| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/18/2009 - 09/21/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45351 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: CAPITAL X-RAY
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: OK-11114-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/15/2009
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE EVENT
The following was provided by the State via e-mail:
"A radiographer assistant employed by the company for about ten months may have been overexposed. The licensee processes dosimetry every two weeks. The employee's badge for 8-1 to 8-15 returned a reading of 3.077 rem deep dose for the two week period. This placed the employee's total exposure for the calendar year at 3.93 rem. The licensee removed the worker from being involved with licensed materials and initiated an investigation. The worker's badge for 8-16 to 8-31 had already been submitted for processing. On 9/3/09, the licensee was contacted by the dosimetry provider and informed that the worker's deep dose for 8-16 to 8-31 was 12.542 rem. This placed his total annual dose at 16 rem. No unusual exposures on the worker's pocket dosimeter had been recorded at any time. The dosimetry provider indicates the badge exposures are 'irregular'.
"The licensee contacted Oklahoma DEQ and initiated a thorough investigation. During the period in question, the radiographer assistant had worked with only one radiographer. All work was done at temporary job sites at industrial facilities. The radiographer and assistant insisted that there had been no unusual events or possibility of exposure, that the worker's alarming rate meter had not alarmed, and that pocket dosimeter readings for the period had been normal. The worker insisted he had not been exposed, and he believed someone else had exposed his dosimetry. The company does not allow assistant radiographers to have keys to cameras, and the worker is not approved for unescorted access to IC quantities of radioactive material. Both workers agreed that the assistant radiographer had never had a key to a camera, but investigation revealed that the assistant radiographer had left the worker alone with the unlocked camera while he went to the restroom. The licensee has counseled the radiographer not to do this, and has informed all radiography staff that assistant radiographers must not be left alone with unlocked radiography cameras. The licensee has contacted local medical assistance, and is told that because of the (relatively) low level of the exposure, and it being spread into at least two components, locally-available blood testing will not reliably detect the exposure.
"Since receipt of the dosimetry report, the licensee is not allowing the worker to work near radioactive materials or x-ray. The licensee does not believe the worker was actually exposed to radioactive material, and wants to use chromosome analysis to test this theory. The State has encouraged the licensee to take steps to investigate whether the exposure was to the badge only, or to the worker." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45356 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM TODD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/17/2009
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2009
Event Time: 13:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER FUNCTIONALITY OUT OF SERVICE
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirement Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The backup power supply functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) will be out of service due to planned maintenance on the SAS Battery. Pre job briefings and steps for restoration in case of emergency have been included in the work plan. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned Maintenance activity."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0355 EDT ON 9/18/09 FROM SWEAT TO HUFFMAN * * *
"In reference to EN# 45456, Plant Vogtle Technical Requirement Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 has been exited. The backup power supply for the Technical Support Facilities (TSC) has been returned to service and Is now fully functional."
R2DO (Bonser) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45361 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN HUFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INOPERABILITY OF BOTH EDG'S DUE TO VALVE FOUND OUT OF POSITION
At 02:00 on Friday, September 18, 2009, the Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve, which is required to be open, was discovered closed. At 10:30 on Friday, September 18, 2009, it was determined that with the valve closed, the EDG Air Jet Assist may not be able to support the EDG fast speed start to meet the EDG's Operability requirements. This condition renders the Unit 2 AB EDG inoperable. The valve was repositioned and verified open at 02:15 on Friday, September 18, 2009, restoring the EDG to operable status. Similar valves were verified to be in the correct position on all other EDGs in both Units.
The Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve was last confirmed open on July 21, 2009. The time the valve became closed is not known. Since July 21, 2009, there have been 3 periods of inoperability for Unit 2 CD EDG, the redundant Emergency Diesel Generator. During each of these periods, both of the Unit 2 EDGs are assumed to be inoperable. The periods are as follows:
August 10, 2009 at 09:31 until August 10, 2009 at 23:00
August 11, 2009 at 07:30 until August 11, 2009 at 23:16
September 9, 2009 al 00:02 until September 9, 2009 at 04:40
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) due to the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45362 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 14:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY A NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR
A non-licensed contractor failed to report derogatory information to the licensee at the time of processing. Upon discovery of the discrepancy, the contractor's plant access was terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 45364 | Rep Org: HILLIS-CARNES ENGINEERING ASSOC
Licensee: HILLIS-CARNES ENGINEERING ASSOC
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: VA
County:
License #: 19-30304-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 16:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
JACK FOSTER (FSME)
| Event Text TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED
A Hillis-Carnes operator was conducting a density test along a portion of the Fairfax County Parkway project on Fort Belvoir property when the gauge was backed over by a pick-up truck. Hillis-Carnes technician was 10-15 feet from the gauge when the incident occurred but could not get the driver's attention in time for him to stop. The gauge (Model No. 3411-B, Serial No. 15826) with 8 mCi of Cs-137 (Serial No. 50-4850) and 40 mCi of Am 241:Be (Serial No. 47-11222) was hit by the under carriage of the vehicle while in the testing mode with the source rod extended to a depth of 8 inches. The depth rod was snapped off the gauge and the source rod remained intact. However, the source rod was slightly bent which prevented the rod from being lifted to the shielded position.
The area was immediately cleared to a minimum distance of 30 feet. Local emergency responders were the first on the scene and surveyed the area. The RSO was not on site at this time but was informed that survey readings were taken, and the levels indicated the sources were not leaking. The responders recommended the area remain cleared until personnel arrived that could address removing the gauge properly.
Hillis-Carnes attempted to contact their 24-hour emergency response service without success. The RSO was also informed by the NRC that the emergency contact numbers did not work. Subsequently, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) representative was contacted by Fort Belvoir representatives to come to the site.
Upon arrival, USACE surveyed the area. No readings were recorded at 30 feet from the gauge (established safe zone), however a reading of 10mr/hr was obtained at contact with the gauge. The RSO and USACE discussed opinions for temporary packaging of the device. It was determined that the gauge would be placed in a 55 gallon drum, sandwiched in soil. The NRC was contacted on this course of action and it was subsequently approved.
The drum was partially filled with soil, then the gauge was lifted from it's test location and immediately embedded into the loose soil with the source rod down the center of the drum. Additional soil was placed over the gauge. Survey readings over the soil in the drum and around the perimeter of drum were 8 mr/hr each. Additionally, the in-place soil was surveyed with 12 to 14 MicroRem obtained at the test location and background noted to be 10 MicroRem. Only individuals with personal monitoring badges were permitted within the 30 foot safety area during the packaging of the gauge.
The drum was transported and placed in an on-site storage container and subsequently surveyed again by USACE. Readings at this point were taken at 30 inches from the container and noted to be 2 mr/hr. The storage container is labeled with radiation placards and labeling was added to the drum. The container was locked and the door barricaded with construction equipment.
Today [9/19/09], the RSO contacted Northeast Technical Services in Westminster, Maryland. They indicated that they could be on-site today to take care of properly packaging and shipping the gauge. It is to be transported to their facility. The RSO contacted others involved in the on-site activities from last evening and it was determined that the USAG [United States Army Garrison] Fort Belvoir Army Radiation representative has not been involved in the actions to date. Army representative wanted the removal of the gauge to be postponed until midday on Monday, September 21st, until the representative could be involved. Northeast Technical has subsequently been scheduled for midday Monday. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 45365 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: JOE BARLETTO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/19/2009
Notification Time: 21:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2009
Event Time: 13:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Event Text HIGH VOLTAGE PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTOR RENDERED INOPERABLE
"At 1323 CST, on 09-19-09 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that C-315 (Tails Withdrawal facility) High Voltage Process Gas Leak Detector (PGLD) YE-10-2-6 was rendered inoperable during asbestos abatement activities. This PGLD system contains detectors that cover the C-315 UF6 condensers, accumulators, and piping heated housing. At the time of this failure, these areas were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.3.4.4 requires that all detector heads in this system be operable during operations above atmospheric pressure. This PGLD System was declared operable and returned to service at 1359 hours, which is within the one hour required by TSR LCO 2.3.4.4.A.1 to enter a continuous smoke watch. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i).
"This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. Once the reason for the failure was identified, the detector was repaired, the C-315 High Voltage PGLD system was tested and declared operable.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-09-2284
PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-15 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45366 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 05:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 01:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"At 0130 the 800 MHZ radio [control] system failed to the 'fail soft' mode rendering all [73] emergency notification sirens inoperable. At 0305 courtesy call notifications were made to the county control centers (Calvert, Dorchester, St. Mary's and MEMA).
"The backup system was placed in service and 800 MHZ radio and ENS sirens restored to operable status at 0526 9/20/09."
Maintenance work to restore the primary system will occur today.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45367 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 05:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL AUTO START DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"This report is being made due to an auto start of the Red Train Emergency Diesel Generator (2K-4A) which was the result of an unplanned loss of power to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) during surveillance testing. Concurrent with the loss of power, Shutdown Cooling Flow was temporarily lost.
"This condition occurred with the unit in Mode 5 during a refueling outage. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressurizer level was 85 percent and RCS temperature was 139 degrees Fahrenheit. During the momentary loss of power, 2A3 automatically shed its loads as designed. This caused the running Shutdown Cooling Pump (Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P-60A) to secure which resulted in a loss of Shutdown Cooling Flow to the RCS for approximately three and a half minutes. Shutdown Cooling was restored using the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure. RCS temperature rose approximately five degrees Fahrenheit.
"During the performance of planned surveillance testing, 2K-4A was unexpectedly auto started. An Offsite Power Transfer Test was being performed to test automatic transfer from Startup 3 Offsite Transformer to Startup 2 Offsite Transformer. The transfer was initiated by momentarily bypassing (jumpering) a relay. When the test was initiated, a slow transfer of the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A1) occurred instead of the expected fast transfer. The slow transfer of 2A1 resulted in a momentary loss of power, for approximately two seconds, to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) which is supplied from 2A1. The under voltage condition on 2A3 caused 2K-4A to auto start, as designed. 2K-4A did not power 2A3, since 2A3 was powered from 2A1 after the slow transfer completed."
The cause of the slow transfer versus a fast transfer is under investigation.
The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Health and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45368 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 40 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF DIESEL GENERATOR
"Event reportability, is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Technical Specification Required Shutdown, due to inoperability of Diesel Generator #4 extending from planned maintenance.
"Brunswick Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 are initiating unit shutdowns in anticipation of Technical Specification Required Shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition H due to the inoperability of Diesel Generator #4 lasting longer than seven (7) days. Power reduction commenced at 1400 on Unit 1, and is scheduled to commence at 2200 09/20/2009 on Unit 2 in accordance with site procedures. Both units will continue the shutdown to Mode 4 or until the emergency diesel generator is declared operable following appropriate repairs and testing."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45369 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JOHN PIPKIN JR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 17:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRC PUMP TRIP
"At 1747 hours on September 20, 2009, at River Bend Station, during plant shut down for a planned outage, an unplanned manual reactor scram was initiated by plant operators. As part of the planned shutdown, the reactor recirculation pumps were being transferred from fast to slow speed. This transfer did not occur as expected. Instead, the pumps tripped to off. After this occurred, the operators entered the manual reactor scram. Power level was approximately 23 percent at the time of the scram. All other plant equipment and systems performed as expected. Plant personnel are investigating the cause of the pump trip. The plant is proceeding with planned outage activities."
All rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via main steam drains and bypass valves to the condenser. Reactor pressure is at 200 psig. The electrical lineup is normal and all safety related equipment is available if required. No safety or relief valves lifted during the manual scram.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45370 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JULIOUS WHITWORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MAJOR LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
"At 1826 on Sept 20, 2009, a lightning strike caused a disruption of power to offsite communications. At 1853, ENS communications from Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to the NRC were verified. At 2129, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was notified the ERDS was not linked to the CECC (Offsite Emergency Operating Facility) or the NRC. At 2218, it was discovered the NRC could not contact Sequoyah Nuclear Plant by the ENS, but Sequoyah Nuclear Plant could still contact the NRC using ENS. At 2240, backup phone communications with satellite phone and cell phones were established between Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and the NRC. Efforts are in progress to restore power to the communications NODE building to restore normal communications."
At 0155 the NRC verified 2 way communications via ENS with the licensee.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |