

John H. Weissinger Vice President – Plant Hatch Hatch Nuclear Plant
11028 Hatch Parkway North
Baxley, GA 31513
912 537 5859 tel
912 366 2077 fax

Date: April 5, 2023

Docket Nos.: 50-366

NL-23-0232

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Primary Containment Penetration Exceeded Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Leakage Rate (La)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact the Hatch Licensing Manager, Jimmy Collins, at 912.453.2342.

Respectfully submitted,

John H. Weissinger Vice President – Hatch

JMH

Enclosure: LER 2023-001-00

Cc: Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager – Hatch Senior Resident Inspector – Hatch

RTYPE: CHA02.004

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and 2

Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00

Subject Primary Containment Penetration Exceeded Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Leakage Rate (La)

Enclosure

LER 2023-001-00

NRC FORM 366

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 12/31/2023

A Acount

(01-10-2023)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; email: oira.submission@omb.sop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection of siplays a currently valid OMB control number.

					A 200 I				requesting	g or requiring the	collection dis	splays a currently va	alid OMB control r	number.				
1. Facility Name										050 2. Docket Number				3. Page				
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2										052	-	00366		1	OF	2		
4. Title																		
Primary	Contair	nment P	'enetratio	n Exceeded	l Maxim	um Allov	wable	Prima	ary Co	ontainme	ent Lea	kage Rat	e (La)					
5. Event Date 6. LI				6. LER Number		7.	rt Date	- 4			8. Other F	acilities Inv	olved	ed				
Month	Day	Year	Year Year Sequentia Number		Revision No.	Month	nth Day		Year	Facility Name				050	Docket Number			
02	07	2023	2023 -	- 001 -	00	04	05	2	2023	Facility Nam	ility Name			052 Docket		Number		
								10. Power Level										
5								000										
11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)																		
10 CFR Part 20 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 10 CFR Part 50							50	V	✓ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A))(2)(viii)(A)		73.12	200(a)			
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)					50.	.36(c)(1)(i))(A)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			73.12	200(b)		
20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)					50.		50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a))(2)(ix)(A)		73.12	200(c)				
20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4)				3(a)(4)	50.		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)			50.73(a))(2)(x)		73.1200(d)					
20.2	203(a)(2)	/(i)	10 CFR	Part 21	50.4		50.73	(a)(2)(v)(A	1)	10 CFR	Part 73		73.12	200(e)				
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			21.2(c))	50.	50.69(g)			50.73	(a)(2)(v)(B	3)	73.77(a))(1)		73.12	200(f)		
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)					50.).73(a)(2)(i)(A)		V	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		;) [73.77(a))(2)(i)		73.12	200(g)		
20.22	203(a)(2)	(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)				50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			73.77(a))(2)(ii)		73.12	200(h)		
20.22	203(a)(2)	(v)			50.	73(a)(2)(i)	73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)								
ОТН	ER (Spec	cify here, i	in abstract,	or NRC 366A).).									- A		1		
					12.	. Licensee	• Conta	act for	this LE	====== ER								
Licensee Co													Phone Nun	•				
Jimmy C	ollins -	Licensir	ng Manag	ıer									9	12-45	3-2342	2		
			13	3. Complete O)ne Line f	or each C	ompor	nent Fa	ailure D	Described	in this	Report						
Cause	S	ystem	Componen	nt Manufactu	urer Repo	rtable to IR	IIS	Cai	use	Syster	m	Component	Manufact	turer F	Reportat	ble to IRIS		
В		BD	ISV	F130	,	Υ									2			
14. Supplemental Report Expected								Month Day				у	Year					
✓ No	No Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)								15. Expected Submission Date									
16. Abstract	t (Limit to	1326 space	s, i.e., approx	ximately 13 single	e-spaced ty	pewritten lir	nes)											

At 1738 EST on 02/07/2023, while in MODE 5 at 0% power, during planned Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) it was determined that the primary containment leakage rate exceeded the allowable limit, La, defined in 10CFR 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" and specified in the Technical Specifications. Two primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in a single penetration failed LLRT which represents a failure to maintain primary containment integrity.

Troubleshooting and investigation efforts identified that the vendor supplied T-rings were manufactured incorrectly causing excessive LLRT leakage. As a corrective action correctly manufactured T-rings were installed in the affected valves, LLRTs were performed satisfactorily, and primary containment was restored to operable status.

NRC FORM 366A (01-10-2023)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 12/31/2023



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; email: oira submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. FACILITY NAME			2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER						
		050	00366	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REV NO.		
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2		052		2023	-	001	-[00		

NARRATIVE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

At 1738 EST on 02/07/2023, while in MODE 5 at 0% power, during planned Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) it was determined that the primary containment leakage rate exceeded the allowable limit, La, defined in 10CFR 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" and specified in the Technical Specifications. Two primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (EIIS: ISV) in a single penetration failed LLRT requirements which represents a failure to maintain primary containment integrity. This leakage also caused a failure of Integrated Leak Rate Testing (ILRT).

Failed Components Information:

Master Parts List Number: 2T48F319 and 2T48F320

Manufacturer: Fisher Controls Company Model: Fisher Series 9200 Butterfly Valves

Type: Isolation Valves

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), and has been classified as a Safety System Functional Failure under NEI 99-02.

EVENT CAUSE ANALYSIS

These LLRT failures were caused by using a vendor supplied T-ring that was incorrectly manufactured, leading to the T-ring rotating away from the valve disc when in operation. All PCIVs of the same model that passed LLRTs had T-rings that did not have the manufacturing defect.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event. Although the leakage rate through the degraded primary containment penetration for the as-found condition exceeded La, the exposure time of the penetration inoperability can reasonably be limited to just prior to shutting down the Unit 2 reactor for the refueling outage. Additionally, any leakage past the degraded PCIVs during an actual event would have been filtered through Standby Gas Treatment and released through the main stack.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Correctly manufactured T-rings were obtained and installed in the affected valves, LLRTs were performed satisfactorily, and primary containment was restored to operable status.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

On January 4, 2020, it was determined that the maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate (La) as defined in 10CFR50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" had been exceeded under postulated accident conditions. Troubleshooting efforts identified the degraded primary containment penetration and noted that leakage past two PCIVs was causing La to be exceeded. The cause was that the set screws that support the T-ring inside the PCIVs were backing out. The root cause corrective action to prevent recurrence was to add to the maintenance procedure to apply Loctite 222 to each set screw threads. This prevented the set screws that support the T-ring from backing out (LER 2020-001-00). The current issue did not involve repetitive failures from previous cycles; all previous corrective actions taken in response to previous LLRT failures of these valves have been effective.