| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/15/2009 - 05/18/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44923 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 07:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 01:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INITIATION FOLLOWING PLANNED MANUAL SCRAM
"At 0121 on Saturday, March 21, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 18% rated power in preparation for Refueling Outage 20. The plant scram was a planned evolution. Following the manual scram insertion at 0121, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level. At 0123, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwater coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
All control rods fully inserted. Electrical lineup is normal and there are no safety equipment out of service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN FINCH TO JOE O'HARA AT 1611 ON 5/15/09 * * *
"Event notification 44923 is being retracted after further evaluation because it has been determined that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation was part of a pre-planned sequence.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) requires that any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in this section, including a feedwater injection system, must be reported within 8 hours. Except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
"The HPCI actuation that occurred after the manual scram from 18% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) was part of a pre-planned sequence in accordance with an operating procedure on plant shutdown. The HPCI initiation was also discussed during Just-in-Time training for the operating crew prior to performance of the soft shutdown.
"At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate systems. The HPCI system is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor water level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to reactor water level shrink."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Holody). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 45053 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: CHERYL GOFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 05/11/2009
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2009
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
LARRY CAMPBELL (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP - Email ()
| Event Text CONCURRENT REPORT - VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY NOTIFIED OF WASTE TREATMENT RELEASE
"On May 10, 2009 at about 0215, Waste Treatment operations began pumping sanitary sludge from the sanitary sludge holding tank to the Low Level Radioactivity (LLR) press. This is accomplished by activating an air-actuated diaphragm pump which suctions from the holding tank and discharges to the LLR press. Observations by area operators both at the press and the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) display showed no abnormal conditions.
"Near or around 0345, area security officers notified the area operators that liquid was accumulating on the ground under the sanitary sludge holding tank. The operator attending to the reported release observed a leak on the discharge side of the diaphragm pump. The pump was halted and the isolation valve at the bottom of the holding tank was closed to halt the release.
"Plant supervision was promptly notified and efforts were initiated to contain the release using absorbent pads and dikes. Most of the liquid was contained and pumped back into the sanitary system, and approximately 10-20 gallons drained to the system Final Effluent Pond (FEP 601). No liquid was observed to have been released to the James River.
"On May 11, 2009 at approximately 8:30 am, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was notified of the release both verbally and by email. This notification was performed to satisfy the notification requirements contained in the current site Virginia Pollutant Discharge Eliminations System (VPDES) permit for unanticipated bypasses of treatment systems. Notification is required verbally (within 24 hours) and in writing (within 5 days) upon discovery of the circumstances surrounding the bypass.
"There were no radiological concerns with this event."
The licensee will contact the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45059 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NODARSE & ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: WEST PALM BEACH State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER | Notification Date: 05/12/2009
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUR TROXLER GAUGES FOUND MISSING
The State of Florida provided the following via fax:
"[The licensee RSO] found 4 Troxler gauges missing from [a] storage facility [located in Winter Park, FL] on 12 May 2009. [The] gauge handles were locked, also a second lock to [the] structure and door was locked to storage room [when last checked by the licensee]. [The] owner is contacting local police department and will offer an award. [The Florida Bureau of Radiation Protection] Orlando Inspection Office will investigate."
The four Troxler gauges each contained 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sources. Three of the Troxler gauges were Model 3430 (S/N: 29922, 35106, and 35474), and the fourth Troxler gauge was a Model 3440 (S/N: 23037).
Florida Incident Number FL09-042.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45062 | Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: GEORGIA DEPT OF TRANSPORATION
Region: 1
City: ATLANTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA50-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC JAMESON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 05/13/2009
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2009
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The licensee reported to the State that a vehicle transporting a Troxler gauge (Model 3430, s/n 38185) was involved in a traffic accident in Perry, GA along Highway 341, Mile Marker 3. The licensee's RSO is enroute to the site. The licensee indicated there was no harm to personnel. The gauge contained both a 40 mCi Am-241/Be source and a 8 mCi Cs-137 source. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45069 | Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 03:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 01:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE
"On May 15, 2009 Indian Point Unit 3 initiated a manual Reactor Trip at 0153 in response to a failure of 33 Main Feed Regulating Valve. 33 Main Feed Regulating Valve failed open causing 33 Steam Generator Level to rise. A manual Reactor Trip signal was inserted when it was determined that the level rise in 33 Steam Generator could not be corrected. As a result of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically actuated per plant design. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3.
"This results in a condition that resulted in an actuation of the Reactor Protection System which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
All rods inserted during the trip. There were no relief or safety valves that lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup. The plant is being maintained at normal operating temperature and pressure using steam dumps to condenser to remove decay heat. Unit 2 was not affected by the trip.
The licensee notified the New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 45070 | Rep Org: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Licensee: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: SNM-362
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM MENGERS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION FOUND ON MODIFIED SEALED SOURCE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"One of the research projects at NIST involves research and testing of different types of bomb detection instruments. One of the experiments required that the source be removed from one of the instruments. Prior to January 2008, Researcher 1 spoke to the RSO for Smiths Detection in Canada. They discussed the possibility of removing the 15 mCi Ni-63 source from their instrument, an lonScan 400b, sealed source device number ND-0163-D-1014-G. The Smiths RSO approved this and sent schematics to assist with the project. Researcher 1 then started planning the project with NIST Health Physics review. It was decided that Health Physics would monitor this project to confirm that there was no unanticipated exposure or contamination resulting from the operation. On January 31, 2008, Researcher 1 began the process for source removal. Work was performed in a hood, in a controlled laboratory space, with a health physicist monitoring the operation. The process of source removal was based on the manufacturer schematics. These schematics were general and not a specific instruction for source removal. No information was available at the time that clearly defined the source encapsulation barrier. After a ceramic cap was removed, the side of the source holder was wiped and contamination was detected. It is believed that the wipe may have touched some of the nickel foil. Upon observing the way the source was placed in the ceramic in addition to the contamination detected, it was decided that it was not possible to safely modify the device in the intended manner. The ceramic head was reattached and reinserted into the box. External swipes were verified to be clean. It was decided to leave the source this way while it was determined if there was anything more they could do to meet the intended research results. It is believed that the sealed source containment was breached in the experiment thereby negating the manufacturer's sealed source certificate. In doing this, it became an unsealed source. The reassembly restored containment. The device was placed into secured storage.
"On May 12, 2009 wipes were taken of the external portion of the ceramic head and confirmed contamination of 72 nCi. A wipe was taken at the manufacturers recommended typical sealed source leak check location and was clean. The source box was collected for disposal. The hood, all items in the hood, and the floor were checked for potential contamination. They were verified to be clean.
"It is unclear whether this constitutes a reportable sealed source leakage situation with respect to 10CFR31.5c, since this occurred during an intended and controlled effort to modify the source configuration. The levels of unsealed source activity are within the limits prescribed in our license, SNM-362." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45071 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWEN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 05:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text GROUP 1 ISOLATION OF ALL MAIN STEAM VALVES WHILE PERFORMING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE
"At 0519 on 5/15/09, a Group 1 isolation signal was received which resulted in all eight Main Steam Isolation Valves closing. The signal was received based upon a valid main condenser low vacuum signal coincident with reactor mode switch placed in RUN position. The isolation was an unanticipated result of a special purpose procedure which was being performed as a functional test for maintenance work that had been performed on intermediate range nuclear instrumentation. The procedure had installed jumpers to bypass the Group 1 isolation for Mode Switch in Run, but did not account for low condenser vacuum isolation. The low condenser vacuum switches were in the bypass position, but this logic does not prevent Group 1 isolation in the Run mode. The Group 1 isolation was completed successfully with all MSIVs and small bore valves closing as designed. MSIV closure with Mode Switch in Run position also caused a RPS actuation / full scram. The reactor was subcritical and all control rods were already fully inserted as the reactor was being maintained in Cold Shutdown."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45072 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 21:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 19:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text 21 OF 44 SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"On May 15, 2009 CPS was notified by the maintenance vendor that 21 EPZ sirens are out of service. This is 48% of the EPZ sirens out of service for greater than 1 hour as of 1942 CDT, due to severe weather and power outages. "
The licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD KISS TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/15/09 AT 2304 * * *
"As of 2130 CST only 2 sirens remain out of service which is below the 25% out of service requirement of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Kunowski). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45073 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/16/2009
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2009
Event Time: 18:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 13 | Power Operation | 13 | Power Operation | Event Text FAILURE OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM SUPPLY VALVE TO CLOSE DURING TEST
"At 1801 on 5/16/2009, the HPCI turbine steam supply valve (HV255F001) failed to close during shutdown of the system following performance of its quarterly flow surveillance. The auxiliary oil pump was de-energized to prevent an inadvertent start of HPCI and the HPCI system was declared inoperable.
"LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system being inoperable was entered at 1720 on 5/16/2009 at the start of the HPCI surveillance.
"An investigation is in progress to determine the nature of the problem.
"This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45074 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL REED
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/17/2009
Notification Time: 05:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2009
Event Time: 03:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF SCRAM AIR HEADER
"At 0335, Hope Creek was manually scrammed due to indications of multiple control rods drifting. All rods indicate fully inserted. Reactor level is being controlled in the normal band with Start-up level control in automatic. Reactor pressure is being controlled by bypass valves to the main condenser. Recirc pumps are in service and no ECCS system actuations were reached. The failure is a solder joint on the air supply to HCU 22-15. A manual scram was reinserted at 0445 to mitigate the air leak."
The licensee reset the scram to re-pressurize the scram air header. Once the leak was located, a second manual scram signal was initiated to secure the leak.
No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and the plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/17/2009 AT 0552 FROM MICHAEL REED TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The failure was on HCU 22-11 not 22-15.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Holody) via e-mail. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45075 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/17/2009
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2009
Event Time: 09:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE DUE LOSS OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Required Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to failure of the Backup Diesel Generator (which provides backup power to TSC related equipment) to pass a required surveillance. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector Tim Chandler has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45076 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MITCHELL SAARE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/18/2009
Notification Time: 05:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2009
Event Time: 04:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TSC HVAC RENDERED NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 0450 on Monday, May 18, 2009, power was removed to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system for planned preventative maintenance activities on the Unit 1 480VAC Load Center 10B014. During the 10B014 bus outage work activities, temporary power will be supplied to maintain all TSC facility equipment functional with the exception of TSC Normal and Emergency Ventilation. The TSC Supply, Exhaust and HEPA Filter fans will be de-energized, rendering the TSC HVAC non-functional while planned maintenance activities are in progress. This maintenance is scheduled to be worked continuously until completion to minimize out of service time. The planned TSC ventilation outage is scheduled to be completed within 48 hours, including a total of 5 hours to establish and remove the clearances. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing EP procedures and checklists. It will take no more than 4 hours to return the Ventilation system back to an operable status, dependent on the stage of the work at the time the emergency occurs. If radiological conditions require TSC facility evacuation during ventilation system restoration, the Station Emergency Director will evacuate and relocate the TSC staff in accordance with, EP-AA-112-200-F-01.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |