| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/29/2010 - 06/30/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45888 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/30/2010
Notification Time: 22:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2010
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LIGHT SOCKET SHORT CAUSES ISOLATION SYSTEMS TO ACTUATE
"At 1648 CDT, while the Control Bay AUO [Auxiliary Unit Operator] was attempting to change a light bulb for 1-IL-99-1AA, 1A [Reactor Protection System] RPS [Motor Generator] MG Set available light, the light socket shorted causing the loss of 1A RPS. The loss of 1A RPS resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiated Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. All systems responded as designed. The Control Room operators entered the appropriate abnormal operating instruction, 1-AOI-99-1, to restore the affected systems. Operations entered TS LCO 3.3.1.1 conditions A.1 (place channel in Trip in 12 hours) and C.1 (restore RPS trip capability in 1 hr). At 1734 CDT, Operations exited TS LCO 3.3.1.1 upon restoration of 1A RPS per 1-AOI-99-1.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) [b. General Containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)], except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM RAY SWAFFORD TO DONG PARK AT 1522 EDT ON 6/29/10 * * *
"Retraction of an 8 hour non-emergency notification for invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation from a loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 1A.
"Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) eight-hour non-emergency report made on April 30, 2010, at 2131 hours Central Daylight Time.
"BFN's initial report was categorized as a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B). The loss of power to RPS 1A resulted in PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. However, plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore, the actuation was invalid. As a consequence, TVA has concluded that this event does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). A 60-day phone call will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). [See EN #46054]
"TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program (PER 227662). TVA has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R2DO (Desai). |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 46051 | Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: NORTH SLOPE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/29/2010
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text SOURCE LOCKING MALFUNCTION OF RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
"On June 29th [at approximately midnight], the radiography crew working the Alpine Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska experienced a malfunctioning locking system on an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 exposure device (serial number 6757).
"During the night shift the locking mechanism tripped prematurely. A survey of the exposure device did not reveal any abnormal readings. When the crank assembly was disconnected it was noted that the pigtail was not in the proper position. A trained technician removed the locking assembly and cleaned dirt from the locking assembly. The exposure device was reassembled with the source in the safe and secure position.
"There was no exposure to the crew or the General Public during this incident."
The IR-100 device uses a 60 Curie Ir-192 source.
Source S/N: P344.
The licensee has informed Region 4. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 46052 | Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: NORTH SLOPE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/29/2010
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2010
Event Time: 01:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text LOCK MALFUNCTION ON A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
"On June 29th [at approximately 0100], the radiography crew working the Alpine Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska experienced a malfunctioning locking system on an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 exposure device (serial number 4814).
"During the night shift the locking mechanism on the exposure device would not operate properly. When the locking latch was depressed the source could not be moved to the exposed position. When retract pressure was applied, the locking device would not 'pop up', it had to be moved manually. The source never left the safe and secure position. The trained radiographer who can work on the locking mechanism decided that the camera would be tagged out and returned to the manufacturer for repair. The camera will be shipped [on today].
"There was no exposure to the crew or the General Public during this incident."
The IR-100 unit uses a 52 Curie Ir-192 source.
Source S/N: P311.
The licensee has informed Region 4. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46053 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/29/2010
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2010
Event Time: 09:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - LICENSED EMPLOYEE CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
"A non-supervisory licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The individual had not entered the protected area and had not performed any licensed duties prior to the event.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector at 1053 hours." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46054 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/29/2010
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2010
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION FROM A LOSS-OF-POWER TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) 1A
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of a written report, under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On April 30, 2010, at 1648 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT) with Unit 1 at 100 percent thermal power, while attempting to change a light bulb, the light socket shorted causing a loss of 1A RPS. The loss resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. BFN's review of the event found that the bulb caused a direct short and caused the loss of RPS 1A. Plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywall pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore the actuation was invalid.
"The affected equipment responded as designed. On April 30, 2010, at approximately 1702 hours CDT Unit 1 operations personnel restored 1A RPS and by 1728 hours CDT, the recovery of the loss of 1A RPS was complete. This event had no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public. The event is documented in the Corrective Action Program (PER 227662).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |