| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/03/2010 - 08/04/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 46141 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: N/A
Region: 4
City: COLUMBUS State: MS
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANNY BRANTLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/30/2010
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/30/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGES LEFT IN WAREHOUSE BY BANKRUPT BUSINESS
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On 7-16-2010, MSDH DRH [Mississippi State Department of Health Division of Radiological Health] received a call from a gentleman who owns a warehouse in Columbus, MS. He stated that as he was going through the contents of his warehouse to determine what could be sold as used equipment or as scrap metal, he discovered a nailed-shut wooden crate with the word 'Radioactive' written in marker on the side. On 7/19/10, DRH inspectors went to the warehouse and discovered that 2 fixed nuclear gauges were in the wooden box. Both gauges were the same model, FM1R-1, manufactured by Mahlo. Labels indicated that each had been loaded with one 100 mCi Pm-147 (Promethium) source. According to the assay dates found on the labels on the gauges, both sources were decayed to less than 0.1 mCi. One other gauge was found in the warehouse. This one was still bolted to a piece of manufacturing equipment. It was an Ohmart fixed gauge loaded with a 60 mCi Kr-85 source in 1994, therefore it is decayed to approximately 10 mCi. DRH inspectors brought the three gauges to DRH office for safe storage until proper disposal can be arranged. Note: The man who reported the box with 'Radioactive' marked on it, had been leasing to a company involved in textile manufacture. The leasee went bankrupt and owed the warehouse owner substantial payments. The owner is legally selling the contents of the warehouse to recoup some of his losses. The owner has no knowledge or background with nuclear gauges. Gauge info follows:
Manufacturer Model Gauge Ser # Isotope
Mahlo FMIR-1 610/61/U1 Pm-147
Mahlo FMIR-1 610/61/IU2VG89 PM-147
Ohmart BAL 2860BX Kr-85
"Further investigation revealed that the Ohmart gauge was identified on a General License in Alabama, licensed to Crown Textile Co.(now out of business). Also a former employee of a company named American Nonwovens (now out of business) said that all three gauges were brought from Alabama to the warehouse in Columbus, MS where they were found.
"MSDH Div of Radiological Health continues to keep the abandoned gauges for safe-keeping and has contacted a disposal company to dispose of the gauges."
MSDH DRH Report: MS-10005. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46142 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CHEVRON
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #: 0802-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CASS KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 07/30/2010
Notification Time: 20:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 15:27 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
MEXICO VIA FAX ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MISSING SOURCES
The following information was received by e-mail:
"Chevron left a voicemail message on 7/28/10, reporting two devices missing [to the Los Angeles County - Region 7- State of California-Health and Human Services Agency otherwise known as the 'Agency']. [The Agency and the licensee] exchanged voicemail messages until [the Agency] was able to talk with the [licensee Radiation Safety Officer] RSO on 7/30/10. [The devices] are Nitons, serial numbers U2779 & U 2778. Each contains 20 mCi Fe-55 and 10 mCi Cd-109. The reporting quantities (1,000X) are 100 mCi Fe-55, and 1 mCi for Cd-109; the Cd-109 is the source that makes this immediately reportable. The sources were last leak tested on November 5, 2007. The RSO looked for them again in May 2008 at the Chevron's 'storehouse,' where these devices were kept. [The storehouse] was moving and [personnel] said they didn't know where [the sources] were [located]. Subsequently, the storehouse said they had been sent back to Niton, as a trade-in for devices using X-ray instead of a radioactive source. Chevron asked Niton to send them a letter saying they had received the devices, but Niton said they had never received the devices. Chevron does have devices using X-ray. They continue to look for the devices, and will check their invoice to see if they had received any trade-in credit when they purchased the X-ray devices."
* * * UPDATE AT 1937 EDT ON 8/3/10 FROM CASS KAUFMAN TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided as an update:
"This is an update for the missing gauges previously reported on 7/30/10. The licensee found records of source exchange, which makes this a 30 day reporting event, and not an immediate reporting event as previously stated. The two gauges remain missing."
"This is a follow-up to our conversation a few minutes ago, & to clarify the reporting requirement. These missing gauges are still required to be reported, but within 30 days, rather than immediately. The sources that require reporting are cadmium 109. Now that we have information that the sources were exchanged in February 2006, the activity of Cd-109 is below 1 mCi (the current activity is about 0.85 mCi). So this is required to be reported within 30 days."
Notified R4DO (Hagar) and FSME (Lewis).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46144 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK GREER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 14:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | Event Text UNIT 1 ENTERED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AFTER DECLARING EDG 102 INOPERABLE
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 entered a Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown due to unplanned inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG] 102 during planned maintenance on opposite division Liquid Poison pump 12. In accordance with TS 3.0.1, Limiting Condition for Operation [LCO] Applicability and TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System, normal orderly shutdown commenced at 1551 [EDT] which was within one hour of declaring Emergency Diesel Generator 102 inoperable."
The unplanned inoperability of EDG 102 was caused by the failure of its lube oil circulating pump due to thermal overload. The licensee is pursuing restoration of EDG 102 and the Liquid Poison pump 12 in order to exit the LCO Action Statement.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROY GREEN TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/3/10 @ 2118 EDT * * *
"The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 TS required shutdown was suspended at 1929 [EDT] upon restoration of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 to operable. With operability of EDG 102 restored, Liquid Poison Pump 11 was also made operable. Accordingly, the TS shutdown action for an inoperable liquid poison system was exited. The lowest power level reached was 92.5% of the licensed thermal power limit. Power ascension is in progress, and [the licensee expects] to be at rated power by 2200 [EDT]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46145 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 06:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
THOMAS BLOUNT (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A HIGH LEVEL WATER ALARM
"This is a one-hour report for the discovery of a condition that met an emergency action level (EAL) for a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) but was not determined classifiable until after conditions meeting the EAL level for the NOUE no longer existed. A detailed review of the conditions that existed at 0650 [EDT], on August 3, 2010 during a planned system drain down of the 2A loop of RHR to the northeast diagonal sump met the criteria for an NOUE: EAL HU1 - Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.
"Threshold Value 6 states: 'Exceeding Max Normal Operating Values specified in EOP 31EO-EOP-014-1(2) SC - Secondary Containment Control Table 5 Secondary Containment Operation Water Levels.'
"At 0650 [EDT] on August 3. 2010 the Hatch Unit 2 crew received a HIGH-HIGH-HIGH alarm which is the Max Normal Level described in 31EO-EOP-014-1(2). This occurred during a planned draindown evolution when a valve (2T45-F004) which is required to transfer water from the sump to radwaste failed to open. At 0656 [EDT] on August 3, 2010 the RHR drain valve (2E11- F069A) was closed discontinuing draining into the northeast diagonal sump. It is estimated that no more than 800 gallons of water was in the system and internal flooding was not a significant concern. However, despite the low safety significance, the EAL threshold criteria was technically met and therefore this report is being made.
"This event is a one hour report based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 Section 3.1.1 for a condition that met an EAL and the condition for the classification no longer existed at the time of discovery. A courtesy notification will be made to state and local agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46146 | Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DEDAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 20:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 15:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTION
"On 8/3/10 South Texas Project Unit 2 was in a scheduled A Train work week with the following equipment inoperable for planned maintenance; Essential Cooling Water Pump, Essential Chiller, Component Cooling Water Pump, Engineered Safety Function (ESF) Diesel Generator (DG), High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump, Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump, and Containment Spray (CS) pump.
"At 0754 [CDT] on 8/3/10 the B train sequencer trouble alarm was received. The immediate operability determination was the sequencer remained operable. It was later identified during testing that the sequencer was inoperable. The B train sequencer was declared inoperable at 1506 [CDT] on 8/3/10. Due to loss of the automatic load sequencing support function, all associated train B safety equipment that is sequenced on the B train
14.16 kv bus during a Mode 1 Safety Injection (SI) was also declared inoperable.
"This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the A and B train HHSI, LHSI, and CS pumps. All C train safety injection pumps remained operable. Pending a formal operability determination, this is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure of the accident mitigating function.
"This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The B train trouble alarm, an auto test feature, was discovered by operators during their rounds. The licensee entered their configuration risk management plan within the 1 hour as required. Currently, the licensee is working on completing the scheduled A train maintenance and restoring operability sometime in the morning. Also, a work package is under development to repair the faulty B train sequencer. The risk based time limit for restoring operability requires completion by 0449 [CDT] on 8/8/10.
Unit 1 is unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |