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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	(ACRS)
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7	KAIROS POWER LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE
8	+ + + +
9	WEDNESDAY
10	MARCH 1, 2023
11	+ + + +
12	The Subcommittee met via Teleconference,
13	at 8:30 a.m. EST, David A. Petti, Chair, presiding.
14	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
15	DAVID A. PETTI, Chair
16	RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member
17	VICKI M. BIER, Member
18	CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member
19	VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member
20	GREGORY H. HALNON, Member
21	WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member
22	JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member
23	JOY L. REMPE, Member
24	MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member
25	

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1	ACRS CONSULTANTS:	
2	DENNIS BLEY	
3	STEPHEN SCHULTZ	
4		
5	DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:	
6	WEIDONG WANG	
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 8:30 a.m. CHAIR PETTI: Okay. The meeting will now 3 4 come to order. This is a meeting of the Kairos Power 5 Licensing Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 6 7 I'm David Petti, Chairman of today's Subcommittee meeting. ACRS Members in attendance are 8 9 Jose March-Leuba, Joy Rempe, Matt Charles Brown, 10 Sunseri, Ron Ballinger, Walt Kirchner, Dimitrijevic, Vicki Bier, and Greg Halnon. 11 ACRS Consultants Dennis Bley and Stephen 12 Schultz are also present remotely. Weidong Wang of 13 14 the ACRS Staff is the Designated Federal Official for 15 this meeting. During today's meeting the Subcommittee 16 17 will review the staff's safety evaluation on Kairos Power Hermes Non-Power Reactor Preliminary Safety 18 19 Analysis. The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC Staff, Kairos Power 20 representations and other interested persons regarding 21 this matter. 22 23 First, we'll hear today about the standards that the staff uses to evaluate and test a 24

non-power reactor, since most of what we review is

1 power reactors, which is а slightly different So, this is going to help us inform our 2 3 review. 4 The rules for participation in all ACRS 5 meetings, including today's, were announced in the Federal Register on June 13, 2019. 6 The ACRS Section 7 of the U.S. NRC public website provides our Charter, 8 Bylaws, Agendas, Letters, and of course full 9 transcripts of all full and subcommittee meetings, 10 including slides presented there. The meeting notice and agenda for this 11 meeting were posted there. Today's meeting is open to 12 public attendance. We have received no written 13 14 statements or requests to make an oral statement from 15 the public. The Subcommittee will gather information, 16 17 analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate posi -- proposed positions and actions as appropriate for 18 19 deliberation by the full Committee. A transcript of the meeting is being kept 20 and will be made available. Today's meeting is being 21 held in person and over Microsoft Teams for ACRS Staff 22 and Members, NRC Staff, and the Applicant. 23 24 There's also a telephone bridge line and

a Microsoft Teams link allowing participation of the

public.

When addressing the Subcommittee, the participants should first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they may be readily heard. When not speaking, we request that participants mute their computer microphone or phone by pressing start six.

We'll now proceed with the meeting. I'd like to start by calling up Bill Jessup.

MR. JESSUP: Thank you Member Petti for the opportunity to present to the Subcommittee today. I'm Bill Jessup, Chief of Advanced Reactor Licensing Branch One in the Division of Advanced Reactors in Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities, or DANU in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or NRR.

Today the staff will be providing an overview of the strategy that's been implemented to support the staff's review of the Kairos Power Construction permit application for the Hermes test reactor.

Our recent interactions with the Kairos Subcommittee have focused on discrete issues related to the Kairos Power fluoride-cooled high temperature reactor technology, also referred to as the KP-FHR

technology, including recent meetings on topical reports for graphite and metallic materials.

Today's presentation will be the first of many over the next several weeks, focused on the staff's review of the broader aspects of the KP-FHR technology as reflected in the Hermes construction permit application.

The staff's presentation this morning is going to cover the foundational aspects of the construction permit application and review strategy, including requirements and guidance that are specific to testing facilities and the license type under consideration.

The staff provided a similar presentation to the Subcommittee at the outset of the Hermes review in April 2022.

Given that we are nearing the end of the construction permit application review, and before we progress into more detailed presentations in the coming weeks, the staff felt it appropriate to revisit the aspects of the review strategy, and also provide some examples of how the strategy was implemented during the review.

The staff's looking forward to today's discussion. Always appreciative of the Committee's

1 insights and comments. And, with that, I'll turn it back over to 2 3 you, Member Petti. 4 CHAIR PETTI: We're ready to start. 5 MR. JESSUP: Okay. I'll turn it over to 6 Ben Beasley. 7 MR. BEASLEY: Thank you, Bill. Well, I am Ben Beasley. I am a Project Manager in the Advance 8 9 Reactor Licensing Branch of DANU and NRR. 10 I'm the lead Project Manager for the staff safety review of the Kairos construction permit 11 application for the Hermes test reactor. 12 Presenting in a few minutes will be Jeff Schmidt, the lead 13 14 technical reviewer for the application. 15 also here to help answer And, 16 questions is Ed Helvenston. Ed is also a Project 17 Manager on the Hermes project and is in the Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility Licensing Branch. 18 We will provide a brief overview of the 19 staff's review process and discuss a couple of 20 examples of how we conducted the review of the 21 preliminary design of a non-power testing facility. 22 Next slide, please. 23 24 So, the review of applications for nonlight water reactors such as Hermes, is an important 25

1 milestone in advancing nuclear technologies in the United States. It is the responsibility of Kairos and 2 other designers to demonstrate the safety of their 3 4 designs. 5 The NRC staff must perform its mission of independently reviewing the safety of the designs in 6 7 an efficient and effective manner. Accordingly, the staff's review of the preliminary design of Hermes was 8 9 focused on matters that are most safety significant. 10 The scope of the staff's review of the 11 design of а structure system or component was commensurate with the risk posed by that SSC. 12 Although the application provided only 13 14 preliminary design of a testing facility, the mission 15 of the staff is unchanged. We must have reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and 16 17 safety. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Can I interrupt you 18 19 in a moment? MR. BEASLEY: 20 Yes. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: A PRA has not been 21 before, correct? 22 MR. BEASLEY: Has not. 23 24 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay. So, how do we determine what is risk significant? 25

1 Let me be the devil's advocate and I'll 2 give you an extreme. Why are you not deciding by the seat of your pants how this cuts corners in the 3 4 review? 5 Explain to me that. Why not that? MR. BEASLEY: And so, I -- two thoughts. 6 7 First, it will be, you know, good for you to have the examples that Jeff presents in a few minutes. 8 9 And second, Ι didn't say risk significance, I said safety significance. 10 it's not based on a risk number. It's based on the 11 design of the system and what is needed to assure safe 12 shut down, you maintain subcriticality, you know, 13 14 provide cooling, those types of things. And so, the design informs what is, needs 15 to be safety related. 16 17 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm taking my argument to extreme, to give you an opportunity. 18 19 mean, I'm quessing there was application position, right? 20 You have some slides that only would say 21 that you have not reviewed that method, because it's 22 not needed for a construction license. We will do it 23 24 later. how do you know what the safety 25 So,

1	significance is if you have no confidential what they
2	are?
3	I'm taking this is risk informed safety
4	significant review to an extreme.
5	MR. BEASLEY: Right.
6	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And will let you
7	explain yourself. Jeff is dying here.
8	MR. SCHMIDT: I am. I am.
9	MR. BEASLEY: Well, I was going to say,
10	let you know, it's probably a good discussion to
11	have when he presents his examples.
12	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah. You'll want to get
13	into it when we go down the slide, like the second one
14	down.
15	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You know I'm talking
16	about that.
17	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, yeah. We can talk
18	about that.
19	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm, you know, I'm
20	not to raise a portion of this risk informed being a
21	risk is mathematically and thoroughly performed
22	properly.
23	It is not mathematically incorrect. It is
24	often used improperly. And, I would like to use this
25	as a forum for discussion of how we have used it.

1	And again, I'm exaggerating. Okay?
2	Before you do that.
3	MR. BEASLEY: And one other quick thought,
4	we didn't we didn't, I forget the term you used,
5	trim back our review, you know, cut corners in the
6	review.
7	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Right.
8	MR. BEASLEY: We did not. You know, we
9	reviewed everything in the application to the extent
10	that information was provided, design information was
11	provided.
12	And so, again, you know, our mission was
13	to assure that its safe. And
14	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And the the scope
15	of the review was commensurate with the risk caused by
16	the design.
17	MR. BEASLEY: So, we can yes. We can
18	get into that
19	CHAIR PETTI: So, let me just
20	MR. BEASLEY: Now and in the future, in
21	Chapter information.
22	CHAIR PETTI: I might think very simply.
23	Construction permit operating different standards. A
24	non-power reactor power reactor, I think in that four
25	quadrant box it will be helpful to kind of understand,
l	I

1	you know, you're doing this is because that's a
2	construction permit.
3	It would be the same if it were a power
4	reactor or a non-power reactor. This is what I do
5	because it's an S-reactor. But, this is a power
6	reactor.
7	You know, both things are floating in it.
8	MR. BEASLEY: Um-hum.
9	CHAIR PETTI: I think we can get confused
10	sometimes. You know, so you might we might ask you
11	to say, okay, so if it were a power reactor, would it
12	be different?
13	Would the standard be different here or
14	not? So, we can figure out is it a CPOL issue? Or is
15	it a non-power reactor power reactor?
16	MR. BEASLEY: Okay.
17	CHAIR PETTI: In terms of the standard.
18	MR. BEASLEY: Yeah. And, I think what
19	we're presenting today will help
20	CHAIR PETTI: Great.
21	MR. BEASLEY: Come up with that.
22	CHAIR PETTI: Great.
23	MR. BEASLEY: So, onto the next slide.
24	MR. SHAMS: If I may offer this here,
25	because it's

1	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Can you state your
2	name?
3	MR. SHAMS: I'm going oh, sure. (Off
4	mic comment) Thank you. Mo Shams, I'm with the
5	staff.
6	So, I think these are incredibly important
7	questions. You know, how were we risked informed?
8	How did we apply the regulations?
9	But, I just wanted to make sure that we're
10	reflecting that we did not take any corners or cut any
11	corners in the review.
12	We've done the review as appropriately as
13	for the CP level of information needed by the
14	regulation and by the level of review associated with
15	that, as well as what we need for a research reactor,
16	or excuse me, a test reactor, Kairos is a test
17	reactor, what we need for a test reactor.
18	We looked at the regulations, what's
19	required. And we hopefully throughout the
20	presentation today, we can particularly show you that.
21	It's not about a preference of a power
22	reactor versus a non. At the end of the day, we need
23	to make the safety case.
24	They're reactors. They're important for
25	us to make sure that we've seen the information we

1 needed to render the appropriate regulatory findings And, hopefully we can show you how we've 2 3 done that today. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay. If you keep 4 5 that in mind during the presentation, I won't keep 6 asking the same questions. 7 MR. BEASLEY: Okay. Okay. Well, and we 8 may not fully answer, you know, your concern or your 9 interest until we get into the Chapter presentations. 10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes. understand, life is a degree of grace and course. 11 And, I'm reducing the area into black and white to 12 make it more to the point where you have to come up 13 14 with the answer. Whereas, it's 50 percent there. (Off mic comments.) 15 MR. BEASLEY: Next slide, please. So, in 16 17 accordance with NRC regulations and the Atomic Energy Act any Class 104c facility must be useful in the 18 19 conduct of research and development activities. In its construction permit application, 20 Kairos states that it plans to apply for a Class 104c 21 utilization facility operating license. 22 Accordingly, the staff conducted 23 24 review of the Hermes construction permit application

consistent with the regulatory requirements that apply

1 to testing facilities and support the conduct widespread and diverse research and development. 2 3 Many -- in CFR Part 50 requirements are 4 for power reactors and do not apply for testing 5 facility requirements such as combustible gas control, ECCS requirement for LWRs, environment qualification 6 7 of electrical equipment, ATWS, and many others. 8 Testing facilities are subject to the 9 cited requirements in 10 CFR Part 100, including 10 accident reference doses. Testing facilities are also subject to a few 10 CFR Part 509 requirements that do 11 not apply to research reactors, including a required 12 ACRS review of construction permit and operating 13 14 license applications and mandatory hearings for the 15 construction permit application. Next slide. 16 MEMBER BROWN: Does that mean you don't 17 have to talk to us? Is that including the ACRS? So, this is a courtesy? That's the way I 18 19 read that sentence in that. MR. BEASLEY: No, no. So, for a testing 20 facility, we do have to talk to you. For a research 21 facility, ACRS review is not required. 22 Okay. I didn't get that 23 MEMBER BROWN: 24 differentiation. I'm sorry. 25 MR. BEASLEY: That's okay.

	17
1	MEMBER BROWN: Now, what is this? Is
2	this a testing facility?
3	MR. BEASLEY: This is a testing facility.
4	MEMBER BROWN: Not research?
5	MR. BEASLEY: Not a research facility,
6	right.
7	MEMBER BROWN: Okay. All right. Thank
8	you. I missed that nuance.
9	MR. BEASLEY: Yeah. And so, there are
10	requirements in 10 CFR 50 that apply to testing
11	facilities that do not apply to research facilities.
12	MEMBER BROWN: Thank you very much.
13	MR. BEASLEY: But then, there's also that
14	distinction of requirements that apply to commercial
15	licenses that do not apply to testing facilities. So,
16	it's kind of the three levels in requirements in CFR
17	50.
18	MEMBER BROWN: Well, my concern well, if
19	this is some kind of parochial protection systems, it
20	is a reactor.
21	MR. BEASLEY: Yes.
22	MEMBER BROWN: It does generate some
23	power. And, it should have safe, reliable reactor
24	protection and whatever whatever in lab safeguards
25	are requirement, whatever those are.

1	I mean, I'm not saying they are, but
2	whatever they are. Okay.
3	MR. BEASLEY: Okay.
4	MEMBER BROWN: That was my concern when I
5	saw that. We lost a bubble, thank you.
6	MR. BEASLEY: Okay.
7	MEMBER REMPE: I have a question actually.
8	I know with Kairos it may not be a concern because
9	they aren't a light water reactor.
10	But, I think you said in the prior slide
11	that when you were talking about Part 50 requirements
12	that for power reactors don't apply to testing
13	facilities. And, you mentioned hydrogen, combustible
14	gas generation,
15	MR. BEASLEY: Right.
16	MEMBER REMPE: You don't have to worry
17	about it. If it were a water one, and it had
18	circular-based cladding, you just won't worry about
19	combustible gas generation?
20	MR. BEASLEY: If it's so, the
21	combustible gas control rule does not, it only applies
22	to power reactors.
23	So yes, if it was a water reactor testing
24	facility, then the combustible gas and hydrogen
25	control would not apply.

1	MEMBER REMPE: That's good insight. That
2	might be less that you're kind of missing something
3	you might want to think about.
4	MR. BEASLEY: Well
5	MEMBER REMPE: I'm just curious, because
6	it doesn't apply if this is just
7	MR. SHAMS: Dr. Rempe, if I'm yes, if
8	I may comment on that, I'm sorry. If it's a relevant
9	act, then we'll look at it, regardless of it.
10	MEMBER REMPE: I would hope so.
11	MR. SHAMS: But, the requirement in the
12	reg yeah. The requirement in the Reg is for power
13	reactors. That doesn't mean that we would not look at
14	it as a relevant act for that reactor.
15	MEMBER REMPE: That's good to know. Okay.
16	Everyone in the staff is aware of that too. Okay.
17	MR. SHAMS: Absolutely.
18	MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you.
19	CHAIR PETTI: Yeah. And, there's a
20	regulatory analysis white paper from Kairos where they
21	go through all the rules. And this is one of the ones
22	where the intent, you know, even though it's held to
23	be a specific thing, they argue that something has
24	sort of a relevance in a different sense.
25	MR. BEASLEY: Right.

1	CHAIR PETTI: And they they've got to
2	do it. So, they did a pretty good job, I think, at
3	it.
4	MR. BEASLEY: Right.
5	CHAIR PETTI: And, in the buckets, they
6	both have a different requirement.
7	MR. BEASLEY: Right. And we did the same.
8	CHAIR PETTI: Right.
9	MR. BEASLEY: And so, there is a
10	requirement, 10 CFR 50.46(a), I believe it is, for
11	high point vents, it does not apply to SC facilities.
12	But, there is non-condensable gasses in this design.
13	And so, we asked the question, is it a,
14	you know, is there a need for a high point vent?
15	Would it affect the design if there's non-condensable
16	gases in there?
17	And, it doesn't have an effect on the
18	design. So, that's a case, and just a very small one,
19	where yes, the regulation didn't apply to this
20	facility, but, we considered it anyway just to make
21	sure that it wasn't an issue.
22	MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
23	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay. But, I like
24	his answer. The regulation doesn't tell you thou
25	shall have a high point vent.

1 But, it tells you you should analyze in Chapter 15 or the actual analysis, and one of them is 2 3 innovative of gasses. And, if you don't have a way to 4 get rid of them, you have a bad accident. 5 That is how we catch it. And, we keep 6 and again, I do it every single day, 7 selecting the accidents, we have to start with a white 8 piece of paper, because it's often very human to start with the actions that all reactors have and to scratch 9 out the ones you don't have from that list and add the 10 ones that you do. 11 And, that is something that your review is 12 you have to get to really what is missing is the most 13 14 important part of all. CHAIR PETTI: So, similarly, the rule will 15 16 probably act as an ATWS and station blackout. 17 it's not a primary, but you guys obviously think about those sorts of events, right? 18 19 MR. BEASLEY: Yes. For all systems, because, 20 CHAIR PETTI: you know, it's sort of a generic issue that you'd want 21 to look at as a for lack of action in the back up. 22 MEMBER Well, it's 23 HALNON: 24 understanding that it was on the applicant to consider that and to justify why they didn't have to have 25

1	beyond design basis type, you know, the ATWS and other
2	things like these events.
3	Did they do that? Or, is that I didn't
4	review the safety analysis. But, really it's not
5	applicable to the analysis.
6	But, it was, it's on them to do that and
7	then you guys review it. You shouldn't be left to ask
8	a question or avoid if you don't see that.
9	MR. BEASLEY: Well, yeah. So, if there
10	was something that we felt was needed, then we would
11	ask them for that.
12	MEMBER HALNON: But, that's my point. Is
13	that you shouldn't have to feel it's needed. They
14	should justify regulation by regulation why they
15	shouldn't have to.
16	And, I believe that's in the guidance to
17	do that. I'll have to go back and look. But, I
18	remember reading where the applicant has to consider
19	all the regulations and tell you why this one doesn't
20	apply.
21	MR. BEASLEY: Right. And, they did that.
22	They I always prepare a topical report on
23	regulatory analysis, identifying which regulations are
24	required
25	MEMBER HALNON: I'd love to see that.

1	MR. BEASLEY: And which ones don't. And,
2	it was, that topical report wasn't just for a testing
3	facility. It was for their design.
4	And so, as a non-water reactor, you know,
5	what applies and what doesn't. And so, that's
6	MEMBER HALNON: So, you weren't just left
7	to wonder way. You actually had
8	MR. BEASLEY: Yes.
9	MEMBER HALNON: Some analysis then.
10	MR. BEASLEY: Yes.
11	MEMBER HALNON: Okay. I see.
12	MR. SHAMS: If I may make just one more
13	comment?
14	MR. BEASLEY: Yes.
15	MR. SHAMS: Mo Shams for the staff again.
16	So, it's just one of the probably the important
17	concepts to share is for research and test reactors,
18	currently the method is for safety assessment, risk
19	assessment is the maximum hypothetical event.
20	So, to your point, you've got to go
21	through a sheet, you know, a blank sheet of paper and
22	assume all the relevant accidents for that reactor,
23	and, then come up with an event that actually
24	encompasses all those.
25	And, our review would be actually to

1 scrutinize that assessment to see did they considered all the relevant events. To your point, if it's not 2 3 a light water reactor, you know, you're going to need 4 to look at, you know, did they consider the right ones 5 from the light water reactor, and do we know have they considered the relevant ones for that particular 6 7 technology, what makes sense. So, to the point of the question about, 8 9 what if its light water reactors, would the hydrogen 10 explosion be relevant? Of course, it would be relevant for a light water reactor. And, we'd want 11 to, you know, need to know that that the maximum 12 probability would capture that. 13 14 So, hopefully we'll walk you through that 15 We'll see what they have done and how they today. So, that goes to the, how do we do a 16 have done it. risk assessment that works for them. 17 CHAIR PETTI: I think there will be lots 18 19 of questions on that. MR. SHAMS: 20 Yes. 21 CHAIR PETTI: How you get to every case, 22 so, yeah. MEMBER REMPE: Since we're going down the 23 24 combustible gas rabbit hole, we're going to probably add another piece of interesting information. 25 In

Japan, I'm trying to understand what happened in Units 1 Three and Four. They can't identify the sources for 2 all the combustible gases. 3 4 And so, they're doing a lot of testing on 5 cabling and trying to see if combustible gases could 6 have contributed to the amount from the cabling 7 heating up so that they could get not only what they saw at Unit Three, but also at Unit Four. 8 9 MR. SHAMS: Interesting. 10 MEMBER REMPE: So, even reactors we've been running for long time, 11 а we still can't understand fully. And so, I wouldn't totally say oh, 12 we don't have to worry about that. 13 14 MR. SHAMS: Great point. Thank you for 15 that. MR. BEASLEY: So, a primary focus, factor 16 17 influencing the safety review was the consideration that Kairos submitted construction permit 18 а 19 For a construction permit, the level of application. detail in an application and the associated NRC staff 20 review, are different then are needed for an operating 21 license. 22 The construction permit application 23 24 describes preliminary design of a facility. While an operating license application needs to describe a 25

1 final design as well as administrative plans programs that are not provided in the construction 2 3 permit application. 4 Review guides for testing facilities does not differentiate between the level of detail needed 5 for a construction permit versus an operating license 6 7 application. Or, provides specific quidance on what maybe deferred to the license application. 8 9 In making this determination on what types 10 of things maybe reasonable deferred versus what is required for a construction permit, the staff used its 11 judgment also considered 12 technical the and requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(a) and (b), regarding 13 14 information that must be included in preliminary and 15 final safety analysis reports. In addition, the staff based its review on 16 the specific findings it needs to make before issuance 17 of a permit, which are provided in 10 CFR 50.35. 18 19 provided by 10 CFR 50.35, the principal architectural engineering criteria for a design must 20 described in a construction permit application. 21 But, some technical or design information 22 maybe left for later consideration in an operating 23

safety questions need to

license application.

Not all

24

1	resolved for the issuance of a permit. But, an
2	applicant must identify research and development which
3	is to be completed prior to the completion of
4	construction to resolve these questions.
5	In making a recommendation that a permit
6	should be issued, the staff also considers
7	requirements in 10 CFR 50.40 and 50.50.
8	CHAIR PETTI: So, just a question that I
9	it's the sub-bullet, the last sub-bullet of the
10	second bullet. That they have to com resolve the
11	safety questions by the completion of construction.
12	I thought it would always be prior to
13	being allowed to move to operation. Is that a
14	difference in those two?
15	I mean, there could be a timing
16	difference. But, you're basically saying it has to
17	all be done before construction is complete.
18	MR. BEASLEY: Yes. And, I, you know, I'm
19	not sure which regulation that comes from.
20	CHAIR PETTI: I just yeah. I just
21	wondered if it was just the words meant something
22	different than what it says.
23	MR. BEASLEY: No. It
24	CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
25	MR. BEASLEY: That's probably in 50.35.

1	Is that right, Ed?
2	CHAIR PETTI: Yeah. And then the other
3	question is, okay, this is all CP. Is it any
4	different for a power reactor?
5	The CP guidance, in terms of what the CP
6	application has to describe?
7	MR. BEASLEY: No. So, this is
8	(Simultaneous speaking.)
9	CHAIR PETTI: So, this is
10	MR. BEASLEY: No, this is a testing
11	reactor, no. It
12	CHAIR PETTI: This is a CP issue.
13	MR. BEASLEY: This is a CP issue. It's
14	not a
15	CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
16	MR. BEASLEY: testing facility, so.
17	CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
18	MR. BEASLEY: Yeah.
19	MEMBER REMPE: So, I have another question
20	that's more pertinent to the Hermes facility. This
21	facility doesn't have any experimental facilities
22	capabilities in it, but the whole thing is sort of a
23	demonstration or an experiment.
24	I'm thinking Chapter 10 and the staff
25	response. And, although and again, this probably

is something that would come up with the operating license, but on the other hand, as you go through and review the construction permit as well as the operating license, there's going to be things that you don't know all the details.

You'll have some data, but there will be extrapolation. Or, the codes won't be fully The coupled effects of radiation and validated. thermo-hydraulics and physics behavior, reactor there's going to be some data obtained as it operates that will confirm analyses.

And, I know that there's like an Appendix A, what we have with a construction permit, where the staff identifies things from the construction permit that have to be answered for the operating license.

But, you also have a subset in Appendix A which, by the way, isn't posted when I looked last time. We don't have the staff's Appendix A yet, which I'd like to see at some point.

But, anyway, will that Appendix A also talk about things you're identifying as you go through the review that you know won't even be available at the time you start up with the operating license that you'd like to see validated as data are obtained from running this facility?

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1	MR. BEASLEY: So, Appendix A does include
2	the research and development activities that Kairos is
3	planning.
4	MEMBER REMPE: For this facility? For
5	this operating?
6	MR. BEASLEY: For this facility. You
7	know, and this maybe more of a question for Jeff.
8	But, I'm not aware of anything that we are putting off
9	past the operating license.
10	We expect the codes, the modeling codes
11	that they used to be validated for use in the
12	operating license. And, Jeff's going to talk a little
13	bit to that in his example.
14	So, it, you know, we want to assure safety
15	before they get
16	MEMBER REMPE: They have to have
17	MR. BEASLEY: To the operating license.
18	MEMBER REMPE: Fully validated codes for
19	the I mean, this is a new facility where you're
20	looking at corrosion effects of the of slide with
21	the graphite and long term behavior combined with the
22	radiation.
23	They'll be periodically looking at the
24	pebbles. And, you've got criteria if it's of such,
25	you know, if something is 10 percent off of the

1	validation that they're predicting, you're not going
2	to say, I want you to shut this thing down or
3	something.
4	Or, I just am a little surprised by that.
5	I have talked with a former member of ACRS, and issues
6	came up over the years with the insights gained for
7	flow instabilities.
8	And, I think that was something I thought
9	I'd seen in an upcoming slide here. Where you wanted
10	them to test and that was done for an operating
11	reactor in the U.S. over the years.
12	So, I guess I'm not sure that everything
13	is fully validated that you aren't going to be
14	exploring something from what I've read so far. And,
15	I think there may be some other things.
16	And, as I go through this review, I would
17	want us as members to be looking for things that ought
18	to be validated at this facility.
19	CHAIR PETTI: My view is there's a handful
20	of things that no matter want we do, no matter how
21	good a job Kairos does analytically, well, it's just
22	until you run the reactor, you're not going to know.
23	So, that's just the nature of it.
24	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And, it is the reason
25	why we're building this facility.

1 MEMBER REMPE: Right. Exactly. Exactly. Exactly. 2 CHAIR PETTI: 3 MEMBER REMPE: No. So, yeah. I think 4 there are some things. Only, I'm not sure I agree 5 with you. But, you've been looking at it more than 6 7 But, I'm going to be looking as I go through 8 this review for things. 9 And, I'm hoping that they're documented 10 and it's something that I don't think you want to --I think you'd want someone at headquarters to be kind 11 of involved in this long term operation as they do 12 these tests and confirm this information. 13 14 MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah. Could Ι just 15 interrupt real quick? This is Jeff Schmidt from the 16 staff, Advanced Reactor Division. 17 So, the things that you are referring to, you'll see a fair number of those are testing done 18 19 during say the construction and before the operating license. In other words, there's a pretty extensive 20 Kairos testing program. 21 And, the specific thing you were talking 22 about was the decay rule system, which I do have a 23 24 You know, they have -- I would characterize 25 it as robust testing programs.

1	So, we can get into that, where they are
2	looking for things. But, this is these would by
3	and large, these are programs that would be completed
4	before either the construction is completed, or the
5	operating license.
6	So, just put it in that time frame or that
7	reference.
8	MEMBER REMPE: There's nothing you think,
9	I mean, this is a test facility to demonstrate the
10	technology for subsequent reactor applications.
11	MR. SCHMIDT: Right.
12	MEMBER REMPE: I would think that it
13	wouldn't be fully validated. But, the thing is a low
14	power thing and the staff saying, okay, it's probably
15	going to be safe enough that we're not worried about
16	public protection.
17	But, I would think you'd want to have more
18	confidence in the performance or the technology before
19	
20	MR. SCHMIDT: So, one of the areas that
21	might fall into the category you're speaking about, it
22	was when we discussed the fuel qual. Right?
23	There's a fuel qual program that will
24	inform the commercial reactor. Right, they're going
25	to take samples out of this reactor and inform

1 information for the test reactor. So, if that's what you're referring to, 2 But, you know, we are making a reasonable 3 veah. 4 assurance finding her for the test reactor. 5 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you. CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, so you know, if it's 6 7 a fuel thing so the tritium control in the system, 8 it's a hot, high temperature system. Tritium is going 9 to go places. You know, it's not a public safety issue. 10 It's a worker safety issue. But, trying to prejudge 11 all of that before you have any operating things, it 12 seems difficult. 13 14 Yeah, it looks like, you know, they're 15 going to be able to meet the requirements. But, you 16 know, go talk to the utilities that are irradiating with TPBARs. 17 You know, that's a low temperature system. 18 19 They don't like the fact that -- they've got tritium going everywhere and it's a low temperature system, a 20 beryllium control. 21 a worker safety issue. 22 Again, That's really hard to analytically put your hands around. I 23 24 mean, so I see a number of things like that.

until you get those operating figures and inform the

1 power the power reactor. 2 Those are just realities. That's why it's a test reactor, right? I mean, I've already written 3 4 a paragraph of a letter saying, we think these are 5 things that everybody should know. They're just 6 there. 7 And, that's why they're building the test 8 reactor. 9 Yeah. And, I would hope MEMBER REMPE: 10 and maybe it doesn't have to be in construction permit, but it seems like a good place to 11 start such a list and have it in Appendix A that we 12 expect to have data to confirm some of the information 13 14 that wasn't fully validated as a long term operation. And, have that list identified and makes 15 sure that the, if there are any controls that the 16 17 staff wants to impose and say if you see something is -- a lot more tritium coming out then you expect, or 18 19 something like that. 20 those kind And have of tech specs identified everybody understands 21 so that expected when you have this type of a first of a kind 22 23 24 MR. SCHMIDT: Right. 25 MEMBER REMPE: Little operating

1 experience. And, is that going to be in your Appendix A or some place? 2 3 MR. SCHMIDT: Well, so not for 4 construction permit. So, you're a step beyond us a 5 little bit in the operating license phase. So, Appendix A does identify the research 6 7 and development activities that Kairos is undertaking 8 for, you know, for this reactor. And so, we'll, you 9 know, we'll -- or that need to be done in order to get 10 the license, operating license application. But, that's a very good idea. 11 I think, you know, that is something that we, you know, we 12 should start thinking about and, you know, planning 13 14 ahead as we, you know, as we get the construction 15 permit finished. If it is decided to award the permit, then 16 we would start thinking ahead about what we should do 17 with the operating license application. And certainly 18 19 the affirmatory activities that you're talking about are, you know, a major purpose for building Hermes a 20 testing facility. 21 There are, you know, there's a lot of 22 reasons to building a testing facility. Kairos wants 23 24 to exercise a supply chain.

They want to develop the scale of craft

1 workers. They want to find out, you know, what costs 2 are like for building and for all the materials they 3 need. 4 So, there's a number of reasons beyond 5 just confirming the technical aspects that the testing facility is being built. 6 7 CHAIR PETTI: So, just sort of a bigger picture. This is the first low advanced reactor, non-8 9 light water reactor. 10 And, we're going to be talking later in our meeting this week about how we're going to 11 approach our letter. And, it's going to be different 12 perhaps then previous letters. It's going to be more 13 14 high level. 15 The question is, when you don't operating experience, how do you make your assessment? 16 And, we've given it some thought. 17 And, the outlying kind of addresses sort 18 19 of a punch list of things that, you know, safety margin for instance, it's critical in my opinion. 20 go back to the early light water reactors, they do 21 tons of margin. 22 23 And so, it should be incumbent on the 24 applicant to show how they have a lot of margin in all the different dimensions of what safety margin is. 25

1	So, those are the things we're going to be
2	looking for as we think about it. Because, you know,
3	it's not going to be, you know, oh, let's see that
4	validation experiment and make sure that that code,
5	you know, is calculated right.
6	I think we have to see these things on
7	that. But, you know, do you really have the margin?
8	Do you, you know, how great is it? Where is it? How
9	are your safety functions implemented?
10	That's sort of a look at things. And
11	what's novel and new? And you guys, I think, are
12	thinking along the same lines as I am.
13	So, that's sort of, at least in my how
14	I'm looking at it.
15	MR. BEASLEY: Thank you. So, next slide,
16	Ed.
17	So, considering that the application is
18	for a testing facility construction permit, the staff
19	performed a, well, not a PRA risk informed reviewed,
20	but a generic risk informed review. In that the
21	review depth and scope were commensurate with the
22	safety significance of areas under review.
23	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Let me air my
24	grievance. Excuse me. But, everybody in this room,
25	I have been trained to risk inform my decision whether

1 to ride a bike to work or take the metro. 2 And, at the end of spending two hours 3 doing that training, you just go by the seat of your 4 pants and do whatever you want. Because that's 5 basically the conclusion I got from that training. And, I think it can be done better for 6 7 I mean, we have the mathematics and we have the ways to actually go have two hypothesis and pick the 8 9 one that is better of the two. And, thoroughness, instead of the seat of 10 the pants, is desired, when it's not your decision to 11 ride the bike or take the metro. 12 MR. BEASLEY: 13 Yes. 14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm airing mу 15 grievance. Thank you. 16 MR. BEASLEY: So, the staff 17 maintained a big picture safety perspective of the Hermes design considering the small size of Hermes, 18 19 the short operating life, and the safety case with low radiological consequences. 20 The staff tailored its review for the 21 unique and novel Hermes technology described in the 22 preliminary design. The staff used NUREG-1537, the 23 24 licensing quidance for non-power reactors to perform

the review.

NUREG-1537 is designed to be technology 1 2 neutral and provides flexibility for a review such as the Hermes application. NUREG-1537, part 1, is also 3 4 the guidance that Kairos used in preparing 5 application. Next slide. So, this is a list of the Chapters in 6 7 NUREG-1537 which aligns with the Chapters in Kairos' preliminary safety analysis report and with 8 staff's safety evaluation. 9 As noted on the slide, some of the NUREG-10 1537 Chapters, for example, Chapters like 16, 17, and 11 18, are not applicable to the construction permit 12 application. 13 14 The project core team in the Division of 15 Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities 16 reviewed technical topics 17 integral to the reactor design, such as fuel and core design, thermal and structural analysis, 18 and 19 accidents. 20 Other topics reviewed by subject matter experts from other divisions, include those such as 21 22 quality assurance, fire protection, site characteristics, and emergency preparedness. 23 Next 24 slide, please.

Hey, Ben?

MEMBER HALNON:

1	MR. BEASLEY: Yes?
2	MEMBER HALNON: Do you recall when the
3	last revision to NUREG-1537 was made?
4	MR. BEASLEY: I'm going to ask
5	(Simultaneous speaking.)
6	MEMBER HALNON: If I recall it, it was
7	like three
8	MR. BEASLEY: I'm not in the non-power
9	MEMBER HALNON: It was like in '90
10	something.
11	MR. HELVENSTON: Okay. This is Ed
12	Helvenston from the staff. It was 1996.
13	MEMBER HALNON: So, given that, and the
14	fact that we have at least exercised the more
15	contemporary, is there any talk about adding lessons
16	learned and doing a revision so that we have some of
17	the I mean, the post-911 regulations are not
18	included.
19	The Fukushima regulations are not, I mean,
20	those orders are not included. A lot of things are
21	not included in 1537 now. And, it just seems like
22	it's old.
23	MR. BEASLEY: So, I'm not in the non-power
24	side of the Division. And so, I don't want to speak
25	for them.

1	MEMBER HALNON: So, it's not a good
2	question for you.
3	MR. BEASLEY: Yes. It's not a good
4	question for me. I don't want to get myself in
5	trouble with other Branch Chiefs, committing them to
6	something.
7	MEMBER HALNON: Okay.
8	MR. BEASLEY: But so,
9	MEMBER HALNON: I'd like to have a
10	conversation about that. Maybe somewhere about
11	whether or not 1537 used today as written is really
12	adequate for some of these new advanced reactors that
13	are coming online now.
14	MEMBER BALLINGER: Didn't they cover some
15	of this in the ISG? There's an ISG associated
16	MEMBER HALNON: That maybe. And I
17	MEMBER BALLINGER: That's for power
18	reactors.
19	MEMBER KIRCHNER: There's an ISG for
20	construction.
21	MEMBER HALNON: And, just a question out
22	there. Maybe I can look up and have a discussion
23	later on.
24	MR. SHAMS: If I may offer. Mo Shams with
25	the staff. We are making updates to 1537 by adding a

1	appendices if you would. And, intended I believe
2	we have
3	MEMBER REMPE: Mo, talk to the mic side.
4	MR. SHAMS: I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
5	CHAIR PETTI: Yeah. Everybody out there
6	can hear you. But, not in here. Yeah, it's one of
7	the bad spots.
8	MR. SHAMS: I believe we have a section
9	that was developed for molten salt reactors. We're in
10	the process of endorsing another one that addresses
11	reactors like in Abilene Christian University.
12	So, to your point, there is an effort to
13	include the new technologies, the nuances associated
14	with it, the lessons learned that we've had, you know,
15	over time.
16	So, we're mindful of the new updates.
17	MEMBER HALNON: Okay. Good. Thank you,
18	I appreciate that.
19	MR. TAYLOR: And, Rob Taylor. Just one
20	other thing. Especially going back to 911
21	requirements. The Commission made specific decisions
22	and we can go look at those about what the
23	applicability of those requirements were to different
24	facilities as they evaluated.
25	And, some of those played out over years

1 as they made decisions on the CAT II facilities and things like that. So, we'd have to look at what the 2 Commission instructions were on those. 3 With regards to Fukushima, we have to look 4 5 -- we would look at Fukushima and ask the question, is this applicable to a small test reactor of this design 6 7 and those lessons learned. 8 So, I mean, it's something we can do. 9 But, it -- given what we're supposed to do under minimum regulations, you also have to ask yourself, 10 does that make sense for a research and test reactor? 11 I'll build on what Rob said. MR. SHAMS: 12 For Fukushima actually, we took a sweeping look at all 13 14 other facilities. We stated out with power reactors, but we looked at all other facilities. 15 16 There were SECY papers that were written up assessing where it was fuel facilities, whether it 17 was ISFSIs, whether it's research and test reactors. 18 19 the research and test reactor community particular, we've identified a handful, and we looked 20 at the hazard and assessed if there's a need. 21 So, that look has been taken, you know, 22 taken into consideration as well. 23 24 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. And, thank you. -- yeah, I agree the Fukushima stuff -- really light 25

1	water, being a light water reactor, even though you
2	have to keep funding standards and other things, and
3	those are picked up in other Reg Guides and the sort.
4	So, but just an audit of 1537 seems like
5	it could be good.
6	MR. SHAMS: Yeah.
7	MEMBER HALNON: Could benefit from a look
8	back and a refresh. Thank you.
9	MR. BEASLEY: Thanks. So, Ed, we can go
10	to the next slide.
11	So, the staff conducted audits in the
12	topics listed on this slide. I identified the
13	approximate number of questions for each audit to
14	illustrate that we conducted a substantial review,
15	and, that our review dug into the areas that were
16	safety significant.
17	Jeff Schmidt is going to provide an
18	overview of a few technical items to illustrate how we
19	carried out the review on our preliminary design of
20	the testing facility.
21	So, I'm going to turn it over to Jeff
22	unless you have any other questions for me.
23	(No response.)
24	MR. BEASLEY: Okay. Next slide.
25	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah. This is Jeff Schmidt

1 with the staff. I was lead technical reviewer for the Hermes construction permit. 2 3 I wanted to give you two examples, I'm 4 sure we'll probably get into more, that covers some of 5 the questions that you were talking about earlier, like what's it based on, preliminary information, what 6 7 maybe applicable for test reactors versus a power 8 reactor. 9 I picked out, I think, two examples of interest and two that were, you know, were deemed to 10 be -- well, certainly the first one, deemed to be a 11 high safety significant system. And, I'll get into 12 13 that. 14 So, a decay heat removal system, is safety 15 significant for maintaining vessel temperature within 16 the accepted limits of the stainless steel 316. You know, the staff's assessment was that 17 the vessel is probably the limiting component in this 18 19 design based on the available fuel margins. we'll get into that when we get into the substantive 20 review. 21 22 But, you know, it became clear to the staff 23 early in the review that temperature 24 distributions within the vessel are going to need high fidelity and that they're relatively close to some of 25

those stainless steel limits.

So, that was the primary focus of, well, not primary, but a significant focus of what we found, to put it in context. And, for those -- that vessel to remain intact, the decay heat removal system has to perform its function when you get it above a certain power level, or threshold power level as its referred to in the safety evaluation.

So, that's the context of why I picked this system for discussion. I guess I covered the second bullet that, you know, it's placed in service when basically passive radiated cooling is not, is no longer adequate.

There is a regime there where you obviously always have that cooling component. But, there is a time where that decay heat removal system has to be placed in service.

And that placing in service was a focus of the review too, in terms of what could happen placing that system in service. Or, if that system, when it's placed in service if you had a reactor shortly thereafter, what would happen when you just met the threshold power.

So, those were kind of areas of the review. The staff went through the preliminary design and

1	identified potential failure modes.
2	So, we tried to take a high level look at
3	the system to see where potential failure modes could
4	be, especially if anything had to move into position
5	to perform that function.
6	And so, I think we'll probably be talking
7	about that fairly significantly during the
8	Subcommittee meeting. There was, you know, some
9	things identified that were just higher, of higher
10	interest than others.
11	CHAIR PETTI: Jeff, the question I had is
12	sort of the opposite, which is there is a system to
13	keep the salt hot.
14	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah
15	(Simultaneous speaking.)
16	CHAIR PETTI: I don't want to lose the
17	heat. I want to keep the heat held in there
18	MR. SCHMIDT: Right, right.
19	CHAIR PETTI: in freezing events and
20	they don't claim that's a safety system.
21	MR. SCHMIDT: That's correct.
22	CHAIR PETTI: And I'm still, I guess, I
23	mean, I'll be asking about the thought process there
24	
	because I you know, if you freeze, as Ron would

1 the like, and so I keep thinking why isn't this safety 2 related? 3 So, you know, okay, under control heat 4 generation, I mean, you could have a separate safety 5 function for coolants that are hot, that have to stay hot, but you could also put it under the umbrella of 6 7 controlling heat. You're trying to get it out or keep it in depending on what's going on. I didn't see that 8 logic in any of their documentation, and again, I 9 10 haven't got into that chapter again. I will say on the second 11 MR. SCHMIDT: slide, the next slide, we address that a little bit --12 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, good. 13 14 MR. SCHMIDT: -- from a 72-hour kind of 15 coping time period. It is an area of interest to the staff. Let's put it that way. If I could get to the 16 second slide, we could discuss it more. 17 Let's see, so as far as we audited -- so 18 19 the calculation that has been performed by Kairos has been like the max heat removal system to keep the 20 vessel temperature intact, and you'll probably see 21 presentations with curves that show, you know, 22 vessel temperature limit relative to the transients, 23 24 but we do get to your freezing question here also. The staff also performed just to ensure 25

water tank volumes were sufficient for seven days of cooling. Staff ensured testing plans, addressed potential flow and heat removal and stability issues during the transition and in-service phases, including the effects of identified potential failure modes of the system.

So, here the staff was concerned about, you know, initially, at least the way it's described now, the system is dry and water is introduced to the system when you get to a certain threshold power.

The staff was concerned that that evolution could lead to flow instabilities, and the staff was also concerned that even once flow was established, you know, the boiling process in these tubes can be fairly violent and subject to things like back pressure changes and things like that which might cause an instability.

So, those, the staff asked questions in that area and really focused on the testing plans. So, they have a testing plan for those items and the staff is going to, I hope, be heavily involved during the testing process as well.

But, you know, the staff did identify these issues. Kairos did respond that they are aware of those and that that will be addressed in their

testing program as they come up with a final design of the heat removal system.

MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And you expect that this will be addressed in the final safety analysis report, correct?

MR. SCHMIDT: I'm sorry, say that again?

MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: They will be addressed in the final safety analysis report?

MR. SCHMIDT: Yes, yes, all of these, so all of the testing programs. So, Appendix A, and thank you, correct me if I'm wrong, are effectively commitments by Kairos made in the PSAR of the testing programs, so that's the way you should review that appendix.

There is a separate list that the staff is keeping for lessons learned, areas of interest to inform the OL review. It's not part of the safety evaluation, but there's a separate document out there in our SharePoint drive that's saying, you know, whoever is responsible for looking at this in the future, look at these items, right? These are identified areas that the staff should, at least the staff as it is now that could identify are areas of interest, so they're kind of like two separate documents.

1	MEMBER HALNON: So, Weidong, can we get
2	that uploaded to ours, that list? I know it's going
3	to be a moving target, but, because I've been keeping
4	my set of stuff, or at least point us to it.
5	MR. BEASLEY: So, confirming, Jeff, yes,
6	Appendix A is commitments that, things that Kairos
7	said that they were going to do during our audit
8	discussions. I'd like to think about the staff's
9	internal
10	MEMBER HALNON: Okay, well, we can give
11	you our list and hopefully it will be
12	(Simultaneous speaking.)
13	MR. BEASLEY: So, in some respects, those
14	are just staff notes for themselves
15	MEMBER HALNON: I got it. I get it. I
16	know.
17	MR. BEASLEY: to allow them to think
18	about that.
19	MEMBER HALNON: Right, I understand.
20	Okay, we'll just make sure that our list is discussed
21	in the meetings and you guys can go
22	(Simultaneous speaking.)
23	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yeah, I mean, in the
24	chapters that I've looked at, they've done a pretty
25	darn good job. I mean, the applicant looks at the

PDCs and discusses how they meet them.

The staff takes a look at it in the SE and says here are how they compare with the PDCs, and by the way, here are the following limitations and conditions we're going to put on the system that have to be satisfied before they're operating. So, it's pretty straightforward, and at least from the ones I've looked at, pretty thorough.

MEMBER HALNON: Yeah, I don't disagree with that. What I see though is a lot of repeat back of what the regulation requires. Yes, we'll do this. It requires this. Yes, we'll do that, and then as you go through it and we talk a little bit more about, you know, referencing other things like 20.1406.

We're going to minimize contamination.

Okay, great. You know, how is that area through to the translation into the operating license application and who is taking a look at it from that perspective?

So, there's just things like that.

Now, I know those very overt commitments are probably on your list as well. It's the -- I wonder why things that, you know, pop into your mind as you're reading this stuff based on past experiences and biases, so those are the types of things, I guess, that we just need to make sure that if we've got them

1 on our mind, to let you know about it. Yes, Member Halnon, that's 2 MR. JESSUP: good feedback. 3 This is Bill Jessup from the staff. 4 So, this is, you know, kind of the foundational 5 meeting today. I think this is really good feedback we 6 can take into the chapter specific discussions, and 7 8 so, you know, we can go take a look at the notes we've 9 put together, go back to the SEs and see if there are those items. 10 I think Chairman Rempe gave us similar 11 feedback about, you know, what are we keeping track 12 What's in Appendix A versus what are we keeping 13 14 track of? So, it's good feedback. 15 MEMBER HALNON: Well, at least for me, I'm putting those thoughts, at least the major ones, in 16 17 the memos to Dave. We don't SharePoints. CHAIR PETTI: Τ 18 19 don't think we would put our stuff on a SharePoint site. We will have it in the memos so that that's our 20 way to translate to you guys hey, whoever is going to 21 pick this up in the future --22 MEMBER HALNON: Some may be very important 23 24 and some may not be important at all --25 MR. JESSUP: Right.

1 MEMBER HALNON: -- but just the thought 2 process. 3 MR. JESSUP: I think it's clear we're 4 definitely going to hear you all's list. CHAIR PETTI: Sure, yeah. No, I think the 5 other thing as I think about this and your earlier 6 7 slide about the number of questions, you know, in the 8 old review where we had the two stages, right, with 9 open items, we kind of collectively had this set of ideas and it was sort of (inaudible). 10 Now, it comes to us with everything done 11 and sometimes you don't see all of the hard work that 12 was done behind the scenes, so it requires probably 13 14 the presentations to be a little bit different than 15 the way it used to be to convince us that you guys 16 have done the homework as opposed to us living it when we did it in the optimal phase things in the past. 17 That's great feedback. MR. SHAMS: 18 Mo 19 Shams with the staff. Great feedback, Dr. Petti, for us, such that we continue to keep this process as 20 efficient as possible. 21 Right. 22 CHAIR PETTI: SHAMS: We need to calibrate our 23 MR. 24 presentation to you in a way that satisfies that need. 25 I got you.

1	MEMBER BROWN: Can I ask a technical
2	question as opposed to this esoteric (inaudible)? The
3	second bullet says the DHRS must be placed into
4	service above a certain threshold. Does that imply
5	that they need to have an automated system that does
6	that or is it totally operator in the present design?
7	I'm totally clueless as to what
8	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, it doesn't get into
9	the details of that system. That's going to that,
10	right now, I'm reading it as operator action, but I
11	don't know the details of how that is implemented.
12	MEMBER BROWN: So, that's an open point?
13	MR. SCHMIDT: I would say it's more
14	consistent with the OL review to be looking at that.
15	I mean, we did have
16	MEMBER BROWN: As opposed to the
17	construction permit?
18	MR. SCHMIDT: That's right.
19	MEMBER BROWN: Oh, okay.
20	MR. SCHMIDT: That's right. I mean
21	MEMBER BROWN: But we've got to design
22	systems.
23	MR. SCHMIDT: Right.
24	MEMBER BROWN: At some point, you've got
25	to have the systems being designed if you want it and

1 what the criteria are. Right. 2 MR. SCHMIDT: 3 MEMBER BROWN: And that just stuck out to 4 me in terms of how I'm glad DHRS had to be, you know 5 had a differential ahead of this, a power level determination of when it was needed and when it was 6 7 You know, if not -- if it is needed, then it 8 sounds to me like you don't want distractions to 9 prevent it from not getting activated. 10 MR. SCHMIDT: So, you're kind of getting to what I refer to as the staff notes, you know, that 11 are kept in the background. You know, this is a 12 preliminary design and I think everybody needs to 13 14 understand that. The details of a lot of exactly how 15 these things are implemented is going to be coming as 16 part of the OL. 17 So, you identified, I mean, we identified human actions that could lead to problems where you 18 19 didn't turn it on when you should have or you've turned it on too soon. Too soon can be as challenging 20 as too late, so you identified some of the things on 21 our list. 22 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, so this is a question 23 24 you've got on your list that would be answered later?

MR. SCHMIDT:

That's correct.

1 MEMBER BROWN: I don't have to go find it 2 3 MR. SCHMIDT: No, no. 4 MEMBER BROWN: -- two years from now? 5 MR. SCHMIDT: No. I mean, those --MEMBER BROWN: 6 All right. 7 MR. SCHMIDT: Those considerations, you 8 know, such as human error or human actions if it's a 9 manual system will have to be addressed. Thank you. 10 MEMBER BROWN: MR. SCHMIDT: Let's go to the next slide, 11 12 please. Okay, this is getting back to the testing plans I was referring to and I talked already a little 13 14 bit about this. You know, when in service, potential 15 dynamic loads on the structure, both due to the 16 transition phase and effectively thermal shock during 17 the transition phase is a concern to the staff, and in-service evaporator boiling, you know, that's the 18 19 continuous operation mode. Those, again, I think were pointed out and I think Kairos is addressing those as 20 part of their testing program. 21 Staff 22 ensured the testing program addressed the potential for corrosion and fouling in 23 24 the evaporator tube affecting both structural

integrity, that's kind of like the stress corrosion

cracking issue if you're running it for longer than not, and the ability to remove any potential fouling. You know, we're thinking of things like what's the quality of the water source that are going into those evaporator tubes? Those are the considerations.

Staff noted the **DHRS** design must accommodate the highest heat loads for vessel integrity and the lowest in-service heat loads to prevent freezing without operator action within 72 hours.

So, this is kind of getting to your question. This is like, you know, you have two design constraints you're trying to design to. You know, the detailed design will have to address those competing design requirements.

You know, I think that it's possible to do those, but we'll need the details of the design. So, that's really the bullet there is final determination of the accuracy of the decay heat removal system for these competing designs will be made based on the design presented in the FSAR.

So, the staff was concerned about could a situation occur where you've met the threshold requirement and you have to turn it on, but then you trip and maybe you don't have the decay heat at --

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1 You know, it was necessary for vessel cooling should you have a transient, but it also could 2 lead to a freeze situation in a shorter period of time 3 4 than the 72 hours. So, the staff is focused on that 5 issue. Petti stated, you know, 6 Dr. the 7 auxiliary heating system is non-safety related, 8 we're using this 72 hours kind of as a guide to say 9 it's time to get the system back in service if it's 10 not in service at that time to prevent the freeze. The design goal is to prevent freeze. Freeze is a 11 non-analyst condition. 12 MEMBER KIRCHNER: 13 And these 14 considerations, Jeff, are applied to just normal 15 operation of the primary system across the board, so 16 you're going to see all of these issues for the 17 primary system, including the reactor vessel. MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah --18 19 MEMBER BROWN: Does that imply you need an automatic auxiliary heating system to make sure it 20 doesn't freeze as well? 21 SCHMIDT: 22 MR. There is an auxiliarv heating system, but it's non-safety. 23 24 MEMBER BROWN: It's an automatic -- how can it be non-safety if it's going to be, if you can 25

Τ	break the system?
2	MR. SCHMIDT: You can as long as, I mean,
3	as long as you have adequate decay heat. If you don't
4	have adequate decay heat, you wouldn't be turning off
5	that system. So, it's really a function of before the
6	threshold power, you still have to provide cooling,
7	and that will be passive needs and that will be
8	adequate.
9	At some point after like, say, a reactor
10	trip, you will have to go onto that auxiliary heating
11	system. What we want to do is just make sure it's far
12	enough out in time that you have capability to, you
13	know, restore that non-safety system.
14	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: What you're talking
15	about, what's the power source for the aux system?
16	MR. SCHMIDT: That, I would have to look
17	up.
18	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's likely offsite
19	electrical?
20	MR. SCHMIDT: I'd have to look it up. I
21	don't remember.
22	CHAIR PETTI: My concern is, you know,
23	when you start up a pebble bed, it takes a heck of a
24	long time to get it to equilibrium. So, they're

25

sitting at conditions.

1	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah.
2	CHAIR PETTI: It could be the entire four
3	years, that they'll never actually get to true
4	equilibrium where you have full 100 percent decay
5	heat, you know, if you shut down.
6	All of that has to be analyzed. I mean,
7	it's almost you know, it's not like something in
8	ten years where there's a true steady state and that's
9	what my concern was. It's complicated
10	MR. SCHMIDT: Right.
11	CHAIR PETTI: in that startup.
12	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, it is complicated
13	because I think it's a function obviously of the decay
14	heat, but also maybe just the reactor power itself at
15	that point.
16	CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
17	MR. SCHMIDT: You know, so it's a function
18	of two powers if you will, and I agree, you know, it
19	is complicated.
20	MEMBER BROWN: It just seems to me you've
21	got competing issues. You've got to make sure you can
22	take it when it gets above a certain threshold
23	MR. SCHMIDT: Yes.
24	MEMBER BROWN: so that the radiated
25	doesn't do the work, and you've got another threshold

1	on the bottom end because I can't let it get too cold
2	because otherwise the system is going to freeze, and
3	yet the whole system in which it breaks, and now it's
4	a non-safety system.
5	Just for some reason, my brain doesn't
6	work very well with that regardless of whether it's a
7	test reactor or a power reactor. I mean, it's got
8	enough
9	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Educate me about it.
10	Freezing is a bad thing, but isn't that an operational
11	concern more than a safety concern?
12	MR. SCHMIDT: So, I personally view
13	freezing at this point as just an unknown. I mean, it
14	could be argued that
15	(Simultaneous speaking.)
16	CHAIR PETTI: It could. I mean, I have
17	seen Flibe freeze inside the welds, yes, in labs, in
18	lab scale stuff. Remember there's a weld at the
19	bottom of the vessel. That's the one that, you know,
20	you'd be worried about.
21	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Does it expand like
22	ice does? I mean, I don't know what, if it expands a
23	lot.
24	CHAIR PETTI: So, let me just ask Jeff.
25	Is this a case where, I mean, given how complex this

1 is, that for the OL, you guys would do confirmatory calcs and try to convince yourself? 2 MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, I mean, I can't commit 3 4 to that at this point. 5 CHAIR PETTI: Right, but, I mean, this is sort of moving in that direction. 6 7 MR. SCHMIDT: I think you could tell by 8 the purpose of the slide and what's stated here that 9 it is an area of concern for the staff, yeah, because, 10 you know, we're just not sure what happens with freezing, right? 11 You could argue it's vessel protection. 12 You might, you know, you could argue it's safety 13 14 related. Maybe if it's frozen, I don't care if I break welds or something like that, but that's not 15 16 where we are today. 17 Where we are today is to prevent freezing within 72 hours. That's the design commitment. 18 19 could evolve, I quess, if they're unable to finalize this design. Well, then I, you know, I think we're 20 going to have to revisit that again. It's going to be 21 potentially revisited. 22 You know, I will say that all of these 23 24 issues have been brought up with Kairos. You know,

that freezing is as much a concern right now as it is

vessel integrity and the maximum temperatures and I think I'll just have to leave it at that.

MEMBER HALNON: So, when you all look at that, at the freezing, and the temperature range, and low decay heat, just from experience, you know, when you have a scram from a low decay heat perspective, things happen.

There are other effects from other systems and I will try to translate it, maybe like the inner gas system or some other system that may either remove a little bit of heat that's significant now because you have a low decay heat, or maybe it would add some heat ahead of the scram or the pressurizer heaters and a little bit of vent insulation cause more heat than the core was putting out and cause natural circulation issues.

So, there's some interactions that go forth beyond just the core and the decay heat recovery system, so you might want to make sure that we look at, you know, expand your bubble a little bit, your circle of what you're going to analyze as you look at low decay heat type situations.

MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, I mean, I can think of one system off the top of my head that, I mean, is kind of in that same vein is the cover gas system.

1	MEMBER HALNON: Right.
2	MR. SCHMIDT: Let's say you increase the
3	flow of the cover gas system, either it might be some
4	cooling effect associated with the Flibe and hence you
5	get to freeze faster, so that's kind of like a control
6	system if I were to group it that could, you know,
7	lead to an earlier freeze. You know, we are we
8	have noted that.
9	MEMBER HALNON: Okay, that's the thought
10	process I was hoping to get to.
11	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah.
12	MEMBER HALNON: Good.
13	MR. SCHMIDT: You know, some of these
14	systems, I think, as you go through are not well-
15	defined in a preliminary design. We're going to need
16	final design like flow rates and things like that to
17	really determine if that is a significant factor or
18	not.
19	You know, some of these things are on the
20	staff's mind, but we're not able to nail some of these
21	down yet without the final details, and I think you're
22	going to be hearing that multiple times, you know, in
23	the subcommittee meetings coming forward.
24	DR. BLEY: Hey, Jeff?
25	MR. SCHMIDT: Yes?

1 DR. BLEY: Dennis Bley. This is an odd 2 question. All of these construction permits, we built 3 in language that implies completeness, but we know 4 there are gaps. 5 The one thing we came to on a couple of cases in the past is what you really want for the 6 7 construction permit is to be convinced that there are 8 no issues that could become really important later that construction or elements of the construction 9 10 could make it almost impossible to address, and we're really trying to have a cushion and make sure there's 11 no real big thing sitting there. 12 Has there ever been a construction permit 13 14 issued with step-wise requirements? You know, before 15 you do this certain weld somewhere, you have to find 16 out the aggressiveness of some of the materials that will be there? 17 I don't know that there ever has been a 18 19 construction permit that had a staging kind of way to It's a stage thing itself in getting to the 20 it. operating license, but I'm just curious if there has 21 been. 22 MR. SCHMIDT: 23 I'm going to have to call

for help here because this is my first construction

permit, so, you know, maybe others would be better

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able to answer that question, like Ed. I'm looking at Ed.

MR. HELVENSTON: Yeah, I'll say -- this is Ed Helvenston from the staff. And this kind of works into the research and development aspect of that requirement that they identify R&D programs that are important and for safety questions brought up during the CP, and we have issued CPs that have had R&D commitments associated with them in the past.

DR. BLEY: Yeah, I've not foreseen these, but it seems like that could be really a safe way to go if there are some things that remain as crucial issues.

MR. SCHMIDT: This is Jeff Schmidt. Well, in chapter one, there are the R&D items listed and I'll just throw one out like the fluidic device. The staff spent a fair amount of time contemplating. You know, that's necessary for decay heat removal and we were looking for failure modes associated with such a device.

You know, that is listed as an R&D because the design is conceptual at this point and they are going through a series of tests of different fluidic devices, and so, you know, that one, I don't know if I'd call it step-wise, but, you know, they have a

program.

They have a schedule. They have, yeah, I mean, they have a test. They're setting up testing programs to find the final design, but I don't know if it's -- I don't necessary consider it, you know, an incremental step. In other words, it's just part of their test program that's a continuum from the CP to the OL.

DR. BLEY: Yeah, but it's kind of close, so thanks. That helps. And there are some things that are just really worth getting straight before you build things. Okay, go ahead.

MR. SCHMIDT: So, yeah, I think the ones listed in chapter one, I want to say it's 1.3.9, section 1.3.9, and, you know, I think some of the things that we'll be talking with the decay heat removal system is another one of those things, right, for the reasons we just described. Okay, let's go to the next slide.

MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Actually, I have a question on this slide, this is Vesna Dimitrijevic, and in the previous slide. So, I'm not seeing this example.

For example, you have defined that DHRS is safety significant because, you know, vessel

1 temperature, and you have discussed the two different safety functions here. One is, you know, to cool the 2 3 vessel and one is to prevent freezing. 4 In the subtext of defining significance of 5 the system, we have, one of the options is that we can discuss significant safety functions. So, did they go 6 7 into this process of defining the safety functions and 8 their significance? That's my first question. 9 My second question is (inaudible) what we 10 are calling the PRA mission times. One is that you want to assure there is volume of the water tanks 11 enough for seven days of cooling, and here you want to 12 prevent the freezing within 72 hours, and so why are 13 14 there those two different mission times discussed in 15 So, those are my two questions. this case? 16 MR. SCHMIDT: So, this is Jeff Schmidt. 17 The first part of your questions is, you know, Kairos, as part of their PSAR, identified what they thought as 18 19 safety significance and the safety-related systems to mitigate those events, and then the staff reviews 20 The second part of your question --21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Did they define the 22 safety functions in this process? 23 24 MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, the safety functions, 25

yes, yes.

1	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, so they
2	defined the safety functions and then tagged them as
3	important and as not important, because we can see
4	here that cooling the vessel is an important safety
5	function, but prevent freezing was determined, maybe
6	wasn't even defined as a safety function.
7	MR. SCHMIDT: It was defined as a safety
8	function. I think the staff had concerns whether the
9	design could accommodate both. Yeah, their goal was
10	always to prevent freezing with a specific mission
11	time, and we had to ensure that the language was clear
12	throughout the document that that was a commitment.
13	I'm sorry, the second part of your
14	question was?
15	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: This mission
16	(Simultaneous speaking.)
17	MR. SCHMIDT: The mission, oh, mission
18	time. Thank you, yeah.
19	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: You said about six,
20	seven days of cooling and 72 hours without operator
21	action.
22	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, so the 72 is borrowed
23	from the power reactors' phase for passive systems,
24	the utility, I think it's called resource document
25	URD. The seven days is kind of analogous to the

thought process for diesel fuel going out to seven days.

They had the capacity to do seven days and, you know, part of the, I guess, staff's concern was, you know, if you have an external event that's pretty severe, you know, would you have enough onsite water to be able to cope with that? And that was kind of where the seven days comes from. Again, it's analogous to the diesel fuel for existing light water reactors.

MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: All right, well, thanks. I mean, you know, I would like to see some systematic definition of these things. In the beginning, 72 hours from what, from onset of what type of transient?

Also, I wanted to add if you don't use the PRA determining safety significance or something that is basic principles like the systems which perform safety-significant functions, the systems which are preventing the important transients, the systems which are bad for defense-in-depth.

So, that is always better when there is some systematic approach to that instead of just stating or say this is the case of this source. All right, so this is just my personal comment.

1 MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, I quess I'd like to follow up because I think Jose had the same comment. 2 So, there was, before the PSAR was submitted, there 3 4 was an analysis. I don't know if analysis is the 5 right word. There was a document that Kairos went through and basically did like fault tree analysis on 6 7 the system. So, they had their system, you know, to 8 9 the level of detail that was designed at that point, 10 and they went through a fault tree to basically say, you know, how this would be addressed, what system 11 would be addressed, the potential failure modes of 12 these events, and the ones that they were going to 13 14 preclude by design. 15 So, there was a systematic approach that Kairos used prior to the PSAR, and I'm sorry I can't 16 17 remember the name of that document. I'll have to get back to you on that, but the staff did review to try 18 19 determine if, you know, events not normally considered were captured by this fault tree analysis. 20 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Is that a docketed 21 22 document? The question is can we get a copy or was it internal? 23 24 MR. SCHMIDT: It was an audit. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It was an audit? 25

1 MR. SCHMIDT: It was an audit. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Do we have a Reading 2 3 Room that Kairos can put it in so we can look? 4 Because that's something we would be very interested 5 in. MR. SCHMIDT: 6 I'll get back to you on 7 that, yeah. 8 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So, you'll take the 9 action item? Because that's some very interesting 10 document. MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah. 11 PARTICIPANT: The functional failure modes 12 and effect analysis. 13 14 MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, I think that was the 15 title of it, yeah, but I'm not 100 percent sure. Ι 16 reviewed it quite a while ago, so I'm not sure I remember the name. 17 It's interesting to MEMBER KIRCHNER: 18 19 observe, Jeff, that we, with other applicants, we've seen this too where they've done this kind of what I 20 would call what you just called it, failure modes and 21 effect analysis, kind of getting at Jose's point of 22 this blank sheet of paper, but it wasn't part of the 23 24 formal submittal. It wasn't part of the -- I think you know which applicant I'm talking about. 25

1 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, the staff has 2 access to all of those non-docketed documents via audits and we have access via Reading Room through the 3 4 courtesy of the applicant. 5 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And the staff, that's correct. 6 7 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Because they're not 8 public documents, so you cannot put it on your NRC 9 laptop. You have to go through their website. 10 MR. SCHMIDT: I guess the point I was trying to make is that Kairos has done those type, 11 that type of work to try to identify events. 12 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, that would 13 14 satisfy many, many of my questions, and I'm sure Walt is in charge of Chapter 13, so it would satisfy many 15 16 of his questions too. 17 MR. SCHMIDT: Okay, yeah, let's move on. The other example I wanted to get out in front of 18 19 everybody was, you know, how the staff approached the methodologies and evaluation models. 20 Just for reference, there are illustrative 21 examples of some of the transients in a technical 22 report that's referenced in the PSAR, and so there are 23 24 figures comparing to larger than MHA in most cases, at

least for some of the transients, that kind of inform,

1 helped inform staff's review, but those codes are not 2 -- you know, they're using codes that have not been 3 None of the codes have been V&Ved in this 4 submittal, so I think keep that in mind. focused on 5 the staff important The methodologies and the codes pick up 6 phenomenon. 7 the important phenomenon in an event and I'll just 8 throw out an example. I reviewed the pebble handling system. 9 You know, one of them is that pebbles get out and they 10 oxidize in air. You know, what does the oxidation 11 model look like? Does it seem reasonable for the 12 matrix material that I expect to see, you know, for 13 14 this pebble? 15 So, we looked at, you know, important phenomena picked up like oxidation and the 16 potential release due to oxidation? 17 The range of conditions evaluated, there was a fair amount of 18 19 discussion of do the methodologies really cover a broad range of conditions? 20 The classic example is rod withdrawals. 21 You know, you're limiting rod withdrawal that may 22 bypass your flux rate trip and be more limiting than, 23 24 say, a fast, big pull withdrawal that would be

terminated by the flux rate trip, right?

1 So, did the methodologies and the construct cover events like that and was it explicit 2 3 in that it covers those events? So, that was an area 4 for the staff's review. 5 Consideration of uncertainties, the staff said, you know, the document has to reflect there are 6 7 uncertainties associated with these and what 8 uncertainties are important and how will they be 9 captured. 10 You know, certainty values not available, concept 11 but the of where you need uncertainties, that's what the staff tried to pick up 12 in its review. 13 14 Identifying model conservatisms, and this 15 kind of goes with the margin is, you know, the staff 16 looked at areas where we thought margins may be 17 stressed, or challenged is probably a better word to 18 say. 19 So, margins in our review were always on our mind and I alluded to the vessel as being one, and 20 the vessel and even like what are going to be your 21 temperature measurements for how many are you going to 22 have and where are they going to be type of questions. 23 24 You know, we didn't resolve all of those

to the level of detail because that's probably, you

know, commensurate with the OL, but we were asking those type of questions of like you might need more than just the outlet plan in this design as, say, what might be a necessary temperature measurement for vessel purposes.

So, all of those things, the staff looked at through the chapter, you know, primarily the

So, all of those things, the staff looked at through the chapter, you know, primarily the Chapter 13 and 4 events. Again, I mentioned the codes are not validated.

Staff performed a detailed review of the MHA and underlying supporting calculations within the limits of the preliminary design information. So, there, there are supporting documents that we can look at and a good example would be like tritium uptake.

You know, we spent a fair amount of time reviewing tritium uptake models, methods, and release fractions that would be associated with, say, tritium. So, that is one calculation that I think, you know, is more fleshed out, obviously, than some of the underlying Chapter 13 postulated events. Next slide, please?

So, because, you know, we haven't performed V&V, the staff had to use a variety of means to reach its reasonable assurance finding, and I provided a list of -- you know, not all are used in

every case.

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It was a case by case basis, but, you know, when correlations were used, we would look to see if those correlations are typically used in pebble beds. Are they correlations that, say, Sandia is using in MELCOR or its models? You know, are those correlations reasonable at this stage of the design? We reviewed journal articles that analysis performed similar orsimilar approaches to get a feel for how the system responds, whether the margins seemed reasonable. So, we did a fair amount of, you know, journal searching, a lot of times associated with the UC Berkeley Mark 1 design.

You know, we looked at some of those journal articles.

I looked at some journal articles on pebble design,

Integral tests, you know, primarily that
was in the area of fuel and I used the AGR program

data and the EPRI topical report for like, you know,

do fuel failure fractions look reasonable? You know,

21 is it reasonable to assume relatively small or

22 negligible transient-induced failures? I used the AGR

data to help inform that decision.

We did perform some scoping, what I would call scoping calculations to inform our engineering

for example.

judgement. There, we utilized the UC Berkeley Mark 1 design that research had set up and we modified it to the extent that could be supported with the preliminary design information to model what we call our Hermes-like design.

You know, we can't say it's Hermes because we don't have the details to really say it's Hermes, but there we wanted to get a feel for things like power distribution, reactivity coefficients, whether we were seeing the right signs, the signs were consistent with like different areas of the core.

We ran some transients to see if the transient behavior was somewhat similar to what was in their illustrative examples. It's really focused on the term scoping calculations.

Now, normally I use the word confirmatory, but the level of detail is not sufficient to call them confirmatory and they shouldn't be judged that. Again, we were just trying to inform our engineering judgment as best we could at the time with the information provided.

MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: In that light, I don't really like the concept of technical reports because all of this, the technical report is embedded in the chapter of the PSAR, but by you issuing an SER

1 the PSAR, are you implicitly approving this methodology? 2 3 You're telling me you're not, that you are going 4 to have to issue a new SER for the OL? So, they're going to have to attach, for example? I'm thinking of 5 6 topical report 017 --7 MR. SCHMIDT: Right. 8 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: -- which is the 9 methodology. 10 MR. SCHMIDT: Well, okay, so 017 is a technical report. 11 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: 12 Correct. MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, that's referenced in 13 14 Chapter 4. So, to the level we're able to, yes, we're 15 effectively approving that. Could it change? Yes, 16 I'll give an example. 17 So, on the pebble handling system, they use an oxide correlation that is specific to what the 18 19 journal article called the new A3-3 matrix material, but Kairos is doing their own testing of their own 20 matrix material. 21 So, the methodology was reviewed, but the 22 actual final values may change because their matrix 23 24 material may be different than that, and hence the oxidation rates may be different, or as, say, 25

1	building or wherever the worst case where the pebbles
2	might spill, you know, might have different heat
3	transfer modes than are just assumed in this design
4	and maybe the temperatures could change.
5	So, I think the way to look at it is, the
6	way we looked at it was we were looking for important
7	physical phenomenon and methodology. The final values
8	are subject to change based on the preliminary nature.
9	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, but the final
10	values were reflected in Chapter 13 of the FSAR.
11	MR. SCHMIDT: Yes.
12	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: The methodology is in
13	TR17. Is that fully reviewed? And if there is a lot
14	to change in that report, can they use that for the
15	operating license?
16	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, so it's incorporated
17	by reference, so if the PSAR changes, so when the PSAR
18	becomes the FSAR, that is subject to change, right.
19	That's going to be
20	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Because the technical
21	report cannot be used in the FSAR. It hasn't been
22	approved for any application.
23	MR. SCHMIDT: Well, like a modification to
24	that will likely appear in that.
25	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Basically, I know

1	you're going to review it and we want you to review it
2	again.
3	MEMBER HALNON: The technical report
4	initially was done under the quality program
5	calculations, so it's subject to 50.59 as soon as you
6	issue the SER for the PSAR. I assume that any changes
7	from there on our is subject to 50.59 in some respect.
8	Just make sure that those changes you're talking about
9	are captured under the quality program. Is that
10	I'm stating that. Is that correct?
11	MR. SCHMIDT: I guess I'm going to have to
12	defer whether 50.59 applies to a construction permit.
13	MEMBER HALNON: Well, it may not be 50.59
14	in itself, but it still, the changes have to be
15	controlled by some quality program and some
16	MR. SCHMIDT: Oh, yes.
17	MEMBER HALNON: change program
18	MR. SCHMIDT: Yes.
19	MEMBER HALNON: that allows you to
20	review it against the PSAR
21	MR. SCHMIDT: Yes.
22	MEMBER HALNON: assumptions or what
23	you're going to reviewing in the FSAR has to start
24	from scratch.
25	MR. SCHMIDT: No, we don't anticipate
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1	starting from scratch and all of the changes have to
2	be done under a quality program, yeah.
3	MEMBER HALNON: So, you'll have a record
4	of those changes and you'll know where it's been and
5	where it's going.
6	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, I know it has to be
7	done and I think we can audit those as we see fit,
8	but, I mean, we really care primarily about the final,
9	right. The emphasis will be on the final design and
10	we'll compare the final probably back to the PSAR.
11	MEMBER HALNON: Yeah, so much like a
12	calculation that's done onsite, maybe just a very
13	simple one that's referenced in the FSAR, you'll look
14	at the calculation to make sure it's all correct, and
15	then from there on out, any changes have to be
16	assessed through 50.59 to the FSAR.
17	MR. SCHMIDT: Right, after the
18	MEMBER HALNON: So, is there an equivalent
19	thing in the construction portion? I know it's
20	controlled by the quality program, but is there
21	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, beyond
22	MR. SHAMS: I can respond to that.
23	MR. SCHMIDT: I'm going to need some help
24	on that, yeah.
25	MR. SHAMS: Mo Shams with the staff.

1 There is. The space that the licensee would be in or the applicant would be in after the construction 2 3 permit is the inspection phase. 4 We have every ability to go in and inspect 5 the construction activities, as well their implementation 6 of their QΑ program, including 7 correction to their documentation calculations, 8 well as, you know, whatever is being done 9 construction itself. So, that's inherent in the 10 process that we apply during construction. MEMBER HALNON: And the fact that it's 11 preliminary allows that final --12 MR. SHAMS: 13 Correct. 14 MEMBER HALNON: It's the final safety, but 15 what we're really interested in is making sure those 16 technical reports are validated or correct. 17 MEMBER REMPE: So, I have, one, I wanted to note that I was glad to hear that the research 18 19 efforts to do the pilot plan evaluations were helpful, and that you even further modified another design and 20 used the MELCOR code or whatever codes from research. 21 One of the things that I know we mentioned 22 to the staff when they presented and discussed them 23 24 with us was about what were some key assumptions or 25 properties that most affected the results, and did those kind of insights come through and help you in your evaluation of what Kairos presented for their analyses to help you focus on hey, that data is not yet available and it needs to be obtained?

And then in looking at your examples again, I just want to reiterate a point I think, I hope I tried to make before that I'm not sure it's realistic to expect that everything will be validated or done by the time the plant Hermes starts up because of the fact that there's not much, if any, operating experience for this type of reactor and its fuel, et cetera.

And, I mean, we've heard that for a demonstration facility like this, one can have a lighter touch. It's just low power, but it sure seems like that there are some key things that staff would want to identify and say we're letting you have a lighter touch, but we sure would like to see this validated later on.

And I think those kind of things should be documented somewhere so the folks that are out in the region understand what headquarters has said and perhaps consults with headquarters to say yeah, this is what we need to do and how it will be monitored.

MR. SHAMS: So, Mo Shams with the staff.

1 Let me try to take a shot at it because I think this an incredibly important sort of conceptual or 2 foundational 3 thought on how we approach testing 4 research reactors. 5 MEMBER REMPE: Yeah, and this goes beyond key permits. 6 7 MR. SHAMS: Absolutely, I think what you're describing is totally integral to our thinking. 8 9 Do we have the right information to be able to 10 authorize that facility to operate? And that's what we're seeking. 11 Now, the level of information drives what 12 we put in the tech specs, how much power. 13 14 facilities are in their own dynamics with the staff 15 are and sort of a more dynamic operation than a power reactor in the sense that they come back for renewals 16 17 or they come back for changes in the tech specs. So, this is how we are actually sort of 18 19 applying what we know and the confidence that we have in the safe operation of the facilities through the 20 different requirements that are applied to them. 21 And the entire nature of a test reactor is 22 one of let me start here and then I'll go forward to 23 24 be able to obtain the information, either offer it

just for other power reactors or for one that's

1 entirely based on that technology as well. So, we're confident that we're going to 2 3 get to the place. Wherever they're starting is 4 commensurate with the information provided, 5 commensurate with the risk of the facility, commensurate 6 with the licensing terms for the

Kairos is not a 40-year facility. It's -yes. So, that sort of informs our look into the
durability of the material or such that the burnup,
you know, sort of information for the fuel. That sort
of stuff all feeds into how we look at the facility
and what solution we get.

MEMBER REMPE: So, the tech specs are where I expected it to be, but I hope that it's -- I mean, the tech specs are kind of out there like in one area, but there are certain concepts that one expects to be evaluated and the tech specs would guide it, and I just am wondering will there be a list of those concepts?

And again, this is just the PSAR. I get it that you could wait until later, but it just seems like a good place to start making that list and have it --

MR. SHAMS: Sure.

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facility.

MEMBER REMPE: -- documented and --

MR. SHAMS: Sure, and I think what Jeff was indicating earlier is such thinking is honest. If there's a formalized part which is Appendix A, these are particular commitments that the applicant needs to do, there's a formalized part. That's the research plan and testing plan that's intended to be done.

There's also something else which is Kairos is actually building three different engineering units prior to actually they get into the nuclear unit itself, to be able to validate certain concepts.

So, and the point I'll get to, and I know, the last one, is there's information that we need for the test facility itself and there is information that we're going to need from the test facility to the power reactor, and to your point, we cannot start the power reactors without the testing facility giving us all of this information. So, one way or another, we're going to need information from that machine.

MEMBER REMPE: So, I think we're on the same path, but Appendix A is stuff, traditionally has been stuff just needed to be completed by the operating license --

MR. SHAMS: Yes.

1 MEMBER REMPE: -- but my point is that we're giving it a lighter touch. I think there are 2 some things that after you start operating also should 3 4 be done, perhaps to have a little more confidence 5 through the four years this thing's going, but also for the future reactor, and where will they -- where 6 7 is that documented? MR. SCHMIDT: So, can I kind of just -- I 8 9 think there's one other aspect and that probably won't fully address your concern, but, you know, the other 10 thing that we are thinking about is, you know, we have 11 startup tests. 12 Startup tests will, you know, don't get 13 14 the time evolution failure modes maybe or concerns, 15 but they allow, you know, kind of like goal posts, and 16 to say that, just to say that like the Chapter 13 safety analyses are still valued, right, you know, 17 rods or reactivity coefficients. 18 19 So, we have been thinking, you know, what needs to be in that startup test plan that would, you 20 know, inform us that, yeah, if they were to complete 21 that successfully, they could continue. 22 Ιf couldn't, then maybe they would have to pause, right. 23 24 So, the startup tests and the startup

tests for this reactor will be different and probably

1 larger than a traditional light water reactor, but the staff has already been going there thinking about 2 3 things like what would this even look like? 4 MEMBER REMPE: This is good. I know so 5 many times in the past when we asked questions about startup testing or operating procedures, we always get 6 7 the response oh, we're going to do that later. 8 not part of the operating license. 9 And again, I just kind of think a list 10 somewhere, and again, the startup test plans another place where it can be done, but just a list of 11 things that are areas that might be considered, that 12 will be better fleshed out at the operating license 13 14 stage, but I just think a list would be nice as again, 15 because it's not just with Kairos. 16 It's going to come up with other designs 17 we're reviewing, and it's just something to think about that I think would be helpful for an early 18 19 indicator for the applicant as well as for the staff in future reviews. 20 Okay, thank you. 21 MR. SCHMIDT: MEMBER REMPE: If one member's --22 (Simultaneous speaking.) 23 24 SCHMIDT: I quess I want to 25 finish up my two slides here. Let's see, so we kind of went through the various tools that were available for the staff's review based on the preliminary information. So, you know, I want to be clear what's going to be like between now, the CP roughly, and the OL.

So, review software quality assurance and implementation. Those are things like, you know, part of V&V, code error, code error notices. Are you picking those up? Are they relevant? Are you evaluating those?

Like code nodal maps, right, nodalization, you know, we didn't go through like nodalization studies to pick up if -- I mean, the state of the models, I don't think it's -- that would be picked up effectively as part of the OL or another topical report that would, say, pertain to their KP-SAM code. You know, we would look at nodalization studies there.

Review code inputs, we didn't ask for input decks. We didn't go through and see if those input decks are reasonable. Again, that is something that would be done during, you know, really at the OL stage for the final FSAR.

Material properties, you know, we have obviously some insights into the material properties based on the topical reports, things like effective

safety analysis, like the viscosity is a function of temperature is kind of a key one.

You know, they acknowledge that they're going to look at a range and the range is consistent with their topical report. We didn't go and check that their codes did that, that had that input. We just kind of said, you know, these are important. You need to include them in the methodology.

And we didn't exercise the applicant's code or perform confirmatory analysis. I said scoping. I'm clearly defining the difference between scoping and confirmatory here. We just don't have the design information to do what I would consider confirmatory analyses at this point.

Justification of models may be provided by test results. I indicated that the ADR program is probably the most relevant one there. It will also be their test results, right. They have an extensive testing program. We'll be looking at that data.

The code V&V, the tradition sense of code V&V will be done, and then other methods before and during the operating license review. So, just to put it in context, I mean, we'll be reviewing this I would say similar to what we do for power reactors in the sense of codes and methods. There's not going to be

1	a big space in that differential.
2	CHAIR PETTI: But in the end for
3	instance, there's a lot of pebble bed stuff out there
4	for gas pebble beds.
5	MR. SCHMIDT: Yes, yes.
6	CHAIR PETTI: And I'm sure they're going
7	to use those.
8	(Simultaneous speaking.)
9	MR. SCHMIDT: There are certain things
10	that they are examining whether they're applicable.
11	CHAIR PETTI: Sure, but I mean, just, you
12	know, calculating K-effect or calculating reactivity
13	coefficients, you know, I think you're going to start
14	you should use the (inaudible) cases to give you
15	some confidence that you're code knows what it's doing
16	
17	MR. SCHMIDT: Right.
18	CHAIR PETTI: and then you move on, but
19	it's putting the salt with the pebble together that
20	there's just going to be little data, but they're get
21	some great thermal hydraulic data out of their test
22	facilities hopefully
23	MR. SCHMIDT: That's right.
24	CHAIR PETTI: that will inform that.
25	So, you know, it's a patchwork, but in the end, the

1 only integral test is the actual reactor, right, so. 2 MR. SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct, yeah. 3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: My only question is 4 when I look at this technical report, it looks like a 5 topical report, and if it was a topical report, you, Jeff Schmidt, would have written an SER underneath 6 that would be at least 50 page, if not 150 pages, no, 7 8 not yet. But all I see in the documentation is half 9 a page in the SER for Chapter 4, so however we are 10 proving on the methodology by implicitly approving 11 12 Chapter 4 and the whole PSAR. I mean, whereas your expectation is that it's going to be further reviewed. 13 14 They will have to do a lot more evaluation and we, the 15 staff, and I mean you, are going to look at it again. 16 MR. SCHMIDT: Yes. 17 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So, that's why I don't understand all of the technical reports. 18 19 SCHMIDT: So, in some sense, It's not a topical report because there are 20 better. probably going to be some changes to that inevitably, 21 and if we wrote a safety evaluation like you said, 22 there would probably be as many pages of limitations 23 24 and conditions as there are pages to the safety

I'm not sure that makes a lot of sense at

evaluation.

1 this point. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: But your expectation 2 is for the OL, the operating license, you will review 3 4 the methodology again? 5 MR. SCHMIDT: Yes. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Because it will have 6 7 changed. 8 MR. SCHMIDT: Absolutely, this is 9 methodology for a construction permit and the level of 10 detail, thought it was commensurate with a construction permit. Everything starts again at the 11 OL. 12 And you will not be 13 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: 14 heard if I propose to the members that our letter says that, that the methodology (inaudible) CP and the 15 methodology is expected to increase for the OL and we 16 17 have to review it again. MR. SCHMIDT: Yes, I mean, I expect that 18 19 to be true. 20 CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, just, and, you know, if you remember, other applicants we've had between 21 preliminary and final panel, it wasn't just changing 22 the correlation. There were major changes to 23 24 materials, the processes, and it took a lot of -- it

changed the whole nature of the review, but, you know,

1 so --

MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm more concerned -CHAIR PETTI: This is why you serve a top
down functional thing. You do the best you think you
can.

MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You asked me to write you a couple of paragraphs on TR 017 and this is what, this is perfectly -- what we've done is more than sufficient for the CP. The oil will change and will need to be done again.

MR. SCHMIDT: Agree.

MEMBER KIRCHNER: We'd just like to make an observation that the staff, back when the advanced reactor policy statements were written, now we're back in the '90s time frame, opined extensively on prototypes.

And what I would just like to observe is that this is a good thing, what's happening here with the Hermes test reactor. They're not trying to make that leap right to a power reactor. Yesterday, we heard from another applicant. They are going to also do a prototype.

And I think, again, this is a preliminary design, so from what I see, this is one person's opinion, I think the staff is doing a reasonable job

for where the applicant is at this point with the 1 preliminary design and this allows the technology to 2 go forward, and I think that's extremely important. 3 4 Not every I and T is going to be crossed at this 5 point. Going back to technical reports, I could 6 7 see -- I'll make up a simple example which actually is derived from what's in front of us from another 8 9 applicant is that there's a technical report on the 10 choice of the stainless steel material for a vessel, reactor vessel, and a lower head. I could see that 11 changing as they learn more or they identify a better 12 material and so on. 13 14 So, that's just a rhetorical example, but 15 what I've seen so far there, yeah, you don't need 16 quite the in-depth that goes into a topical report for 17 a methodology that we were just talking about at this point. 18 19 So, I think maybe we should ask the staff about how they're going to handle technical reports 20 that are attached to FSAR or PSAR chapters in the 21 future and --22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: That's exactly what 23 24 I'm asking.

MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- the process there.

1	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: One concern that I
2	have, I have
3	(Simultaneous speaking.)
4	MEMBER KIRCHNER: That's only on FSARs,
5	so.
6	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You know I have a
7	dirty mind and I'm thinking here an applicant can save
8	a lot of money by saying you already approved it
9	before, well, yeah, I'm going to use that one that you
10	approved and I'm not going to change it. Kairos is
11	too responsible to do that because I know them, but we
12	should not allow them the temptation.
13	MR. SCHMIDT: Yeah, I mean, we reviewed
14	the methodology to see if it picked up all of the
15	important phenomena. The final like correlations, for
16	example, they're all subject to either the test
17	programs or change at this point.
18	So, you know, I think the framework is
19	pretty good. I don't expect a lot of changes in the
20	overall framework, but the final details, I guess I
21	expect changes and the staff is going to have to re-
22	review all of that stuff again to the level that it's
23	commensurate with an FSAR.
24	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: All of the
25	correlations are going to be different and all of the

1	uncertainties are going to be different because
2	MR. SCHMIDT: Certainly, the uncertainties
3	are not identified, yeah.
4	(Simultaneous speaking.)
5	MR. SCHMIDT: The theories of
6	uncertainties are. The final values are not.
7	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So, it's going to
8	change.
9	MEMBER KIRCHNER: To repeat myself, when
10	the staff back 30 years ago opined about prototypes,
11	they basically looked at it in the sense of the
12	prototype should be of sufficient scale and fidelity,
13	these are my words, not the staff's words, such that
14	the primary safety functions can be demonstrated
15	through the concept, and that was how they basically
16	put together guidance on the topic of prototypes.
17	So, what we have in front of us now is
18	indeed a prototype that is addressing those major
19	safety functions, hopefully successfully.
20	MR. SCHMIDT: So, that ends my
21	presentation about that. Is there anything after
22	these slides?
23	MR. BEASLEY: The last slide is just
24	contact information.
25	CHAIR PETTI: Okay, so I have a question.

1 Let's talk about MHA for a minute --2 MR. SCHMIDT: Okay. 3 CHAIR PETTI: -- because that's going to 4 come up. How do you establish the reasonableness of Is it, if I think in power reactor terms, is 5 6 it supposed to be sort of a worst-case DBA or is it, 7 because it's hypothetical, sort of slightly beyond the 8 DBA? So --9 MR. SCHMIDT: 10 CHAIR PETTI: Because, I mean, we're going to talk about it. I'm sure we're going to get into 11 that in detail. 12 MR. SCHMIDT: So, Ed can correct me or Ben 13 14 can correct me as we go, but, you know, the construct 15 is the MHA forms the box or outer envelope, and all the DBAs effectively have to fall, you know, below it 16 or MHA bounds it. 17 And, you know, you look at both material 18 19 like the stainless steel we were talking about, as well as the dose criteria. So, all of your 20 events, and I'll just throw one out for an example, 21 like the salt spill accident, you know, that event, at 22 the end of the day, has to be bounded by the dose 23 24 associated with MHA. So, the MHA is bounding from that, but it 25

1 is not a DBA. It also assumes some functions perform as expected. Some safety-related functions perform as 2 3 expected and I'll give you a specific example, reactor 4 trip. It assumes you have reactor trip and you 5 have at least three trains of decay heat removal. So, 6 with certain assumptions, what I typically call like 7 system 8 reactor assumptions, system performance 9 assumptions, then the MHA bounds those other events. 10 CHAIR PETTI: So, you don't -- I mean, let's go over the sodium reactors and unprotected 11 12 transients. You know, it was such a big deal back in the day that EBR2 did with the reactor unprotected 13 14 transients, right. 15 Right. MR. SCHMIDT: 16 CHAIR PETTI: The system did not trip and 17 they showed the safety. That certainly sort of would bound any MHA or could be a surrogate for MHA, but 18 19 you're saying that no, you tend to assume the safety functions? 20 MR. SCHMIDT: There is a section called 21 22 precluded events. Those events are precluded. are -- you know, there are certain assumptions that 23 24 will, that have to happen to ensure, I think, the MHA

is bounded.

1	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Is that consistent
2	with a single failure criteria or it's more of an LMP?
3	MR. SCHMIDT: The single failure criteria
4	is addressed. So, like when I talked about like the
5	decay heat removal
6	CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, three out of four.
7	MR. SCHMIDT: I did one train.
8	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: No, I'm talking about
9	the MHA, what you were talking now about the precluded
10	events.
11	MR. SCHMIDT: The precluded events?
12	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: A lot of it's based
13	on single failure criteria or LMP frequency?
14	MR. SCHMIDT: I mean, it's not based on
15	LMP. I'll just give you an example, like an ATWS-type
16	event is precluded and, you know, we spent a fair
17	amount of time making sure that that was a reasonable
18	assumption based on like testing for control rod
19	insertion into the pebble bed, that you could have
20	adequate control rod insertion.
21	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, and we have
22	approved, I mean, you guys have approved some reactors
23	for that.
24	MR. SCHMIDT: Well
25	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: For no power.

1 MR. SCHMIDT: Return to power, are you referring to or you're referring to ATWS? 2 3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: The high quality of 4 the scram system from reactor (inaudible). 5 SCHMIDT: So, the staff looked at potentially 6 aspects that could challenge 7 assumptions that went into the MHA is the best way to 8 say it. Again, reactor scram is assumed as part of 9 The staff made sure that effectively in the the MHA. 10 staff's mind, the probability of occurrence was low and they had information supported by testing to 11 12 ensure that. I mean, with this system, 13 CHAIR PETTI: 14 you could do an unprotected transient and you're 15 probably going to be okay because of the strong negative coefficient calculations, right, which I, you 16 know, have no reason not to believe that they're 17 right, so, but you're saying that you basically don't 18 19 -- that's sort of beyond. MR. SCHMIDT: That's beyond, I think, what 20 is constructed for the MHA. 21 That's what they say, but, 22 CHAIR PETTI: I mean, are you referring -- is there some quidance 23 24 that you guys used to, this idea of the safety systems

program, I mean, is that written down somewhere that

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2	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: What I'm hearing is
3	that this reactor is limited by the vessel, that the
4	fuel is so good that it's transferred immediately to
5	the vessel wall. There is no temperature.
6	CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, but, well, on a
7	reactivity event, I'm not sure that there's some
8	temperatures challenged. There is some temperatures
9	challenged on heat removal, right?
LO	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: On long term.
L1	CHAIR PETTI: Long term.
L2	MR. SCHMIDT: I mean, they could be
L3	challenged on both. I think you'll see the curves.
L4	If we look at the curves in the illustrative example,
L5	you know, vessel temperatures can be
L6	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: If you're going to
L7	scram, the vessel will be
L8	(Simultaneous speaking.)
L9	DR. BLEY: If you can use the microphone,
20	it will help.
21	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's extremely
22	(inaudible). Just talk to it.
23	MR SCHMIDT: Okay all right yeah sorry

about that. I apologize. Yeah, so, you know, all of

the events look at whether, their material limit and

24

_	the dose consequence. That's the best way to say it
2	and you'll see those plots. The plots are in the, I
3	want to say the appendix to technical report KPTR018.
4	So, you know, the temperatures feed the
5	releases, dose releases, as well as obviously the
6	limits. The limits for the fuel are, you know,
7	they're nowhere near the limits of the fuel, so that's
8	not really in play, but the vessel limits are, the
9	temperatures associated with the reflector and not
LO	necessarily the reflector material limits, but the
L1	dose associated with that, those temperatures, and
L2	those are all discussed in the safety evaluation, but
L3	the MHA is bounding from a dose standpoint.
L4	CHAIR PETTI: Any other questions,
L5	members, particularly those online?
L6	MEMBER SUNSERI: This is Matt. I don't
L7	have any questions. Thanks.
L8	CHAIR PETTI: Well, then I guess I want to
L9	thank you guys.
20	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Are we asking for
21	public comments?
22	CHAIR PETTI: Oh, I suppose so. We'll go
23	out for public comment. If there's any member of the
24	public that wishes to make a comment, please unmute
. –	
25	yourself, state your name and your comment. Okay, I'm

1	not hearing any.
2	Then, again, I want to thank you. I think
3	this was good. It was productive. It clarified some
4	things, at least in my mind, so with that, I think we
5	should probably go for a small break. Let's
6	MEMBER REMPE: Your agenda only gave us
7	five minutes. Can we have a little more than five
8	minutes?
9	CHAIR PETTI: So, yeah, let's come back at
10	10:45 then.
11	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
12	CHAIR PETTI: Thank you.
13	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
14	off the record at 10:26 a.m. and resumed at 10:46
15	a.m.)
16	CHAIR PETTI: Okay, folks. We're back in
17	session, and we've got most members, not all members
18	yet.
19	MEMBER SUNSERI: This is Matt. I'm here
20	if you need a quorum.
21	CHAIR PETTI: No, I think we have a
22	quorum. Subcommittee, so we don't have a quorum. So
23	we're going to deviate a little bit from the agenda.
24	The agenda says we're going to start with Chapter 1,
25	but the staff is going to present Chapter 1 in March

subcommittee. So we'll hold off doing that until we 1 hear their presentation, in which case we're going to 2 3 move in to the afternoon chapters. 4 So the first one up is Chapter 10. So if 5 Sandra could bring up the Chapter 10 memo. 6 there? Yes. 7 MS. WALKER: I'm here. I just don't have 8 rights to share. 9 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, okay. Hold on. 10 going to do 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18. yes, because the staff will not present on these 11 because these really have limited information. 12 for completeness, we're going to still provide a memo 13 14 on it. 15 So, Joy, it's yours. 16 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you. So when Dave 17 assigned Chapter 10 to me and I looked at it in the application for Hermes, I said, hallelujah, it's only 18 19 a paragraph long, it's on experimental facilities, and there are none; this ought to be easy. But, anyway, 20 I went ahead and wrote the background up and talked 21 about that and the guidance that was applicable. 22 And if you'll scroll down, Sandra, I did 23 24 read what the staff wrote, but then I got to thinking

about it a bit and, even though there aren't really

any experimental facilities, there is a capsule where they can irradiate some specimens that it's not supposed to affect reactivity, et cetera. But the thing is the whole test reactor is an experiment, and that is why I, even if you'll even go on down to later parts, there's as lot of things that I just don't think will be known, and that's what I harped on today with the staff about that we hope they validate their codes entirely.

We hope they have some adequate knowledge about the performance of the instrumentation, which isn't even identified what sensors they're going to use in the construction permit because they don't have to in a construction permit, but I think that's unrealistic optimism and I think that there will be some things that will have to be identified and investigated further after the plant is granted an operating license because it is a low-power facility and I think the staff will have confidence for adequate safety to give them a reasonable, have reasonable assurance to let them have an operating license.

But there ought to be some things that are explored and validated more for continued operation of Hermes, as well as follow-on power reactors, and I

1 think that a list ought to be formulated. Again, I don't know what it will be. They might pick their 2 3 sensors and we may have confidence in them by the time 4 it starts operating, but I have a possible activities 5 include and I have a list there. If somebody wants to add something to the list, I'm willing. 6 This is a 7 draft memo to add it to the list if I agree with it 8 because it is my memo. And I don't think 9 additional discussion on Chapter 10 is needed, but I'm 10 writing this mainly for the members also to think about this as we go through and maybe in the final 11 letter have a better list than what I have in my memo. 12 And that's about all I wanted to say on 13 14 this chapter. Vicki, you look like you have a --15 MEMBER BIER: Yes, I just have a question, 16 which you may not know the answer to. 17 curious, do you sense that they probably do have a first set of sensors picked out and just didn't want 18 to put it in a docketed filing or they really haven't 19 gotten that far in the design yet? 20 MEMBER REMPE: I don't know. 21 CHAIR PETTI: I mean, they're doing these 22 engineering test runs. They're going to have to have 23 24 some instrumentation there, some instrumentation. But

that's in no radiation, but they've got to have some

instrumentation for that. My guess is they're going to test some stuff and see what works.

MEMBER REMPE: Okay. So they talk about the Flibe as a fission product retention barrier. Okay. So how far, what's the height of the Flibe over the core if you're going to count that as a barrier for fission product release, and I know I asked that question and they said we haven't decided yet. suddenly that level sensor becomes more important. light water reactor designs, water level is sometimes a difficult thing to measure and what's the accuracy of it. But there's just a bunch of questions that -and, again, we're going to first-of-a-kind things, and I just think it's important to start thinking about And it's not just a Hermes question. this. It's something that I think ought to be considered for a lot of these test facilities.

So, philosophically, on MEMBER HALNON: these prototypes and test reactors that will eventually morph into а larger power-producing reactor, are we expecting them to push the envelope in the operating parameters and maybe even operate it at values that it would not be? In other words, the high-level limits and other things to get data so that they can better inform the higher, for lack of a

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better word, higher risk of the power reactor here?

MEMBER REMPE: That's something that came up with another applicant we discussed, but, again, I think that's something that the staff should communicate to the applicant that has informed them they're planning to do this and when they inform it with Hermes. I haven't heard them talk about the higher power ones like we have with other applicants, so I wouldn't have put that in here. I'm just saying, you know --

MEMBER HALNON: Well, that's why I was just thinking philosophically because I wouldn't learn a whole lot if I built a prototype and just ran it straight and normal for five years and said, okay, everything looks pretty stable and then not --

MEMBER REMPE: Ι think the staff's responsibility with others who have told us they plan to do it, and that was the question that I pursued in a prior subcommittee meeting that, you know, how is interaction going, staff that and the didn't. understand my question because maybe I didn't make it clear enough, but I tried to follow-up because they appropriate to like, well, it's authorized by DOE this time, but I'm like, again, you guys really have no authorities being authorized by

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1 DOE, but they actually are tasked these, not just the applicant who is paying for that demo, and I think 2 3 that if NRC knows some things, they ought to be 4 pointing out those things. And I think it's just a 5 wise interaction; I don't think that I can do that with this facility. 6 7 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. Authorized by DOE, 8 to me, didn't mean less study for lower standards of 9 allowing them to cut corners, but I don't know their process. But, nevertheless, I had not heard, I mean, 10 we're treating this thing like it's going to be 11 operating in this envelope and we're going to be 12 gathering data, but is that data really useful after 13 14 a period of time? 15 CHAIR PETTI: My quess is that they 16 obviously have the design of the bigger machine in 17 mind. So, you know, assuming they have enough margin in a normal operation, which they should, you know --18 19 MEMBER HALNON: They would put it through some exercises. 20 CHAIR PETTI: Yes. I mean, the tech specs 21 and LCOs at levels that would allow them to do that. 22 MEMBER HALNON: 23 Yes. 24 MEMBER REMPE: But, again, that may be something that they'll discuss with the staff later. 25

What I really want, though, is to make sure the headquarters staff is engaged in it because, to convey my concern to Dave, I was like, well, Chernobyl was actually a safety test after the plant was operating, and we didn't want that to happen, although, again, that's a much bigger reactor and a different type and all that stuff. But that's a good way to communicate my concern.

MEMBER BIER: Yes. And I agree with some of the comments that Dave was making earlier, like not that it necessarily affects what we say about this one chapter. But the process is kind of opaque if there are some topics that, you know, the staff doesn't address explicitly in what they provide, we really don't know is that because they haven't even gotten to that yet and they don't have that info from the vendor? Is it because they've already reviewed it and decided it's a non-issue and they don't need to delve deeper? It's really hard to see, like, what we're critiquing.

CHAIR PETTI: I think this new process, I mean, we've all picked it up. It puts a little bit more work on the staff unfortunately, but they have to come to us and not just tell us what they found but lead us through their due diligence, right, so that we

1	get the confidence. And you didn't have to do as much
2	in the old process because we all did it together and
3	it developed out of a common understanding. That's
4	not necessarily come through the new process unless
5	you deliberately think about it.
6	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Speaking of process,
7	for SHINE, we asked them, the reviewers, to write the
8	chair a paragraph for him to put in the letter. And
9	if there were conclusions and recommendations, now
10	would be the time to do it instead of waiting until
11	June.
12	CHAIR PETTI: Yes, yes, no, no, no. So
13	what I'm expecting, when we talk about how we treat
14	the outline of the letter, you'll see that, yes,
15	please write your memos thinking about me listing
16	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: The memo is too long.
17	Now is the time to summarize my memo into one
18	paragraph for a new letter.
19	CHAIR PETTI: Sure. If you want to put
20	it, like, as a conclusion or something.
21	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Oh, no, a separate
22	document, an email.
23	MEMBER REMPE: I will do that. I'll take
24	it actually, if I look at
25	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It makes your life

1 much easier if Joy gives you a paragraph on what she meant for this --2 3 CHAIR PETTI: But I think you need to see 4 the outline so that you can see the context in which 5 Well, you can write a MEMBER REMPE: 6 7 paragraph and throw it in the trash or do what you want to do with it, and then I'll --8 9 (Simultaneous speaking.) 10 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. One thing, though, when I look at this, I see a typo on my part. Sandra, 11 the last thing led to several items that I recommend 12 members explore in our reviews of subsequent, because, 13 14 sorry, I was thinking about the final letter. But do you see where I'm saying that? 15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: The very last line --16 17 MEMBER REMPE: The very last line. And something I picked on Greg on in the past, so I better 18 19 -- I'm surprised Greq didn't pick on me today. anyway, let's say items, yes, several items that I 20 recommend members explore. Members. And then delete 21 the words up to explore. And, again, this is a draft, 22 and I know it will come for signature for me later, 23 24 but I just was afraid I'd forget it because I looked

at this several times and tried to correct things like

1	that.
2	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: We don't want to fix
3	all the references the panel
4	MEMBER REMPE: Yes, I didn't do much on
5	the references. I just listed what I thought should
6	be there. Anyway, that's all I have to say for that
7	simple paragraph I was assigned to read.
8	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's a new record.
9	You wrote a memo that is 20 times longer than the
10	MEMBER REMPE: Well, the staff did two
11	pages, and I did two pages because
12	(Simultaneous speaking.)
13	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: If the staff's
14	(inaudible) is shorter than the topical report, they
15	(inaudible).
16	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Just one observation I
17	would make is that, at the OL stage, a lot of these
18	things will be done.
19	MEMBER REMPE: Yes. I added that
20	paragraph to respond back to Dave where it says they
21	aren't related to items that will be done at the OL
22	stage. I'm talking about things that go beyond that.
23	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Well, yes. So that's
24	where I was going. So a lot of these things will be
25	done as part of the OL and the startup of the reactor

sample, instrumentation calibration set points and so on and so forth. It will measure things like reactivity coefficients, and they'll start pulling rods or turning drums or whatever. So it would be -- I have no objection to this. I'm just saying that a lot of these things will be picked up at the OL stage.

What might be interesting for us to think about and you were hinting at, Joy, is that those things that might go beyond, as Greg was saying, just let's run it for four years and see how it goes kind of thing to some of the testing that would perhaps, at power, demonstrate, much like was done with EVR 2. I'm not suggesting that for this particular machine but where they just set it off on a significant transient that it would have a --

CHAIR PETTI: Right. I mean, I've put some notes in my outline about something that I think we ought to discuss. They have no plans to do that. I asked them explicitly whether they would do some sort of transient testing to demonstrate the, you know, the real robustness of the technology, if you will, and they said they didn't. But that said, I also have a list of things that you're not going to know until you build it, right: beryllium control, tritium control, lead ox control in the actual

environment with neutrons in a temperature grade. You know, you can list a number of them. That's why you have to build one. And, again, it was just to say that there is some residual uncertainty, but that's what a test reactor is about.

MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Sandra, can you show us lower numbers to the paragraph with the staff concerns? You recommended that ACRS request the staff provide additional information. Is this a recommendation for the letter? I suppose not. What you're asking is, in a future subcommittee, they address this to us?

MEMBER REMPE: I just want more. Again, we heard about some sort of internal list they have, and it's just something that, again, how it gets addressed is beyond my memo. I can beef up a little more of what you're saying, Walt, but I tried to say that when I had these, you know, I said, basically, I'm not talking about the things in Appendix A, which are what you're talking about of things that they expect to be done, and I will add that the thing about startup testing will obviously address some of these things. But I'm thinking about things that will be used that need to be addressed that can only be addressed in a test facility for a first-of-a-kind

1 technology with little operating experience. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes. My concern is, 2 3 at this point, we could solve this by requesting the 4 staff in the next subcommittee meeting they address 5 this issue as part of Chapter 10. We don't have to go into Chapter 10, but we can ask them to address it. 6 7 MEMBER REMPE: I would like that. 8 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: In which case, this 9 memo should not be part of the final letter because 10 they already addressed it in April. So if we can rewrite this as a request or keep a (inaudible) that 11 says we have reviewed with the staff the following 12 items, you know, in the April meeting. 13 Well, 14 MEMBER REMPE: it says our 15 discussions regarding Chapter 10, however, led to several items we planned, I have now that I request 16 17 that members explore in reviews of subsequent chapters. I don't know where. It may not get 18 19 If it doesn't get addressed, we'll put it addressed. in the final letter. But I'm trying to give them 20 opportunities to say, yes, we know this isn't going to 21 be totally done, which I think is an important concept 22 23 to --MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I see a procedural

(inaudible).

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1	MEMBER REMPE: (inaudible).
2	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes. This is part of
3	our final letter.
4	MEMBER REMPE: It doesn't have to be part
5	of our final letter.
6	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It is. It's going to
7	be in our appendix, right, on this memo?
8	MEMBER REMPE: Yes. But then we need to
9	say during our review we explored this (inaudible).
10	Dave has to put something about this in his letter,
11	either say we explored it and we've come to this
12	realization, which the staff has perfect knowledge and
13	that they don't need more or they need more. I don't
14	know how it should be resolved at this stage.
15	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Well, all they have
16	to come is go directly to the microphone and say I do
17	solemnly swear that this part of Jeff's checklist
18	MEMBER REMPE: Oh, I'm from Missouri.
19	They're going to have to give me a list to see that
20	it's complete. And I doubt they're going to be able
21	to do that at the end of the construction permit, but,
22	you know
23	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: My impression is we
24	were in a hurry, and we wanted to have a final thing
25	in May.

1 MEMBER REMPE: Yes, but they've got April and full Committee May. 2 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: 3 This is not their 4 final memo. In this form, this cannot be a final 5 memo. MEMBER REMPE: It can be a final memo that 6 7 was -- I had comments in the last, in the SHINE review 8 that we got addressed in a subsequent meeting, 9 remember, about the instrumentation set points? 10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm just raising my concern that (inaudible). 11 CHAIR PETTI: I don't actually think that, 12 I think we're better off leaving it as a list. 13 14 Matt's hand is up. Matt, Matt, go ahead. 15 MEMBER SUNSERI: Thanks, Dave. So just 16 listening to this discussion, I have not seen and I 17 wonder if it would be a fair request at some point for the operating license or whatever to ask the applicant 18 19 provide the strategic objectives and success criteria they are aiming for as a result of the 20 operations of the facility over its life. You know, 21 I mean, they're doing it for some objective, right. 22 What are those objectives, and how will they know they 23 24 would support that? That could go a long ways in

addressing some of these questions, I think.

1	MEMBER REMPE: I like that idea.
2	CHAIR PETTI: That's clearly an operating
3	license. I mean, I'm sure they're not there today,
4	right?
5	MEMBER REMPE: Yet, they're willing to pay
6	the money to get a construction permit?
7	(Simultaneous speaking.)
8	MEMBER SUNSERI: They probably have some
9	idea of what they're doing, or they wouldn't be going
10	this route, right? They wouldn't be pursuing a small
11	version, and they wouldn't be seeking a construction
12	permit if they didn't have some big picture ideal of,
13	strategically, what they want to accomplish. That's
14	all I'm saying.
15	CHAIR PETTI: Yes. And I think they could
16	write something at a fairly high level, though. The
17	question is the level of detail, I think.
18	MEMBER HALNON: Right. I think the level
19	of technical detail
20	MEMBER REMPE: Matt, I think that's a
21	great idea, but I'm also wondering our mission is
22	safety and, I mean, I guess, I think they should do
23	it, but is that a safety request?
24	MEMBER SUNSERI: Well, it depends on what
25	their objectives are. I mean, you know, if they're

going to be, as Greg said, maybe operating the reactor just to demonstrate some proof of principle or something, that might not be. But if they're going to challenge some of the safety limits because they don't know or whatever, that could be.

MEMBER BROWN: Can I provide something high level similar to what Matt just --

MEMBER REMPE: Sure.

MEMBER BROWN: -- went through? I'm trying to figure out what --

MEMBER REMPE: Speak closer to your mike.

Sorry about that. MEMBER BROWN: trying to figure out what the objective of this review is. This is a construction permit. They've written an SE already, which says something. We are now reviewing in very rapid time comments, you know, six items or whatever the number is today, and there will be more in the next subcommittee meeting. And we're The purpose of the memo is to do writing a memo. what? Are we rubber-stamping their SE? I'm using a somewhat pejorative word. Let me finish my thought process, okay? Putting aside my pejorative comment, which was not meant to be nasty. And I'm taking this from our discussion that we had relative to the decay heat removal system today, relative to the concerns.

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But it's going to be addressed at the operating license. Shouldn't our memos reflect at least our concerns and -- we're not going to get any responses to our memos because they're going to go on. So why shouldn't our memos identify what we want to make sure gets addressed at the operating license stage?

CHAIR PETTI: We should. So the decay heat removal will come up when Walt's chapter comes up, yes.

MEMBER BROWN: Yes, but his memo ought to reflect that and, like mine on Chapter 7, would be to say if the description and the architecture is not complete but just kind of a sketchy thing, they ought to make sure they comply with the fundamentals, et cetera, and here's several items that we've emphasized in past ones and say we'd like to hear about that at the -- so, to me, that's the approach I was going to take on Chapters 7 and 8 and probably look at Chapter 6, which is safequards, as well, even though somebody else is assigned that one. Oh, you got that? have any feedback, I'll give it, but that's my And I didn't hear us talking about that in terms of what the objective is for our memos. what I was going to be doing.

CHAIR PETTI: Just as it was for SHINE.

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1	I think, yes, no, exactly. I mean, I figure if
2	they're important things that we think nothing less
3	than a punch list of items, safety concerns for the
4	OL, our letter is the only way to share that with the
5	staff.
6	MEMBER BROWN: Yes. And then we'll have
7	a more detailed review of individual chapter by
8	chapter, as opposed to this mass attack.
9	CHAIR PETTI: Well, these are all
LO	MEMBER BROWN: No, they're
L1	(Simultaneous speaking.)
L2	CHAIR PETTI: Right. They're two-page
L3	things
L4	(Simultaneous speaking.)
L5	MEMBER BROWN: No, there's four. Even I
L6	can read this in four days. The point is I fall
L7	asleep halfway through; I'm just joking.
L8	CHAIR PETTI: Even the ones in March,
L9	there's not that much there.
20	MEMBER BROWN: Mine are like 20 pages long
21	in the PSAR, and there's some figures, and I haven't
22	read the SEs, but I did take a quick look. It's 7 and
23	8. I haven't looked at Chapter 6 yet. I've got to
24	really read them now.
25	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's only functional

1 containment on the decay heat. MEMBER BROWN: Is that right? They hit 2 3 the decay heat --4 (Simultaneous speaking.) 5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Anyway, I'm just trying to make sure that I'm on the right track as to 6 7 how I write my memo here and that we ought to, I hope 8 that would be a consensus opinion that that's what we 9 ought to be focusing on. 10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Going back to the problem at hand, if we can rewrite this paragraph to 11 say that at the OL we will expect the staff address 12 these issues because, when you're writing this, I 13 14 don't know if you want the staff to address these 15 concerns for you before the --16 (Simultaneous speaking.) 17 MEMBER REMPE: Read the sentence that says these concerns are not related to items that are, I 18 19 should say required to be resolved prior. I have another typo. Get rid of the second not; I'm sorry, 20 Sandra. Right there. Do you see on the -- after the 21 bullets, there's a not, not required. 22 Okay. These are -- the second not. Not that one. 23 Yes, right 24 there.

These concerns are not related to

Okay.

those items that are required to be resolved prior to issuance of the construction permit. Oh, actually, that not was correct. But, anyway, but expect to be resolved prior to operating license. I get that there's some things that are going to be resolved when the operating license is issued because those items are identified by the staff and listed in Appendix A of the staff SE. Rather, I'm talking uncertainties associated with the first-of-a-kind technology demonstration facility that cannot resolved until after the facility is operational.

Again, it's just things that I think we won't know because we're taking this lighter approach with a small demonstration test facility.

MEMBER BROWN: No, but the safety issues that we have to deal with need to be addressed before the facility is operating. If we've got those, we ought to identify --

MEMBER REMPE: Because the maximum hypothetical accident doesn't have a large source term, okay, so, yes, maybe they have a small amount of radiation leak that's on the site and all this kind of stuff, but the long-term ability of a new sensor to perform in this corrosive environment with radiation exposure --

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1 MEMBER BROWN: That's a different issue from a safety. That's a shutdown and have to fix it. 2 3 CHAIR PETTI: That's an operation, 4 could be an operation --5 MEMBER BROWN: But if it fails, it' a 6 shutdown and fix it issue. It's not a safety-safety 7 issue because they will shut down if it breaks. MEMBER REMPE: But if it's water level or 8 9 Flibe level and it's affecting their potential to 10 retain radionuclides, what if it's a reactivity coefficient and they -- again, you can do some startup 11 12 When you find that out, 13 MEMBER BROWN: 14 it's a shutdown and then they recalibrate. That's a different issue, okay? 15 16 MEMBER REMPE: I'm not trying to get the 17 stuff that is required prior to operating license. I'm trying to think about other things that are beyond 18 19 that. Well, I think the key for 20 MEMBER BROWN: is what's the safety issues we have to have 21 resolved before the operating license is granted? 22 What you're talking about are fundamental analytical 23 24 physics issues of some type or will the instrument That's an operating thing we find 25 last long enough.

1 out they're going to break. I mean, those are -- we really ought to focus on what do we need to do for the 2 operating license, get those so we get those resolved. 3 4 And then, if we think there are what you call the more 5 esoteric issues, throw them in as how are these going to be confirmed, okay, once the facility is operating. 6 7 Is there a test program, is there things they can take 8 periodically, is there whatever. 9 Okay. And so, again, I MEMBER REMPE: 10 think other people will deal with the things that are documented in Appendix A that are what are needed for 11 the operating license. What I'm talking about is 12 Chapter 10, which is an experimental facility, because 13 14 some test reactors have irradiation capabilities and you worry about their safe operation. This whole 15 16 thing is an experiment --I understand that. 17 MEMBER BROWN: But we're mixing apples and oranges in terms of getting 18 19 the construction permit done and what has to be satisfied to start up the plant as an operating --20 MEMBER REMPE: And other people will take 21 I hope so, but I'm only a Chapter 10 22 care of that. 23 person. 24 MEMBER BROWN: Well, that's what I tend to

look at, you know, for 7 and 8 and safeguards, and

1	they got to have some answer for the decay heat
2	removal thing. Do they need an automatic system for
3	that because they've got an upper end and a lower end?
4	Are they going to worry about a guy reading the meter
5	the right way or the glass panel or whatever hell he's
6	got to monitor stuff? To me, that's unsatisfactory.
7	You've got to have something that warns the operators,
8	and I'm going to be looking for that
9	MEMBER REMPE: And those things are very
10	important and more important, frankly, than what I'm
11	bringing up here. I'm talking about
12	MEMBER BROWN: That's why we ought to
13	focus on that.
14	MEMBER REMPE: Absolutely. But I only was
15	given Chapter 10.
16	MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I understand that.
17	That's my thought process.
18	CHAIR PETTI: Charlie, we agree with you.
19	MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
20	CHAIR PETTI: The strategy was there were
21	a bunch of chapters that had very little safety
22	significance.
23	MEMBER BROWN: I agree. We ought to get
24	off of Chapter 10 right now.
25	MEMBER REMPE: Absolutely.

1	CHAIR PETTI: We're going to move beyond
2	those in this meeting and really the real meat starts
3	at
4	MEMBER BROWN: In March, March 24th and
5	25th.
6	CHAIR PETTI: I thought these wouldn't be
7	a big deal. Of course, I'm wrong.
8	MEMBER BROWN: They're not.
9	MEMBER BALLINGER: So this was the ramp.
10	CHAIR PETTI: Right. This was
11	MEMBER REMPE: This is the easy-off. I
12	thought, hallelujah, I only have a paragraph.
13	CHAIR PETTI: Okay. I move we can move to
14	the next
15	(Simultaneous speaking.)
16	MEMBER REMPE: I need to figure out my
17	nots in that one sentence.
18	CHAIR PETTI: Chapter 12, please. Matt,
19	you up there?
20	MEMBER SUNSERI: Yes, I am.
21	CHAIR PETTI: It's yours.
22	MEMBER SUNSERI: So while Sandra is
23	bringing that up, I did look at Chapter 12, and I
24	guess I drew the long stake in the thing. My chapter
25	was several hundred pages long, considering all the

appendices and everything.

And, you know, I just want to make a comment here. I've heard a couple of times either members or maybe even staff refer to it that this gets a lighter touch because it's a test reactor. I don't support those statements. There's fewer things to do, so there's less work overall, but the things that I review I give it the same level of rigor in the technical depth and detail as any other review that I do. So I just want to be on record for that. This is not a light touch for Chapter 12.

There were several activities covered in Chapter 12. Conduct of operations. It involved operator training, quality assurance program, emergency plan, startup. And I apologize; this copy of my memo was not the most up-to-date version. There was also material and accountability control plan as part of this chapter.

So my conclusion is, after a thorough review of all these areas of performance, I do not see anything that warrants additional chapter reviews at this time, nor do they affect any crosscutting areas that we would have to look at as far as the construction permit goes. I do have a couple of observations, though, that I would make and offer, so

if you could maybe put -- yes.

When I was looking at the conduct of operations section specifically, I note that the plant manager is assigned overall responsibility for protecting personnel from radiation, from exposure to radiation. However, the radiation protection function and chemistry functions report to the manager of technical services. And although this alignment is satisfactory for the construction phase, I would recommend that consideration should be given to aligning those functions with the plant manager for the operation phase. That's where it's really going to count.

The Kairos stated that their operation program will comply with 10 CFR 50.55 or, I'm sorry, 10 CFR 55, excuse me, and they will submit that plan with their operating license application. That's fine.

Looking over the quality assurance plan, it has all the elements in there. It follows the standard review plan, the guides. It parallels NQA requirements. It parallels Appendix B and CFR 50 requirements. It's specific for this design. However, I did note that there's one minor discrepancy they might want to consider addressing in that in the

Chapter 12 of their PSAR they say that quality
assurance, which I think is good because I criticize
other organizations for not calling out where quality
assurance points out, so they do point out where
quality assurance fits in in the big scheme of the
operating model, but they have it reporting, and I'll
have to read my words here to make sure I get this
straight, I think it's Chapter 12 shows they're
reporting to the site executive, but, yet, Chapter 2
of the quality assurance program says it reports to
the maybe I have this backwards. Chapter 12
reports to the site executive. Chapter 2 through the
oh, yes, through the chief executive officer. Okay.
So it really doesn't matter. It needs to be
independent of production operations, and it is.
However, the Chapter 2 of the quality assurance plan,
which will be the governing guidance, is that the QA
function has access to all levels of management
necessary to assure effective execution of the program
irrespective of the organization structure, which I
agree with that statement. They should just put that
footnote in the PSAR, too, for consistency and
clarity. Just a nit.

On a positive note, they have a very well thought-out emergency plan, and I just would like to

note, we've had comments on this before, but I would note that it's a positive observation that they have had early engagement with the city of Oak Ridge, Oak Ridge Central Fire Department, the police department, and medical center, county agency, state of Tennessee, and other federal agencies. So we've been critical of some of that in the past, and they're doing a good job of engaging early.

Can you scroll further down a little bit,
Sandra? These next two areas, Kairos did not provide
any information on the material and control
accountability program, which is appropriate for this
phase. They're not going to be handling any special
nuclear material, so that will all be sent in, as they
say, during the operation license application.

And also Kairos did not present their startup plan in saying that this will be presented as part of the operating license also. And I think some of the comments we just had in the previous Chapter 10 memo might carry over to things they want to consider as they develop that startup plan. Anyway, we'll give it a thorough review when it is submitted as part of the operating license.

So that's really all I had as far as the review. I'm not recommending any further, as I said

before, any further changes or discussion. I don't want to take up the Committee's time with any grammatical or typographical errors because there are some in here, so if you have some send them to me. I'll take whatever I get by Friday and I'll write my final memo.

That concludes my presentation.

CHAIR PETTI: Thank you, Matt. Nice and concise. Any comments, members?

I'd like to make MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes. a comment for my time in the barrel over SHINE, and that is what happened was we got the memos and they had what are called recommendations and concerns in and interpreted those recommendations them, concerns because the last thing that the person usually said was I have no concerns, it's fine. when it came time to writing the letter, we got in extensive discussions about things that we wanted the letter to require the applicant to do, and that was different than what was said in the memos because the memo writer, in some cases, interpreted recommendation as being a requirement.

So we need to be very careful, I think, this time around where, when we get to letter writing, we don't end up in an infinite loop where we get

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1	disagreements about what we would like the person to
2	do versus what we would recommend that they consider,
3	which is a lot different. So I can see that coming.
4	I can see that coming.
5	CHAIR PETTI: Good feedback for members as
6	they write their memos.
7	MEMBER BALLINGER: We're getting SEs with
8	no open items, right?
9	CHAIR PETTI: Right.
LO	MEMBER BALLINGER: So that means there
L1	shouldn't be any open items. And if we find what
L2	amounts to open items, that's a big deal.
L3	MEMBER HALNON: And that's to the staff,
L4	not the applicant.
L5	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes. I mean, either
L6	way
L7	MEMBER HALNON: Well, I mean, I think
L8	we've talked about in the past. We don't tell the
L9	applicant to do things. We work through the staff for
20	them to assess and, if they say, no, we're not going
21	to have them do it, then, you know
22	MEMBER BALLINGER: But if we tell the
23	staff we disagree, you should do this, that feeds
24	right back to the
25	MEMBER HALNON: Right. Just like we said

it would be good to see it in a corrective action program, and then the applicant put it in the corrective action program and we were happy at that point on some stuff.

CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Thank you. Then let's do tech specs. I can't remember. Is that you, Greg?

MEMBER HALNON: Yes, it's me.

CHAIR PETTI: Chapter 14, Sandra.

MEMBER HALNON: Okay. So the tech specs, at this point, obviously, are very nonspecific because of the designs and parameters that you typically see listed in tech specs is not there. But they did pare it back effectively and accurately the requirements in 1537 and the ANC document that covers tech specs for test reactors. So the framework is there, and it's solid, so I don't really have any issues with the way they have provided it and didn't have any issues with way the staff has did their SER from standpoint that, you know, they basically said the same thing, it meets all the requirements and is a good springboard to get into the operating license when you start getting the parameters set for you want to monitor and stay within envelopes.

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The concerns aspect of it is where I was this morning on how do you tie it altogether? specs kind of ties the entire envelope of the plant together at the end, and there's a lot of moving parts right now relative to detailed design parameters you're looking at, the decay heat removal envelope, if you will, temperatures, and things like that. started the review on Chapter 9, which is auxiliary tremendous systems, and there's а amount information about how these systems are non-safety related, but, and those buts are pretty extensive, you So there's a lot of tentacles that could come back on these auxiliary systems and other safety systems that may be not necessarily specifically covered by the ANC document and others because it's a new technology.

So I said that there needs to be an important mapping of some of these support systems and support functional requirements that the tech specs and the safety envelope that you want this plant to stay within to ensure that tech specs is not too narrow and focused just because it's not necessarily a pool reactor or something to that effect, which is really where most test reactors are, you know, university reactors are.

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Just for example, functional containment.

This is the first time we'll use functional containment, and how do you tech spec functional containment? You've got to do something. You need to have some, is it coolant monitoring, is that how you're going to do it? Is it isotopes? You know, what's too much, what's not enough, and that sort of thing. So there's going to be a lot of, I'm sure, back and forth with the staff and the applicant on what the applicable limits need to be to ensure the containment is adequate. And then how do you test it? Is it through the pebble handling system and, when you offload it, do you measure it? How do you look at the offgas system? How do you measure to make sure the containment is still there?

So I make that mention is that this firstof-a-kind reactor has to not assume that the past tech
specs are going to be all-inclusive of what we may see
going forward in this tech spec. So it will be an
interesting exercise to get there.

Another just an example I put in there was that there's a heavy reliance on natural circulation cooling, and, you know, there's some passive components in that, obviously, and some redundancy. Is that going to be part of, you know, potential

operability aspect of tech specs? Those types of things need to be carried through, and that's why I said there needs to be a close mapping of all these other systems to make sure that they're not affecting the safety envelope that we're trying to maintain. So there's nothing that we need to do on this, but this is that list of things to look at as we're going forward and thought processes that I was hoping the staff was going to -- it sounds like they're keeping a list and having the same type of discussions internally. Bottom line is that everything is fine for It met all the requirements. this PSAR. MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Let me pound once These memos are going to be an again on my concern. appendix to our letter to the commissioners, right? That's the way we handled it before. And the Commission is going to turn to the staff and say what do these guys want us to do, and the staff will say I I don't know what you want me to do with don't know. this memo. CHAIR PETTI: I didn't think we attached I thought we just referenced them. the memos. MEMBER BALLINGER: No, we attached them. CHAIR PETTI: We did attach them?

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1	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So they're really
2	part of the letter. Yes, we tell you don't bother to
3	read in too much detail, this is the important part,
4	but, I mean
5	MEMBER HALNON: It says I recommend no
6	further actions. That means nothing. It's
7	information to the staff this is what we're thinking
8	about, and they can take it or leave it.
9	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: But these are
10	recommendations that the staff should look at during
11	
12	MEMBER HALNON: That's
13	(Simultaneous speaking.)
14	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: license stage.
15	MEMBER HALNON: Yes, but there's no
16	recommendations.
17	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm just saying
18	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, I have a, I'm
19	stubborn with this on the SHINE, too. We have our
20	concerns, but we have no recommendations. So how can
21	that be?
22	MEMBER HALNON: Concerns is not the right
23	word for that. You know, that's the template. It's
24	not concerns
25	CHAIR PETTI: Observations?

1	MEMBER HALNON: It's observations really.
2	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But you sort of also
3	recommend something to be done in, you know,
4	throughout the
5	MEMBER HALNON: Or just discussion like we
6	do
7	CHAIR PETTI: Can we change the template?
8	Just change concerns to observations.
9	MEMBER HALNON: Or just discussion. I
10	would just say discussion.
11	CHAIR PETTI: Or discussion.
12	MEMBER HALNON: Yes, that goes along with
13	our well, you letter reports have discussion. Our
14	letter report has discussions, and I think that's
15	probably appropriate because that's all it is at this
16	point.
17	CHAIR PETTI: It's not so much for the
18	Commission. It's for the staff. They've got an
19	internal list; we know that. Oh, well, we didn't have
20	that. Okay, we'll write that down.
21	MEMBER HALNON: But to Ron's point under
22	recommendations, was there anything that I thought
23	they needed to do differently in their SER that's a
24	draft that would translate back into a revision or
25	additions into the no there's nothing

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MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, Greg, but don't you want them to put something in the there for the future things, like, you know, things that you just discussed about? You know, that's some things which, you know, like Jose put, there's heavy lines, blah, blah, blah. I mean, don't you want that to be

Well, I don't think that MEMBER HALNON: -- this is my position on what I think the staff should do. For one, I don't consider myself smarter than the reviewers that are going to be doing this. I have a comment that maybe they didn't think about overtly that, hey, that's a good idea, but I don't think that they're not going to do this. I think that they're going to do it. I think they may not do it in, quote, mapping sense or something to that effect. But when I get to the operating license review of Chapter 14, I'm going to take those core systems and I'm going to walk them through how they affect the safety of the plant and decide whether or not I feel like there should be a tech specs. Am I going to do it comprehensively? No, I'm going to pick and choose very maybe obvious and not so obvious ones and do that.

I'm going to make the assumption that

I'm going to verify and validate that they did by 2 3 So this is my thought process on why I'm 4 going to do that. 5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: That maybe discussion is still not good thing. 6 I was thinking 7 when we were listening in the morning, you know, about 8 this, you know, the reg and how it applies, and we 9 come up with this Appendix A, which contains both commitments from the Kairos NRC expectations and maybe 10 there could be third category there insides from the 11 12 ACRS review something like that, you or something which we identify in our letters, and I can 13 14 see that we identify those things which will be good to be monitored for in the future, you know. And that 15 will not come this discussion. 16 Maybe the concern 17 wasn't a good name, but maybe that, say, insights or things to be monitored in the future. I don't know 18 19 how to call it, you know. MEMBER HALNON: Yes. Well, that's kind of 20 descriptive of what it is. I mean, discussion is 21 probably just --22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Very general, you 23 24 know. 25 MEMBER HALNON: Yes.

they're going to do that, and I'm going to go check

1	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: What is the name of
2	does Appendix A has a title?
3	CHAIR PETTI: Well, we don't actually have
4	Appendix A out on SharePoint, so I don't know. These
5	are commitments, the commitments that Kairos has made
6	to the staff on the R&D they will complete prior to
7	the end of construction.
8	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: You know, some
9	concerns also, the policy contain issues to be
LO	addressed in the future identified by the staff.
11	MEMBER HALNON: That's on their one-off
L2	list that they're talking about that they keep on
L3	their SharePoint.
L4	CHAIR PETTI: Staff can help you.
L5	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, basically, we
L6	are sort of giving recommendation to that list. I
L7	
	mean, you know
L8	mean, you know CHAIR PETTI: So I can see us in our
L8 L9	
	CHAIR PETTI: So I can see us in our
L9	CHAIR PETTI: So I can see us in our letter having information that we think is important
L9 20	CHAIR PETTI: So I can see us in our letter having information that we think is important that they have in the FSAR or the operating license,
L9 20 21	CHAIR PETTI: So I can see us in our letter having information that we think is important that they have in the FSAR or the operating license, and it could be a list. And whether we actually put
19 20 21 22	CHAIR PETTI: So I can see us in our letter having information that we think is important that they have in the FSAR or the operating license, and it could be a list. And whether we actually put it in the letter or we make it an appendix, I don't

1	belong as a recommendation for review and inclusion in
2	the FSAR, their operating license.
3	CHAIR PETTI: Yes, their future
4	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Future. But they
5	should be tasked as such in the letter so, when I read
6	it, I know what you're talking about.
7	MEMBER HALNON: My impression was that we
8	were looking at the PSAR and trying to render judgment
9	on whether or not the PSAR was adequate
10	CHAIR PETTI: But we can't help ourself,
11	we skipped over that line.
12	MEMBER HALNON: Right. So that's why I
13	didn't bring it to the recommendation level because I
14	didn't see any missed open items, if you will
15	CHAIR PETTI: I just worry that it could
16	become an extremely long list when you look at how
17	preliminary so much of it is, and it's fine at this
18	stage.
19	MEMBER HALNON: Right. And even, Joy,
20	your letter, you could have probably expanded that
21	bulletized list, you know, pages long.
22	MEMBER REMPE: Such as.
23	MEMBER HALNON: Right. You know, so what
24	is the most on your mind in general, not in general,
25	but, you know, what do you want to make sure they keep

1 in mind and what we're going to keep in mind as we go 2 3 CHAIR PETTI: So let me just ask, I mean, 4 I haven't gone back and read the letter that we wrote, that you wrote, I wasn't part of the Committee, for 5 6 SHINE construction permit. Did you guys have a list 7 of things that you --8 MEMBER REMPE: Oh, yes. 9 CHAIR PETTI: -- thought was important? 10 MEMBER REMPE: Yes. And, actually, the Commission meeting, the topic of, you know, what's 11 needed for assurance for moving forward with the 12 construction permit versus an operating license. 13 14 know, we got slapped back a little bit about asking 15 for to much. That was my takeaway from that 16 discussion with one of the commissioners that, again, 17 there is this list in Appendix A which I think the staff was going to tell us we were going to get soon 18 19 and it will be documented. But I have a question for Greg. 20 I mean, today, when I brought up these things, they said, 21 well, the tech specs will help, you know, will be one 22 mechanism, along with the startup plans, to help us. 23 24 In light of the fact that this is a first-of-a-kind

reactor, should the tech specs be more limiting?

1 you want more monitoring on this facility to make sure it's not going south than you would with an operating 2 3 plant for a known technology? Do you have any feeling 4 for that yet? Because that's what I'm wondering about 5 because --CHAIR PETTI: I think it all depends on 6 7 the margins, and there's huge margins. 8 MEMBER BALLINGER: Not got their head in 9 ground. They're going to say, if there's the 10 additional monitoring needed, they're going to say so. MEMBER REMPE: Yes, but I'm asking Greg. 11 I know the staff will do this, but what's your qut 12 the staff will come 13 know up 14 something, but I'm just curious as a person who's 15 running a plant for years and knowing about leaky 16 valves that were allowed to leak and tech spec changes 17 at TMI, too, you know, what do you think? Do you think we should have more for a first-of-a-kind than 18 19 something that is well known? MEMBER HALNON: Well, so the startup plan 20 will be approved by the staff, and that startup plan 21 will have some of those things in there. 22 There are some one-cycle only, first-cycle only tech specs that 23 24 we had when we started up the plants for testing, and

those eventually went away the next revision of tech

1 specs once you satisfy them. So there's some one-time only tech specs 2 that may be in there. I would assume --3 4 MEMBER REMPE: And is that included in the 5 PSAR, the acknowledgment that there will be some onetime tech specs? 6 I mean --7 MEMBER HALNON: No, I don't recall them in 8 there, but I think that --9 MEMBER REMPE: That might be something to 10 add to your memo. It's up to you, but it's something that I think additional attention should be paid to 11 the tech specs. 12 MEMBER HALNON: And a part of that comes 13 14 back to what we were talking about earlier about what 15 is the intent of having a test reactor. You're not 16 just going to run it for four years and say, okay, 17 everything runs really smooth. What is the intent, and that might come back again to that same question 18 19 as, all right, if you're going to push the envelope, how much margin are you going to allow them to get to 20 this tech spec limit before you say you've pushed that 21 too far because now you're in my realm of margin, 22 you're not in your realm of margin anymore. 23 24 So Ι think that's very detailed

discussion and something that will have to take place

1	between the staff and the applicant.
2	MEMBER REMPE: And it would be good for us
3	to know about how that discussion went is what I'm
4	kind of
5	MEMBER HALNON: Yes, and I would fully
6	expect that to be in the FSAR.
7	MEMBER REMPE: Yes. I think, again, if
8	it's not in the PSAR, if there's something like that
9	that we expect, it would be a good place to mention it
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11	MEMBER HALNON: I'll go back and look at
12	that with that in mind to see if there was anything in
13	there. I don't recall just off hand
14	MEMBER REMPE: I looked at the tech spec
15	thing because that was acknowledged in Chapter 10 and
16	the staff's PSAR or their SE, and I went and looked at
17	the tech spec and I surely didn't see anything, and
18	it's something I think might be mentioned.
19	MEMBER HALNON: I'll take a note and go
20	back and look and see if there's something in there
21	about potential one-time only or, you know, special
22	tests type tech specs. I don't know. I just don't
23	remember. If you didn't see it, then
24	MEMBER REMPE: Well, I didn't, but, again,
25	I did this a couple of weeks before meetings. I had

1 other commitments the last week. 2 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. MEMBER SUNSERI: 3 This is Matt. 4 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, I'm sorry, Matt. 5 MEMBER SUNSERI: I just wanted to make a 6 comment on the tech specs. I mean, the tech specs are 7 the activities that the applicant or the operator uses 8 to bound the safety analysis. It's not the, 9 the place to put wouldn't be things to It's just, it safeguards the 10 operational issues. that 11 initiating conditions ensures your safety analysis is valid. So I just think about that. 12 13 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I agree, Matt. 14 that's why we don't have the final safety analysis, 15 obviously, so we don't know what needs to bound it. 16 But I agree we don't want to put operating limits in 17 here, we want to put safety limits with margin. are other programs that will provide the operating 18 19 envelopes. I quess I'm going to ask 20 MEMBER BROWN: another question as to this is a construction permit. 21 When I looked briefly at 7, for instance, there's not 22 enough information in there to design the character of 23 24 the reactor protection and/or safequard systems, for

It's general. There's some block

whatever they are.

1	diagrams, but they're very block. They talk nothing
2	about the types of systems they would be using,
3	whether it's processors or FPGAs or whether they do
4	mention one-way data diode once, but it's off of
5	everything in a big line and you have no idea how
6	combined they are. Is it multiplex or what have you?
7	So that chapter is, if they're going to use this
8	chapter to build the reactor safety systems,
9	protection system, it's not adequate.
10	So when we did NuScale, I had a complete
11	
12	CHAIR PETTI: Yes, but be careful.
13	NuScale was one step.
14	MEMBER BROWN: I understand that. We had
15	a single memo, but all I'm saying is the systems were
16	defined as to how they were going to design them. If
17	construction project, does this mean they can now go
18	build everything? If that's the purpose of this
19	construction process, that PSAR is not satisfactory
20	for neither Chapter 6, Chapter 7 or Chapter 8. I
21	haven't looked at 6 yet.
22	CHAIR PETTI: No, because that's not the
23	way to think about the construction permit. They
24	talked about it in this morning that it's about how

their design criteria and does the design address the

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1	criteria at a conceptual level.
2	MEMBER BROWN: Is there going to be an
3	FSAR?
4	CHAIR PETTI: Of course.
5	MEMBER BROWN: Will we review that before
6	
7	CHAIR PETTI: Absolutely.
8	MEMBER BROWN: the plant, before any
9	construction starts?
10	CHAIR PETTI: No.
11	MEMBER BROWN: Before the systems are
12	built?
13	MEMBER BALLINGER: Like we did SHINE.
14	Construction permit, operating permit.
15	MEMBER BROWN: I had a lot of detail on
16	SHINE.
17	MEMBER BALLINGER: When?
18	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: On the operating
19	license.
20	MEMBER BALLINGER: The operating license.
21	MEMBER BROWN: All I want to make sure is
22	when I come through and review it for the operating
23	license and they say, hey, we've already designed the
24	stuff, I'm going to just write a letter that says,
25	propose that it's unsatisfactory and doesn't

1 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: That's correct. MEMBER BROWN: all 2 meet the requirements. 3 4 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: They design it at 5 their own risk. The NRC just has to give them a license because it satisfies the requirement or not. 6 But the designer, the applicant designs everything at 7 8 their own risk. It has never happened that the NRC 9 has rejected it, but that's the process. 10 MEMBER BROWN: If that's the point, then my comment on my memo is going to be fairly explicit 11 relative to it's not satisfactory for designing --12 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I think that we 13 14 should have a section here that says recommendations 15 for review of the operating license, write in the way 16 you want to because this is what you're writing here is for construction it's okay but, from now on, the 17 staff needs to consider the following items. 18 19 MEMBER BROWN: For instance, defense-indepth is how do you use computers in some of these 20 That was covered in the other items we've 21 systems. 22 It was done, you know, suitably. And NuScale, I mean, excuse me, SHINE was not, I mean, I accepted 23 less than what I would have seen for NuScale. 24 But, again, NuScale was a 25 CHAIR PETTI:

1	one-step licensing.
2	MEMBER BROWN: So was AP1000, so was
3	CHAIR PETTI: Right. So they were at the
4	FSAR stage.
5	MEMBER BROWN: I understand that. But so
6	I knew what they were hidden, but in SHINE there was
7	enough information in there so that I knew, I could
8	tell that defense-in-depth was going to be okay, they
9	knew they had processors and they knew they needed,
10	they were keeping everybody out, no connecting to the
11	internet. It was really clear.
12	MEMBER BALLINGER: But that was at the
13	operating license.
14	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes. And when we
15	were reviewing Chapter 7 for SHINE, we walked inside
16	a containment and (inaudible) so where the control
17	room is going to be
18	MEMBER BROWN: All right. I'll quit. All
19	I'm saying is I just, I just want to make sure the
20	architecture requirements and other types of stuff in
21	the reg guides that define how they get used
22	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is the point.
23	We can make a recommendation about how that process
24	happens.
25	MEMBER BROWN: Okay.

1	(Simultaneous speaking.).
2	MEMBER HALNON: Yes. So I approached my
3	reviews with this is what they're going to do and
4	then, when we get to the operating license, the FSAR,
5	it's the what and the how.
6	CHAIR PETTI: And the how. That's a good
7	way to think about it.
8	MEMBER HALNON: And so if the what is
9	adequate, they're meeting the right codes, they've got
10	the right things, they say they're going to use
11	analytical issues, they're going to use test data for
12	this, the system is going to be able to take the
13	gasses and they're going to be able to scrub them, and
14	blah, blah, blah, blah, you know, that's looking
15	at it almost like a system description as opposed to
16	a system design. There will be a design, and that
17	design will be summarized in the FSAR.
18	MEMBER BROWN: As long as I'm getting an
19	FSAR.
20	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You will in a couple
21	of years.
22	MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Or whoever is met at
23	that time.
24	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Maybe we can raise
25	these things as recommendations for ACRS review of

	operating license. Fair warning: ACRS will look at
2	these items when you send us an operating license to
3	review. This is what we're going to look. You decide
4	whether you want to risk it or not; that's your job to
5	do it. But this is what we will look at.
6	MEMBER REMPE: Maybe give us a template.
7	Some of us may think we might get some additional
8	information as the review progresses in some of these
9	cases, so I, you know
10	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You want to finish the
11	thing by May. You're not going to get anything else.
12	MEMBER REMPE: When you're the first one
13	out of the gate, I would hope I get something else.
14	We didn't even see Appendix A and, you know, it's like
15	it's a big guess right now.
16	MEMBER BROWN: I don't remember that. I
17	don't think they did. I don't remember.
18	MEMBER BALLINGER: Somebody did.
19	MEMBER BIER: I like Jose's comment of the,
20	you know, these are notes to ourselves in the future
21	and, therefore, also notes to staff and licensee that,
22	you know, we don't want anybody to forget that
23	somebody is going to be looking at these things.
24	MEMBER HALNON: So back to Vesna's, it's
25	more insights from our review, which maybe that's the

1	right
2	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Our own Appendix A,
3	if you want to call it that way.
4	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, I was thinking
5	maybe we should say the name of this to be considered
6	in the future or consideration or something when we
7	just put discussion now.
8	MEMBER HALNON: That's true that many of
9	us, some of us won't even be here for the operating
10	license review, and that's the same thing with the
11	staff. So they're keeping their list of lessons and
12	insights, and that's the same thing that we're kind of
13	doing with these.
14	CHAIR PETTI: I think we understand the
15	comments. We need to break because we've got a P&P
16	subcommittee. So let's take a break, and we will be
17	back at 1:00.
18	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
19	off the record at 11:50 a.m. and then went back on the
20	record at 1:01 p.m.)
21	CHAIR PETTI: Okay. So we officially
22	close the meeting, and we're going to continue working
23	on our memos.
24	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
25	off the record at 1:01 p.m.)



NRC STAFF REVIEW STRATEGY FOR THE SAFETY REVIEW OF THE KAIROS HERMES TESTING FACILITY CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATION

Briefing for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Wednesday, March 1, 2023

By the Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation



Background

- Test reactor different licensing requirements than a commercial power reactor
- Construction Permit application preliminary design.
- The NRC staff performed an appropriate level of review, focusing on matters that are
 most safety significant, and the scope of the review was commensurate with the risk
 posed by the design.
- Unswerving focus on adequate protection of public health and protecting the environment.



Testing Facility Licensing

- Kairos expects to apply for a Class 104c license for a utilization facility useful in the conduct of research and development activities. Accordingly, the staff conducted the CP review consistent with Section 104c of the Act.
- Many 10 CFR Part 50 requirements are for power reactors and do not apply to testing facilities.
- Testing facilities are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria."
- Testing facilities are subject to a few 10 CFR Part 50 requirements that do not apply to research reactors, including Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) review, and mandatory hearings for CP applications (10 CFR 50.58).



Construction Permits

- The level of detail needed in a CP application and associated NRC staff SER are different than for an OL (or combined operating license)
 - ➤ The CP application describes the preliminary design of the facility, while an OL application should describe the final design of the facility, as well as plans and programs not provided in the CP application
- The staff must make the following findings to issue a CP, based on 10 CFR 50.35:
 - > Facility has been described, including the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design
 - Further technical or design information may be reasonably left for later consideration in the final safety analysis report (i.e., OL application)
 - Safety features or components requiring research and development have been identified
 - Safety questions will be resolved prior to the completion of construction and the proposed facility can be constructed without undue risk to the health and safety of the public
- Staff's conclusions are also based on the considerations in 10 CFR 50.40 and 50.50



Risk-Informed Review

- For its CP application review, the depth and scope of staff's review was commensurate with the risk or safety significance of items under review
- The staff maintained a "big picture" safety perspective of the Hermes design. The scope and level of detail of the review considered the small size of Hermes and the anticipated strong safety case with low radiological consequences, and as appropriate for a testing facility CP application.
- The staff's review is also tailored to the unique and novel technology described in the CP application, using the appropriate regulatory guidance in NUREG-1537, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors." Other guidance (e.g., regulatory guides and industry standards) and engineering judgement are also used, as appropriate.



NUREG-1537 Review Areas/Chapters

- 1. The Facility/Introduction
- 2. Site Characteristics
- 3. Design of Structures, Systems, and Components
- 4. Facility Description
- 5. Coolant Systems
- 6. Engineered Safety Features
- 7. Instrumentation and Control
- 8. Electrical Power Systems
- 9. Auxiliary Systems
- 10. Experimental Facilities
- 11. Radiation Protection and Waste Management

12. Conduct of Operations

- Emergency Planning
- Physical Security
- Operator Licensing
- Startup Plan
- Human Factors
- Quality Assurance
- 13. Accident Analysis
- 14. Technical Specifications
- 15. Financial Qualifications
- 16. Other License Considerations
- 17. Decommissioning
- 18. Uranium Conversions
- 19. Environmental Review



Hermes Review Examples

- Staff conducted audits of:
 - Site characteristics (~ 30 questions)
 - Nuclear design and accident analysis (over 100 questions)
 - Decay heat removal system (16 questions)
 - Instrumentation and Controls (16 questions)
 - General (reactor fuel, reactor coolant system, electrical power, chemistry control, inert gas system, radiation protection, emergency planning, financial qualifications and other topics) (~130 questions)
- Example of DHRS review
- Example of methodologies and evaluation models

Overview of DHRS Review

- The DHRS is safety-significant for maintaining the vessel temperature within acceptable limits for SS-316
- DHRS is placed in service above a threshold power where passive radiative cooling only is not adequate
 - During this transition phase water is introduced to the guide tube and evaporator
- Staff reviewed the preliminary system design to identify potential system failure modes
- Staff audited the Kairos DHRS heat performance calculation which determined the level of system performance necessary to maintain the vessel below the SS-316 limit
- The staff preformed independent calculations to ensure water tank volumes where sufficient for 7 days of cooling
- Staff ensured testing plans addressed the potential flow and heat removal instabilities issues
 during the transition and in-service phases including the affects of potential failure modes

Overview of DHRS (cont.)

- Staff ensured testing plans addressed the potential dynamic loads on the structure and components due to transition phase thermal shock and in-service evaporator boiling
- Staff ensured testing plans addressed the potential for corrosion and fouling in the evaporator tube affecting structural integrity and the ability to remove heat
- The staff noted the DHRS design must accommodate the highest heat loads for vessel integrity and the lowest in-service heat loads to prevent freezing without operator action within 72 hours
 - Final determination on the adequacy of the DHRS to meet these competing design requirements will be made based on the final design presented in the FSAR
- Staff concluded that the preliminary design is consistent with the associated PDCs

Overview of Methodologies and Evaluation Models

- Staff review of the methodologies included:
 - Consideration of important phenomena
 - Range of conditions evaluated
 - Consideration of uncertainties
 - Identifying methodology/model conservatisms
 - Margin to acceptance limits
- Codes used for the CP evaluation have not been validated
- Staff performed a detailed review of the MHA and underlying supporting calculations within the limits of the preliminary design information

Overview of Methodologies and Evaluation Models (cont.)

- Staff used various means to assess evaluation models to reach a reasonable assurance finding. Examples include:
 - The correlations or models used in the Kairos codes are used in established codes or evaluation models
 - Review of journal articles which perform similar analysis or describe the use of similar modeling approaches for related applications
 - Integral test results
 - Scoping calculations to better inform engineering judgement
 - Engineering judgement
- Staff plans for OL review will include:
 - Review software quality assurance program or implementation
 - Review code nodalization
 - Review code inputs
 - Review assumed material property inputs
 - Exercise the applicant's code or perform confirmatory analysis
- Justification of models may be provided by test results, code verification and validation, or 11 other method before or during the Operating License review



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