| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/20/2010 - 10/21/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46325 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JEFF SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/11/2010
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2010
Event Time: 10:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | A/R | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING TRANSFER OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BUS
"On October 11, 2010 in preparation for maintenance, the 'A' Reactor Protection System Bus was being transferred from the normal to the reserve power supply. As a part of the transfer, a half scram is expected. During the transfer a [full] reactor scram occurred. All rods inserted to their full-in positions.
"Following the reactor scram, all systems operated as expected. Reactor vessel inventory is being maintained by the Condensate / Feedwater system.
"Following the scram, the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator auto started due to the transfer of the Auxiliary Power system.
"Currently the cause of the full Reactor Protection System [scram] is unknown. Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the malfunction.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."
The auto-start of the EDG was expected as a result of the 'A' RPS bus transfer and has been secured and placed back in standby. Decay heat is being discharged to the condenser. The Unit is in a normal shutdown electrical line-up. The scram had no impact on Unit 2. The licensee characterized the scram as uncomplicated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM RILEY RUFFIN TO ERIC SIMPSON 1415 EDT ON 10/20/10 * * *
The second to last paragraph of the original report has been updated to read as follows:
"The auto-start of the EDG was anticipated as a result of the Auxiliary Power System transfer and has been secured and placed back in standby."
The R3DO (Orth) has been notified. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46346 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE WONG
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/19/2010
Notification Time: 20:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2010
Event Time: 15:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text VALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On October 19, 2010, at about 1515 PDT, SONGS Unit 3 RPS channels 'B' and 'D' were tested for maintenance. During this testing, both channels were powered off, which brought in LPD/DNBR [local power density/departure from nucleate boiling] trips on both channels. There are no applicable Technical Specifications required for these RPS channels in Mode 5.
"Southern California Edison(SCE) is reporting this occurrence as a valid actuation of RPS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(a).
"SCE has taken actions to restore both channels 'B' and 'D' of RPS and cleared the RPS trip signal. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was at approximately 100% power and Unit 3 was in a Steam Generator Replacement Outage, Mode 5, shutdown and cooldown with the RCS open, proceeding to Mode 6."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DENNIS MORRIS TO PETE SNYDER AT 0045 EDT ON 10/21/10 * * *
"On October 19, 2010, SCE reported (Event No. 46346) a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Upon further review, SCE determined the actuation was invalid and is retracting the notification.
"Maintenance and surveillance testing was being conducted by Computer Technicians on the Core Protection Calculator [CPC] Channels 'A' and 'D', respectively, following station procedures. De-energizing the CPC channels was expected to bring in an RPS trip signal. The process to disable the control room RPS alarms had not as yet, been completed by the Instrument and Controls group when the CPCs were de-energized by procedure, actuating the RPS logic and causing the control room alarms.
"The actuation is considered invalid, as the equipment that would have been actuated by the trip safety function was previously de-energized and removed from service for the refueling outage. The Unit 3 reactor was in Mode 5, with the reactor trip breakers open, and control rods inserted. Unit 2 reactor remains at 100% power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (V.Campbell). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46347 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RYAN HAMILTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/19/2010
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2010
Event Time: 21:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FAILURE OF PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER DISPLAYS AND SPDS TO UPDATE
"This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states that the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of: 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).'
"At 1308 EDT on Tuesday, October 19, 2010, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Control Room received the annunciator for Process Computer Trouble. At the same time, all Process Computer displays stopped updating, including the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).
"All Control Room panel indicators and annunciators continue to respond properly providing operators with non-computer based emergency assessment capability. An additional Plant Operator has reported to shift in accordance with Technical Specification 6.2.2.a for minimum shift complement with the process computer out of service.
"An update to this notification will be made after repairs are completed and the SPDS is returned to service."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0802 EDT ON 10/20/10 FROM JOHN DRISCOLL TO DONG PARK * * *
"On Wednesday, October 20, 2010, repairs were completed and at 0439 EDT, the Plant Process Computer (PPC) was successfully restarted. Upon restart, SPDS was verified operable."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Miller). |
| General Information | Event Number: 46348 | Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 10/20/2010
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21 GP VIA EMAIL ()
| Event Text PART 21 - CRACK INDICATIONS IN MARATHON CONTROL ROD BLADES
The following was received via facsimile:
"A recent inspection of near 'End-of-Life' Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6 has revealed crack indications. The CRB assemblies in question were manufactured in 1997. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) continues to investigate the cause(s) of the crack indications. Once the cause of the crack indications is determined, GEH will evaluate the nuclear and mechanical lifetime limits of the Marathon Control Rod Blade design in light of the new inspection data, and make revised lifetime recommendations, if necessary.
"This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), is sent for all plants that are D lattice, BWR/2-4 or S lattice, BWR/6 plants. Since there have been no reported cracking occurrences in C lattice assemblies to date, these CRBs are tentatively eliminated from the investigation. C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants have been included on Attachment 2 for identification. Should the results of the investigation implicate the C lattice plants, the final resolution to this 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will include the C lattice plants."
The D lattice and S lattice plants in the US that are affected by this notification include Nine Mile Point, Unit 1; Millstone, Unit 1; Fitzpatrick; Pilgrim; Vermont Yankee; Grand Gulf; River Bend; Clinton; Oyster Creek; Dresden, Unit 2; Dresden, Unit 3; Peach Bottom, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Unit 3; Quad Cities, Unit 1; Quad Cities, Unit 2; Perry, Unit 1; Duane Arnold; Cooper; Monticello; Brunswick, Unit 1; Brunswick, Unit 2; Hatch, Unit 1; Hatch, Unit 2; Browns Ferry, Unit 1; Browns Ferry, Unit 2; and Browns Ferry, Unit 3.
* * * UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO ERIC SIMPSON VIA FAX AT 1556 ON 12/1/2010 * * *
"In August 2010, GE Hitachi (GEH) performed the planned inspection of four near 'End-of-Life' CRBs at 'Plant O.' The inspection revealed crack indications on all four Control Rod Blades (CRBs). The observed cracks are much more numerous, and have more material distortion than previously observed. Further, the cracks occur at a much lower reported local B-10 depletion than previously observed, with cracking predominantly starting at approximately 40% local depletion, whereas previous inspections observed cracking only above 60% local depletion.
"The cracks at 'Plant O' are also more severe, in that they resulted in missing capsule tube fragments from two of the inspected CRBs. A lost parts analysis performed for 'Plant O' determined that there is no negative affect on plant performance due to the missing tube fragments.
"At this point in the investigation, no causal or contributing factors unique to the 'Plant O' CRBs, nor their operation, has been identified.
"Including the inspections at 'Plant O,' GEH has now completed the visual inspection of 97 irradiated Marathon CRBs, with 10 showing crack indications. As 'Plant O' is an S lattice design, all crack indications are still confined to D and S lattice applications, with no crack indications on C lattice designs. When considering only D and S lattice applications that are near 'End-of-Life' depletion limits, 10 of 23 control rod inspections have revealed crack indications."
Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Ring), R4DO (Powers) and Part 21 Group.
* * * UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA FACSIMILE AT 0934 EST ON 02/15/2001 * * *
"Subject: Part 21 Reportable Condition Notification: Design Life of D and S Lattice Marathon Control Blades
"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) has completed its evaluation of the cracking of Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6. This issue was initially reported on October 20, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-327 (Reference 1). Additional information was provided on December 1, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-351 (Reference 2).
"GEH has determined that the design life, of D and S lattice Marathon Control Blades may be less than previously stated. The design life if not revised, could result in significant control blade cracking and could, if not corrected, create a substantial safety hazard and is considered a reportable condition under 10 CFR Part 21.21 (d). Marathon C lattice Control Blades are not affected by this condition. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from GEH's investigation of this issue."
Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Group. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 46349 | Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: VETERANS AFFAIRS MARYLAND HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/20/2010
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2010
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text LOOSE SURFACE CONTAMINATION FOUND ON OUTSIDE OF RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PACKAGING
"The package was received today (October 20, 2010) at about 10:00 AM EDT by the VA Maryland Healthcare System, Baltimore, Maryland.
"A wipe test performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of about 1800 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters.
"The package contained a unit dosage of around 12 milliCuries of Fluorine-18 labeled radiopharmaceuticals and was shipped from Cardinal Health, Baltimore, Maryland. The vendor/shipper also serves as the delivery carrier. The VA nuclear medicine staff immediately notified staff at Cardinal Health about the contaminated package around 10:30 AM EDT.
"As corrective actions, additional wipe samples were taken in the VA nuclear medicine department, and the indication was that the package was most likely inadvertently cross-contaminated by a technologist who had handled similar materials just before checking in the package. Specifically, a contaminated absorbant pad was identified near the check-in area. The healthcare system Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) indicated that additional area and personnel surveys were performed to ensure that residual contamination in the area was identified and addressed appropriately. Also, the RSO reinstructed the technologists involved in the incident on proper material handling techniques to avoid future cross-contamination of items and packages. Additional reinstruction of technologists is planned.
"As additional follow-up information, the RSO spoke to the pharmacy supervisor at Cardinal Health around 12:00 PM EDT and again at 1:30 PM EDT and learned that the driver and the vehicle were surveyed by the vendor and found to be free of contamination. Also, the vendor received no other reports of contaminated packages from other customers. This information supports a conclusion that the contamination was most likely from cross-contamination after package receipt.
"We will notify our NRC Project Manager at NRC Region III of this event." | |