| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/30/2009 - 05/01/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 44890 | Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKLEFORD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/04/2009
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NMSS)
FUELS GRP EMAIL ()
| Event Text GLOVEBOX OVERFLOW DRAINS MAY BE INADEQUATE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION
"Many gloveboxes in the processing areas are equipped with overflow drains to prevent solution from exceeding an unsafe depth. These overflow drains are sized to accommodate the credible flow rates into the associated gloveboxes. During the generation of set-point analyses for overflow drains in a new process area, questions arose regarding how the drain discharge flow rates are calculated. To resolve these questions, NFS performed field tests using a glovebox on 2/26/2009 and 2/27/2009. Initial results of these tests indicated that the discharge flow rates are sensitive to drain weir height and glovebox floor flatness. This caused NFS to question the ability of the drains to perform their intended function. NFS, therefore, generated a plant-wide list of all potentially affected gloveboxes and suspended operations in them on 2/27/2009. Uranium-bearing materials were removed from the gloveboxes and all of the affected gloveboxes were tagged out of service. Engineering evaluations of the affected gloveboxes were performed and proceeded through 3/4/2009. As a result of Engineering evaluations, it was determined that in some instances a single drain alone was not capable of maintaining a solution depth to within design parameters in some localized areas within the glovebox. Modifications are being made to the drains to restore their functionality.
"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. The potential criticality consequences to the workers were low due to the conservatisms included in the analyses."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1350 EDT ON 04/30/09 FROM RANDY SHACKLEFORD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee will issue a press release to summarize the results of NRC Special Inspection Report No. 2009-007.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Bjorkman) and Fuels Grp via email. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44910 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WOODBURY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 12:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text SHORT TERM LOSS OF SUPPLEMENTAL SPENT FUEL COOLING
"On 3/16/2009 at 1225, Unit 2 was in Mode 5 (Refueling), during natural circulation mode to support maintenance on the common suction line to both loops of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems, both Secondary Side Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pumps tripped. Earlier on the same day at 0550, the unit had been placed into natural recirculation mode when the RHR Loop 'A' was secured from the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation. In this mode the 'A' loop of Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling coupled with the 'A' loop of the Fuel Pool Cooling system was designated as the primary decay heat removal system and the 'B' loop of both systems were designated as the backup decay heat removal system. At the time of the secondary pump trips, the RHR Common loop suction was being placed under clearance.
"The trip of the Secondary Side pumps caused a loss of the entire ('A' and 'B' loops) Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and resulted in a partial loss of the decay heat removal system. Both 'A' and 'B' loops of the Fuel Pool Cooling System remained in service. In addition, Unit 2 remained in an Active LCO for Technical Specification 3.9.7 due to securing all loops of Shutdown Cooling at 0550. The Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system was restored to operation at 1245, and actions to restore RHR to the Shutdown Cooling Mode of operation were in progress.
"RHR 'A' Loop was restored to on available status at 1259, and placed in the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation at 1447.
"Based on the combination of systems out of service, and no supporting calculation to ensure Spent Fuel Pool Temperature remains below 150 degrees Fahrenheit (as described In the UFSAR), this could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for Decay Heat Removal.
"The safety significance of the loss of primary decay heat removal was minimal. During the loss of the Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system, reactor vessel temperature rose by approximately 0.5 degrees Fahrenheit. Total heatup of the Spent Fuel Pool was less than 2 degree Fahrenheit. Allowed Technical Specification Heatup rate is limited to 100 degrees Fahrenheit per hour which the was not approached, or exceeded, at any time. Calculated time to boil (with no cooling supplied) was greater than 24 hours; transient was brief in duration and did not challenge time to boil. At all times, the Fuel Pool Cooling System remained in service. There were no challenges to the reactor pressure vessel, or the fuel, due to the loss of decay heat removal.
"The Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System was restored to operation at 1245. RHR was restored to service in the shutdown cooling made of operation at 1447."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1342 EDT ON 04/30/09 FROM MARK TURKAL TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On March 16, 2009, at 2017 hours, the Control Room Supervisor made a notification (Event Number 44910) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat). The notification was made as a result of a loss of the secondary side Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SSFPC) system pumps. At the time of the loss, both loops of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling were out of service to support maintenance. In this mode, the 'A' loop of the SSFPC system coupled with the 'A' loop of the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) system was designated as the primary decay heat removal system and the 'B' loop of both systems were designated as the backup decay heat removal system. Loss of the secondary side SSFPC system pumps impaired the ability to remove decay heat; both the 'A' and 'B' loops of the FPC system remained in service.
"Basis for Retraction
"Event Notification 44910 was conservatively made because, although the FPC system remained capable of removing decay heat, there was no documented calculation which demonstrated that the FPC system could maintain the fuel pool and reactor cavity temperature at or below 150 degrees F, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. An Engineering Calculation (i.e., 0041-0021. 'Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Removal Capability') demonstrating that the FPC system was capable of maintaining temperature below 150 degrees F, at that point in the outage, has been completed. As such, the March 16, 2009, loss of the secondary side SSFPC system pumps does not represent a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 325496.
"The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction." Notified R2DO (Ernstes). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45030 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 00:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2009
Event Time: 19:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE
"At 2230 on April 29, 2009, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1938 [on 4/29/09].
"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The National Weather Service is currently working to determine the cause of the failure and time frame for system restoration.
"The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remain operable.
"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement Personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program, and the [NRC] Resident Inspector has been briefed, and the state PSC will also be notified.
"UPDATE: Notified by Oswego County that the Tone Alert Radios were restored 00:12 on 04/30/2009." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45031 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN DRISCOLL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2009
Event Time: 19:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE
"At 2230 on April 29, 2009, with Nine Mile Point Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1938 [on 4/29/09]. At 0015 on April 30, Oswego County Emergency Management notified the Control Rooms that the Tone Alert Radios had been restored to service as of 0012, April 30, 2009.
"This impacted the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF [James A. FitzPatrick see EN# 45030] Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remained operable.
"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency offsite communications capability. Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement Personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program, and the [NRC] Resident Inspector has been briefed, and the state PSC will also be notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45032 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2009
Event Time: 08:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS MADE DUE TO INADVERTANT ACTIVATION OF SIX EPZ SIRENS
"At 0855 six sirens had been activated by the Ottawa County dispatch console for 3 minutes.
"At 0905 Ottawa County Sheriff Dispatch Center notified [the licensee] that sirens in Ottawa County had been inadvertently activated. It appears this was caused by the county radio service vendor resetting the dispatch center consoles during trouble shooting of the sheriff's radio system.
"Immediate actions taken: RA-EP-00420, Response to Prompt Notification System Malfunction, was implemented. The siren system was polled and the data from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) siren computer was reviewed. The computer data indicated at 08:55:55 the six sirens located in Bay Township had been activated by the Ottawa County Dispatch Console for 3-minutes. Fleet siren maintenance was contacted and requested to come to Ottawa County to meet with the radio service vendor to determine the cause of the inadvertent activation.
"In addition, NOP-LP-5001, Communicating Events of Public Interest, was implemented and associated notifications were made."
These notifications included the State of Ohio, Ottawa County, and Lucas County.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45033 | Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2009
Event Time: 13:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) UNAVAILABLE FOR GREATER THAN 1 HOUR
"Oyster Creek's ERDS is expected to be unavailable at 1315 EDT today, 4/30/09, and remain unavailable until scheduled maintenance on the Plant Process Computer is returned to service at approximately 1600 EDT today, 4/30/09."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM THOMAS DUNN TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 4/30/09 AT 1633 EDT * * *
ERDS was returned to normal as of 1550 EDT today.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Miller). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45035 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KONRAD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2009
Event Time: 10:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 10 | Startup | 0 | Startup | Event Text HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF TEST LINE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST
"During plant startup on 4/29/09 at 2239 [EDT], the startup had progressed to the point where plant conditions were adequate to allow performance of SR 3.5.1.9, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System flow testing against system head corresponding to reactor pressure. A Note to SR 3.5.1.9 allows 12 hours to perform this test after adequate reactor steam dome pressure and flow have been established for test performance.
"During the test performance, the test line pressure control valve did not properly operate to establish the required system head. The HPCI system was shutdown and returned to Standby. Earlier, on 4/29/09, SR 3.5.1.10, low pressure HPCI flow testing was successfully completed. Troubleshooting of the test line pressure control valve was begun.
"At 1039 [EDT] on 4/30/09, the 12 hour allowance of the Note to SR 4.5.1.9 expired and the HPCI system was declared inoperable for failure to complete the required surveillance. The HPCI system remains in Standby and is configured to perform its safety function.
"However, this event represents a potential loss of a single train safety system pending repair of the test line pressure control valve and completion of flow testing."
With HPCI inoperable, the Unit is in the 14-day Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.5.1. The licensee is revising their surveillance procedure to allow for manual operation of the failed control valve and estimates that the required testing will be completed within 4 hours. The Unit will remain in Mode 2 pending completion of this test.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |