| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/25/2003 - 11/26/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40353 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HUPKE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/25/2003
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2003
Event Time: 15:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 20 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO DEGRADING CONDENSER VACUUM DURING POWER ASCENSION
Unit was in process of returning to operation following repair of condenser expansion joint. During power ascension, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading condenser vacuum. During the reactor water level transient after the scram, reactor water level dropped below 170 inches and caused the isolation of PCIS groups 2, 3, and 4. All isolations went to completion. This reactor water level drop is normal following a scram from 20% power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level was restored to normal using the feedwater system and the PCIS group isolations are being reset. Current plan is to remain in Mode 3 during condenser vacuum troubleshooting and repair.
All rods were fully inserted during the scram, no SRVs lifted, and the electric distribution system is in a normal lineup for plant condition. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed to the main condenser using the bypass valves. No additional specified system actuations occurred.
Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40354 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GOFF
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/25/2003
Notification Time: 20:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2003
Event Time: 17:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ETHYLENE GLYCOL LEAK
"On November 25, 2003 at 1730, offsite notification was made regarding a 692 pound leak of ethylene glycol from the north cooling tower de-ice system. The de-ice system was shutdown after the event.
"The National Spill Response Center, EPA Regional Response Center, the Michigan Stale Police Operations Center, State of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and US Coast Guard were notified."
Site permit requires state notification of any leak above 500 pounds. The material leaked into the cooling pond associated with the cooling tower and the cooling pond water will be slowly decanted into Lake Erie per normal procedure. The cause of the leak is being investigated. There is currently no affect to the plant due to loss of the de-icing system.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40355 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM VASH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/25/2003
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2003
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY NOTIFICATION DURING RANDOM DRUG TESTING
A contract employee tested positive during a random test. The employee's access to the protected area has been terminated. Contact the HOO for additional details.
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40356 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: K. A. BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/25/2003
Notification Time: 21:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2003
Event Time: 03:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
| Event Text 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION REGARDING LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTION
"At 0420 on 11/25/03, the PSS (Plant Shift Superintendent) was notified that contrary to NCSA (Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment) CAS-011, 'Shutdown of the Cascade With or Without Inventory', M&TE (Measuring & Testing Equipment) pressure gauges, installed on the RCW( Recirculating Cooling Water) return side of the C-331 U/3 C/2 condenser, were removed prior to the RCW supply spool piece being removed. NCSA CAS-011 requires independent verification that the supply spool piece has been removed prior to removing the M&TE gauges. The purpose of these gauges is to monitor the condenser pressure to insure RCW pressure in the condenser does not exceed 17 psig in the event the RCW supply valve leaks with the return valve completely closed. As long as the 17 psig limit is not exceeded, RCW pressure can not over come the coolant pressure and leak into the coolant.
"Evolutions that occurred during the spool piece removal found that the RCW return valve to the condenser could not be completely closed. This provided an open flow path to pressure gauges installed on the RCW return header allowing for pressure readings to be taken that provides an indication of the pressure at the condenser. Pressure readings on the RCW return header indicate that the RCW return did not exceed the 17 psig as required in the NCSA.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No, ATRC-03-4076, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2003-021, NRC Event Worksheet # 40356
"Responsible Division: Maintenance
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Double contingency was not maintained because independent verification that the supply spool piece had been removed before removing the M&TE pressure gauges was not performed. However, since the RCW return header did not exceed 17 psig, the process condition was maintained. This event was of low safety significance due to moderation control being maintained.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: Once the fluorinating environment is removed from the process cell, moisture that may leak into the process gas side could potentially moderate a uranium deposit that may be present. RCW pressures below 17 psig will prevent water from leaking into the coolant that could then leak into the process gas side. Sufficient water would have to leak into the process gas side from the coolant and moderate a critical mass of uranium.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): This system has a process limit of [DELETED].
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on ensuring that a condenser tube leak will not introduce RCW (moderator) into the process gas side through the coolant. This is accomplished through monitoring the RCW return pressure to be 17 psig or less. Once the return RCW valve is closed the M&TE gauges, installed on the RCW return side of the condenser, provide indication that the condenser does not exceed 17 psig. The purpose of these gauges is to monitor the condenser pressure in the event the supply valve leaks with the return valve completely closed. Under these conditions, actions are required if the condenser pressure exceeds 17 psig. As long as the 17 psig limit is not exceeded, RCW can not over come the coolant pressure and leak into the coolant. Since the pressure gauges were removed prior to the spool piece being removed, this control was violated. However, due to the return valve leaking at the condenser, an open flow pathway is available to peak reading pressure gauges installed on the RCW return header that would provide an indication of the pressure at the condenser. Pressure readings from the RCW return header do not indicate the return pressure exceeded 17 psig. Therefore, the process parameter, moderation, was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on an independent verification that the supply spool piece has been removed prior to removing the M&TE pressure gauges. Since the gauges had been removed before the supply spool piece was removed, the independent verification requirement was violated. Though this control was violated, the process parameter was maintained due to the RCW return header pressure not exceeding 17 psig.
Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The M&TE pressure gauges were re-installed at approximately 0620 on 11-25-03."
The licensee will notify the DOE Site Representative. | |