| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/03/2003 - 12/04/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40363 | Rep Org: NEVADA RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: Henderson State: NV
County:
License #: 00-14-0404-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STAN MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 12/01/2003
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2003
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN AND RECOVERED
The State of Nevada provided the following information via facsimile:
"Date notified of event by licensee or non-licensee: November 17, 2003
"Radionuclide, activity Cesium 137.8 millicuries
"Any exposures (indicate short and long-term effects): Unknown
"Sealed source, device, etc. (make, model #, serial #): Troxler 46408, S/N 2361
"Leak test information, if applicable: Unknown
"Persons involved, consequences: Unknown
"Cause and contributing factors: Gauge was secured, according to procedures, in the licensee's field lab trailer. Thief defeated locks and barriers to break into storage closet and remove gauge. Gauge case and source rod were padlocked at the time of gauge theft.
"Licensee corrective actions: None, source was properly secured at the time of theft
"Provide status through resolution (update record when found): Gauge recovered on November 26, 2003 by a person wanting to remain anonymous. Gauge delivered to State regulatory agency and will be returned to licensee.
"Notifications, local police, FBI and other States; as needed: Henderson, NV Police Dept., Nevada Highway Patrol, Nevada Division of Emergency Management, and lastly, Nevada Radiological Health Section
"Identify any possible generic safety concerns: None
"Potential for others to experience the same event: Slight"
Note: This EN is actually an update to EN 40334. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40365 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L00446-060
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/01/2003
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2003
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING WELL LOGGING SOURCE ABANDONMENT
"Texas Incident No.: I-8079
"Event Report ID No.: 40365
"Event location: Newfield Exploration Company
"Well: Cotton Whitehead 2501
"Valverde County, Texas
"Notifications: Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control; Texas Railroad Commission, NRC Operations Center; NMED; NRC Region IV
"Event description: Late Friday evening, November 28, 2003, a logging source string became stuck in the customer's well. After several fishing attempts without success, it was decided to abandon the sources downhole. The sources will be cemented in place with the top most point covered by a minimum of 100 feet of red dyed cement. A deflection device will be place above the source string. A plaque has been ordered for installation on the wellhead. The source string held three sources: one Am-241/Be source manufactured by NSSI, Model DA-5, Serial No 27942, with an activity of 4.5 curies; one Cs-137 source manufactured by AEA, Model CDC.CY4, Serial No. 2907GW, with an activity of 2 curies; and a second Cs-137 source, manufactured by Gammatron, Model GT-GHP, Serial No. Z-194, with an activity of 0.8 curie." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40370 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KIETH ZACEK
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 12/03/2003
Notification Time: 07:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2003
Event Time: 03:36 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text PLANT HAD AN AUTO REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL
The "2 D" steam generator Lo-2 level was caused by the loss of the "2C" feedwater pump while performing the "2 BWOS" feedwater weekly surveillance of the HP stop valve. Both trains of the aux feed actuated as expected on the "2D" Lo-2 s/g level signal. The plant is currently in mode 3 with all rods fully inserted. No ECCS or safety relief valves actuated.
Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40371 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KELLY ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/03/2003
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2003
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID GROUP III PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide the NRC with information pertaining to the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group III invalid actuation signals that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system on two separate occasions.
"On October 31, 2003 and November 9, 2003, with the reactor at full power, an invalid actuation of the 'B' Reactor Building Ventilation Monitor caused Group III isolations of PCIS. A spike that was caused by electronic noise within the detector invoked a spurious High Level Trip to this monitor (RM 17-452B), that resulted in a trip to PCIS logic Channel B1.
"The PCIS functioned successfully providing a complete Group III isolation. The train actuation was complete. Both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed. The PCIS Group III isolation occurred which involves isolation of valves in the following systems:
Drywell Air Purge and Vent, Drywell and Suppression Chamber Main Exhaust, Suppression Chamber Purge and Vent, Containment Air Compressor Suction Valve, Exhaust to Standby Gas Treatment, Containment Purge Supply and Makeup, Containment Air Sampling, Air dilution Subsystem Valves, Vent Subsystem Valves, and Containment Air Dilution Vent System MOV VG-22 A/B.
"It was determined that both of these Group III isolations were invalid, due to the Reactor Building Vent Monitor Radiation Level Trip occurring at 25 millirem/hr on 10/31/03 and 15 millirem/hr on 11/09/03. General area radiation levels in these areas at the time of the event were approximately 2.5 millirem/hr to 6 millirem/hr."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40372 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/03/2003
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BACKWARD INSTALLATION OF CONTAINMENT LOOP SEAL PENETRATION VACUUM BREAKERS
"Vacuum breakers 1WL980 and 2WL980 are installed backwards. In their current orientation, the valves will not lift from their seats to break a siphon into the corresponding unit's Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank (VUCDT).
"The VUCDT input line is a 6-Inch pipe. There is a loop seal between the outboard containment isolation valve and the VUCDT. Since the VUCDT is vented to the auxiliary building environment, the purpose of the loop seal is to provide a barrier between the containment atmosphere and the auxiliary building atmosphere during normal unit operations. The purpose of the vacuum breaker is to prevent siphoning water out of the loop seal. In its current configuration, the vacuum breaker will not open. The loop seal is not needed to provide a barrier between the containment atmosphere and the auxiliary building atmosphere during a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) because valves 1(2)WL867A and 1(2)WL869B will close on a Phase B containment isolation signal on high-high containment pressure (3.2 psig in containment, accounting for instrument error). During certain small break LOCAs, however, a high-high containment isolation signal may not occur, since pressure might not reach the setpoint. In this scenario, the loop seal is needed to isolate the containment atmosphere from the auxiliary building atmosphere.
"Given the size of the VUCDT inlet piping, the only mechanism that could form a siphon out of the loop seal is a large flow of water that would push the air out of the top of the loop seal. In this instance, a siphon could form and pull water out of the low point of the loop seal. If this were to occur, a vent path from the containment atmosphere to the auxiliary building atmosphere would be open. However, during normal operation, there is not sufficient flow into the tank to make this a plausible scenario.
"For a large break LOCA, containment pressure would rise quickly to the high-high setpoint; then the inoperable VUCDT loop seal would be isolated by its containment isolation valves. For smaller LOCAs, particularly, for a rod ejection accident resulting in a LOCA, containment pressure would rise slowly- from 2.81 psig (the pressure at which the loop seal isolation function would fail), until 3.2 psig (the maximum high-high containment pressure setpoint, accounting for instrument error), the inoperable loop seal would represent a containment leak path. The rod ejection accident does result in a high level of fuel clad failure; therefore, the unisolated containment leak path represents a source of release to the environment until such time as the high-high containment pressure setpoint is reached (if it is reached). The dose consequences associated with this potential leak path have not been evaluated.
"Upon discovery of the incorrectly installed vacuum breakers, the containment isolation valves associated with this penetration flow path were closed to isolate the path. The Unit 2 loop seal configuration has since been modified to correct this situation. The Unit 1 loop seal configuration will be modified prior to the completion of the current end of cycle 14 refueling outage."
The incorrect installation of the vacuum breakers was identified on 11/03/03, and it is being investigated on how long this condition has existed. It is possible that it has existed since construction.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local regulatory agencies. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40373 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/03/2003
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2003
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY CAUSES UNANALYZED CONDITION
"While reviewing operator emergency response times contained in Callaway Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), it was determined that emergency procedure E-0 did not contain specific guidance for actions to be taken when one train of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) failed to properly operate. In FSAR Chapter 15A, the limiting single failure analyzed for the CREVS is the failure of a filtration fan within one train of CREVS. In this accident analysis scenario, a Control Room Filtration Unit fan fails and the train must be secured to prevent inadequately filtered Control Building air from being introduced into the Control Room. If the train is not isolated within 30 minutes, postulated dose to Control Room staff could potentially exceed GDC 19 limits.
"While procedure E-0 addressed identifying faulted CREVS equipment and an attempted restoration of the faulted equipment, it did not contain sufficient guidance to ensure the Control Room staff would isolate the faulted train of CREVS if the equipment restoration attempt failed.
"A revision to procedure E-0 has been issued to correct this procedural deficiency."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |