| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/28/2015 - 01/29/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50745 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7072-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/20/2015
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2015
Event Time: 15:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (EMAI)
TRISH MILLIGAN (EMAI)
PAMELA HENDERSON (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL RADIOGRAPHER EXCESSIVE EXPOSURE
The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via email:
"Event Date and Time: 01/16/2015, around [1515 CST] a radiography crew was working at the ExxonMobil Refinery on Scenic Highway, Baton Rouge, LA. The event was reported [about 1645 CST] on January 17, 2015, by a phone call from [an individual] who represented himself as the Corporate RSO. He stated he drove down on January 17, to evaluate and investigate this incident. He reported this incident appears to be a Human Error Potential Excessive Exposure.
"Event Location: ExxonMobil Refinery 4999 Scenic Highway. Baton Rouge, LA 70805. A temporary jobsite for Acuren Inspection.
"Event type: This is a potential excessive exposure involving a radiographer attempting to breakdown a radiography exposure setup. He attempted to disconnect the guide tube from the exposure device and the source was not locked in the shielded position. It was noticed that the locking device was red after the guide tube was handled to disconnect it from the exposure device.
"Notifications: LA DEQ [Department of Environmental Quality], Assessment, Radiation by direct phone call to our after hours answering system. The notification came in around [1645 CST] on January 17, 2015.
"Event Description: The radiography crew was making exposures on lower level equipment at the ExxonMobil Refinery. The crew was utilizing [about] 38 Ci of Ir-192. The crew attempted to breakdown/disconnect the equipment after the exposures. The guide tube would not disconnect. The 2nd hand of the crew manipulated the drive cable that returned the source into the shielded position. A quarter turn on the crank shielded the source.
"The radiographer and his equipment were checked. His pocket dosimeter was off scale, but he claims his Alarm Rate Alarm meter did not alarm. A second check of the Alarm Rate Meter revealed the unit did alarm, but it was a weak alarm.
"Estimated dose calculations were done for his whole body and extremities. His whole-body estimated dose was 3.3 Rads and his extremity dose was estimated at 206 Rads to his hands. These were calculated on a one minute exposure where a .5 minute is more realistic. The exposed radiographer was taken to Core Occupational Medicine for examination, x-rays and blood work. He is being monitored and examined every other day. At this time he has been asymptomatic for an excessive radiation exposure. The Licensee is conducting reenactments.
"This incident is not considered closed by the Department [LA DEQ]. The investigation findings will be updated when they become available.
"The equipment was all QSA equipment loaded with 38 Ci Ir-192. This appears to be an operator error exposure.
"The source is secure from removal and unnecessary exposure. This event is not closed and additional investigation and evaluation will continue. The source is in a safe shielded position and no threat to workers or the general public.
"Transport vehicle description : N/A This was at a temporary job site inside the ExxonMobil Refinery located in Baton Rouge, LA."
License Numbers: LA-7072-L01, AI 126755
Louisiana Event Number: LA1500002 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50746 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY
Region: 1
City: EWING State: NJ
County:
License #: 507375
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES T MCCULLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/20/2015
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GENERALLY LICENSED TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following information was received by email:
"Event Description: A specific licensee reported the loss (potential theft) of two generally licensed tritium (H-3) exit signs. The signs had been removed from installation and are missing from the storage location. The licensee became aware of the missing material on 1/14/2015, however, it is possible the material was missing for approximately one month. The devices were last seen by licensee staff in mid-December 2014. Specific details about the device model and activity have not yet been provided, potentially up to 15 Ci H-3 per device. An NJDEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] inspector will visit the site to investigate the incident."
New Jersey Event: #C545467
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50747 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICAL COMPANY LP
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L00230
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/21/2015
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2015
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK GAUGE SHUTTER
The following information was received by email:
"On January 21, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on January 20, 2015, during the process of closing fixed nuclear gauge shutters at its facility in order to perform detector calibrations, it discovered that the shutter on one of its Ohmart-Vega SH-F2 gauges, containing a 500 millicurie cesium-137 source, would not close. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position and the failure does not pose a risk of exposure to any person. The licensee is coordinating to have repairs made. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I 9269 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50772 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SETH BELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/28/2015
Notification Time: 08:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2015
Event Time: 05:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY AFFECTED BY VALVE CLEARANCE
"At 0535 CST on 1/28/15, control room staff identified that valve EJHV8716A, RHR A To SIS [Safety Injection System] Hot Leg Recirc Loops 2&3 [isolation valve], had been closed per clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 to support maintenance on the A RHR system. Closing valve EJHV8716A placed Wolf Creek in TS 3.0.3. At 0550 CST on 1/28/15, power was restored to valve EJHV8716A and the valve was opened, allowing the unit to exit from TS 3.0.3. Subsequent reviews of clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 identified that valve EJHV8809A had been energized and closed per direction of the clearance order. TS 3.0.3 was reentered at 0635 CST due to discovery of this condition. At 0650 CST, valve EJHV8809A was opened and deenergized allowing exit from TS 3.0.3."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50773 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DANIELS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/28/2015
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2015
Event Time: 10:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED VENTILATION MAINTENANCE
"The Comanche Peak Primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be unavailable during planned maintenance on the EOF ventilation system.
"On January 28, 2015, CPNPP [Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant] began planned work to improve the reliability of the EOF ventilation system. The EOF will be unavailable for approximately three weeks. During the time the primary EOF is unavailable, the affected ERO members will respond to the Backup EOF in Granbury, Texas for any declared emergency event. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time the primary EOF is unavailable.
"The extended unavailability of the primary EOF is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when the primary EOF availability is restored." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50774 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BRANSCUM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/28/2015
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2014
Event Time: 10:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 60 DAY OPTIONAL REPORT - HALF SCRAM AND A DIVISION 2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL
"On December 6, 2014, at approximately 1012 CST, while the plant was operating at 100 percent power, the Division 2 reactor protection system (RPS) bus de-energized unexpectedly. This resulted in a half-scram and a Division 2 primary containment isolation signal. Operators executed the appropriate abnormal operating procedures to begin an orderly restoration of the affected systems. Atmospheric pressure in the primary containment momentarily reached the high-pressure alarm setpoint, necessitating entry into the emergency operating procedure for that condition.
"Automatic isolation valves in the following systems closed as designed:
- reactor plant component cooling water
- drywell unit cooler water supply
- reactor building floor and equipment drains
- reactor building HVAC chilled water supply
- containment airlock seal air supply
- reactor recirculation system flow control valve hydraulics
- main steam line drains
- reactor water cleanup
- auxiliary building and annulus HVAC systems
"These engineered safety systems actuated as designed:
- standby gas control filter trains
- fuel building filter trains
- control building filter trains
"The event occurred approximately 25 hours after the Division 2 RPS motor-generator (MG) was aligned to the bus following replacement of the voltage regulator. Following the event, the MG set was found running with its output breaker tripped.
"A failure analysis determined that the spike suppressor and the field flash card were potential sources of the MG breaker trip. The spike suppressor was replaced. Inspection of the field flash card found a strand of wire from one of the attached leads nearly touching a trace on the circuit board. Testing determined that the wire strand was the most likely cause for the breaker trip. With no spare card readily available, the wire strand was removed and the field flash card was re-installed. Other cards were inspected, and no similar conditions were found. The MG set was load tested for 30 hours, and was placed in service on December 17[, 2014].
"Additionally, it is suspected that there is an intermittent failure occurring in the field flash card. A design change will be developed to correct that condition."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50775 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL GAGNON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/28/2015
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2015
Event Time: 08:49 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SITE STACK RADIATION MONITOR FAILURE
The Millstone site stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, failed and was declared inoperable at 0849 EST on January 28, 2015. Repairs are in progress.
This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off-site response capability, or off-site communications capability.
The Instrument and Controls Department is conducting troubleshooting and repair. The cause of the radiation monitor failure was pump failure.
Estimated return to service is 1600 EST on 1/29/15.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State and Local authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50778 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: NICK ROH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/28/2015
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2015
Event Time: 19:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SAFETY SYSTEM WILL NOT FUNCTION AS REQUIRED
"At 1957 EST on 01/28/2015, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, it was discovered that a modification installed during the fall 2013 refueling outage at H. B. Robinson inadvertently cross connected both trains of reactor protection. This cross connection resulted in both trains of safety injection being required to actuate in order to produce a reactor protection reactor trip. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) since it was determined that an automatic safety system does not function as required.
"The cross connection of the reactor protection trains presented an unanalyzed condition and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). An additional unanalyzed condition was identified in which the 'A' and 'B' DC Train systems were cross connected by the same condition and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This condition is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) condition that could prevent fulfillment of safety functions.
"At no time during this occurrence was the public or plant staff at risk as a result of this event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
This condition did place the unit in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for the reactor protection system and the DC vital buses, but the condition causing the issue was cleared at 2048 EST prior to any lowering of reactor power.
The licensee will be notifying appropriate State, local and other government agencies as required. | |