| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/01/2010 - 09/02/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 46210 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MULTIPLE
Region: 1
City: NEW CASTLE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/27/2010
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING ORPHANED / MISSING GENERAL LICENSE SOURCES
The following information was received from the State of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Event Report ID No: PA100020
"License No: PA-G0241, PA-G0029, PA-G0141
"Licensee(s): New Castle Rolling Mills, Sharon Strip Steel and/or Cedar Mills
"Event date and time: Unknown
"Event location: 902 North Cedar Street, New Castle, PA 16102
"Event type: Five (5) missing [licensed material] GL sources and shutter function failure
"Notifications: July 2010 PA DEP Southwest Regional Office Inspection
"Event Description: Since becoming an Agreement State in March 2008, DEP has transitioned hundreds of NRC specific and general licenses (GL) to PA state control. Recently, working from an NRC spreadsheet, DEP has been issuing GL certificates of registration for certain category GLs, and tracking unresponsive GL owners. The original information we had from the NRC indicated 11 sources had been distributed to the above location over time. The current facility owner is not a steel manufacturer, and was unaware these GL sources were on their property.
"An inspection in July 2010 noted 6 of potentially 11 'C-frame' thickness gauge GL sources could be accounted for, with 4 onsite and 2 recently transferred back to a gauge manufacturer. Each of the 11 GL gauges contained a one (1) curie americium-241 sealed source. Since there is no NRC data on possible return or transfer of GL sources, and two manufacturers are no longer in business, the tracking of 5 GL sources appears to be impossible. The event location noted above has had three different owners / GL licensees over the years, two of which are known out of business. A third firm may still be in business, and will be pursued regarding the 5 unaccounted for sources. Lastly, 1 of the 4 GL sources was found to have an open shutter. All 4 'orphan' sources have been registered with the DOE/LANL OSRP [Off-Site Source Recovery Project] program for transfer.
"Due to the unaccountability of the five 1 Ci Am-241 GL sources, DEP believes this to be reportable under 20.2201 (a)(1)(i). And, since one of the six sources that were accounted for had an open shutter, DEP finds this to be reportable under 30.50(b)(2)(i).
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Improper transfer of GL sources and ineffective regulatory control.
"ACTIONS: Two of the devices have been returned to a manufacturer. Four of the sources remain at the facility in New Castle, PA in a secured location. More investigation is being done to track the five unaccountable GL devices.
"Media attention: None at this time"
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46213 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/30/2010
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOUND IN SCRAP SHIPMENT
"On August 3, 2010, the Department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] received a phone call from the Utah Division of Radiation Control. A steel mill in Utah was returning a shipment of scrap metal to Colorado due to the portal monitor indicating radioactive material present in the shipment The shipment origin was Van Gundy Ampco at 1018 S. 5th Street, Grand Junction, Colorado (a scrap metal company, not a radioactive materials licensee).
"On August 12, 2010, the DOT paperwork was faxed from Utah to the Department. The DOT special permit indicated the material was a railcar with a side which scanned at 22 [micro]R/hr (background = 0.005 mrem/hr).
"On August 19, 2010, the railcar was returned to Van Gundy Ampco in Grand Junction. The Department made the determination using an IdentiFinder that the material was an oilfield pump contaminated with Ir-192 with a dose rate of 0.34 mrem/hr. The pump was isolated from public and workers with barrier tape.
"On August 25, 2010, Protechnics (license CO-545-01) agreed to take possession of the pump to decay in storage. Protechnics is licensed for Ir-192, so no provisional license will need to be issued to Van Gundy Ampco or Protechnics. On August 27, 2010, Protechnics took possession of the oilfield pump. Personnel from Protechnics cleaned an oily residue out from the oilfield pump. The pump at this point scanned as indistinguishable from background and was released for unrestricted disposal. The oily rags and materials used to decontaminate the pump were taken to the Protechnics site in Fruita, Colorado for decay in storage.
"The source of the Ir-192 is unknown as the oilfield pump was in a railcar full of scrap metal and the pump bore no identifying marks. Therefore, no Notice of Violation has been issued in regards to this incident. Additionally, the public dose in regards to this incident is also unknown as it is not known how long the pump was in public and the route the pump took from the oilfield to the scrap yard.
"This incident is considered closed."
Colorado Incident I10-11 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46214 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BBC&M ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 3
City: LIMA State: OH
County:
License #: OH31210250006
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SNEE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 08/30/2010
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/26/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Ohio via e-mail:
"Ohio Department of Health (ODH) was informed on 8/27/10 of an incident involving a portable moisture density gauge. The incident occurred on 8/26/10 at a work site in Lima, Ohio. The incident occurred due to operator error on behalf of a BBC&M Engineering, Inc. (BBCM) employee - the employee backed over the gauge with a BBCM truck. BBCM staff followed established company emergency procedures - the area was cordoned off, all other site personnel were kept more than 20 feet away from area, and a BBCM employee stayed in the area until further notice.
"BBCM obtained a Radiation Alert Monitor and a lead 'pig' from CTS, Inc. and used the monitor at the project site in the area of the damaged gauge, truck, and original testing location of the gauge. The reading near the gauge (at 1 meter) was 2.0 mrem/hr. All other readings taken at the sire measured only background level readings. The gauge was damaged but the radiation sources were not comprised and/or leaking. As the source rod would not retract into the gauge, BBC&M installed a lead cap ('pig') over the rod tip/source end. The gauge was then transported to BBCM's Dublin, Ohio office to be stored until it can be transported to CTS, Inc. for further inspection."
The gauge contains 0.010 Ci Cs-137 and 0.050 Ci Am/Be sources.
Ohio incident #2010-051. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46215 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CALTRANS
Region: 4
City: SAN LUIS OBISPO State: CA
County:
License #: 1539
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PREDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/30/2010
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/26/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
MEXICO VIA FAX ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of California via email:
"[On August 26, 2010] at 3:30 p.m., [the licensee Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)] received a call from a technician at the Caltrans Paso Robles Construction office, stating that a compaction gauge had been removed from his truck while parked at the construction laboratory. The gauge had been placed in the aluminum metal transportation box adhered to his truck, but unlocked and last seen at 12:30 p.m. [PDT]. He had gone back into the lab to continue work and went to the jobsite at 3:15 p.m. where he discovered the gauge missing. He called [the RSO] immediately and [the RSO] called the local police and filed a report.
"The moisture/density gauge missing is a Troxler 3440, Serial No. 30701, containing 10 mCi of cesium 137 and 40 mCi of americium 241. The Paso Robles Police Report is case No. 1Q-2886.
"[The RSO will be] placing an advertisement in Craigslist and in the local newspaper for the return of the gauge with a cash reward, no questions asked. [The RSO] will also speak personally to authorized gauge users about the importance of keeping the gauges locked up at all times, when not in use. A letter addressing the same will be sent to all."
California Report Number: 5010-082710
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46220 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/01/2010
Notification Time: 13:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 18:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION IN LIEU OF A WRITTEN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT OF INVALID ACTUATION
"On July 26, 2010, at 1819 hours [CDT], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Run), the Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) restarted after being secured. The DGCWP provides the Emergency Service Water to the 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room area cooler and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) water pump/Low Pressure Core Spray [LPCS] pump room area cooler.
"The apparent cause of the restart was the momentary interruption of the DGCWP run logic. The Division 1 DGCWP was in operation to support cooling of the Unit 1 RCIC/LPCS pump room area (run logic satisfied). When the Operator placed the Division 1 DGCWP control switch to the normal-after-stop position, the DGCWP feed breaker opened. The Operator reset the DGCWP feed breaker trip by returning the control switch to the normal-after-stop position and, because the run logic for the DGCWP was still satisfied [due to elevated room temperatures], the DGCWP restarted.
"This invalid start signal from the Division 1 DGCWP breaker being reset resulted in the automatic actuation of the Division 1 DGCWP. The Division 1 DGCWP responded satisfactorily.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), which states that in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center with 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46221 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 09/01/2010
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2010
Event Time: 22:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF LOAD TRIP SIGNAL ON ALL FOUR CHANNELS OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
"On August 23, 2010, at approximately 2210 hours, with the Palisades unit at 100% power, the turbine protection relays, 305L and 305R, were identified as being inoperable due to a loss of electrical power from their 125 VDC power supply. On an actual turbine low auto stop oil pressure condition, 305L and 305R energize to generate a loss of load trip signal to all four channels of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). 305L provides input to RPS channels A and C. 305R provides input to RPS channels B and D. The RPS generates a reactor trip upon receipt of two (2) of four (4) loss of load trip signals. The loss of load trip is required by Technical Specification (TS) Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 and was inoperable until 305L and 305R were reenergized on August 24, 2010, at approximately 0939 hours.
"The on-shift operations crew entered a TS 3.3.1 LCO, however, TS 3.0.3 LCO should have also been entered. TS 3.0.3 LCO was applicable due to all four (4) loss of load input signals to the RPS being inoperable. The eight (8) hour notification was not reported within the required time frame due to a misinterpretation of the event that has since been re-evaluated and determined to meet the eight hour immediate notification requirement.
"The safety significance of this even was minimal. Although required by TS, the loss of load trip function is not credited in the plant safety analysis.
"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46222 | Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 09/01/2010
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2010
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTATION
"On September 1, 2010 at 1600 hrs. [it was] identified that the 21 and 22 Hot Leg Remote Shutdown Temperature Instruments are inoperable. This constitutes a safety system functional failure which is reportable. The cause of the inoperability is under investigation. Per Technical Specification 3.3.4, these instruments must be restored to operable status within 30 days."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |