| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/04/2009 - 12/07/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45424 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TIM CORRIGAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 10/10/2009
Notification Time: 14:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2009
Event Time: 13:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTAINANCE
"Post maintenance operability testing of the 'A' CREF (Control Room Emergency Filtration) subsystem will result in a planned potential loss of safety function for the CREF for a brief period of time when the 'B' CREF subsystem is simultaneously made inoperable during the testing. Clear guidance for timely restoration of the 'B' CREF subsystem, and therefore, CREF safety function is included in the test procedure. An operator will be dedicated to the testing to ensure that the CREF will perform its safety function if required."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1525 EST ON 12/04/09 FROM COOK TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Monticello is retracting the event reported based on further evaluation. An investigation of the event found the removal of the [CREF] system from service was part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing and done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS [Technical Specifications]. In addition, the event would not have prevented the completion of the fulfillment of a safety function since an operator was stationed and briefed that in the event of the start of any transient, the CREF system would be immediately restored to operability and thereby ensure the train would have been available to perform its safety function In its required timeframe. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
R3DO (Riemer) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45532 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ECS-TEXAS LLP
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 12/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2008
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
BILL VONTILL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED NUCLEAR GAUGE NOT INITIALLY REPORTED
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On Monday, February 4, 2008, a technician was attempting to load a gauge on a truck when he dropped the gauge on the tailgate whereupon the index probe broke off and the Cs-137 probe became extended and failed to retract to the shielded position. The gauge was then loaded into the cab of the truck and was delivered to the local site office less than ten minutes from the work site. A service company was notified and within an hour, the source rod was safely retracted into the shielded position. The gauge sources were satisfactory leak tested. No overexposures occurred in this event. The licensee required all gauge users to attend refresher training on nuclear gauge safety and procedures. The licensee was cited for a related violation.
"During a record review, it was discovered that this event was reported to the NRC using the Nuclear Materials Event Database (080192) instead of to the Headquarters Operations Officer.
"Texas Incident #: I-8494" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45541 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/05/2009
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2009
Event Time: 10:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE SUCTION AUTO-SWAP FUNCTION
"On 12-04-09 at 16:00, condensate storage tank (CST) level switch [2E41 N002], was declared inoperable due to not actuating at the correct set point. A RAS [Required Action Statement] was entered to align high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) suction to the suppression pool within 24 hours as required by Tech Spec [Technical Specification] action statement 3.3.5.1.D 2.2. The switch was found stuck and was freed up after manual manipulation and tripped correctly during a functional test. It was decided on 12-05-09 to perform a calibration on the level switch prior to declaring it operable.
"During performance of calibration procedure 57CP-CAL-012-2 at 1059 EST on 12-05-09, a jumper was installed that rendered the HPCI and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) auto-transfer suction swap from CST to suppression pool inoperable. This is a loss of function for the initiation capability of HPCI and RCIC CST low level suction swap instrumentation. This loss of function was not discovered until 1330 on 12-05-09, at which time TS [Technical Specification] 3.3.5.1.D was entered for HPCI and TS 3.3.5.2.D for RCIC, until HPCI and RCIC suction were manually aligned to the suppression pool which allowed the plant to exit the required actions to declare HPCI and RCIC inoperable within 1 Hour. HPCI and RCIC were aligned to the suppression pool at 1341 EST.
"The RCIC suction was realigned to the suppression pool as required by the Tech Specs in order to restore its operability. It should be noted that no credit is taken for RCIC in the safety analysis nor is this system considered an ESF system. For this reason there are no reporting requirements associated with the inoperability of RCIC. HPCI was declared inoperable in accordance with the instrumentation Tech Specs, but during this time frame HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. However- additional review will be needed to confirm that HPCI could have operated for the duration of its mission time of 4 hours while aligned to the condensate storage tank. Absent that information this report is being made due to HPCI being declared inoperable until its suction was realigned to the suppression pool. This assumed loss of function for HPCI is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) since a final determination has not been made that HPCI would have continued to perform its safety function for the required mission time while aligned to the CST."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |