U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/16/2003 - 10/17/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40240 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: GREATER KELLY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Region: 4 City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX County: License #: NO LICENSE Agreement: Y Docket: I-8061 NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/13/2003 Notification Time: 10:16 [ET] Event Date: 10/10/2003 Event Time: 08:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/13/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4) JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION AT FORMER KELLY AIR FORCE BASE "A hangar formerly used by the U.S. Air Force was under re-construction for transformation to a corrosion control facility. The unlicensed facility had been contaminated by radium during use as a paint shop during 1922-1929, and as a paint removal facility during later years. Supposedly this facility has been deed recorded as a site of contamination with Ra-226 [Radium-226]. The facility is not Licensed by the State of Texas. At this time it is unclear if this facility was released for unrestricted use when turned over to the Greater Kelly Development Authority. This Agency can find no record of the site contamination. Contractors from the Boeing Corporation were working on the facility to be remodeled to a corrosion control facility. Digging around the foundation (slab) they hit a 2-inch galvanized pipe that was contaminated with radium-226. Background levels at the facility were measured at 10,000 counts per minute and after the incident at 10 times that level. An Agency inspector will be on site for soil sampling. It is estimated that 10-20 Boeing employees may have come in contact with the material. Urine analysis has been ordered by the contractor for personnel suspect of working in the contamination. Initial reports from both Greater Kelly Development Authority and the Boeing Corporation have been received - but are inconclusive." The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, the EPA, and the U.S. Air Force have been notified. | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40241 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL Licensee: COASTAL ENGINEERING AND TESTING CO Region: 1 City: CHARLESTON State: SC County: License #: 368 Agreement: Y Docket: SC030007 NRC Notified By: ANDREW ROXBURGH HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/13/2003 Notification Time: 10:48 [ET] Event Date: 10/10/2003 Event Time: 15:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/13/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS) RONALD BELLAMY (R1) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/STOLEN GAUGE "The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on October 10, 2003, at 7:45 pm [EDT] by Coastal Engineering and Testing, Co. that a Troxler Model 3430 gauge, s/n 33695 was stolen from the back of a company pickup truck while at a temporary jobsite in Charleston, SC. The gauge contained an Am: Be [Americium: Beryllium] source with an activity of 44 mCi [millicuries] and a Cs-137 [Cesium-137] source with an activity of 9 mCi [millicuries]. The licensee has called the local police department to file a report. The licensee in its official report will provide further information to the Department." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40251 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 NRC Notified By: BRIAN CRAIG HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/16/2003 Notification Time: 00:16 [ET] Event Date: 10/15/2003 Event Time: 23:02 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/16/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (PNS) SIRENS EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE OUT OF SERVICE TIME. More than 4 Prompt Notification System sirens were simultaneously out of service for greater than 12 hours. In accordance with site procedures, this is a major loss of notification capability. These sirens are out of service due to a loss of power caused by elevated wind conditions in the region. Oswego County is currently working to restore power to the sirens. State and Local counties were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40252 | Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: D. POULIN HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/16/2003 Notification Time: 00:28 [ET] Event Date: 10/15/2003 Event Time: 23:02 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/16/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (PNS) SIRENS EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE OUT OF SERVICE TIME. More than 4 Prompt Notification System sirens were simultaneously out of service for greater than 12 hours. In accordance with site procedures, this is a major loss of notification capability. These sirens are out of service due to a loss of power caused by elevated wind conditions in the region. Oswego County is currently working to restore power to the sirens. State and Local counties were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. *****UPDATE ON 10/16/03 AT 1524 FROM PAGE TO LAURA***** "On October 15, 2003, the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant notified the NRC that more than 4 prompt notification system sirens were simultaneously out of service for greater than 12 hours due to loss of power caused by elevated wind conditions in the region (reference EN # 40252). On October 16, 2003 at approximately 0107, the county notified FitzPatrick that only 3 sirens remained out of service. As of October 16, 2003, at approximately 1200, only 2 of the sirens remain out of service. Efforts are continuing to restore electrical power to the remaining 2 sirens. As a result, the conditions under which the initial notification was made no longer exist (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) major loss of offsite response capability - due to loss of 4 or more sirens for greater than 12 hours). This informational notification is provided to update the NRC as to the current conditions." Notified R1DO (Brian MCDERMOTT) | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40253 | Rep Org: EXELON POWER LABORATORY Licensee: EXELON POWER LABORATORY Region: 1 City: COATESVILLE State: PA County: License #: 37-30768-2464 Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: BILL DOWNEY HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 10/16/2003 Notification Time: 10:03 [ET] Event Date: 10/16/2003 Event Time: 09:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/16/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE | Person (Organization): BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1) ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS) | Event Text CALIBRATOR SAFETY INTERLOCK FAILED TO FUNCTION DURING OPERATIONAL TEST The licensee RSO reported that the electrical interlock between the access door and the source position on a J. L. Shepherd Model 89-400 calibrator failed to function during the daily pre-operational test. With the door open, the interlock should have prevented raising the source, but did not. The source (400 Curie Cs-137) was lowered and the door re-closed without further incident. Radiation levels were normal and no personnel exposure occurred. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40254 | Facility: COOPER Region: 4 State: NE Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: CLYDE EDINGTON HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 10/16/2003 Notification Time: 13:47 [ET] Event Date: 10/16/2003 Event Time: 12:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/16/2003 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED | Person (Organization): GARY SANBORN (R4) TERRY REIS (NRR) DOUG WEAVER (IRO) RICK DASILVA (DHS) JIM DUNKER (FEMA) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT AT COOPER DUE TO SMALL FIRE AT A TURBINE BEARING The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 12:30 CDT pertaining to a small fire, located at the high pressure turbine number 1 bearing, which was burning greater than 10 minutes. There were no injuries and the turbine continues to operate at full power while the fire brigade attempts to extinguish the fire. Subsequently, the licensee extinguished the fire; however, several minutes later, the fire restarted. The licensee decided to lower power to approximately 65% power to lower general area radiation levels for the fire brigade personnel. The fire was extinguished and reflashed a few times. The fire brigade used water, dry chemicals and foam when fighting the fire. The source of the fire at the bearing is under investigation by the licensee. *****UPDATE ON 10/16/03 AT 1700 FROM FISCHER TO LAURA***** The licensee reports that the fire is out and the investigation determined that the most likely source of the fire was oil pooled under the bearing pedestal. No current oil leakage was found. The licensee planned on contacting the turbine vendor prior to returning the plant to full power. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1541 CDT. Notified R4DO (G. Sanborn), DIRO (D. Weaver), NRR EO (T. Reis), DHS (J. Clardy) and FEMA (J. Dunker). | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40255 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL Region: 2 City: COLUMBIA State: SC County: RICHLAND License #: SNM-1107 Agreement: Y Docket: 07001151 NRC Notified By: DAVID WILLIAMS HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 10/16/2003 Notification Time: 17:53 [ET] Event Date: 10/16/2003 Event Time: 15:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/16/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: RESPONSE-BULLETIN | Person (Organization): CHARLES R. OGLE (R2) ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS) | Event Text 24 HOUR BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION FROM WESTINGHOUSE COLUMBIA FUEL FACILITY "Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the ADU Bulk Blending System is assured by (1) preventing moderator from becoming available to a bulk container, and (2) preventing moderator from entering a bulk container. The first contingency did not occur because the moderator was never available to a bulk container. Moderator is prevented from entering a bulk container by preventing high moisture polypaks from being dumped into the bulk container. The polypaks are processed through a scan and dump interlock, which prevents unacceptable polypaks from being dumped. The software malfunction left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5a), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification. "As Found Condition: See Reason for Notification above. "Summary of Activity: Immediately after all packs were dumped into the bulk container to complete the blend of material, Operations noticed that the packs had not been denoted as "consumed" by the data base, and notified the computer system administrator and Nuclear Criticality Safety. The computer system administrator stopped all dumping operations. The computer system administrator immediately checked all packs that had been dumped into the blend. All moisture values were acceptable. All operations that use the same PLC interface program for criticality controls were stopped. "Conclusions: Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained. All moisture values for the material involved were acceptable, and the total amount of moderator in the blend was very low, far less than criticality limits. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed." | |