| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/21/2009 - 09/22/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45358 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: ORLANDO State: FL
County:
License #: 3137-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/17/2009
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE OF TRITIUM
The following report was received from the State via facsimile:
"Leaking sealed source containing tritium was discovered by state inspector during routine inspection. Lab technician was bio assayed (urine) and an activity level of 1.25 E5 p/Ci per liter was reported. REAC/TS has been notified. [The device containing the tritium source] belongs to a company in Texas, BetaBatt, [whose] license number is L05961. This office [State] is still investigating."
Florida report number - FL09-064 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45370 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JULIOUS WHITWORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MAJOR LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
"At 1826 on Sept 20, 2009, a lightning strike caused a disruption of power to offsite communications. At 1853, ENS communications from Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to the NRC were verified. At 2129, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was notified the ERDS was not linked to the CECC (Offsite Emergency Operating Facility) or the NRC. At 2218, it was discovered the NRC could not contact Sequoyah Nuclear Plant by the ENS, but Sequoyah Nuclear Plant could still contact the NRC using ENS. At 2240, backup phone communications with satellite phone and cell phones were established between Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and the NRC. Efforts are in progress to restore power to the communications NODE building to restore normal communications."
At 0155 the NRC verified 2 way communications via ENS with the licensee.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45371 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"Planned preventive maintenance and testing activities are being performed on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system on September 21, 2009. These maintenance activities include the performance of preventive maintenance on the TSC air handling unit, condensing unit and fan and testing of the filter train. These work activities are planned to be completed within the (12) hour day shift on 9/21/2009.
"During the time these activities are being performed, the TSC air handling unit, TSC condensing unit, TSC filter train and the fan unit for the TSC filter train will not be available for operation. As such, the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of this work activity. If an emergency condition occurs during the time these work activities are being performed which requires activation of the TSC, the contingency plan calls for utilization of the TSC, as long as radiological conditions allow for habitability of the facility. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC so that TSC functions can be continued.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM URQUHART TO PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 9/21/09 * * *
Maintenance to the TSC has been completed and the TSC is fully functional.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
R2DO (Bonser) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45372 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 05:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text TRANSPORT OF A POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL OFFSITE
"Earlier this morning, a contract worker fell from a ladder inside the Unit One Containment. The distance fallen is estimated to be eight and one half feet. First Responders arrived at the individual and after examining him secured him to a backboard, after which he was carried from [the] containment. Health Physics Technicians were not able to survey the individual's back since he was strapped to the back board. The ambulance containing the individual exited the PA [Protected Area] at 0551 and a Health Physics Technician accompanied the individual to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital and examination by a physician, the Health Physics Technician was allowed to fully check the individual and determined that there was no contamination present.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) since it could not be positively determined that the injured individual was not contaminated when he was transported off site."
The individual has been released from the hospital.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45373 | Rep Org: BAYER CROPSCIENCE
Licensee: BAYER CROPSCIENCE
Region: 1
City: INSTITUTE State: WV
County:
License #: 47-04373-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 3006663
NRC Notified By: EDWARD GAZDIK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN
"On Sept 21, 2009, [the licensee discovered] a stuck shutter on an ammonia tank (top) in the catalyst area. The gauge is an Ohmart Model SH-F2, Serial 64692, containing 800 millicuries of Cesium-137. The gauge was originally installed in 2006. The stuck shutter was discovered during a routine 6 month shutter check on Sept 18, 2009. The technician tried to electrically close the shutter, but was unable to do so. [The licensee has] scheduled a service provider for repair within the week. The source is safely mounted on the side of a tank, [and the licensee] expects no exposure to occur. The Ohmart manufacturer was contacted." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45374 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 13:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNPLANNED MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING REACTOR STARTUP
"At 1227 EDT, a reactor startup was commenced on Unit 2. Mode 2 was entered at 1325 EDT. At 1333, a Reactor Control Operator noted that Primary Safety Valve V1202 had indications that it was leaking past its seat. Plant procedures required reducing RCS [Reactor Coolant System] pressure in 100 psi increments until the safety reseated. This event required the plant pressure to be reduced to 200 psi below Normal Operating Pressure. Prior to commencing the depressurization, a manual reactor trip was ordered by the Unit Supervisor as discussed in the pre-evolution brief. The unit was in Mode 2 approaching criticality at the time of the trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby.
"The reactor trip was uncomplicated. All equipment operated as expected. Main feedwater remained available during the entire event. Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves remained in service during the entire event.
"Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remained at full power.
"The grid remained stable throughout the event."
All control rods fully inserted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45375 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 19:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 14:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION AFTER PLACING HPCI SYSTEM INSERVICE
"On September 21, 2009, at 14:46 EDT, Unit 1 received valid actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Primary Containment Isolation System. Unit 1 was non-critical, operating in Mode 3, when a RPS actuation occurred. Operators were placing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system in service for reactor pressure control, when a resulting water level shrink caused level in the Reactor Pressure Vessel to drop to Low Level 1 causing the actuation of RPS and the Primary Containment Isolation system. The HPCI system was secured, and level stabilized in the normal band.
"Primary Containment Isolation system Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 8 (i.e., RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolation signals were received. RHR was not in shutdown cooling at the time of the isolation signal. Actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed, with the following exceptions: Two Group 2 valves (1-G16-F003 and 1-G16-F019) and two Group 6 valves (1-CAC-V6 and l-CAC-V9) did not automatically isolate and were manually isolated from the control panel. Investigation is under way to determine why these valves did not automatically close.
"Unit 1 was non-critical, in Mode 3, with all rods inserted at the time of the event. The four primary containment isolation valves that did not automatically close did not create an unisolated primary containment penetration. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), along with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), were operable and available."
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |