| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/14/2003 - 10/15/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 39459 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MATUSZEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 12/18/2002
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2002
Event Time: 14:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
KEN BARR (R2)
CATHY HANEY (IAT)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY
An unauthorized entry into the protected area occurred by a contract employee. Immediate compensatory measures were taken upon discovery. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the HOO for additional details.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/14/03 @ 1650 BY REIMERS TO GOULD * * *
After further review of this event the Licensee has concluded that this event is not reportable and therefore it should be retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed.
Notified Reg 2 RDO(Ogle) |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40228 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: O'Keefe
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/07/2003
Notification Time: 18:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
At 1100 EDT on October 7, 2003, Seabrook Station concluded that the source of small boron deposits on the Reactor Vessel Head was a leaking conoseal weld on a CRDM housing.
The defect in primary coolant is not acceptable per ASME XI. This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii).
The caller stated that through testing it is indicated that the leak had occurred in the last 2 months. A small amount of boric acid crystals was found.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/14/03 @ 1709 BY BEMIS TO GOULD * * *
This report supplements and retracts the 8 hour notification (Event Number 40228) made on October 7, 2003 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) documenting reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. FPL Energy Seabrook has determined that the initial report, although conservative, inappropriately interpreted canopy seal degradation to be pressure boundary leakage. The canopy seal weld is neither a structural weld nor a pressure retaining weld comprising the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. Therefore, the initial report is being retracted. A permanent plant design is being developed to repair the canopy seal using a standard canopy seal clamp and will be installed prior to startup from the current refueling outage.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified Reg 1 RDO (MCDERMOTT) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40235 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: THELEN ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 31210310005
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK LIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/09/2003
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2003
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection was notified on 10/9/03 that a CPN Model MC portable moisture density gauge, S/N MD20606630, was stolen from an employee's vehicle parked overnight at his residence. The gauge contains two (2) sources; 9.7 millicuries Cs-137 and 49.8 millicuries Americium-241/Beryllium. The theft was discovered earlier this morning and reported to the State at 1259 EDT. The State is dispatching a field investigator for followup. The licensee informed the local Police Department of this incident. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40236 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SACRED HEART MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: SPOKANE State: WA
County:
License #: WN-M031-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY C. FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/09/2003
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2003
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL LEAKING SOURCE
"This is notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection.
"STATUS:
"New (this is an preliminary notification due to the lack of required information at this point in time).
"Licensee: Sacred Heart Medical Center
"City and state: Spokane, Washington
"License number: WN-M031-1
"Type of license: Medical
"Date of event: 8 October 2003
"Location of Event: on campus (OR)
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention)
"The licensee was implanting a source train of I-125 seeds for a lung cancer treatment and during that implant decided the source train in use was longer than necessary. They decided to clip the unwanted part of the train but snipped a source rather than the space between the sources.
"What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? Leaking source, possibly. If not, no notification is required, if so, then a possible overexposure to the patient (thyroid).
"Activity and Isotope(s) involved: Iodine-125 therapy seed(s).
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence) None, with the possible exception of the patient.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): This was an Iodine-125 seed, part of a source train of such seeds which was damaged when the licensee attempted to shorten the train but cut through a seed instead of the interstice desired.
"Disposition/recovery: No loss of seeds.
"Leak test? Licensee is performing one ASAP but as of this writing there are no results.
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number): N/A
"Release of activity? Unknown at this time, if the seed is not leaking, then 'no'. If the seed is in fact leaking then the potential exists for release of material inside the patient.
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A, the proper nuclide and activity was delivered to the intended treatment site.
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A, this was not a misadministration.
Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: N/A, no device involved.
Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: No unplanned exposure, unless the source turns out to be leaking.
Was patient or responsible relative notified? Unknown at this time.
"Was written report provided? Not yet, but it will be.
"Was referring physician notified? Yes, referring MD notified by oncologist.
"Consultant used? No."
This is WA Event Report # WA-03-043.
* * * UPDATE 1830 EDT ON 10/9/03 FROM ARDEN C. SCROGGS VIA EMAIL * * *
"New (this is an updated notification).
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention)
"The licensee was implanting a source train of 31 [Iodine-125] seeds for a lung cancer treatment along the lining of the pleura and during that implant decided the source train in use was longer than necessary. They decided to clip the unwanted part of the train but snipped two source(s) rather than the space between the sources.
"The licensee administered large quantities of SSKI within one hour of breaching the seeds. The current plan is to continue administration of SSKI in amounts of at least 0.5ml daily for at least the next two weeks.
"What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? MISADMINISTRATION via leaking source.
"Activity and Isotope(s) involved: Iodine-125 therapy seed(s). A total of two seeds with an activity of 0.729mCi each according to the licensee.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence) None, with the possible exception of the patient. The primary handler has received thyroid bioassay with negative results. The licensee is expecting results of the pleural fluid sample taken from the patient soon, and will attempt thyroid bioassay of the patient at the 72-hour exposure interval.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): These are Iodine-125 seeds, part of a source train of such seeds which were damaged when the licensee attempted to shorten the train but cut through two seeds instead of the interstice desired. The manufacturer is MPI, the model is the 'Oncoseed' 'Rapid Strand'. The licensee will include an enlarged version of the product insert with their written report.
"Disposition/recovery: No loss of seeds although remains of the two leaking sources are properly stored awaiting decay/disposal.
"Leak test? Leak test results from the soak test (four hours in plain water) showed 'significant leakage' according to the licensee, and they are assuming a worst-case scenario basis of one entire seed leaking and one-half the second seed leaking.
"Release of activity? Yes, it is assumed on a worst-case basis that the entire contents of one seed and fifty percent of the second seed has or will leak.
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: This was a misadministration by definition because the sources are determined to have leaked.
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: Exposure is limited to the patient only. The licensee will attempt to quantify through both calculation and bioassay the extent of patient/thyroid exposure. Physicians involved expect little or no adverse effects at this point, assuming the SSKI works as expected.
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? Yes.
"Rev 1. 1530 hrs, 9 October 2003"
Notified R4DO(Bill Johnson) and NMSS(Holonich). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40237 | Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ-07-080
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY V. GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/09/2003
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE VEHICLE ACCIDENT
"At approximately 2:15 PM [MST] October 9, 2003 the Agency was informed by the Licensee that a truck carrying a moisture-density gauge had been involved in a single vehicle accident and the driver is dead. The reporting individual indicated that they were informed of the accident by the Department of Public Safety. The accident occurred on AZ Highway 260 between Bridgeport and Camp Verde. The moisture-density gauge is a Troxler Model 3440, SN 27494. The device contained 40 mCi Be:Am-241 and 8 mCi Cs-137 [mCi=millicuries]. The device remained in the transporting box inside a locked steel box in bed of pick up. The Licensee is trying to retrieve [it] from law enforcement for storage and leak test. [It is] Currently in an impound yard in Mayer, AZ.
"Agency continues to receive information regarding this fatality. The Agency is unaware of any press coverage regarding radioactive materials.
"The U.S. NRC is being notified of this event."
AZ First Notice: 03-19 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40238 | Rep Org: WISCONSON DEPT HEALTH & FAM SERVICE
Licensee: WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERV CORP
Region: 3
City: GREENBAY State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 10/10/2003
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2003
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text GENERAL LICENSED DEVICE PLACED IN PUBLIC DOMAIN
The Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services reported that on 10/9/03 it was discovered that a general licensed gauge used on the coal conveyor at the Wisconsin Public Services Corporation Pulliam coal-fired power plant in Green Bay, WI was removed without properly closing the shutter and left in a public area on 9/25/03. The gauge contains a 50 milliCuries Cs-137 source. The device was subsequently recovered and properly shuttered on 10/09/03.
Wisconsin Public Services Corporation issued on 10/09/03.
Fixed Gauge Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear
Source S/N: B2920
The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] took readings in the direction of the open shutter; at 8 feet (4 to 5 Mr/hr) and at 3 feet (10 Mr/hr).
Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Radiation Protection Section staff will perform an investigation the week of 10/13/03.
* * * UPDATE 1706 EDT ON 10/13/03 FROM JASON HUNT (WISCONSIN ) TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
The Wisconsin licensee notified the State of Wisconsin that there was an error in the original report related to gauge make, model, serial number and source strength.
The new detailed information is as follows:
ThermoMeasureTech Model # 5200, Ser. # B2011, Source Activity 20 mCi [milliCuries].
Notified R3DO (Madera) and NMSS (Holonich). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40239 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: GASTONIA State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE L. ACCATTATO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/10/2003
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2003
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF NUCLEAR GAUGE IN SCRAPYARD
"This is to inform you that North Carolina Radiation Protection Section has discovered a fixed nuclear gauge that was scrapped and is now being held by a North Carolina scrap dealer from Gastonia, NC.
"Radioactive Materials Branch Incident 03-13 has been open pending further investigation of a device, originally described as an X-Ray head, having been found in a returned scrap load sent to a South Carolina scrap steel processor and returned under a CRCPD exemption.
"A Section representative performed a field inspection on October 9, 2003 on the undetermined item being held in secure isolation at the scrap-yard since its discovery in March 2003.
"At present our investigation has determined that:
"- Device is a Fixed Nuclear Gauge. K-Ray model 7107-6. This device is inactive per the SS&D registry sheet and is considered for both GL [General Licensing] and Specific Licensing.
"- Contains isotope Cs-137 in the amount of 50 millicuries. Reference year from gauge label is March 1983.
"- Highest general area (about 1[meter]) dose rate is approx 0.1 [millirem per] hr with 200 [millirem per] hr on contact. It is unknown whether the shutter is open or closed but dose rates when compared to SS&D [Sealed Source & Device] information for the general model indicate it may be open.
"- Labeling has been painted over and also appears as if a deliberate attempt had been made to destroy the device identification labeling & serial number(s).
"Corrective Actions So Far:
"Surveys and leak tests have been performed. Analysis on wipes is pending but source does not appear to be leaking.
"Device has been re-secured. Verbal direction has been given to the State Line Manager on its necessary security and continued isolation from the scrap yard workers and other members of the public.
"Additional steps are being taken to determine if any significant exposures could have been received by anyone at State Line who spent time nearby or who may have handled the device since its return to them.
"If/when significant additional information becomes available it will be passed along to you." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40245 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/14/2003
Notification Time: 05:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 04:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
JEFF GLICK (DHS)
MR AUSTIN (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED - LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING
At 0404 EDT on 10/14/03, Millstone 2 lost shutdown cooling due to the loss of power to vital power bus VA10. Power and shutdown cooling were restored at 0414. Millstone declared an Unusual Event at 0423 due to a greater than 10 degree increase in reactor coolant system temperature. Reactor coolant system temperature increased from 101 degrees to 113 degrees.
Power was lost to VA10 while attempting to swap power supplies from inverter 1 to inverter 5. Inverter 1 is now supplying power to VA10.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STRICKLAND TO GOTT ON 10/14/03 AT 0740 * * *
Millstone 2 exited their Unusual Event at 0532, after completing the abnormal operating procedure and stabilizing plant conditions.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR (Reis), DIRO (McGinty), DHS (Rick DaSilva), and FEMA (David Barden)..
* * * UPDATE 10/14/03 @ 12:02 BY WILL CHESNUTT TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
An update to event notification 40245 is being made to reflect that the loss of shutdown cooling is also considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Additionally, further review of plant response following the loss of VA10, indicates that due to an equipment performance issue (failed relay) the containment isolation valves did not respond as expected and were manually closed per procedure. This issue will be investigated and addressed as needed in the LER.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified
Reg1 RDO(McDermott) was notified. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40246 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 10/14/2003
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING IMPROPER MASS CONTROL
Improper Filling of Dry Combustible Trash Drum
"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched less then or equal 5.0 wt.% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
Time and Date of Event: October 14, 2003
Reason for Notification: Dry combustible trash was placed into a single 55-gallon drum without proper mass control. Dry combustible trash drums are positioned on scales for filling. An operator removed a single drum from a scale and then filled the drum with dry combustible trash.
The filling of drums on scales prevents exceeding the critical mass limit of [DELETED]. The scales actuate a visual alarm at 66 lbs.; and visual and audible alarm at 90 lbs. If the 66 lbs. limit is reached, operators are required to remove trash from a drum. If the 90 lbs. Limit is reached, operators are required to remove trash and write a Redbook.
Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for dry combustible trash is assured by preventing [DELETED] of UO2 from becoming available to a single combustible trash drum, and preventing the total weight of a drum from exceeding the [DELETED]. Criticality limit. The removal of the drum from the scale and subsequent filling left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5a), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
As Found Condition: During a routine checking of drums for spacing (i.e., U-235 gram counts), a second operator noticed that a dry combustible trash drum had a net weight of 95 tbs. The operator recognized that a drum weight of 95 lbs. Exceeded the scale limit of 90 lbs. and generated the required Redbook. The drum indicated an assay value of 5.285 grams of U-235.
Summary of Activity:
- When the second operator found the drum, it was placed on hold. Both process engineering and EH&S were notified.
- The drum contents were examined and no improper material types were found in the drum. It was also determined that the material was not compacted.
- The drum was weighed and assayed and found to match the values on the drum label.
Conclusions:
- Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained.
- Less than a critical mass was involved.
- At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
- The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
- A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee will inform the Region 2 Office. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40247 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. McFEATERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/15/2003
Notification Time: 01:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 23:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 39 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW "B" STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL.
"Automatic Trip due to low (21%) B Steam Generator Level (all rods fully inserted into the core).
"While decreasing power for heater drain pump repairs, the B main feedwater regulating valve did not respond properly. Manual attempts to restore level were not effective. Steam generator level decreased to the low level trip setpoint.
"Auxiliary feedwater systems automatically started due to low post rip steam generator levels. This includes the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The steam discharge of this pump is considered to a gaseous release due to trace amounts of tritium in the secondary system. These trace amounts are well below limits. The pump was shutdown after 16 minutes of operation, terminating the discharge. The Rad Waste & Effluents Section will assess the impact during the event response review.
"Plant is currently stable in Mode 3 with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values. The steam dumps and main unit condenser are available for heat removal. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee. | |