| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/28/2010 - 06/01/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45879 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN OHRENBERGER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/28/2010
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2010
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RCIC DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO OIL LEAK ON GOVERNOR SYSTEM
"On 04/28/10, at 1400 EDT, with the reactor at 100% power, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was declared inoperable by the Shift Manager (SM) due to an oil leak on the RCIC governor control oil system that could have impacted the system performance during the accredited 24 hour mission time. The fitting where the oil leakage was observed was tightened and the machine was placed in service with no leakage identified. Currently the system is operable and in its normal standby lineup. The system was available for use during this time. At no time was there an impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN WHALLEY TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1300 EDT ON 5/28/10 * * *
"On April 28, 2010, at 1940 hours, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) made an 8-hour non-emergency 50.72 notification, Event Notification EN# 45879. The notification was made in accordance with 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Accident Mitigation. Earlier on April 28, 2010, at 1400 hours, a minor oil leak had been identified on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system at a lubricating oil vent fitting. The leak was immediately repaired by properly tightening the fitting, then running RCIC to verify no active leak existed. However in the interim, the Shift Manager conservatively declared RCIC inoperable when the high standard for operability could not be assured by initial system engineering judgment for the impact of the oil leak on RCIC system performance in consideration of mission time.
"Subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that the observed leak, conservatively assumed to be one drop per 3 minutes, would not have impacted RCIC operability for the duration of its required 24 hour mission time. All relevant technical information is documented in the PNPS corrective action system.
"Therefore PNPS is retracting the event notification EN# 45879. The USNRC Resident Inspector Office has been notified of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Dwyer). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45953 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: HILLIS-CARNES ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: INDIANA State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1366
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED TROXLER NUCLEAR GAUGE MODEL 3411; S/N 6343
The following report was received via fax:
"Event Description: On May 24, 2010, the licensee's nuclear gauge operator was working on the road leading to the Pinegrove State Correctional Institution (PSCI). The gauge operator left the jobsite and pulled onto Route 286. While the gauge operator was sitting in traffic, it was noticed that the tailgate was open and the gauge was gone. The gauge operator and local highway construction workers looked for the gauge.
"A guard from PSCI left work at 1400hrs. While traveling on SR 286 in Indiana County. The guard noticed the yellow transport box with radiation symbols along side of the roadway. The guard loaded the box onto a truck and took it to the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) barracks in Indiana, PA. The label noted it contained Cesium-137, thus the PSP requested a local Hazardous Material Team come to the barracks and survey the container.
"Radiation levels appeared normal. The evening of May 24th the PSP, the licensee and a gauge service provider were contacted by DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] Bureau of Radiation Protection [BRP] to assess the situation at the barracks, secure the nuclear gauge, and arrange for the licensee to meet DEP/BRP staff at the PSP barracks the next day to examine the gauge and move it to the licensee's PA facility. Regional DEP staff met the licensee on [May 25th] to perform a radiation survey and conduct an interview. The gauge was released to the licensee by PSP.
"Cause of the Event: The gauge was not secured in the vehicle, and the tailgate was left open as the operator drove the vehicle.
"Actions: DEP performed an investigation on May 25, 2010. After the investigation, the PSP returned the gauge to the licensee. DEP will continue to review the licensee's actions related to this event."
Event report number: PA100005 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45954 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: MIDLAND State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE FOUND IN SCRAP METAL
The following information was received by fax:
"On Friday May 21, 2010 radiation detectors alarmed due to a device containing 200 mCi of Americium [Am]-241 detected at the ATI [Allegheny Technologies Incorporated] Midland [Pennsylvania] facility prior to a charge being loaded into the furnace. On Monday May 24, 2010 an employee from Allegheny Raw Materials (ARM) saw part of a radiation symbol in the off-loaded metal scrap and contacted AHP [Applied Health Physics] when they got high radiation level readings. The scrap metal had passed thru two sets of radiation detection monitors prior to being detected by a rail detection system. When AHP responded, production was stopped at ATI (which uses an electric arc furnace), and AHP checked the three charge buckets, and other areas. The Am-241 gauge was reading about 150 mR/hr on contact. The manufacturer of the device is NDC systems, serial # 295. The device was sold to Magla Corp (NC) [in] January of 1976.
"The device [is] onsite and has been wrapped in lead by AHP. AHP and ATI have labeled the device with a 'caution radioactive material' sign and stored it in a secured room with two chains and two locks."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID No: PA100007
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45955 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: HARSCO METALS AMERICAS
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0038
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ALLOY ANALYZER SHUTTER FAILURE
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: A letter from the Radiation Safety Officer dated May 17, 2010 was received May 21, 2010 by the Department of Environmental Protection explaining the event. Note: an initial review of the letter by PaDEP [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] and NRC Region I noted this was a 30-day NMED reporting [only] per 10CFR30.5(c)(5), but upon further review of 10CFR31.2 and 30.5(b)(2)(ii), it was concluded this event is a 24-hr report.
"Event Description: On May 14, 2010, Harsco Metals identified a failure of the shutter mechanism on a generally licensed portable alloy analyzer during the semi-annual test. The analyzer was a Niton model XLp818 (ser# 6500) with approximately 30 mCi (1.11 GBq) of Americium-241. A licensed contractor attempted to provide a radiation exposure survey and found the device could be operated without utilizing the [trigger switch] safety mechanism. No individuals were in contact with or exposed to the direct beam during this procedure.
"Cause of the Event: Equipment failure
"Actions: The device has been taken out of service and Harsco Metals will contact the device manufacturer for instruction on returning the instrument for repair or replacement. PaDEP considers this a closed incident at this time."
Event Report ID No: PA100006 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45956 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: RADIOLOGY REGIONAL CENTER, PA
Region: 1
City: FT MYERS State: FL
County:
License #: 2923-4
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 05/26/2010
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED LEAK TEST ON CS-137 SOURCE
The licensee gave verbal notification on 25 May 2010 of a leak tested Cs-137 (249.2 microcuries) source that failed. The vial source contained a removable amount of 0.287691 uCi. The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control received a written report on 26 May 2010 from the licensee that the source has been taken out of service and identified. Previous leak test was fine, daily surveys have not shown any contamination to other hot lab surfaces or staff. The licensee will return damaged source to manufacturer. No further action will be taken on this incident.
The location of the incident is 1110 Lee Blvd Lehigh Acres, FL 33972.
The sealed source is a NASI, model # MED3550, serial # 12574.
Incident Report # FL10-069 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45959 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA
Region: 3
City: PAULDING State: OH
County:
License #: 31200640000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/27/2010
Notification Time: 14:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED SHUTTER LOCKING MECHANISM
The following information was obtained from the State of Ohio via email:
"The shutter locking mechanism for the licensee's Rock Belt fixed gauge has failed. The shutter is still functional, but is not capable of being locked. This failure was identified by the manufacturer's service technician during a site visit on 5/6/2010 while they were troubleshooting the electronics unit for this particular fixed gauge.
"The gauge was manufactured by Ohmart/VEGA, Model SH-100, Serial # M-5800, containing a 50 mCi Cs-137 source installed in June 1991. This style of source holder is currently no longer being manufactured and the licensee is working with Ohmart/VEGA to determine possible repair or replacement options."
Ohio Report Number: OH100007 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45960 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 03:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 00:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
"A Unit-2 reactor trip was initiated by a loss of the Unit-2 'B' station service bus. The loss of the 'B' station service bus caused a reactor trip due to the loss of flow on one-of-three loops due to the loss of the 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump. The Auxiliary Feed Water system actuated as expected due to the reactor trip. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 using the appropriate emergency procedure.
"During the transient, the 'B' Reserve Station Service Transformer de-energized and the Unit-2 'H' Emergency Diesel Generator was previously tagged out for planned maintenance. This resulted in the Unit-2 'H' emergency bus being de-energized. The alternate AC diesel generator has been placed in service and is providing power to the Unit-2 'H' emergency bus. The automatic tap changer for the 'C' reserve station service transformer did not work in automatic and had to be manually adjusted to control voltage. Unit-2 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump remains in service.
"All control rods fully inserted on the trip and no relief valves lifted or safety valves lifted in either the primary or secondary systems. The turbine drive and 'B' motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water pumps automatically started and injected into the 'A' and 'B' steam generators on a low level signal. The 'A' motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water pump failed to start due to the loss of the 'H' emergency bus. The 'C' steam generator is being controlled with main feed water though the 'C' main feed regulating valve bypass valve. Decay heat removal is via the condenser steam dumps.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL WHALEN TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1707 EDT ON 5/28/10 * * *
"EN#45960 reported the RPS Actuation (50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)) and AFW System Actuation (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The event occurred at 0003 EDT on May 28, 2010. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered at 0004 hours on May 28, 2010, for inoperable offsite power sources with the 2H emergency diesel generator (EDG) being inoperable per TS 3.8.1. M.
"Update: At the time of the event, the station was experiencing a severe lightning storm. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was returned to auto standby at 0558 hours. At approximately 0942 hours, RCS cooldown to Mode 4 was started on Unit 2. Mode 4 was entered at 1245 hours. The 'A' and 'B' RCPs remain secured in Mode 4. Following repairs and post maintenance testing the 'C' reserve station service transformer (RSST) was declared operable at 1324 hours. This restored two (2) qualified offsite circuits for Unit 1 and one (1) qualified offsite circuit for Unit 2. TS 3.0.3 was cleared at this time on Unit 2. The 'B' RSST remains out of service (OOS) pending repairs and testing. The Unit 2 'B' station service bus remains OOS.
"The 2H EDG previously reported OOS for scheduled maintenance is expected to be returned to service on Monday, May 31, 2010. The alternate AC diesel generator continues to supply power to the 2H emergency bus.
"Limiting action remains for one (1) offsite circuit for Unit 2 being inoperable along with the 2H EDG OOS."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Haag). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45961 | Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES INC
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES INC
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KRIS TUFAROLO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text POST CORROSION ON DCU BATTERIES
The following was received via fax:
C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) received a report from a non-domestic customer who is not a U.S. licensee concerning cracks in positive post seals in C&D 3DCU-9 batteries. As a precautionary measure, C&D has chosen to treat this customer's report in the same manner as if the report involved a defect claim by parties regarding matters subject to 10 CFR Part 21. This defect is believed to affect DCU product line batteries 3DCU-7, 2DCU-9, and 3DCU-9, manufactured in the period January 1993 through May 2008. These batteries are used in class 1E applications.
The facilities affected by this are DC Cook, Nine Mile Point, Grand Gulf, Susquehanna, Columbia, and Sequoyah. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45962 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 21:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION CAUSES REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On Friday April 2, 2010, Unit 1 refueling outage activities were in progress and the 1A RPS/UPS Static Inverter was being removed from service. At 2156 hours, the inverter static transfer switch was placed in 'Bypass' which transferred the load from the inverter to the secondary alternate source. The manual bypass switch was then placed in 'Bypass' which was followed by the RPS/UPS series breakers tripping on an overvoltage condition. The actuation caused a loss of power to the IA RPS/UPS power distribution panel loads which provides power to the Division 1A and IIA RPS relays and Division IA and IIA NS4 relays. This caused primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) to automatically close on more than one system. The IB and IIB channels were unaffected.
"Troubleshooting determined that the secondary, alternate source voltage was 132 VAC which exceeded the overvoltage setpoint of 126 VAC. During outages, the 13kV bus voltages are higher than on-line voltages due to low operating equipment loading on the buses. The secondary alternate source to the inverter is not regulated which can result in greater than normal voltage to the RPS/UPS loads.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuation of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on drywell chilled water (DWCW), reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), and suppression pool cleanup."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45963 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER GRAPES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 09:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed contract supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45964 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/29/2010
Notification Time: 21:16 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2010
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SIGNAL CAUSED CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION
"While operating in Mode 1, 100% rated thermal power (RTP), Wolf Creek received a Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS) caused by Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitor GT RE-33 exceeding the high radiation trip setpoint. There was no containment purge in progress at the time of the CPIS so no containment dampers actuated or were required to actuate. Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS) was also received, as expected, from the actuation of the CPIS. All CRVIS components actuated as required. Review of GT RE-33 identified that the radiation monitor spiked high causing the CPIS then returned to normal values. All other containment radiation monitors are indicating normal values.
"The NRC Resident has been notified of this event by the Licensee."
GT RE-33 is currently removed from service. | |