| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/30/2009 - 10/01/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45382 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BETABATT
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: L-05961
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/25/2009
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2009
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE OF TRITIUM
"On September 1, 2009, the Agency [Texas DEH] received a call from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control notifying them that during a routine inspection of a facility in Florida, they found tritium contamination on and outside of a container that contained a prototype tritium battery sent to them by a company in Alvin, Texas. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at the Texas facility was contacted by the this Agency. The RSO stated that the facility had shipped two of the six batteries they had made from their facility to Florida. He stated that they had not had contamination issues in the past with these batteries and he believed the contamination event was caused by the testing facility when they opened the outer battery housing to determine the cause of a failure. He stated that they had not experienced any significant contamination issues at their facility.
"On September 18, 2009, in response to additional information provided by the State of Florida, an Agency [Texas DEH] inspector conducted an onsite investigation at the facility in Alvin. The inspector performed a removable contamination survey in the area where the batteries are handled and stored. During his investigation of the event, the inspector learned that the seven batteries were manufactured in a city outside of the State of Texas. One was shipped to the facility in Florida directly, and six were shipped to the facility in Alvin, Texas.
"On September 24, 2009, the Agency [Texas DEH] received notification that the results of the tritium survey done at the facility indicated all swipes exceeded the limit for unrestricted use. The Agency [Texas DEH] contacted the licensee and informed the licensee of their results. Documents regarding previous radiological surveys for the battery storage area, leak test of the 3D diodes, receipt survey on the six 3D diodes that were sent from the manufacturer, and any Bioassays that have been performed on their staff were requested from the licensee.
"On September 25, 2009, at 12:45 PM (local) the Agency [Texas DEH] was notified by the licensee that the area had been isolated and that decontamination work would go on for an undetermined period of time. The licensee has begun providing the requested information. Updates will be provided as additional pertinent information is obtained."
Texas Incident #I-8668.
See also Event Notification #45358 for the notification made by the State of Florida on the same event. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45385 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: 388-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/28/2009
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2009
Event Time: 13:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following agreement state report was received via e-mail:
"On September 25, 2009 (at approximately 14:45 MDT), the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment was notified by the RSO for Team Industrial Services that a source disconnect had occurred within the prior 1-2 hours at a temporary jobsite located in Rifle, Colorado. The source remained disconnected at the time the RSO made the notification to the Department as no personnel working in the area were trained for source recovery operations. Once the radiographer in charge at the jobsite realized that a disconnect had occurred and the source could not be returned to the radiography device, the source was cranked/pushed out to the collimator to provide additional shielding.
"The RSO reported that the radiographer and radiographer assistant involved in the source disconnect had received approximately 1 mrem up to and including the time of the source disconnect. According to the RSO, the temporary jobsite was located adjacent to an oil or gas drilling rig site, but radiography operations were located at a sufficient distance so as not to impact other non-radiography personnel (members of the public) working in the vicinity. Additional (licensee) radiography crews working in the Rifle, CO area were dispatched to the jobsite where the disconnect had occurred to provide additional support and access control.
"On September 26, 2009 (at approximately 11:08 am MDT), the licensee notified the Department that the source recovery had been successfully completed by the RSO at about 1:30 am MDT that morning. The personnel involved in the source recovery - including the RSO - had received approximately 8 mrem each based upon pocket dosimeter readings.
"The event involved a radiography device containing 35.6 curies of Ir-192. The source had been in use for several months and the source was nearing the end of its useful life. The radiography device involved in the disconnect was a Sentinel Delta 880 (Serial #D4309) containing approximately 35.6 Ci of Ir-192. The Ir-192 source was a Model 424-9, Serial #53922B.
"The Department [Colorado Department of Health] recommended to the licensee that the device and source be returned to the manufacturer for further evaluation. The licensee is expected to submit a written report to the Department within 30 days of the incident.
"Colorado Incident #I09-19" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45389 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 20:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING RESPONSES
"At 15:09 CDT, today the Technical Support Center ventilation system stopped running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is suspected to be an interlock between the fire detection system and the ventilation unit. The cause of the this condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JULIE BISSEN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1314 EDT ON 9/30/09 * * *
Technical Support Center ventilation system is now functional and is available for Emergency Planning Responses.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Mike Shannon) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45391 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 23:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNIT 2 MANUALLY SCRAMMED AFTER TRIP OF AN OPERATING CONDENSATE PUMP AND RAPIDLY LOWERING RVWL
"On 9/29/09, at 2323 [hours] Unit 2 was manually scrammed due to loss of one of the remaining two Condensate Booster Pumps due to low pump suction pressure. The cause for the Condensate Booster Pump low suction pressures is unknown at this time, but is under investigation. The operating crew was removing feedwater pump 2B from service when the condensate booster pump tripped. The condensate booster pump 2C was already out of service to support maintenance. After the reactor was scrammed manually, reactor water level lowered below the automatic scram set point (+2 inches) and below the automatic start for HPCI and RCIC (-45 inches). All expected Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation valves operated as required, isolation groups 2, 3, 6 and 8 were actuated. Both reactor recirculation pumps tripped due to the low reactor water level. HPCI and RCIC actuated as expected to restore reactor water level. Reactor pressure control was maintained on the turbine bypass valves, and no Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) were opened as a result of the transient.
"At this time the unit is stable in mode 3. Reactor water level is being controlled using one Reactor Feedwater pump. HPCI and RCIC have been returned to standby readiness. Reactor pressure is being automatically maintained by the main turbine bypass valves.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) (ECCS discharge to the reactor and Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation) and as an 8 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) (specified system actuations)."
Lowest observed Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was -50 inches. Following actuation of HPCI level recovered to +51 inches and then returned to the normal operating band of +33 inches. Safety-related equipment out-of-service prior to the scram included Core Spray Loop 1. All control rods fully inserted. Unit 2 is in a normal post scram electrical lineup.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and does not plan a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HUNTER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1508 ON 9/30/09 * * *
"The initial notification made at 0409 hours ET on September 30, 2009, reported that the RCIC system actuated as expected in conjunction with the HPCI to restore Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level. However, during a review of plant data, BFN [Browns Ferry Nuclear] determined that after receiving a valid actuation signal, RCIC failed to inject to the RPV. The cause of the failure is under investigation.
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of the update and does not plan a press release."
Notified R2DO(Ernstes). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45392 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF TODD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION FROM A SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY TEST SIGNAL
"On Sunday September 20, 2009 @ 1800 hrs EDT the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and performing testing for Containment Ventilation Isolation. A jumper was installed per operations procedure 14238-1 for this testing. The jumper was inadvertently dislodged resulting in a B Train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). There was not a valid radiation alarm signal present; only a test signal. Per Technical Specification 3.3.8 this function is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The actuation occurred during a maintenance activity and was not from a valid signal.
"This is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) based on the following: Per 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid and: (i) Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii) Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.'
"The event occurred during a surveillance activity and resulted in an invalid actuation from a test signal. The actuation was invalid and the system was not removed from service during this activity. The actuation was considered complete and successful. The CVI signal for Train B automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45394 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2009
Event Time: 11:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SHUTDOWN DUE TO HYDROGEN IN-LEAKAGE TO STATOR WATER COOLING SYSTEM
"At 11:09 EDT 09/30/09, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 122 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected.
"The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram all Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable, and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45395 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRUBAKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2009
Event Time: 15:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
"Voluntary notifications, a press release, and a webinar are being made to various government agencies and the media to provide information regarding the installation of temporary structures on top of earthen embankments of the Fort Loudoun, Tellico, Cherokee and Watts Bar dams. These dams are on the Tennessee River System. Recent upgraded flood modeling indicates that there is a possibility for overtopping to occur on these dams during a hypothetical extreme flooding scenario in the winter/spring period. As a precautionary measure, TVA is effectively raising the height of some of the dams in certain areas. These precautionary measures ensure that the TVA nuclear sites (Sequoyah, Watts Bar and Browns Ferry) will remain within their original licensing basis.
"Currently, Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 (DPR-77 & 79) and Browns Ferry Units 1 & 3 (DPR-33 & DPR-68) are operating at 100% power, Browns Ferry Unit 2 (DPR-52) is in Mode 4. Watts Bar Unit 1 (NPF-90) is shutdown for refueling."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors at each of these sites. The licensee's corporate management is issuing a press release. | |