| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/06/2010 - 07/07/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 46061 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: HOLLISTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 10:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A FOUND RA-226 SOURCE
"[A] transfer station for waste disposal detected radioactive material contained in a roll-off container with other debris. [The] debris came from a house clean-out job in Newton Corners, MA. [The] transfer station called Holliston Fire Department who responded with survey instruments capable of identifying radioactive material (RAM). [The]RAM was identified as Ra-226 contained in a device that appeared to be from a WWII vintage aircraft.
"[The] Agency sent an inspector to verify description of RAM trash. [The] inspector confirmed the RAM is Ra-226 contained in an aircraft leveling device. [The] inspector placed the device in a plastic container and sealed [it] with radioactive warning tape. The external dose rate measured 0.1 mR/ hr. The plastic container was placed in secure storage awaiting disposition of RAM. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46065 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GANNETT FLEMING
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: 4195-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HECTOR TABARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 07/02/2010
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2010
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"[The State of Florida] received [a] report from company's RSO at 1030 hrs today that a soil moisture density gauge and case were stolen yesterday July 1st at 1830 hrs from a truck parked in a lot near the MIC Earlington Heights jobsite in Miami. FL. Thief or thieves apparently used bolt cutters or other device to cut chain used to secure transportation locked box which contained said gauge, then took both transportation box and gauge. Miami-Dade police were contacted (case# PD 100701276792). The licensee will offer a reward for information helping in the recovery. The incident was assigned to the Miami Inspection office for investigation. This office will take no further action on this incident."
The Troxler gauge (Model 3440; S/N 23094) contained 40 mCi AmBe and 8 mCi Cs-137.
Florida Incident Number: FL10-079
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46070 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 07/06/2010
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text 60 DAY REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF HPCI AND RCIC SYSTEMS
"Invalid Primary Containment And Vessel Isolation Control System (PCIS) signal results in partial actuation of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components:
"The following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) systems. NUREG-1022, Revision 2, identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"On May 17, 2010, during the Refueling Outage 28 ECCS test control room personnel identified the reactor vessel level was lowering. Valves HPCI-15 and 16 automatically isolated due to an invalid high steam flow isolation signal. The control room personnel immediately started both control rod drive (CRD) pumps as required by procedure. It was determined that the lowering of reactor vessel level was due to water flowing down the HPCI system and RCIC system turbine steam supply lines. The RCIC-15 valve was manually isolated terminating the event. At this time one CRD pump was secured. Acceptable water level in the reactor vessel was maintained throughout the event. The condition has been entered into the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Corrective Action Program for evaluation and implementation of corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
"The high steam flow isolation signal is considered invalid because: 1) At the time of the event, the unit mode switch was in a mode where PCIS was not required; 2) No steam was being generated; and 3) The water flow past differential pressure instrument generated a false high steam flow signal.
"The event is being reported in accordance with 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that as a result of an invalid initiation signal resulted in the actuation of one or more of the systems listed in paragraph 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46072 | Rep Org: TRENTEC
Licensee: RONKEN INDUSTRIES INC
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARION MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 07/06/2010
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PART 21 VIA EMAIL ()
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING FAILURE OF OIL-FILLED CAPACITOR
The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from Trentec dated July 6, 2010.
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The basic component containing the defect is a Ronken oil filled capacitor with a rating of 70 micro Farad-660 VAC @ 60 Hz. The part number is P91D23706H05 with a 06-06 date code (manufactured in 2006). The capacitor is commercially dedicated by Trentec for use in safety related applications. The associated Trentec part number is 7T20701 with a 06-06 date code.
"Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"Trentec, Business Unit of Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation, 4600 East Tech Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45245
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
"The defect pertains to 70 micro Farad capacitors that failed in the inverter circuitry for the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP). The failure of the capacitors was determined by an independent testing lab to be a manufacturing defect in which the internal spot-welded (no solder used) connection points on the capacitors were inadequate and resulted in poor/high resistance connection points which culminated in internal arcing at several of the connection points.
"The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system for each unit consists of two motor driven pumps and one turbine driven pump. The TDAFWP UPS for each unit has an A and B section for system redundancy, with two 70 micro Farad capacitors used in each section. The capacitors currently installed in the Farley 1 TDAFWP UPS B section and Farley 2 TDAFWP UPS B section have the suspect date code (total of four).
"Given a loss of a TDAFWP UPS due to the capacitor failures, together with a single failure of one of the motor driven AFW pumps leaves the one remaining motor driven AFW pump to ensure the reactor coolant system is properly cooled via the steam generators during emergency conditions. However, two of the three AFW pumps are required to satisfy the flow demand for the most limiting associated design basis accidents and transients, i.e., feedwater line break, main steam line break, and loss of main feedwater. Accordingly, the flow demand is needed to mitigate the consequences of these events which can result in over pressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and to prevent uncovering the reactor core and potential radiological releases. Additionally, credit for operation of the TDAFWP is needed for coping with a station blackout event during which the TDAFWP is the only source of AFW.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
"Farley Condition Report 2010107145 was written on May 25, 2010 to determine 10 CFR 21 reportability of the capacitor failures. Trentec Failure Evaluation Plan was written on 6/7/10. Trentec's capacitor evaluation and report was completed 6/30/10.
"In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
"The Ronken 70 micro Farad capacitors with 06-06 date code have only been supplied to the Farley Plant on PO number QP070496 for a quantity of 8 each, shipped 5/11/2007 with Trentec tag number 7T20701.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
"Corrective actions have been scheduled for Farley Maintenance to replace the suspect 06-06 date code capacitors by July 30, 2010.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
"Perform a failure analysis of any recently failed Trentec qualified Ronken 70 micro Farad capacitor to determine proper corrective action. Replace any Trentec qualified Ronken 70 micro Farad capacitor with a date code of 06-06. They should also be removed from stock to prevent their future use.
"In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred"
"Not applicable." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46073 | Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BENJAMIN CHANG
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 07/06/2010
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2010
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POST CONTINGENCY LOW VOLTAGE ALARM RECEIVED FOR OFFSITE POWER
"The Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) Energy Control Center (ECC) notified Ginna Operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm was received for the offsite power system. Ginna Operations entered procedure O-6.9, Operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission, and declared the offsite power inoperable per ITS 3.8.1 [72 hour LCO]. Per NUREG-1022, section 3.2.7, if either offsite power or onsite emergency power is unavailable to the plant, it is reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) regardless of whether the other system is available.
"The RG&E ECC monitors 115 kV voltage using their State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System. The State Estimation portion of the system evaluates real time system power flow and voltages on the 115 and 34.5 kV transmission systems. The Contingency Analysis portion analyzes the voltage effect of a Ginna main generator trip concurrent with worst case accident loading. If the Station 13A voltage would drop below the minimum required voltage for offsite power alignment a Ginna Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm occurs.
"If the main generator should trip, then the absence of a Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm on the RG&E State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System will ensure that the subsequent offsite 115kV system voltage transient will not result in Ginna Station experiencing an under voltage condition on the 480V Safeguard Busses.
"The RG&E ECC notified Ginna operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm cleared at 1311 EDST on 07/06/2010. The plant was maintained at 100% steady state conditions throughout the event. Both circuits remain inoperable but available for use. And will be restored to operable status when the system reliability is assured.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |