| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/24/2010 - 02/25/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45713 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: SHELL LUBRICANTS
Region: 4
City: VICKSBURG State: MS
County:
License #: GL-154
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDY FRAISER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/19/2010
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2010
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB (via email) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN UNACCOUNTED FOR GENERAL LICENSE SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Mississippi Division of Radiological Health (DRH) via email:
"Description of Incident: The licensee contracted with a disposal company to dispose of one (1) Industrial Dynamic Model C1-2C FILTEC source holder, Serial No. 555, source. During the disposal company's visit, it was discovered that the source was not in the source holder and could not be accounted for. The facility has changed ownership in the previous years and the records were not well maintained of receipt/transfer and leak tests. The Industrial Dynamic Model C1-2C FILTEC source holder, contained a 100 millicurie Americium-241 source, Serial No. not known.
"Isotope(s): Americium-241
"Activity: 100 millicuries
"Date of Incident : unknown
"Date Reported To DRH: 02-01-10
"Mississippi Incident No.: MS-10001"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45722 | Rep Org: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
Licensee: DUBOSE NATIONAL ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: SENECA State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SANDRA SEVERANCE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 02/24/2010
Notification Time: 14:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2010
Event Time: 06:32 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE STUD ATTACHMENT TO EMBEDED PLATES
"On February 17, 2010, Duke Energy (Duke) completed a reportability determination which concluded that a defect associated with Nelson Stud attachment to embed plates is reportable under Part 21. The embed plates with Nelson studs were procured safety-related from DuBose National Energy Services, Inc. (DuBose) on December 18, 2008. Receipt of the material began as early as August 1, 2009. When delivered to the on-site storage location, it was identified that a Nelson Stud was missing from one of the plates. Follow-up investigation and evaluation identified that automatically timed stud welding procedures/process control weaknesses in the areas of cleanliness and operator/equipment performance have resulted in cold weld joints and weld failures. Duke will provide follow up written notification within 30 days pursuant to Part 21.21(d)(3)(ii).
"Initial Safety Significance: None. The potentially defective embedded plates installed in the Protected Service Water (PSW) Building prior to this discovery have not been placed into service. These plates will be removed, abandoned, or re-engineered prior to placing the system in service. However, the embed plates described were to be used for a variety of QA Condition 1 functions, including reaction points for PSW Building structural steel framing and support/restraint of PSW electrical equipment. Depending upon the installation location of these embedded plates and the number and location of ineffectively attached Nelson studs, this deviation could have created a substantial safety hazard were it to remain uncorrected.
"Corrective Action(s):
"1. Notified vendor (DuBose).
"2. Re-work all embeds by installing a fillet weld on each stud.
"3. Determine whether the installed embeds will be removed, abandoned, re-engineered.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45723 | Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: THOMAS & BETTS
Region: 1
City: TUCKER State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT HALE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 02/24/2010
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
PART 21 GRP EMAIL ()
| Event Text FAULTY LOGIC BOARD FOR CYBEREX 20 KVA INVERTER MODEL AC
The following is a summary of information received via fax:
On or around April 23rd, 2009, PSEG Nuclear LLC at Hope Creek Nuclear Station notified United Controls International (UCI), that they had encountered a problem with a Logic Power Supply circuit board (p/n: 90-41-974313) after installing it in their safety related inverter. This circuit board was a Logic Power Supply printed circuit board used in a Cyberex 20 KVA Inverter model AC.
Upon inspection, PSEG determined that a jumper was missing from the circuit board by comparison to the originally removed board.
The cause of this issue was due to an incorrect bill of materials (BOM) for the circuit board at the manufacturing location.
The affected facility is the Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station. Nine boards were all shipped to PSEG at Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station.
Preventive Actions Taken: The manufacturer, Thomas & Betts, has corrected the Bill of Materials (BOM) to show the jumper installed on this circuit board. Additionally, UCI has enhanced its inspection schedule for these boards by performing a component level inspection of each board against the BOM.
Corrective Actions Taken: Of the nine potentially affected circuit boards - Two circuit boards have been returned to UCI by PSEG and have had the jumpers added and retested. These two were returned to PSEG. Three circuit boards have been verified to have the jumper correctly installed.
Corrective Actions to be taken: There are four suspect circuit boards that have been shipped to PSEG (Hope Creek Nuclear Station) that need to be inspected for the correct jumper. If found to be missing the jumper, then these boards need to be returned to UCI for jumper installation and retesting. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45724 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN MUSSER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/24/2010
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2010
Event Time: 11:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS MAY EXPERIENCE RUNOUT AT LOW STEAM PRESSURES
"At 1140 CST, both of the stations safety related auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps were declared inoperable. The AFW pumps were declared inoperable due to an evaluation that determined that the pumps may experience runout at low steam generator pressures during some design basis events. The stations Technical Specifications require that: 'With both AFW trains inoperable, then initiate actions to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status immediately.' Technical Specification (TS) 2.0.1 and all TS actions requiring MODE change are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.
"The station is aggressively working to develop a solution to return at least one train of the AFW system to operability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SPARGO TO PETE SNYDER AT 2323 ON 2/24/10 * * *
"At 2133 CST, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, FW-10, was declared operable based on an engineering evaluation that determined FW-10 will perform as required under all design basis conditions.
"Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, FW-6, remains inoperable. [The licensee] exited Technical Specification 2.0.1 and 2.5(1)D, and entered TS 2.5(1)B, 24 hour LCO, effective as of 1140 CST."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Lantz).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SPARGO TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0435 ON 2/25/10 * * *
At 0238 CST, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, FW-6, was declared operable per an Engineering Operability Evaluation. [The licensee] exited Technical Specification 2.5(1)B.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Lantz). | |