| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/16/2010 - 07/19/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45910 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: LANTHEUS MEDICAL IMAGING
Region: 1
City: NORTH BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0088
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 05/07/2010
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2010
Event Time: 14:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXCEED LIMITS
The following was received via email from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
"Lantheus Medical Imaging (LMI) received a customer complaint on 4/23/10 from a customer (GE Healthcare in Tampa, FL) reporting a reading of 310 mR/hr on a Tc-99m generator that was manufactured on 4/22/10 at the facility in Billerica, MA. On 4/27/10, LMI was able to clarify that the reading was on the package surface rather than on the generator itself.
"The customer reported the situation to the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control on 4/28/10. LMI has been investigating and have not yet found any evidence of a problem with this generator in their manufacturing records. LMI will continue to investigate and will be receiving the generator back from the customer in the next week or so. They will then examine it directly."
The R1DO (Cook) and FSME (Suber) have been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SUMARES TO JOE O'HARA VIA FAX AT 1041 ON 5/10/10 * * *
The Commonwealth clarified their report that the TC-99m generator is actually a Mo-99 generator.
Notified R1DO (Gray) and FSME (McIntosh).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SUMARES TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1213 EDT ON 7/16/10 * * *
The following was received via fax from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
"This updated information is taken from Lantheus Medical Imaging letter dated June 11, 2010.
"Lantheus Medical Imaging received the generator back from the customer on 5/10/10 and performed tests and inspections on the unit. LMI found no evidence of any defect or condition that could have caused the high reading. Their radiation levels measured on 5/10/10 and back decayed for this generator on the day of manufacture was reported as 140 mR/hr. LMI reports there are only two scenarios to explain the high readings:
"1, Migration of Tc-99m activity out to an unshielded section of the fluid path while the generator was in transit. LMI reports that this would involve an as yet unknown failure mode since all required fittings and plugs were in place at time of inspection of the returned generator.
"2. The 310 mR/hr reading is in error, given that the customer reported a normal TI value, (i.e., 4.6 mR/hr measured vs. 5.2 mR/hr label value), a high reading Is difficult to explain, and the customer could shed no light on this apparent discrepancy.
"Based on the reported measurements of the returned generator which were back decay calculated to 140 mR/hr, it appears that the labeled TI value was correct. The customer's TI measurements agreed with the labeled TI value. The Agency [Commonwealth] considers this event to be closed."
Notified R1DO (Joustra) and FSME (Villamar) |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45937 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/20/2010
Notification Time: 01:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2010
Event Time: 16:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) INOPERABLE
"On 5/19/2010 at 1209 CDT, Unit 2 entered Mode 4 from Mode 5 and started realigning RHR from a shutdown cooling to an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) lineup. During this transition, the suction check valves for the RHR pump are tested for safety function closed per the In-service testing program . The valves are closed to provide train separation for the RHR trains and to prevent diversion of flow from suction sources.
"On 5/19/2010 at 1228 CDT, both Unit 2 trains of RHR were declared inoperable due to the failure of the pump suction line check valve for each RHR pump (2RH-3-1 and 2RH-3-2) to meet In-Service Testing (IST) acceptance criteria. Technical Specification 3.5.2 Condition A was entered for inoperability of the one required ECCS train (RHR) in Mode 4 with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg temperatures above safety injection pump disable temperature.
"On 5/19/2010 at 1640 CDT, both RHR pit sump covers were opened to facilitate multiple entries into each sump while performing a revised test procedure to verify the operability of check valves 2RH-3-1 and 2RH-3-2. The pit sump covers are required to be closed in [Modes 1 through 4] for each operable RHR train. Since both trains of RHR were inoperable both covers were opened.
"On 5/19/2010 at 1947 CDT the pit sump cover was closed for one train of RHR.
"On 5/19/2010 at 2005 CDT the revised test procedure was approved and completed satisfactorily. The train of RHR with the pit sump cover closed was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.5.3 Condition A was exited. Both suction check valves passed the closed safety function and a loss of safety function did not occur as originally thought on 5/19/2010 at 1228 CDT.
"On 5/19/2010 from 1640 CDT to 1947 CDT both trains of RHR were inoperable due to both pit sump covers open on both RHR trains. The inoperability of both trains of RHR represents a condition that prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structure or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE (RETRACTION) FROM STEVEN INGALLS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1654 EDT ON 7/16/10 * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract the ENS report made on May 20, 2010 at 0124 hours [ET] (ENS #45937) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The pump suction line check valve for each Unit 2 RHR pump failed to meet acceptance criteria per the in-service testing program. A revised test was performed which demonstrated that the check valves could perform their safety function. The RHR pit covers were removed to facilitate this test. After test completion, it was identified that both trains of RHR were inoperable due to both pit covers being open. However, subsequent review has determined that the condition where pit covers were open did not impair the ability of the RHR system to meet its safety function. Also, there was not a loss of safety function due to the check valve testing issue. Thus, there was no safety system function failure of the RHR system.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R3DO (Dickson) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46103 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 07/16/2010
Notification Time: 20:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2010
Event Time: 16:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO UNISOLABLE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM LEAK
"At approximately 1641 EDT on July 16, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor was manually scrammed due to a large unisolable circulating water system leak in the main condenser area. Attempts to isolate the source of the leakage were unsuccessful. During these attempts, reactor operators lowered reactor power from approximately 90% to about 39%. Based on rising water level in the condenser area and unsuccessful isolation of the source of the leakage, Operations decided to shut down the plant. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown. All control rods [fully] inserted. Reactor water level lowered to -28 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC. No steam relief valves opened. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed and the circulating water system was shut down. Pressure control was initiated using HPCI in the pressure control mode. All safety systems operated as expected. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Actions to isolate and investigate the cause of the circulating water system leakage are underway. Unit 2 continued power operation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be issuing a press release. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46104 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 07/17/2010
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2010
Event Time: 21:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO EMERGENCY SIREN INADVERTENTLY ALARMING
"At 2134 [CDT] on 7/16/2010 the NextEra Energy Duane Arnold control room was informed that an emergency siren in the Cedar Rapids area was alarming with an emergency message. This information came via a local news station stating that they had been receiving several phone calls regarding the siren message.
"No emergency condition existed at NextEra Energy Duane Arnold and the siren appears to have malfunctioned and incidentally relayed the emergency message. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold has informed local media and the Linn County Emergency Director of the malfunctioning siren, and that no emergency condition exists at NextEra Energy Duane Arnold. The single siren (of the 144 total in the local siren system) was deactivated."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 46105 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/18/2010
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2010
Event Time: 14:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
| Event Text 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT ON LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CRITICALITY CONTROL CONTINGENCIES
"At 1407 CDT, on 07/17/2010 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that cracks had been discovered in the C-400 Spray Booth containment pan by Quality Control Inspectors. The floor pan for the spray booth storage tanks, near the hand tables, was found to be inadequate and would allow solution to leak directly onto the concrete floor, in violation of NCSE (Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation) 015. The floor pan is a Safety Related Item that is intended to prevent solution from leaking to the concrete floor beneath the floor pan and accumulating in or creating an unsafe geometry/volume.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC Bulletin 91-01 Supplement 1.
"The process conditions relied upon for double contingency for this scenario are mass and geometry. The first leg of double contingency is based on the mass of uranium in solution form that leaks out of the system. The analysis credits both the integrity of the Spray Booth system and the fact that the tanks and piping are inspected for leakage. Small leaks will be identified and fixed before they have leaked enough uranium mass, in solution form, to be a concern. This control was not violated.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on the integrity of the floor pan to prevent accumulated liquids from leaking to the underlying concrete floor and accumulating in unfavorable geometries that may be present or created under the containment pan. Because a portion of the floor pan was discovered to have a hole, the Safety Related Item was violated; therefore, this control was violated. Pressure was placed on the Spray Booth floor pan in the area around the crack. Based on this inspection, there are no indication of unsafe geometry voids being present or having been created under the floor pan. Because the integrity of the floor pan was not maintained, this leg of double contingency is conservatively being considered as having been lost.
Double contingency is conservatively considered to have been lost since the integrity of the spray booth storage tank floor pan was lost.
"In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a safe mass of fissile material, in solution form, would have to leak out of the system undetected, leak under the floor pan, dissolve the concrete floor, and accumulate in an unsafe geometry.
"While the intended safety function of the Safety Related Item was violated, there was no significant uranium solution leak from the Spray Booth system. Additionally, there are no indications of unsafe geometry voids under the floor pan.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The crack was characterized as through-wall and approximately 9 inches long. Since the pan is flush to the concrete floor it is mounted on, the licensee does not believe that any material has accumulated under the pan. A preliminary inspection of the pan did not reveal any indication of voiding under the pan. The licensee still has not determined if the pan will be lifted to inspect underneath. The crack was found during an annual inspection of the pan. The cause of the cracking is still under investigation. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46106 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICHARD BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/18/2010
Notification Time: 23:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2010
Event Time: 23:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY DUE TO PLANNED AT&T FIBER OPTIC CABLE OUTAGE
"The notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Communication.
"A planned outage of commercial phone lines is scheduled to occur between 0000 and 0800 on Monday, July 19, [2010]. This outage is allowing AT&T to replace phone lines along one of the local roadways. Even though actual work is estimated to take less than four hours, the outage is scheduled for an eight-hour window.
"The impact to the site has been evaluated and the following losses will be experienced.
"Outside Commercial Phone Lines
ENS Line
HPN Line
RSCL
PMCL
ERDS
"This condition is reportable as an event that resulted in a loss of offsite communication capability due to the loss of ENS and HPN. The notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Satellite and Mobile phones are available to allow contact with offsite agencies and personnel. Communications between Emergency Response Facilities (Main Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operation Facility) are available and will not be affected by the outage.
"Information Technology personnel will be at job site and at the plant site during this evolution.
"A follow-up notification will be made following restoration of the communications lines.
"State and affected Local agencies have been made aware of the pending communication outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been made aware of the ENS notification."
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP PRATER TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/19/10 AT 0407 EDT * * *
Notified that planned cable outage is complete.
Notified the R3DO (Dickson). | |