| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/12/2010 - 11/15/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46261 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/20/2010
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 13:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION - DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER IDENTIFIED
"This is a late eight hour report submitted under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), 'Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition.'
"During walk downs for the Fire Penetration Seal Project on September 16, 2010 at 1343 [hrs. CDT], a degraded fire barrier was identified in the wall between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 sides of the Electrical Piping Area. The wall is listed as an Appendix R wall between Fire Area (FA) 29 and FA 30. The wall separates safety related redundant cables.
"There is an approximately one inch gap filled with loose fitting foam from the top of the wall to the concrete ceiling above it. In one place the foam has a gap approximately one inch wide. This has been identified as a missing fire barrier such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking.
"A fire watch was established as a compensatory measure on 9/16/10. The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event."
The fire watch remains in place.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/15/2010 AT 1328 EST FROM STEPHEN SEILHYMER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on September 20, 2010 for a degraded fire barrier between Fire Area (FA) 29 and FA 30. Subsequent engineering analysis determined that the degraded fire barrier maintained the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and plant safety was not significantly degraded. The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) report is retracted.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been informed."
Notified the R3DO (Cameron). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46318 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/07/2010
Notification Time: 21:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2010
Event Time: 13:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER
"During a walkdown for the Fire Penetration Seal Project a degraded fire barrier was identified in the wall between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal 480V Switchgear Rooms. The wall is listed as an Appendix R wall between Fire Area (FA) 37 and FA 38. The wall separates redundant safe shutdown cables.
"There is a 2 inch gap where the top of the wall meets the ceiling. The gap is filled with combustible foam - some loose and some stationary. This has been identified as a missing fire barrier such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking.
"A fire watch has been established as a compensatory measure and will remain in place until the fire barrier is repaired.
"The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event."
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/15/2010 AT 1328 EST FROM STEPHEN SEILHYMER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on October 7, 2010 for a degraded fire barrier between Fire Area (FA) 37 and FA 38. Subsequent engineering analysis determined that the degraded fire barrier maintained the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and plant safety was not significantly degraded. The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) report is retracted.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been informed."
Notified the R3DO (Cameron). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46406 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LIMA REFINING COMPANY
Region: 3
City: LIMA State: OH
County:
License #: 31201020001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 11/09/2010
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER NOT OPERATING PROPERLY
The following information was reported via email by the State of Ohio:
"A licensed service provider (AHP) visited the licensee's site on 10/19/10 and completed an inspection of six fixed level gauges with the following results:
a) Four device shutters functioned as designed and were secured closed for maintenance activities.
b) One shutter device was inoperable due to the fact that the shutter positioning pin was rusted and could not be removed. Through lubricating and gentle mechanical persuasion the pin was removed and the shutter cycled properly.
c) The last device had a shutter operating handle that turned freely but did not rotate the shield block into the beam path. This device obviously did not function as designed and meets the reporting criteria. Through the use of more aggressive measures that did not include disassembly the shutter was eventually closed.
"These activities were closely monitored by the service provider's representative and at no time were licensee personnel exposed to the direct beam. The shutter on this device is now seized in the closed position. Upon identification of the shutter hanging up the service provider contacted the Bureau by telephone and e-mail.
"All six devices remain bolted in their fixed positions. The licensee intends to have the service provider unbolt and transfer all six devices to a secure storage location on licensee property where they will be properly packaged for transfer for disposal."
The 2 sealed sources are both 50 milliCuries of Cs-137. The manufacturer of the fixed gauge is General Nucleonics, Model # 13250, serial # 114 & 116.
Ohio Item Number: OH100027 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46408 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SALISU DAKUBU
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/09/2010
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Category 2" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT FAILS TO ARRIVE
"A shipment containing 88.7 Ci Ir-192 that was scheduled to be delivered on 11/8/2010 did not arrive as scheduled. A trace was requested today. Details are as follows:
"On Friday 11/5/10, QSA Global, Inc (MA License 12-8361) shipped a CPIR100 to Kakivik Asset Management (NRC 50-27667-01) to be delivered C/O Northern Air Cargo in Anchorage, AK. It was shipped [by the carrier] P1 (Priority overnight) along with a small non-radioactive piece that contained a leak test kit. Both pieces were scheduled to be delivered to Northern Air Cargo on Monday 11/8/10. The leak test delivered without issue. However, the radioactive piece is still showing as arrived at [the carrier's] location in Newark, NJ.
"Today, Tuesday, 11/9/10, [the carrier] was contacted to put a trace on the radioactive material. They believe that the address label must have somehow come off the package. QSA provided a complete physical description of the IR100 overpack."
Source serial # - 66641B
Source Activity - 88.7 Ci / 3281.9 GBq
Surface reading - 18.0 mr/hr
Transport Index - 0.4
* * * UPDATE FROM JOSH DAEHLER TO DONG PARK AT 1025 EST ON 11/10/10 * * *
The following information was received via email:
"QSA has been notified by the carrier this morning that the package referenced [above] was located overnight and has been forwarded to its destination on a new tracking [number]."
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), FSME (Burgess), and ILTAB (Pearson).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46411 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: State: MS
County:
License #: MS-EBL-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 11/10/2010
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2010
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING VARIAN GAS CHROMATOGRAPH CONTAINING TWO 15 MILLICURIE NICKEL - 63 SOURCES
"The licensee's RSO notified Department of Radiological Health (DRH) about their missing Varian electron capture detectors on 10/15/10, while conducting their six (6) month sealed source inventory and leak tests. The licensee's Receiving and Property Control Office picked the Varian gas chromatograph, Serial No. 10734, up for disposal from one of the licensee's labs and boxed it for shipment to Creative Recycling Systems, Inc., in Palmetto, Georgia. Creative Recycling Systems received the licensee's recycle trailer on 10/12/10. On 10/15/10, the licensee's property control office contacted Creative Recycling Systems, Inc., and requested notification if the detectors were ever found."
Creative Recycling Systems did not find the Varian electron capture detector containing two Ni-63 sources, serial numbers A2115 and T585, and it is assumed that it has been lost at the recycle facility. The licensee did survey a similar Varian device and found that survey readings were very close to background.
MS Incident #: MS-10006.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46414 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 08:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE NOBLE GAS CHANNEL SETPOINTS NON-CONSERVATIVE
"At 0818 CST, 11/12/10, Radiation Protection determined that the setpoints for the Control Room Outside Air Intake Noble Gas channels are non-conservative. This affects Tech Spec 3.3.7 required monitors 0PR31B, 0PR32B, 0PR33B and 0PR34B (Noble gas channels). The current setpoints for 0PR31B, 0PR32B, 0PR33B and 0PR34B are High Alarm 9.55E-05 microCi/cc and Alert Alarm 9.55E-06 microCi/ml. The calculated required setpoints are High Alarm 6.61E-05 microCi/cc and Alert Alarm 6.61E-06 microCi/cc. This is approximately a 30% decrease in setpoints from the current setpoints. LCO 3.3.7 conditions A and B were entered at 0818, 11/12/10. LCO 3.3.7 conditions A and B required actions completion time is 1 hour. All required actions were complete at 0900 11/12/10, less than 1 hour.
"This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, 8 hour non-emergency notification.
"Both trains of radiation monitor setpoints were non-conservative and actuate control room ventilation in emergency mode. The margin available in the control room dose analysis will be reviewed to confirm impact on safety function. The setpoints have been non-conservative since 1999."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BART KELLER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1414 EST ON 01/20/11 * * *
"At 0818 CST, 11/12/2010, Radiation Protection determined that the setpoints for the Control Room Outside Air Intake Noble Gas channels are non-conservative. This affects Tech Spec 3.3.7 required monitors 0PR31B, 0PR32B, 0PR33B, 0PR34B (Noble Gas channels). ENS notification was made under ENS 46414 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The design basis accidents do not credit automatic actuation of the Control Room Outside Air Intake system to the Emergency mode from a high radiation signal. Therefore, the high radiation signal is not needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and this event did not result in a safety system functional failure.
"Therefore, ENS notification 46414 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. Notified R3DO (Bloomer) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46415 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST
"At 1300, on November 12, 2010, Exelon Generation Company LLC concluded that inaccurate information contained in the PRA technical bases for a 1987 License Amendment Request (LAR) for Byron and Braidwood Stations would have potentially impacted the acceptability of the LAR by the NRC. The LAR was to extend Allowed Outage Times (AOT) from 72 hours to 7 days for several systems, to include the Component Cooling (CC) and Residual Heat Removal (RH) Systems.
"The original design intent of the CC system was that each unit has two independent CC pumps and a fifth pump (U0) CC pump could be used as an operable spare for any of the unit specific pumps. This is how CC was modeled in the PRA technical justification for the 1987 LAR. However, a piping configuration design flaw that was recently evaluated in that the U0 CC pump could not be considered an operable spare for either unit's B pumps was not correctly modeled in the PRA.
"During the evaluation to assess the potential significance of this CC design flaw on the PRA justification for the 1987 LAR, another potentially significant discrepancy was discovered in that it appears the operational practice to always split CC trains after a design basis LOCA was not modeled correctly in the RH analysis.
"Administrative controls have been put in place to restrict the AOT for the CC pumps and RH trains to the pre-LAR timeframe of 72 hours pending the permanent corrective actions. In addition, administrative controls have been put in place to prohibit the U0 CC pump from being an operable spare for either unit's B trains.
"This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46416 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEO WEHNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST
"At 1300, on November 12, 2010, Exelon Generation Company LLC concluded that inaccurate information contained in the PRA technical bases for a 1987 License Amendment Request (LAR) for Byron and Braidwood Stations would have potentially impacted the acceptability of the LAR by the NRC. The LAR was to extend Allowed Outage Times (AOT) from 72 hours to 7 days for several systems, to include the Component Cooling (CC) and Residual Heat Removal (RH) Systems.
"The original design intent of the CC system was that each unit has two independent CC pumps and a fifth pump (U0) CC pump could be used as an operable spare for any of the unit specific pumps. This is how CC was modeled in the PRA technical justification for the 1987 LAR. However, a piping configuration design flaw was recently evaluated in that the U0 CC pump could not be considered an operable spare for either unit's B pumps was not modeled in the PRA.
"During the evaluation to assess the potential significance of this CC design flaw on the PRA justification for the 1987 LAR, another potentially significant discrepancy was discovered in that it appears the operational practice to always split CC trains after a design basis LOCA was not modeled correctly in the RH analysis.
"Administrative controls have been put in place to restrict the AOT for the CC pumps and RH trains to the pre-LAR timeframe of 72 hours pending the permanent corrective actions. In addition, administrative controls have been put in place to prohibit the U0 CC pump from being an operable spare for either unit's B trains.
"This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46417 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN RAJKOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 20:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 12:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 47 | Power Operation | 47 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED 10CFR50 APPENDIX R SCENARIO
"At approximately 1210 on November 12, 2010, a fire protection assessment identified a potentially unanalyzed condition in the plant's 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis. In the unlikely event of a fire in the main control room or cable spreading room, coincident with a fire induced loss of off site power, in which the control room must be evacuated, Operations personnel would proceed to the Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) panel to perform required safe shutdown activities. During certain scenarios, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) may start on a reactor low-low water level signal or on high drywell pressure signal. Since HPCI is not controlled manually from the ASDS, a postulated fire induced short could prevent the HPCI system high reactor water level trip and possibly result in reactor vessel overfill.
"Operation of the Safety Relief Valves in this condition has not been analyzed. For this scenario, the following unlikely sequence of events is required:
1. A fire would have to occur in the main control room or cable spreading room
2. The fire would have to be significant enough to require main control room evacuation
3. Offsite power would have to be lost
4. HPCI would have to initiate
5. A fire induced short preventing HPCI from tripping automatically would have to occur
"Applicable safety systems remain operable, and Operations personnel are trained in procedures to handle complex fire scenarios, including fires in the main control room and cable spreading room. Additionally, the cable spreading room is protected by an automatic Halon fire suppression system.
"As a precaution, a fire watch has been established as a compensatory measure. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46418 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHAWN HAFEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/14/2010
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2010
Event Time: 06:52 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF COOLING TO THE 'A' PHASE MAIN BANK TRANSFORMER
"At 0617 [hrs. EST], Watts Bar experienced a failure of the cooling system to the 'A' phase Main Bank Transformer. Due to rising oil temperatures on the 'A' phase Main Bank Transformer, the reactor was manually tripped at 0652 hrs. All systems responded as designed with no issues."
All rods inserted during the trip. There were no primary or secondary relief valves that lifted during the transient. The grid is stable and the plant is in a normal shutdown electrical line-up. The reactor is at normal pressure and temperature with decay heat being removed via the steam dumps to condenser with auxiliary feedwater providing steam generator make-up. The cause of the loss of cooling to the 'A' phase Main Bank Transformer was the failure of a control power transformer that supplies the Main Bank Transformer cooling system components.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46419 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/15/2010
Notification Time: 07:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2010
Event Time: 06:03 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF A CIRCULATING WATER PUMP WITH ANOTHER PUMP OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"On 11/15/10 at 0603 [hrs. EST], the Unit 3 reactor was manually tripped after receiving a report that there was an overheating packing gland on the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump. The 3A1 Circulating Water Pump was already tagged out for maintenance. This required Unit 3 to be tripped due to only two Circulating Water Pumps in operation. The Unit 3 reactor was stabilized in Mode 3. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically actuated. A train of normal feedwater remains available to feed Steam Generators.
"During the Unit 3 reactor trip, the 3B Steam Dump to Atmosphere failed to close on operator demand per procedure. It was locally isolated with a manual isolation valve stopping the cooldown. The RCS was stabilized at 487.56?F and was borated as required by procedure. All boration systems operated as designed. The RCS returned to normal operating temperature and pressure."
During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Other than the steam dump to atmosphere valve lifting, no other relief valves lifted. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The electrical grid is normal and the plant is in a normal shutdown electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via the 3A and 3C steam dumps to atmosphere since the Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed. The plant is heating up to normal operating temperature at which time auxiliary feedwater will be secured.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |