Roach). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50903 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WARREN PAUL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/19/2015
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2015
Event Time: 07:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
GREGORY ROACH (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 70 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AN OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR UPSCALE ACTUATION
"At 0702 EDT on March 19, 2015, Fermi 2 received an automatic scram due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function of Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale. The plant had recently transitioned to Single Loop Operation after securing the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Pump due to loss of normal and emergency cooling water supply. The lowest reactor water level was 134 inches above top of active fuel. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal band by the Feedwater and Control Rod Drive Systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor pressure is being maintained via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and Main Condenser. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level 3 isolation occurred. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All off-site power sources were available throughout the event. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and in a stable condition. Investigation into the cause of the event is ongoing.
"This event is being reported under the four hour Non-Emergency reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50907 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: BARB DOTSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/19/2015
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
GREGORY ROACH (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF TRITIUM IN GROUND WATER
"On February 26, 2015, as a result of routine monitoring well sampling, Palisades Nuclear Plant identified tritium in temporary wells 7 and 8, located within the plant protected area. Tritium concentrations were less than the threshold value (20,000 pCi/L) for initiating voluntary communications in accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute Ground Water Protection Initiative. The station promptly isolated and rerouted the likely source. Subsequent sample concentrations from samples obtained on March 18, 2015, have resulted in concentrations of tritium less than the minimum detectable activity. The wells are currently used only for on-site sampling and not for drinking water. There is no threat to public health and safety.
"These results confirm that a leak from the pipe that runs from the turbine sump oil separator to the turbine building drain tank was the likely cause. The volume of the leak cannot be determined but is potentially greater than 100 gallons. Therefore, voluntary communications have been made to state and local stakeholders. The Licensee has notified the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Van Buren County Administrator, the Township Supervisors in Covert, Geneva, and South Haven Townships, as well as the City of South Haven Mayor and City Manager.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors."
The tritium is suspected to be migrating through the steam generator tubes to the turbine building waste water. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50909 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER GRAPES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 03/19/2015
Notification Time: 22:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2015
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL NOTIFICATION - INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves.
"On January 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) received a partial primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems:
"Containment Monitoring System
Drywell floor drain sump and
Drywell equipment drain sump
"All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The containment isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a relay for Hi Drywell Pressure on Channel 11 during surveillance testing of the same relay on Channel 12. Drywell pressure was reading normal at the time of the relay failure. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid.
"The event was entered into the corrective action program as Issue Report 02440213. The moveable contacts on the failed relay were replaced and retested satisfactorily. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |