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Open Session

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# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

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#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

#### NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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#### ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

(ACRS)

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#### RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE

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OPEN SESSION

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WEDNESDAY

OCTOBER 4, 2017

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ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

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The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., JOHN W. STETKAR, Chairman, presiding.

#### COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

JOHN W. STETKAR, Chairman

DENNIS C. BLEY, Member

MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, Member

RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member

MARGARET SZE-TAI Y. CHU, Member

WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member

JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member

DANA A. POWERS, Member

HAROLD B. RAY , Member

JOY L. REMPE, Member

GORDON R. SKILLMAN, Member

MATTHEW SUNSERI, Member

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:

CHRISTIANA LUI

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 8:32 a.m. 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The meeting will now 4 come to order. This is a meeting of the Reliability 5 and PRA Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. I'm John Stetkar, Chairman of the 6 7 subcommittee meeting. in attendance are 8 ACRS members Ron 9 Ballinger, Matt Sunseri, Harold Ray, Dick Skillman, 10 Mike Corradini, Dennis Bley, Dana Powers, 11 March-Leuba, Walt Kirchner, and Joy Rempe. Christiana Lui of the ACRS staff is the Designated Federal Official 12 13 for this meeting. The subcommittee will hear the staff's 14 15 presentations on the progress of the Level 3 PRA 16 project. A portion of this meeting will be closed in 17 order to discuss and protect information that 18 proprietary pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(c)(4). 19 The subcommittee will gather information, 20 analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate 21 proposed positions and actions as appropriate for 22 deliberation by the full committee. 23 The ACRS was established by statute and is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 24

This means that the committee can only speak through

its published letter reports. We hold meetings to gather information to support our deliberations.

The ACRS section of the U.S. NRC public website provides our charter, bylaws, letter reports, and transcripts of meetings open to the public, including slides presented at the open meetings.

Interested parties who wish to provide comments can contact our offices requesting time. That said, we also set aside some time for spur-of-the-moment comments from members of the public attending or listening to our meetings. Written comments are also welcome.

We have received no written comments or requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's meeting.

We have a bridge line established for interested members of the public to listen in during the open session today. To preclude interruption of the meeting, the phone bridge will be placed in listen-in mode during the presentations and committee discussions.

We will unmute the bridge line at a designated time to afford the public an opportunity to make a statement or provide comments. And I'll do that at the end of our open session.

1 At this time, I request that meeting 2 attendees and participants silence their cell phones and any other electronic devices that are audible. 3 4 A transcript of the meeting is being kept. 5 Therefore, we request that participants in this meeting use the microphones located throughout the 6 7 meeting room when addressing the subcommittee. 8 The speaker should first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume 9 10 so that they may be readily heard. Make sure that the green light on the microphone is on before speaking 11 and off when it is not in use. 12 13 We have a lot of material to cover today. 14 I hope we can get through it all. I want to make sure 15 that we have a good exchange of comments 16 information. And to not waste any more of our time, 17 let's get started. 18 I don't know, Mark, do you want to make 19 some opening remarks? 20 Yes, I'll make it quick. MR. THAGGARD: 21 So, for those of you that don't know me, I'm Mark I'm the Deputy Director of the Division of 22 Thaggard. Risk Analysis in the Office of Research. 23 I'd like to thank the subcommittee for 24 25 giving us the opportunity to come and present, provide

you a status on where we are on the Level 3 PRA effort.

We find these discussions with the subcommittee to be very beneficial. I mean, seriously, it's provided us some very useful information in order to make the ultimate product the best that we can make it.

Back in May, we briefed the subcommittee.

And during that briefing, we gave you an update on where we are with the Level 1 PRA on internal fires and seismic events. We also gave you some information on our preliminary thoughts in terms of what we were going to do with the final document, the project.

Today what we want to do is we want to give you an update on the actual Part 1 of that NUREG report that we think we're going to develop as part of the documentation for the project.

We also want to give you information and an update on where we are with several Level 2 PRA results, Level 3 PRA for internal events and floods, and also give you an update on what we're doing with spent fuel, the spent fuel pool PRA.

We are still finding some challenges in terms of meeting our schedule based on, you know, staffing. But so far we seem to be doing the best we can. And I'm sure Alan's going to maybe get into a

1 little bit of that when he gets into the discussion. 2 So those are the main items I wanted to 3 bring up. So, with that, I'm going to turn it over 4 to Alan. I think most of you probably know Alan and 5 They're going to be our key presenters 6 for today. 7 MR. KURITZY: Thank you, Mark. And I want to echo Mark's gratitude to the committee. 8 In 9 seriousness, we do, we very much value your feedback. 10 And we've gotten a lot of feedback from you guys that's 11 really helped us out. And we appreciate your continued interest and almost a full house today, too. So this 12 13 must be a banner meeting, you know. So we'll try to 14 live up to expectations. 15 This, I think, is about our --16 MEMBER POWERS: -- meeting tomorrow. 17 MR. KURITZY: This is, I think, our twelfth 18 meeting with the subcommittee, somewhere around that 19 ballpark. And so we've been interacting regularly for 20 quite a number of years. And it's been very beneficial 21 to us. I'm Alan Kuritzy at the Division of Risk 22 23 Analysis and Research. As Mark mentioned, Mary Drouin 24 is here with me, too. You'll be hearing from a number

of other key members of the team later today about

various topics.

And even though there's been a number of people who have presented in front of you either at this meeting or at previous meetings, but there's also a huge team of both staff and contractors that have made tremendous contributions to this project. And they don't get the air play that some of us do. But their contributions are, have been substantial throughout the project. And we really appreciate the whole team effort.

Going on, to try and keep this thing pretty quick, because as Mr. Stetkar mentioned, there's a lot of stuff on the table today that we want to discuss. My up-front briefings should be pretty quick this time because most of the work now is kind of out of the initial model phase and into the review cycle. So I'll leave most of the technical discussion to the later presentations.

MEMBER BLEY: Alan, let me ask you a question up front. But don't answer it now; answer it as you go through. In almost uncountable number of places, as I read through especially the Level 2 work, there's, we've only done this much now. The rest is reserved for later.

When you go through this discussion, let

1	me know which of the things are really going to be done
2	later. And if there are some things that you're
3	figuring aren't actually going to be done, let us know
4	about that, too.
5	MR. KURITZY: Okay, will do. Thank you.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And just, Alan, for the
7	meeting record, we've been joined by ACRS member
8	Margaret Chu.
9	MR. KURITZY: Almost a full house. Okay.
10	So just I think Mark pretty much mentioned the general
11	agenda for the today of what things we're going to cover.
12	In the open session, I'll give a quick overview. And
13	then Mary is going to further discuss the first part
14	of the NUREG.
15	I think primarily her intention is we
16	provide that to you ahead of time. And she's really
17	here to hear what are the comments, you know, what
18	comments you might have on what we're planning to
19	present in that part of the NUREG.
20	So when we go to closed session, we are
21	going to, of course, talk about the Level 2 PRAs. As
22	Mark mentioned, we have several parts of that to
23	discuss, the internal event and flood, seismic high
24	winds and fire, as well as our initial work on shutdown.

Then you'll hear the Level 3 work from Keith

1	Compton for internal events and floods. And finally,
2	Brian Wagner will present information on our ongoing
3	spent fuel pool PRA.
4	MEMBER CORRADINI: So let me just ask you
5	this question. So, in the open I guess I'm trying
6	to understand. I view this as essentially a redo of
7	WASH-1400 for a large dry PWR.
8	MR. KURITZY: WASH-1400?
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: Yes, NUREG-1150.
10	(Off mic comments.)
11	MR. KURITZY: WASH-0740 was the one before
12	that.
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, but the reason
14	I'm bringing it up is more in terms of documentation.
15	What is going to be public versus what's going to be
16	proprietary in the final reports, because I've been
17	trying to track in the Level 2 part, and I've been sent
18	to this document and that document. And those are
19	proprietary documents. So it's going to be a roll up
20	of results will be the only public thing, and the
21	analyses will all be proprietary?
22	MR. KURITZY: We haven't actually ironed
23	all that out. Some of that will be involved with
24	discussions with us and people from Southern Nuclear.
25	But in general, approach and results and

insights will be in the public document. A lot of the underlying analyses and plan-specific information will be only in the, we currently call them Tier 3 reports. But it would be kind of like the NUREG/CR-4550 and 4551 reports from the NUREG-1150 era. But unlike those reports that were all public at the time, those supporting documents right now would probably not be public.

MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. So, if this is not the time to ask this, then you can postpone me or the Chairman can.

But I'm trying to understand what's proprietary that, or what is it about these analyses that make them proprietary. Is it plant data? Is it analyses methods, because it strikes me that if there's some important insights that somebody wants to delve into, do I believe or not believe the insight, I've got to go to analysis, but I can't unless I'm within the NRC family, so to speak?

MR. KURITZY: Right. And it's plant data and plant information that is proprietary. Where that boundary gets drawn, what information, plant information that can be released or not, again, that's going to be future discussions between Southern Nuclear and us.

1 unfortunately, you are 2 There's going to be a lot of areas that someone externally at NRC might want to dig into. And they're 3 4 going to run into a roadblock that's unfortunately --5 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. So then let's say we run into this roadblock. Who do they go to to 6 7 unblock? 8 MR. KURITZY: Well --9 MEMBER CORRADINI: Do they have to get 10 Southern permission or your permission or both? 11 MR. KURITZY: They would probably, 12 unfortunately, they may not be able to get it unblocked, 13 because if it deals with proprietary information, 14 Southern certainly can say, hey, we no longer believe 15 this information to be proprietary, and therefore, we're okay releasing it or, NRC, you can release it 16 17 or they can release. 18 The practical reality is it's going to 19 probably be fairly difficult for someone to get to that 20 next layer of information. People within the NRC or 21 the, you know, federal government community and 22 contractors will probably be able to have access to But there is going to be that kind of impenetrable 23 barrier there that the external stakeholders will have 24

a hard time getting --

1	MR. THAGGARD: Well, they will probably
2	come to us. And we will, as the intermediary working
3	with Southern, to see what we can provide to them.
4	I mean, Alan is probably correct. Ultimately, that
5	information may not be, you know, available to them.
6	But they will come to us.
7	MEMBER CORRADINI: So the usefulness of
8	this primarily is for the staff to keep on top of the
9	state of the art and the practice.
10	MR. KURITZY: Well, there's multiple uses.
11	And I'm not going to go into all of
12	MEMBER CORRADINI: That's fine. You've
13	answered my question. I don't want to waste your time.
14	MR. KURITZY: Okay. Thank you. All
15	right. So let's see, moving forward.
16	Now, this is the overview presentation.
17	Again, this is a slide you've seen many times. We have
18	our Rubik's Cube.
19	It's really to demonstrate that we have
20	so many different individual PRA models that comprise
21	this project between the various radiological sources,
22	the various internal and external hazards we're looking
23	at, plant operating states, and also the different
24	levels of PRA, 1, 2, and 3. So you have many, many
25	different PRA models.

1	We've kind of clumped them together for
2	the sake of the presentation as you see on this slide.
3	So I'll be going over them in this particular order.
4	We'll first talk about the internal event
5	and flood PRAs, and then the internal fire and seismic
6	ones, high winds and other hazards. We'll talk about
7	our shutdown models, spent fuel pool, dry cask and
8	integrative site risk. And at the end, I'll just
9	mention some of the near-term deliverables that are
LO	coming up or near-term milestones.
L1	MEMBER BLEY: Let me sneak in a question
L2	here
L3	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
L4	MEMBER BLEY: because it will come up
L5	later. And it came up in previous meetings. And if
L6	any of your answer would get into proprietary stuff,
L7	we can save it for the closed session.
L8	In the past, you had talked about problems
L9	with the computer code for the PRA blowing up on certain
20	things. Has that happened primarily when you try to
21	couple all these things together, or is it happening
22	on individual elements of the PRA?
23	MR. KURITZY: Okay. So, for internal
24	events and floods, it was not an issue. Where it really
25	has become an issue was when we linked our Level 1 and

1	2 models together, because then you have of course,
2	as you know, from the event tree structure, every time
3	you add a new node, even if it's binary, you're to the
4	power, 2 to the power of n type thing. So
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, just for the
6	public record, the Level 2 model is for internal fire
7	events and floods.
8	MR. KURITZY: Internal
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You said for internal
10	events and floods, it was not a problem. But when we
11	linked the Level 2 model, it was a problem.
12	MR. KURITZY: Right
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That model is for
14	MR. KURITZY: Yes, yes, the Level
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: internal events and
16	floods.
17	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's all one model.
19	So
20	MR. KURITZY: Right, right. But when we
21	quantified the Level 1 first, that was not an issue.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
23	MR. KURITZY: It's only when we linked it
24	to Level 2 that we ran into
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.

MR. KURITZY: -- an issue with the code. The second thing, the internal fire model was a huge model in its own right even at the Level 1 stage. But, as we briefed the committee, subcommittee in May, we've knocked down the fire standards in the licensee's fire PRA to like 210 event trees in our model. So it made it more attractable, though still somewhat challenging.

When we go to Level 2 for internal fires and some, that's where we really run into a lot of problems. The internal fire model Level 1 would run, but -- I think it was the fire one, or sometimes it would take like 24 hours to run. It was a beast.

But when we linked it to Level 2, it was a no-go. And so, as you're going to hear from Don Helton later this morning, we've had to focus all our Level 2 work in the internal fire realm to a subset of the total number of sequences.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, have -- when I -- we're going to get into the Part 1 of the main report next on the agenda. But since this came up, I didn't see much discussion in there on, when you talk about limitations of the study, about the fact that perhaps the tool that you used isn't a state-of-the-practice PRA quantification tool, because others, for example, Southern, seem to be able to propagate thousands of

1 fire scenarios using whatever software they use. 2 MR. KURITZY: Yes, again, I don't know --3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that's -- no, the 4 reason -- I don't care about the calculator. In fact, 5 I don't care whether it takes you seven weeks to quantify the model, because you're not going to be trying to 6 7 do it to make, you know, minute-by-minute, real-time So that is, the quantification time is 8 9 irrelevant to me. 10 But if, because of limitations in your 11 available tools you're having to make challenging decisions that affect the technical scope of your 12 analyses -- you said, well, you know, in the Level 2 13 14 models we had to kind of finesse things so that we could 15 get the software to run. I think that's an important lesson. 16 17 don't want to necessarily imply that risk assessment 18 is the calculator, because it isn't. But if, because 19 of limitations in your calculator, you have to, if that 20 imposes real significant challenges in your mind on 21 the ability to develop a comprehensive evaluation end 22 to end, I think that's an important issue that should be discussed. 23 24 MR. KURITZY: Yes, I agree. If that was 25 an important issue, I don't know -- I haven't --

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I didn't read it up
2	front. I mean, recognize this is still a work in
3	progress obviously.
4	MR. KURITZY: Right, but
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But the limitations
6	that I've read appropriately focus on specific methods
7	for specific issues, you know, scope of models in terms
8	of technical scope, if you will, of the PRA itself.
9	There are, as we get into Level 2 later,
LO	there are kind of pointers to the fact that, well, we
L1	had to some things. But it's your decision.
L2	It's just from what I'm hearing is that
L3	it may have been a real constraint, or if you had known
L4	the constraint going in, been aware of it, you might
L5	have organized your level of detail differently. I
L6	don't know.
L7	MEMBER BLEY: I think we're going to hear
L8	more in the closed session. But I'm there were
L9	places where the report talks about how you gained
20	confidence despite this problem. And that's not been
21	transparent to me. So I want to understand that when
22	we go through the Level 2 stuff.
23	MS. DROUIN: We'll
24	MR. KURITZY: Let me actually, Mary,
25	hold on one second

MS. DROUIN: I'm just going to just be real quick. I'd like to hear more about this when we get into the discussion of the NUREG, because this was not something we really pursued in the NUREG. So we can talk about it more then.

MR. KURITZY: And actually, I want to respond to some of that right now actually. So I agree that if that was a big limiting issue, that's something that should be highlighted, because that would be a driving, influencing factor. And as you mentioned, if we had known that ahead of time and it was a limiting factor, we would probably try to address things differently.

In reality, a couple points to be made, Southern's software, an industry software, does not run into these problems. Our software is state-of-the-practice. The other software doesn't run into these problems for, a, they don't link the Level 1 and Level 2 together. Southern doesn't have a Level 1/Level 2 linkage. And that's where we ran into the biggest problems.

Two, for the fire scenarios, the industry uses the Franks software primarily, which is more of a, for lack of a better, a bookkeeping type of software to feed information in and out of the PRA model. So

1 it's kind of like an adjunct thing that you send stuff off here, and you can deal with all this stuff and then 2 3 feed it back in. 4 So, yes, we don't use that type of software. 5 Whether or not we could adjust SAPHIRE to feed into 6 that and out, that's -- I'm not the software expert, 7 but I imagine that's something we could do. But the reality is, by making a certain 8 9 number of assumptions and constraints on the modeling, we've been able to get through the problem so far. 10 11 And I don't feel we've lost a lot of accuracy. 12 Every time we've done, we've had to make some simplifications, we've done a check to see what 13 14 we think we might be losing. And we've never come to 15 the point -- and Don will probably talk to you more 16 about it when he talks about the fire, Level 2 later. 17 But I don't think we're really losing much from having to adjust our models to account for the limitations. 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Let's see if we can talk 19 20 more about a little bit of the details and the 21 constraints when we get into the Level 2 if we want. 22 And thanks for the perspective on what the industry 23 does or doesn't do. 24 MR. KURITZY: My pleasure, to my limited 25 knowledge, by the way.

Okay. So here is a diagram that I think also we showed last time, too. But this kind of puts things in context for when we go into the project status just to understand the various steps that we're going through. And when I tell you where we are in different parts of the study, you'll have a feel for what we're talking about.

The first thing that we do, of course, is develop the initial PRA model. And even though that's just one block on this figure, that's really the lion's share of the work. So the bulk of the leveled effort goes into putting that first model together.

We then have several layers of internal review that we do on that model. And once it's revised, we send it off for what we loosely term our technical adequacy review. That's kind of like our external to the project team review. And that involves several different layers.

Up until just recently, one of the principal parts of that review was PWR Owners Group-led peer reviews to the PRA standards. That's now being scaled back because PWR Owners Group was not only leading those but funding them. And because of their budget constraints, they can no longer do those on a regular basis for us.

So we'll probably rely more heavily on the top block, which is our Technical Advisory Group reviews. And just to remind the subcommittee members or anyone who wasn't involved in previous meetings, the Technical Advisory Group is a set of individuals here at the NRC. It's the senior level advisors in PRA and PRA-related areas from the various offices around the agency, as well as a couple of members from the industry.

We have a gentleman from Westinghouse that serves on the TAG, as well as somebody from EPRI. And they serve as kind of our advice. They provide insight and advice and guidance to the team for various issues and review the various documents.

And with the limited participation of the PWR Owners Group going forward, we'll probably rely on them more heavily to, not necessarily do a standard space review, but do a more complete structural review, keeping in mind some of the requirements of the standards so that, you know, they can kind of fill that role also.

And, of course, the ACRS, which we brief regularly and we get some times voluminous feedback on our various PRAs, and that's served us very well also.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, and just I always
2	have to do this. And it was a comment that I was going
3	to make on the NUREG. You have not received any
4	feedback from the ACRS.
5	MR. KURITZY: Sorry, members
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And be careful when we
7	say that orally on the public record, and be really
8	careful when you write it in the report.
9	MR. KURITZY: Right.
LO	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The only letter that
L1	the ACRS has written, surprisingly enough, on this
L2	entire project was June 22, 2011 where we recommended
L3	that the staff go ahead with a full scope Level 3 PRA
L4	for a particular plant. That's the only letter.
L5	That's the only ACRS pronouncement on this project.
L6	So
L7	MR. KURITZY: I still blame you for that,
L8	by the way.
L9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oral statements in
20	subcommittee meetings are one thing. But be really,
21	really careful when you document stuff
22	(Laughter.)
23	MEMBER BLEY: As the Chairman of this
24	subcommittee, are we hitting a point where a letter
25	from the committee begins to be useful? Should we talk

1 about that later today? 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We should talk about 3 that later today. We were trying to get to a point 4 where there would be some productive use of a letter 5 in the near future, near being within the next six months But we'll talk about that a little bit more. 6 7 MEMBER REMPE: Even March 2018 might be a good time to try and get a letter out for some reason. 8 9 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Alan, I would like to 10 ask this question, please. 11 MR. KURITZY: Yes. It's relating to the TAG 12 MEMBER SKILLMAN: 13 review and to the PWROG peer review. What assures that 14 there isn't groupthink? Get a bunch of like-minded 15 people together and they can review a product and pat 16 each other on the back and say this looks pretty good. 17 Where is accommodation made for the, not 18 the cynic, but the critic, the critic that says I'm 19 not sure, I'm not comfortable with this, I think we're 20 missing something? How does that get incorporated into 21 the TAG review and the PWROG review? 22 MR. KURITZY: So let me respond in two 23 First off, with our Technical Advisory Group, 24 as our chair of that group, Nathan Soo, could attest

to, it's kind of like herding cats trying to get that

group together to review things.

And, in fact, the bulk of our feedback from the TAG to date has really been individual comments, not a consensus report, because they haven't been able to get people to provide it, sufficient people in a sufficient timeframe to give us a consensus report.

And so we've gotten various members for different topics who have provided us information. And it's more of their own set of comments. So there's very little groupthink between the individual member feedback.

And secondly, it distinguishes itself from the PWR Owners Group, because that's primarily an industry-led process where you do have people from various organizations working on this, and they're working to the standard.

And I think that structural review process, which is, has its benefits and its limitations honestly, but it's a very good, established process for doing what it's intending to do, which is do a high level review of the approach, make sure it looks like sound practices are being followed, and it drills down in selective areas to make sure things are on solid ground.

It's not, obviously, a six-month effort to find out every last fault tree is totally correct.

1 But it does a generally good job at making sure the 2 model has a certain level of pedigree. 3 And so those are, they themselves, the TAG 4 review and the PWR Owners Group-led review, are very 5 distinct. And as I mentioned, the TAG members themselves are pretty much, they're kind of following 6 7 their own path. And that's the nature, that position in 8 9 the NRC, the BSLs, they're really there for that 10 They're very experienced and well-known 11 experts in the various areas. And so they're known 12 for having their own personal views. And so that is 13 kind of -- you know, we take advantage of that as part 14 of our TAG reviews. 15 MEMBER REMPE: So the industry folks who 16 serve on the TAG, are they volunteering their time, 17 or are they paid to do this --MR. KURITZY: Yes, the --18 19 MEMBER REMPE: -- because sometimes we see 20 -- you get what you pay for in life is why I'm asking 21 that. Right, right, right. 22 MR. KURITZY: So, and a good guestion. The leader is paid for by the 23 PWR Owners Group. And the travel for the other members 24 25 is by the PWR Owners, is paid for by the PWR Owners

1	Group
2	MS. DROUIN: But she was asking about the
3	TAG.
4	MEMBER REMPE: I'm asking about the TAG
5	
6	MR. KURITZY: Oh, the TAG or the PWR Owners
7	oh.
8	MEMBER REMPE: because, I mean, the PWR
9	Owners Group thing is going away. So they don't have
10	the funding anymore, right?
11	MR. KURITZY: Oh, so you're talking about
12	the two external members of the TAG.
13	MEMBER REMPE: Yes, so you don't have the
14	PWR
15	MR. KURITZY: Right, going forward.
16	MEMBER REMPE: peer review anymore
17	MR. KURITZY: Right.
18	MEMBER REMPE: the Owners Group one.
19	MR. KURITZY: Right.
20	MEMBER REMPE: So now you're down to just
21	the TAG, which I understand the senior level experts
22	will devote time as they have it available.
23	MR. KURITZY: Right.
24	MEMBER REMPE: But what about these
25	industry folks? Are they

1	MR. KURITZY: Okay.
2	MEMBER REMPE: volunteering their time,
3	or are they
4	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
5	MEMBER REMPE: paid?
6	MR. KURITZY: Okay. So thank you for the
7	clarification.
8	MEMBER REMPE: Yes.
9	MR. KURITZY: The two members from
10	industry on the TAG are, their time is being
11	volunteered. Their organizations are paying for it.
12	However, our experience to date, the one
13	gentleman from Westinghouse, who formerly was with
14	NextEra and now moved to Westinghouse and Westinghouse
15	will continue to support his involvement when he moved,
16	he's been one of our most active respondents. And he's
17	actually extremely knowledgeable in PRA. Ken Kiper
18	is very knowledgeable in many aspects of PRA. And so
19	he's been a tremendous asset.
20	MEMBER REMPE: And he is paid. So he
21	MR. KURITZY: Well, he's being paid by
22	Westinghouse.
23	MEMBER REMPE: Right.
24	MR. KURITZY: Right, right.
25	MEMBER REMPE: But again, somebody

1	MR. KURITZY: It's not on their own time.
2	MEMBER REMPE: That gives you yes.
3	MR. KURITZY: Right, it's not on their own
4	time.
5	MEMBER REMPE: That gives you a higher
6	MR. KURITZY: Right, right, level of
7	MEMBER REMPE: focus on it, yes.
8	MR. KURITZY: Exactly.
9	MEMBER REMPE: No, okay.
10	MR. KURITZY: And the same thing for EPRI.
11	The EPRI gentleman that was on the TAG actually moved
12	off. I guess he must have transferred or changed
13	responsibilities. So we're just getting a new member
14	
15	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
16	MR. KURITZY: from EPRI on there, which,
17	who is also very well, has a lot of experience in PRA.
18	And we're looking forward to interacting with him.
19	But, yes, they're getting paid by their
20	home organization.
21	MEMBER REMPE: That's good. Thank you.
22	MEMBER BLEY: Alan, just as a reminder,
23	while it was still active, what parts of the PRA did
24	the Owners Group peer review consider? I know it did
25	Level 1.

1	MR. KURITZY: It did Level 1 for internal
2	events and floods. It did Level 2 for, you know, the
3	draft standards for the Level 2 internal events and
4	floods, the draft standard for Level 3 internal events
5	and floods, and then also the Level 1 high wind PRA
6	and our other hazards screening analysis
7	MEMBER BLEY: So you got a pretty good
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But you did get what
9	I call an end to end, all the way through Level 3 for
10	internal events and internal floods.
11	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Good.
13	MR. KURITZY: Yes, yes. And we got the
14	full peer review that they would do for an industry
15	PRA. It was a full, there was nothing, no shortcuts,
16	no cutting corners on that.
17	MS. DROUIN: And just to answer your
18	question about the group thinking on the peer review,
19	the way the peer review is done is that all the different
20	experts are not physically separated, but they are all
21	assigned different areas. And they don't review as
22	a group. Each expert reviews his assigned area.
23	Then they come together as a group. And,
24	say, you were assigned, you know, the HRA. Well, then
25	in the group, you make your case. You know, I think

1 that the PRA met these requirements; it didn't meet And then they vote as a consensus. 2 3 they don't have full consensus, any differing opinions 4 are documented as part of the process. 5 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you. MR. KURITZY: Okay. So just moving back 6 7 to this chart, so we do the internal reviews, revise 8 And as we mentioned, we go down to these external reviews. 9 After that, we move to what I call Phase 10 11 In this presentation today, sometimes I'll loosely refer to Phase 1 and Phase 2 just to kind of make it 12 13 easier. 14 Phase 1 is the report, the modelings report 15 prior to this external, the team review. And then Phase 16 2 is afterwards. 17 And so, when we move into the Phase 2 area, 18 which often times involves a lot of comments and 19 feedback from the technical adequacy review, we revise 20 the model, revise the report. And then we go through 21 the internal review process again, both the technical 22 review and a project management review. And then it's 23 signed off as final. So it's kind of like the left side is Phase 24 25 1; the right side is Phase 2. Just kind of keep that

in the back of your mind because I may throw those terms out later.

Okay. So, in terms of project status, as I mentioned before, there's probably close to 20 PRA models that are involved with this project. So I didn't want to put 20 lines on this chart. So I've condensed them down

It's actually I realize fairly similar to the breakdown that we're going to discuss things today with the exception that the fire, seismic, other hazards, and high winds are all in that second all hazards category.

But these are -- so it combines the model in those different categories. Also, as you notice, there's no PRA level here. So I've also combined the Level 1, 2, and 3 models all within that bar.

And so what you can see is those that have moved fairly far along, like the internal events and floods for the reactor or the dry cask storage, those have had a lot of progress in all the Level 1, 2, and 3 models, where as some of the other areas that were just kind of in the middle there, the Level 1 model has probably been completed or seen a lot of progress. The Level 2 is probably is in midstream somewhere. And then, in most cases, the Level 3 probably hasn't

started yet. And so --

MEMBER CORRADINI: Just so I understand what you're trying to tell us, so take the second blue bar. Your point is the Level 1 has gone through all the way, Phase 1 and Phase 2, and has been finalized. And you're still working on the Level 2 part.

MR. KURITZY: Not exactly. That's why I used that Phase 1 and Phase 2 thing, too. What it means is that the Level 1 is probably somewhere in the Phase 1. But it's in the review cycle, somewhere in the review cycle for Phase 1, whether that's internal review or project management review or technical adequacy review.

We don't have to -- essentially, once we have the model for like Level 1 up through into the technical adequacy review, we start the Level 2. We don't wait till it's totally signed off, otherwise the schedule will go out forever. So there's kind of overlap of the Level 1, 2, and 3 to some extent.

So what this means is, like for instance, that second bar is a tough one because there's four separate hazards in there. But in general, as an example, we might be in the project management review for the Level 1. The Level 2 is actually going through the, ongoing through the technical work.

1	It's similar to what you're going to hear
2	later because well, last, in May, we presented our
3	work on the fire and seismic. Those are now in for
4	project management review. The Level 2 you're going
5	to hear later today is in midstream. Level 3 has not
6	been started yet for those. So that's kind of an
7	example of where that would be.
8	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay
9	MR. KURITZY: And then just at the bottom,
10	the overall, so right now I would estimate we're about
11	70 percent done with the project at this yes.
12	MEMBER BLEY: The one right above that
13	MR. KURITZY: Integrated site.
14	MEMBER BLEY: give me a hint what 30
15	percent complete on integrated site means.
16	MR. KURITZY: Okay. That one is I
17	actually have an algorithm for calculating all these
18	percentages, assigning weights to every aspect, every
19	block that you saw on that previous diagram and every
20	single piece of the thing made up on my own judgment
21	of how much each piece contributes.
22	The integrated site one is even
23	MEMBER BLEY: Does 30 percent mean you've
24	kind of figured out how you're going to do it?
25	MR. KURITZY: It means that we have an,

1 as I'll discuss later when we talk outside, we have We've been piloting that approach for 2 an approach. 3 a number of different of models. 4 As the individual single source models get completed to the Phase 1, you know, the Phase 1 part 5 gets done, then we use that to do kind of a pilot test 6 to see if we had a two-unit model for that, how well 7 8 does our approach work on that. And so we've been going through those 9 10 various pilot cases as I'll discuss later. So that's 11 essentially what it means. That one, of course, will not be totally done until all the other ones are done 12 13 because that's the caboose on the train. 14 MEMBER BLEY: I'm having a little trouble 15 thinking about these pilot cases, because in the end, 16 the claim is you're going to have the whole integrated 17 site all tied together. So you're kind of doing 18 pair-wise things to see how you'd integrate them? 19 MR. KURITZY: Right. Because, yes --20 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 21 MR. KURITZY: -- because we want to wait 22 till we see -- our approach, and I'll get to this later, 23 for the integrated site, as we briefed the committee 24 about a year ago on this, we're using the insights and

the results and insights from the single source models

to help prioritize where we're looking for multi-source contributors.

And so we wait until we get a single source model done, and then we can say, hey okay, now with this approach, how well does it work for those results. So the first thing was the Level 1 internal events. That was the first model done. So we did a two-unit test case for that.

And then, as the other pieces started coming done, Level 2 or seismic, we started testing those pieces out, too. So right now, they're just, yes, for lack of a better phrase, pair-wise or individually looking at them, not in combination, but, you know, at a two-unit model for these various single unit models that we have so far just to see what kind of issues would come up and how well we think the approach would work.

As we start to get more and more of these models ready, we'll have to start looking more than pair-wise to make sure that the approach will work when you start to throw even more pieces in at once. But right now they've all been essentially pair-wise pilot studies.

MEMBER BLEY: You said you're going to tell us later. When today are you going to talk about that,

1	because I'm a little
2	MR. KURITZY: Just in this presentation
3	at the end, there's, we'll have a, just a
4	MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay.
5	MR. KURITZY: It's not a detailed
6	discussion, but
7	MEMBER BLEY: I'll wait for that.
8	MR. KURITZY: Yes, we can discuss
9	MEMBER BLEY: So this morning?
10	MR. KURITZY: Yes, it will be this morning.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We'll discuss more of
12	it during the spent fuel pool closed session.
13	MR. KURITZY: Okay. So now, moving on to
14	the status of the individual areas, the reactor at-power
15	internal events and floods, that was the cornerstone,
16	the basic piece. As Mr. Stetkar mentioned before,
17	we've managed to get all the way through Level 3 on
18	that right now. This one is, as you saw on the previous
19	diagram, the one that's furthest along.
20	All three PRA levels for internal events
21	and internal floods have already been through the
22	standard space peer review. And they're in various
23	levels of completion.
24	The internal event report is totally
25	complete and signed off. The internal flood report

1 is just about complete. This is for, sorry, for Level 2 So the internal flood one is just going through 3 some final review. And it's about ready to get signed 4 off. 5 On the Level 2, as you'll hear in more details later today, the internal event and flood model 6 7 is, it's in for project management review. mostly done. And you'll get a detailed presentation 8 9 on that. Level 3, which you're also going to hear 10 about later today, that one is pretty much near the 11 end of the road. It's still going through some final 12 13 documentation. I think there's some work still being 14 done on sensitivity analysis and uncertainty analysis 15 in wrapping up some of the documentation. And then 16 it will go into technical review. 17 These are the Phase 2 reports. So once 18 they are signed off, they're done completely. 19 And also, just to remind the subcommittee 20 that we did perform an external solicitation to get 21 better insights onto the frequency of interfacing 22 system LOCA. And that work has already been documented 23 in a contractor report. And we presented that to the 24 subcommittee a year ago or so.

Moving on to internal fires and seismic

events, we have completed the initial revisions of the Level 1 seismic and fire PRA models. This is different than Phase 1 or Phase 2. That's why I call it an initial revision.

Just to remind the subcommittee members, we had completed Level 1 seismic and fire PRAs about a year and a half ago. Southern provided us all new information and a lot of new information for both of those. So we felt we needed to redo both of them, so almost starting from scratch on those two.

But now those revisions have completed. They've gone through the self-assessment, the internal technical review. And now they're sitting either in project management review or in the queue for project management review. They have -- let's see. I guess I covered, yes, covered that.

So the Level 2, again, you'll hear more about that this, or later this morning. That is in progress. That's something that you didn't get a report for because that work is right in the middle. We didn't have anything documentation-wise to provide you on that. But Don Helton will, in his presentation, will go over where we stand for those.

Basically, we're leveraging heavily the internal event Level 2 model for that. But, of course,

1	we have to consider the hazard-specific implications
2	for containment, event tree modeling, or human
3	reliability analysis, the various models. We'll have
4	to look and see what those specific hazards, how they
5	impact the work to date. But it does leverage heavily
6	the internal event model.
7	MEMBER BLEY: But when you use the word
8	leveraging here and in the report, that means taking
9	advantage of what the licensee did in their own
10	MR. KURITZY: No, leveraging, our Level,
11	in other words, our internal
12	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
13	MR. KURITZY: Our internal event Level 2
14	for the fire and seismic or high wind Level 2 will
15	basically use that model
16	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
17	MR. KURITZY: and then adjust it as
18	necessary.
19	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Alan, clarification,
20	what do you mean by project management review?
21	MR. KURITZY: Okay. So let me jump back.
22	So, in those internal reviews, there's three levels.
23	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Right.
24	MR. KURITZY: There's a self-assessment,
25	which is essentially according to the standards, kind

1 of a standards-based thing that they follow. That's 2 Level, that's the first internal review. 3 Then it goes to what we have as internal 4 technical reviewers. Someone on the project team is 5 assigned to technically review the document in detail or the models in detail and sign off on it. 6 Then it has to come 7 to the project management team for a final sign off. And that project 8 9 management team up to date has been Kevin Coyne, Mary 10 Drouin, and myself. 11 So one of the three of us will review it also at a higher level and sign off on it. That's that 12 13 project management review. And as we're going to find 14 out, as I'll discuss later, that's really becoming the 15 big element. Kevin Coyne, who has been an invaluable 16 17 member of the team to date, he's been transferred over 18 to another organization. John Nakoski is now our 19 cognizant branch chief for the project. 20 Kevin remains part of the project even 21 though it's not his primary role anymore. 22 had tremendous contributions to the project ever since its inception. And he will continue to be involved. 23 24 And we may even get to squeeze up a project management 25 level review or two out of him also in his new role.

1	So that's really what that is. It's one
2	of the three leadership team
3	MEMBER KIRCHNER: But you mean technical
4	review, not project management review
5	MR. KURITZY: Well, yes, yes, no, no,
6	no
7	MEMBER KIRCHNER: not schedule
8	MR. KURITZY: Yes, it's a technical
9	review, but it's a higher level by a member of the
10	project management team.
11	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. I'm with you.
12	MR. KURITZY: Moving on to the high winds
13	and other hazards, again, as I mentioned earlier, both
14	those have been through their standards-based peer
15	review.
16	The other hazards report, which was a
17	qualitative screening analysis, that one has been
18	updated to account for all the feedback from the
19	technical adequacy review. It's currently undergoing
20	a final project management review. Mary's got the lead
21	for that.
22	She also well, I'll get to that in a
23	second. But she's juggling that with some other work,
24	too. So, when I get to the schedule later, you'll see
25	there's definitely some uncertainty with regard to the

1	schedule.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Just for the public
3	record
4	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: she can handle it,
6	though.
7	MR. KURITZY: We have the utmost
8	confidence in her.
9	The second area is the high wind PRA. That
10	actually is a quantitative PRA model. That went
11	through its peer review. We got a lot of feedback both
12	from the ACRS, from the standards-based peer review,
13	from the TAG.
14	One of the main things that happened after
15	that review is we went out and got Applied Research
16	Associates, which is a very well-known wind PRA company,
17	to go do a plant walkdown and provide us some additional
18	information particularly related to wind fragilities
19	and wind hazards.
20	And so now we've redone that quantitative
21	model. And it's currently going through the internal
22	technical review. Once that's completed, it will go
23	through the project management review and then get
24	signed out.
25	Moving on to the low power and shutdown

1 model, that initial model also has now been completed. 2 It's internal -- let's Okay. This says see. feedback 3 currently incorporating from internal 4 technical review. That actually was completed on 5 So this slide is a little bit out of date. That is now in the queue for project management review. 6 7 The Level 2 work for low power and shutdown is ongoing as we'll hear again more later this morning. 8 We've already completed a lot of the bridge tree and 9 10 Plant Damage State work for that. 11 In terms of deterministic analyses, we've done the MELCOR runs for the CRA accent progression 12 13 We're now focusing mostly on and timing. 14 probabilistic aspects, essentially the containment 15 event trees, HRA, things like that. Again, details, 16 Don Helton will give you more details. 17 And wanted t.o remind Т iust t.he 18 subcommittee that we also did perform a Phenomena 19 Identification and Ranking Table, a PIRT 20 elicitation process, to try and prioritize what areas 21 in a shutdown PRA or low power shutdown PRA should be focused on if you don't have the resources and time 22 23 to do everything completely. And that work was documented in a contract 24

It contains a lot of proprietary information.

report.

So we can't release that.

But we did feel that this, the results of that expert elicitation may have some benefit to the broader PRA technical community. So we are embarking on making a version of it as a NUREG/CR where we would essentially scrub out the proprietary information and maybe expand some of the discussions and issue that publicly.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, we haven't seen that PIRT report. But something always bothers me about a bunch of experts who have no experience doing low power and shutdown PRA getting together and giving people guidance on what's important to look at, because of they've only looked at a few things in the past. That's very pejorative, and it was intended to be that way.

In particular, everybody always looks at mid-loop operation because everybody always knows that loss of off-site power during mid-loop is the only thing that people need to look at in low power and shutdown.

The studies that have been done elsewhere have discovered that that isn't necessarily true.

And, therefore, the conclusions from a committee who hasn't had broad actual experience performing full scope low power and shutdown studies

1 for a variety of different types of plants who organize their outages differently, there's a danger that that 2 3 process could tend to perpetuate things that we already 4 know and not instill a notion of the fact that low power 5 and shutdown is a beast. You really need to look at plant-specific 6 7 outage management, plant-specific configuration And there may be broad differences. 8 9 So I just wanted to mention that, that when 10 you start to say, well, we want to publish this perhaps as a NUREG so that everybody can use the insights from 11 12 this group, without having seen those insights, I have 13 no, you know, notion how far they went in terms of 14 experience from international low power and shutdown 15 PRAs, for example. 16 MR. KURITZY: So thank you very much --17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And the international 18 community actually has done a lot more. And I'm not 19 talking just about Europe. The Russians have done a 20 bunch, for example. 21 MR. KURITZY: Thank you very much for that. 22 Yes, and that's a comment that we've heard before. 23 And we appreciate that. For this work, first of all, 24 I'll just ask, before I get to a little bit on what

that PIRT showed, but the --

Well, actually let me mention that the panel that was used for that PIRT, several of the members do have experience doing low power and shutdown PRA.

Not probably as -- I don't know how many involved were European versus domestic work. And they don't have probably the plethora of experience that you may be aware of.

But, nonetheless, they are, some of the members have direct involvement in preparing and developing low power and shutdown PRAs. Others were plant people who have experience in outage management and outage operations. I can't remember what the other expertises were that were used in the panel. But it was a fairly broad panel of expertise.

But I did just -- the idea -- and so just to mention, so what they did was they came up with essentially looking at the different plant operating states. They ranked them in various conditions, really looking at core damage and release, and under each of those, looking at four different hazard types, internal event, internal flood, fire, and seismic.

The results were as you mentioned. The areas that were the highest, they felt were the biggest potential risk contributors were those involving the most limited amount, the lower RCS water levels, which

1	means mid-loop operation or the operating states where
2	you're down around the vessel head flange.
3	But I am curious, because you mentioned
4	a number of times that overseas they have identified
5	a lot, well, I don't know a lot, but other ones. What
6	specifically, like what areas
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's been very, very
8	plant specific.
9	MR. KURITZY: But
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that's the problem.
11	One thing I can recall is the effects of fire, spurious
12	signals, especially that can open up drain down paths,
13	for example, depending on where you are in the outage
14	has showed up. Seismic events have shown up, again,
15	depending on the plant configuration.
16	MR. KURITZY: But, John, but again,
17	wouldn't those be even more severe when you're at one
18	of these lower RCS levels because
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, not well, the
20	fact of the matter is that some plants don't go into
21	a mid-loop operation with the core, with the fuel in
22	the core. They wait. They just don't do that.
23	MR. KURITZY: Right.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You know, so, if you
25	have a plant that doesn't do that, now what do you look

1	at?
2	MR. KURITZY: Well, except that mid-loop,
3	again, even other states where you do lower the level
4	of, like for instance, if it gets down to the vessel
5	head flange, I mean, there are still states where you
6	are
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But those tend to be
8	low pressure, also if you're in a high pressure, when

low pressure, also if you're in a high pressure, when the system is bottled up, either coming down at the beginning of the outage or going back up at the end of the outage where you can actually blow the plant down.

What else can I -- it tends to be a laundry list of very often plant specific, when they take traditionally their cooling water systems out of service and what vulnerabilities does that leave the plant.

But I recall one study that I saw that loss of, for lack of a better term, service water was important --

MS. DROUIN: I think --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: -- in particular plant operating states only because of the way that they organize their particular progression of an outage.

MS. DROUIN: Well, if I translate what I

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1 think I hear you saying is that you just wanted to make 2 that the part that perform we done plant-specific local. 3 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, and that's good. And I think it should have been. 5 MS. DROUIN: Yes. 6 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's very, 8 appropriate where -- the reason I wanted to get this on the record was what Alan said about perhaps we're 9 10 going to publish this as a NUREG/CR for public release 11 as guidance for use by the industry so that I now, as a member of the industry, operating Joe's reactor, has 12 13 quidance from the NRC saying, well, we feel that the 14 only thing you need to look at is plant operating states, 15 you know, 1, 7, and 13. 16 MS. DROUIN: So you don't 17 plant-specific study perhaps sending the message that 18 this can be applied generically. 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Exactly. 20 precisely correct. 21 MS. DROUIN: Okay. Yes, and we understand that. 22 MR. KURITZY: And I think, though, because we'll have to 23 make sure that whatever we do produce in the NUREG/CR 24 25 does make that very clear.

1	Now, this wasn't supposed to be based just
2	for Vogtle. But, nonetheless, a lot of the
3	information, it's certainly biased towards Vogtle, so
4	even though it's not intended to be that. So
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's my whole point.
6	MR. KURITZY: Right.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: See, if I had, if I
8	personally had done a similar insight looking at only
9	one study that I had been involved in, I might come
10	up with a different ranking just because that's my only
11	experience base.
12	MR. KURITZY: Exactly, exactly.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that ranking might
14	be meaningless, you know, for your plant
15	MR. KURITZY: Exactly.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: or for Vogtle for
17	that matter.
18	MR. KURITZY: No, that is a very valid
19	point. And we'll have to and, again, I don't want
20	to speak out of turn, because I'm not sure exactly to
21	what extent the expert panel considered other types
22	of designs. But certainly that's something that we
23	have to be very cognizant of.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
25	MR. KURITZY: Even if they did, it's not

1 going to necessarily be fully applicable to the whole 2 suite of --CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, just remember, and 3 4 we'd have to be a little bit cognizant of time here 5 MR. KURITZY: 6 Yes. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: -- but Mike mentioned earlier that this will be the 20, hopefully some between 8 the 2010 and 20-decade incarnation of the NRC's best 9 10 guidance on how to do an integrated Level 3 risk 11 assessment. 12 MR. KURITZY: Right. CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And still I mentioned 13 14 this in past meetings, that I think we need to 15 collectively be very careful to avoid very focused 16 quidance that hasn't had a lot of breadth and experience 17 behind it, because people are going to take that focus 18 guidance and says, as I said, the NRC says that all 19 we need to look at is, you know, plant operating states 20 1, 3, and 15 or whatever, because everybody knows that 21 those are the only things that are important. 22 MR. KURITZY: Yes --23 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Or that a particular 24 hazard is the only thing that's important, whether it's 25 full power, low power, or shutdown, or whatever.

1	MR. KURITZY: That's excellent. That's
2	right on the money. And we'll
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
4	MR. KURITZY: We'll definitely make sure
5	that when the public, even our internal documents should
6	make that very clear. So I
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, and certainly, as
8	I said, certainly when it says public release
9	MR. KURITZY: Right.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: on this
11	MR. KURITZY: Right.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: that's where I get
13	really, not concerned, but
14	MR. KURITZY: The antenna goes up.
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, that's right.
16	MR. KURITZY: Thank you very much. Okay.
17	So let's see. I'm trying to move forward quickly.
18	We're getting near the end.
19	Spent fuel pool, well, again here, I don't
20	need to say much because you're going to get a full
21	discussion of this later. Just to mention that the
22	Level 1 analysis is mostly done, going back to what
23	Dr. Corradini was mentioning in the bars, so the Level
24	1 analysis. It's the Phase 1 report that is pretty
25	much complete. And now we are working mostly on the

1 Level 2 part of that, looking into the HRA acts of 2 progression. 3 Documentation is ongoing, as some of the 4 members may be already painfully aware that we didn't 5 really have a report to provide you that was a polished It was really a totally in-progress thing 6 7 that we kind of put together for your purposes. Probably ahead of time we would have done it normally. 8 9 So I'm hoping that it was at least -- I 10 know we had some issues last presentation last meeting 11 with some of the reports we gave to you that weren't 12 quite cohesive and connected. This one hopefully was 13 enough that you could follow what was going on. 14 But Brian Wagner will be here in the 15 afternoon to try and untangle any knots that we tied 16 you into during your review. 17 MEMBER BLEY: I'm not quite sure how to 18 say this. You succeeded in burying us in information. 19 There seem to be ties from the main report, loose links 20 out to other places that justify things. 21 When I try to chase those, there is so much 22 information out there that finding just what it is that 23 justifies what you did in the main report isn't 24 transparent or easy to chase. But I think you've got

the links there. So you can do that better later.

1	But, yes, you gave us lots of connecting
2	information. And that's helpful. But you got a lot
3	of work to do to really pull it together. But I think
4	you're set up to do that better than many people have
5	done it.
6	MR. KURITZY: Thank you. Yes, and we
7	recognize that. That was really an in-progress report.
8	But thank you. We will try and make sure that the
9	references are a little more targeted or focused in
10	the final product, not left in a sea of paper.
11	Okay. So moving on to the dry cask storage
12	PRA, this view graph I think is the same one that I
13	showed you in May. Really nothing was happening on
14	dry cask storage PRA. The report was waiting for
15	project management review, just sitting collecting dust
16	on a desk. I'm not going to say whose desk.
17	Anyway, but then finally their time freed
18	up. And they started making a good faith effort to
19	get it out, ran into a few issues with the documentation.
20	So that person is currently juggling the
21	other hazards review and this one together. And
22	hopefully both of them will be getting out soon. I'll
23	talk about schedule in a moment.
24	MS. DROUIN: And I wonder who that person
25	is.

MR. KURITZY: Not going to mention names.

Okay. This is the integrated site PRA. I think maybe

Dr. Bley was the one who mentioned he wanted to hear

about this. I don't have much here actually to talk

about. Dan Hudson is going on so he can give you more

information.

We did, about a year or so ago, we did present to the subcommittee our approach. Just to remind everyone, that was basically looking at the results and insights of the single source models to help us focus on what, you know, to help, you know, prioritize what we were going to focus on in looking for multi-source contributors.

Also, though, to provide additional insurance that we weren't missing anything that could be important, we have a number of other systematic approaches that we are employing, things such as looking at those things that were screened out on the single source models to see, again, whether they might have greater implications from a multi-source point of view either due to their frequency or their consequences, also looking, for instance, at operator actions that were important to the single source models to see whether those actions could be heavily influenced by an event occurring at another source on the site, also

looking, for instance, at multi-source operating experience, any experience that's out there where things had some impact on more than one radiological source on site to see whether or not that's kind of captured by what we're looking at.

So we have a number of these supplemental approaches that we're using to kind of increase our confidence that we haven't, nothing has fallen through the cracks.

Also, just to mention the pilot applications we talked about before, as Dr. Bley mentioned, kind of pair-wise, but really individually looking at the two-unit reactor model for internal events, a two-unit model for internal events with floods for Level 2.

We also just recently completed the two-unit Level 1 PRA for seismic events, our pilot case for that. I haven't yet been briefed on it. We had a briefing that got postponed. So I haven't heard it yet.

My understanding is that that went fairly well. There were a couple of technical challenges that they recognized they were going to have. But there was nothing that was a showstopper that they couldn't kind of work around.

1	And one thing that's not on here yet, we've
2	already started now that we have the low power shutdown
3	model, Phase 1 model, complete. We've started looking
4	at a two-unit shutdown model where one unit is on
5	operation and the other unit is in various stages of
6	operating states. And so we're seeing how well that
7	works, too.
8	(Off mic comments.)
9	MEMBER BLEY: Can you tell us a little bit
10	about how you're laying that out? Are you laying out
11	a combinatorial set of these where you are in shutdown
12	versus where the other operating plant is in its
13	operation?
14	MR. KURITZY: Honestly, I had forgotten
15	we were doing that part today. And that's why it's
16	on the slide until Dan mentioned to me about last night
17	
18	MEMBER BLEY: We'll look forward to
19	learning more about that.
20	MR. KURITZY: But Dan can speak to it
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: There is, this
22	afternoon, we'll hear something about that in the spent
23	fuel pool study. And I hope they're using that same
24	concept.
25	MEMBER BLEY: Structure, okay.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And without
2	MEMBER BLEY: But save it till then.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: going into the
4	details.
5	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So I think we'll see
7	it this afternoon.
8	MR. KURITZY: Okay. Dan, you'll be here
9	in the afternoon, right? Okay. Thank you.
10	MEMBER CORRADINI: So maybe this, you've
11	answered this one. So is this some sort of general
12	methodology that can be applied regardless of
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
14	MR. KURITZY: Yes, yes, oh, definitely.
15	This is, yes, definitely, is not design specific. This
16	is more like modeling specific.
17	MEMBER CORRADINI: So is this applicable
18	to NuScale?
19	PARTICIPANT: Yes.
20	MR. KURITZY: Theoretically, if you have
21	it should be practicable for anything you have a
22	PRA for. If you had PRAs for the various individual
23	sources and hazards, then you should be able to apply
24	this approach to that.
25	MEMBER CORRADINI: And the NRO PRA team

1	that's reviewing NuScale is aware of this and
2	communicating with you?
3	MR. KURITZY: Right now they're not,
4	because we are in the early stage of this work. But
5	they will certainly be I mean, we are working as
6	a multi-office project. So there will be an
7	interaction all along.
8	The NRO, our TAG has a senior level advisor
9	from NRO on it. So they've already been briefed on
LO	the approach. So that, so NRO is aware of the approach
L1	that we're following.
L2	MEMBER KIRCHNER: So do they, are they,
L3	to follow up, are they in sync on the basic methodologies
L4	that you're applying, the combinations and such to
L5	putting multi-sources in?
L6	MR. KURITZY: Yes, so far, we have not
L7	gotten any, I don't think any negative Dan could
L8	speak to it more complete. But I don't think we've
L9	gotten any negative feedback about the approach. So
20	
21	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
22	MR. KURITZY: I'm assuming, what is it,
23	negative consent. I don't know.
24	MEMBER CORRADINI: All I want to do is make
25	sure that connection is being maintained, because, to

1 me, that's important since that's going to come up as part of that review. 2 Right. 3 MR. KURITZY: And that's why we 4 do -- in fact, that's one of the reasons we impound 5 the TAG, not just so that we would get the benefit of their input on our models, but to make sure that the 6 7 other offices would also be aware of what's going on. That's one of our main connections in the field office. 8 I mean, we brief the other offices at 9 various levels on various parts of the project all 10 But we also have tightly connected with the 11 senior level advisors in PRA for those different offices 12 so that they are aware of all the work that we're doing. 13 14 And we'll maintain that all through the project. 15 So, without going into too MEMBER REMPE: 16 much detail on bullet 2, are you seeing that some items 17 that were screened out are important because you are 18 going to multi-source accidents scenario evaluations? I don't -- Dan will speak 19 MR. KURITZY: 20 I'm not sure how far along we are on that to this. 21 22 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. 23 MR. KURITZY: -- approach yet. 24 MR. HUDSON: Good morning. Good morning. 25 Is this on? Okay. Can you hear me? Dan Hudson,

Division of Risk Analysis in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, I'm the technical lead for the integrated site PRA task.

And to follow up on some of the questions and comments that have been made on this technical element for the Level 3 PRA project, I'd just like to remind the ACSR subcommittee members and other members who are here in attendance today that we did brief this subcommittee on the integrated site PRA approach in December of 2016. So, if you went back, you'd see the overall approach that we've laid out.

And it is a generic approach that's technology neutral. The principal change that's been made to the approach since we've briefed the subcommittee last year is bullet 2.

We heard your comments loud and clear about what could potentially be missed by focusing primarily on the risk insights obtained from the individual single-source models that are providing input to this task. So that's a big change.

But we haven't quite gotten to that next stage where we're actually applying these systematic techniques. We've identified some approaches that we think are going to be useful to provide some rigor, to look into what might be missing. But we haven't

1 actually applied it in practice yet. So we don't have 2 insights from that quite yet. Thank you. 3 MEMBER REMPE: 4 MR. HUDSON: You're welcome. 5 MR. KURITZY: Thank you, Dan. Okay. let's wrap this up quickly, so just some near-term 6 7 milestones. Actually, when I was going through this 8 presentation yesterday afternoon, I recognized that 9 10 every single one of these upcoming milestones is either in the so-called project management review or in queue 11 12 for project management review. So the bottleneck sits 13 in front of you right now at the front of this table. 14 Like I said, Kevin Coyne is back in the 15 fold. I'm hoping we can squeeze a review or two out 16 But right now, we are clearly the bottleneck. 17 The updated other hazards report, Mary is 18 currently reviewing. We hope that one will get signed 19 out and be done by the end of this month. 20 Dry cask storage is another one that Mary 21 is juggling. And hopefully once the other hazards is 22 out, she can resolve the documentation issues for the 23 dry cask storage. And that will get out hopefully by the end of this month or the next month. 24 25 The internal fire one is sitting on my desk.

It's been there for a few months I think. And I get some hours to work on it. And then I get pulled away.

And then two weeks later I'm back looking at it again and trying to remember what I did two weeks ago.

I'm sure the subcommittee remembers, there was a lot of issues with the documentation in that report. So there was a lot of restructuring and redocumenting of it.

As part of my review, I'm doing a lot of rewriting of it just to try and be consistent with some of the feedback we received from the subcommittee and elsewhere. So that review is just taking a little bit longer than the typical review. But I will slog my way through it eventually. And --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, ACRS does not get involved in NRC management decisions. But in my own personal experience reviewing things, what you just mentioned is really difficult for me to do.

When I review something, I find it necessary, at least for my personality, to kind of get immersed in it and start really thinking about what I'm reviewing. If I spend a day or two on it one week and then come back to it a couple of weeks later, I personally have an awful difficulty remembering where I was.

1 So there's inefficiency there, or there's 2 that propensity to say, well, okay, I'll just pick up 3 where I left the little yellow sticky and go forward. 4 And I miss things that way. 5 So this notion of kind of reviewing things in fits and spurts is not only inefficient in terms 6 7 of time management, it might not be as thorough in terms of technical feedback as a more intense, focused, 8 end-to-end review, if you will. 9 10 And that's, as I said, that's time 11 management. It's not what we get involved in. 12 you're well-aware of this. But I'm saying it on the 13 record because it's on the record. And I'm saying it 14 because of the management folks are in the room. 15 And I appreciate it. MR. KURITZY: 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And Ι 17 anything more about it. 18 MR. KURITZY: And I appreciate it. 19 want to give you one case in point, though. 20 to take solace on is that my review anyway, the project 21 management review, is more of a are we giving the right 22 message, is it clear what we're saying. The technical 23 detail is really coming from the technical review below 24 us. But we still always pick up things.

But example of the rank, so in the fire

1	report, there was a whole section I had apparently,
2	as I came back to it after several weeks, I found a
3	section that I decided to rewrite because it didn't
4	seem consistent with what my current thinking was.
5	And then as I was looking back some ways
6	for something else, I realized that I had rewritten
7	all that in a different section earlier. And I'm like,
8	oh, you know, and then I had to go kill all those changes.
9	So it's not efficient. But it's what it is. So thank
LO	you.
L1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It isn't. I don't care
L2	about efficiency. I care about kind of technical
L3	continuity. And to say that you're not technical is
L4	not true, you know. Regardless of what elements of
L5	the review you're checking off the boxes on, you're
L6	a technical person.
L7	MR. KURITZY: Right.
L8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And Mary's a technical
L9	person. And Kevin's a technical person.
20	MR. KURITZY: Kevin's a technical, yes.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So
22	MR. KURITZY: The point is valid. The
23	point is definitely valid. And we appreciate it being
24	on the record.
25	MEMBER BALLINGER: At what point would we

1 -- excuse my ignorance. At what point would we be, 2 could we expect to be able to see some of this? 3 MR. KURITZY: So most of these things, we 4 try to provide these reports to you when we get to that, 5 at the end of Phase 1 so we can incorporate your feedback in Phase 2. 6 7 It's led to some frustration because you 8 guys are getting stuff that may or may not, depending 9 on where the meeting times out to where we are, you 10 may get a completed Phase 1 report, which is great, 11 or you may get one that's in progress, which is not 12 so great. 13 But we try to time it so you get it near 14 the end of Phase 1 so that we can incorporate your 15 feedback into Phase 2. 16 Today you're going to get a briefing on 17 the Phase 2 report just because they are some of the 18 first ones to get wrapped up. And I'm not sure we ever 19 gave you a really good briefing. At some level, we 20 gave you it, but not necessarily a complete Phase 1 21 report. So we wanted to at least go through the Phase 22 2 report with you. So it just kind of depends on where the 23 24 meeting falls out on the schedule, because, remember, 25 we had like 20 horses running in the race at different

1	points. And we have fixed points where the meetings
2	are. So we
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I mean, just for the
4	record, what we've tried to do is sort of intercept
5	the project and schedule a subcommittee meeting at the
6	time when it seemed to be reasonable to do that. So
7	it isn't that the subcommittee meetings are scheduled
8	for a date, and they just dump on us, you know, whatever
9	is available at that date.
10	There's some notion of trying to intercept
11	the schedule at points
12	MR. KURITZY: Right.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: where there's some
14	level of, reasonable level of maturity in each of the
15	technical tasks so that we get a snapshot of those tasks
16	at a time that we can give them feedback that might
17	be useful before they get too far along and at a point
18	where they're far enough along so that
19	MR. KURITZY: We have something
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: there's enough meat
21	there for us to dig into.
22	MEMBER BALLINGER: So, for example, the
23	dry cask storage, is that October 2017 a hard date?
24	MR. KURITZY: No
25	MEMBER BALLINGER: Because this is

1	October.
2	MR. KURITZY: Right
3	MEMBER BALLINGER: I see.
4	MR. KURITZY: So the plan is to have that
5	done by the end of the month. So
6	MEMBER BALLINGER: Okay.
7	MR. KURITZY: So we're still targeting.
8	Again, I have confidence that the other hazards one
9	will be done by October.
10	The dry cask storage one, it just depends
11	how much documentation has to be modified to see whether
12	we can still make the October date. But that's one
13	that we already briefed the subcommittee on
13 14	that we already briefed the subcommittee on  MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.
14	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.
14 15	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we
14 15 16	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we wouldn't come back to you on that one.
14 15 16 17	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we wouldn't come back to you on that one.  But as Mr. Stetkar mentioned, so we do some
14 15 16 17	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we wouldn't come back to you on that one.  But as Mr. Stetkar mentioned, so we do some  it's not ad hoc when the meetings show up. They're
14 15 16 17 18	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we wouldn't come back to you on that one.  But as Mr. Stetkar mentioned, so we do some  it's not ad hoc when the meetings show up. They're timed. There's certain completions.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we wouldn't come back to you on that one.  But as Mr. Stetkar mentioned, so we do some it's not ad hoc when the meetings show up. They're timed. There's certain completions.  But what happens is then when we have that
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes.  MR. KURITZY: a while back. So we wouldn't come back to you on that one.  But as Mr. Stetkar mentioned, so we do some it's not ad hoc when the meetings show up. They're timed. There's certain completions.  But what happens is then when we have that date, often times we'll try and throw some more stuff

a while back that we never got to brief you on.

So

1	it's we stuff everything in there that we can as
2	today is an example of.
3	So let's see. So I guess
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Don't ever do this
5	again.
6	MR. KURITZY: Are we driving you into
7	retirement?
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I think you might have
9	accomplished that. And thank you.
10	MR. KURITZY: Needed a push.
11	MEMBER BLEY: Level 2, we have two hours
12	scheduled for the day
13	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
14	MEMBER BLEY: to talk about Level 2.
15	We could have two hours or half a day or longer to talk
16	about the HRA for Level 2 or the, your document on
17	questions and answers or the phenomenology. So we're
18	jamming an awful lot of stuff into that two hours.
19	And we'll see how we manage to cover it
20	MR. KURITZY: Right.
21	MEMBER BLEY: because I think at least
22	back when we started with Level 1 and the structure
23	of Level 2, we had more time to dig
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, let's, I want to
25	keep moving here. I personally am viewing this

1 subcommittee meeting as a work in progress. If the 2 subcommittee feels that we need to have another subcommittee meeting to delve into more details on a 3 4 particular issue, particular topic, we'll work with 5 the staff and make that happen. So it isn't necessarily true that those 6 7 two and only two hours will be our entire shot at 8 something. 9 MR. KURITZY: Right. This isn't 10 necessarily your last word. 11 So I think, so we talked about The seismic one is just sitting in the 12 internal fire. 13 queue. Whoever gets done, Mary or I, first or if Kevin 14 is willing to do it, that will be the next person to 15 look at that. Then comes the Level 2 internal event and 16 17 flood that you're going to hear about this afternoon. 18 That one is all done except for the project management 19 review, too. And it's just sitting in the queue for 20 whenever one of us can get to it. 21 And the same thing for the Level, or the 22 low power shutdown Level 1 internal event PRA, that 23 one just, as I mentioned, got through a technical review 24 on Monday. It's now in my, on my desk. And it will

get farmed out to whoever has availability as soon as

We do.

So that's where we stand on those milestones that are coming up the rest of this year.

I just want to end with acknowledgment. Southern Nuclear, again, we can't express enough how much we appreciate all the support they've given us both in terms of the tremendous volume of information, the time and effort they put to gather that and send it to us, hosting us for numerous and numerous site visits.

We have a couple of Southern Nuclear personnel here in the meeting. We express our gratitude to them.

One thing, while I have it on my mind, I think, unfortunately, we didn't really have time in this meeting. As you know, the agenda is quite packed. But I think in the next meeting we have with the subcommittee, Southern Nuclear would like a few minutes to kind of give their view on how they see the results are coming out from our study. And so we certainly want to afford them that opportunity at the next available meeting.

We also want to acknowledge, as we mentioned before, the PWR Owners Group, which not only supported or led those PWR Owners standards-based peer

1 reviews, but actually funded much of it. So we're 2 greatly indebted to them. 3 Westinghouse and EPRI, as I mentioned, both 4 providing members to our Technical Advisory Group, and 5 so thanks are due there. We've support 6 gotten and very 7 contributions from all the main program offices here at the NRC, NSIR, NRO, NRR, NMSS, either as individual 8 9 technical reviewers people or on rotations, 10 participation and review panels, or just providing information or answering questions. So it's really 11 12 been a cross-agency effort. And we appreciate that. 13 All of our contractors, the National Labs, 14 and our commercial contractors, as well as many, many 15 staff that have been involved in this project, have 16 all made tremendous contributions. And we appreciate 17 all of that. 18 Lastly, we threw in the ACRS because we 19 know where our bread gets buttered. And we wanted to 20 make sure that we acknowledge the great feedback we've 21 gotten from the subcommittee, as I mentioned, I think 22 a dozen meetings already. So we greatly appreciate 23 24 MS. DROUIN: From the members. 25 From the individual, and MR. KURITZY:

1	again, the individual well, so let me point, there's
2	three things that we've gotten.
3	We have gotten oral comments from
4	subcommittee meetings. We've got either oral or
5	written comments from individual members as part of
6	fact-finding meetings. And I'm trying to remember what
7	the third avenue. I guess it was just, it was really
8	just oral feedback.
9	So we appreciate that, because it really
10	has been a tremendous boon to the project. May not
11	help our schedule so much, but it's helped the quality
12	of the models. So we appreciate that. And that's all
13	I got.
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything more for Alan?
15	Okay. If not, Mary, you're up. We're running short
16	on time, but we'll probably make it up later or not.
17	MS. DROUIN: How much time do I
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Let's try to get done
19	with this by 10:15 to 10:20 at the latest.
20	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So we had you down for
22	40 minutes. I don't want to cut you too short, so 30
23	to 35 minutes.
24	MS. DROUIN: Okay. Try and do that.
25	One of the things I want to say up front

that, you know, this, what you all have seen is a very, I'm sorry, is a very early draft. It hasn't gone through any technical editing. It hasn't -- we're at the very beginning of Phase 1 here.

But I felt it was important before we start getting into these reviews to get a sense of feedback from the members right now, you know, not, you know, feedback on how a particular sentence. But, you know, the scope and the content of Part 1 would be very beneficial at this time.

So, you know, the NUREG report, we gave you a briefing, you know, across the whole, you know, outline of the NUREG report. And, you know, we wanted it to be user friendly. We wanted it to be accessible, you know, all of these good things here.

But today, and in doing this report, you know, we have lots of goals and challenges. You know, we want to have sufficient information, you know, to understand the design and operation of the plant without getting down into, you know, very specifics.

You know, we want the readers to understand overall the technical approach, you know, what are the major assumptions, you know, the major results, you know, the major insights and perspectives, you know, what potential uses of this NUREG, and, you know, what

potential future work.

But in trying to, you know, meet those goals, we have some, you know, significant challenges, you know, the level of information that we can go to, recognizing, you know, the proprietary information, you know, the significant, just the sheer size of the project and how to contain that, you know, into a usable document, and so how to represent the information, you know, when you're looking at this four-dimensional project, you know, that's addressing multiple hazards and et cetera.

So today --

MEMBER REMPE: Mary?

MS. DROUIN: Yes.

MEMBER REMPE: I focused more on the Level

2 when I was trying to read the massive amount of
material we were given on this meeting.

But a comment that I planned to give Don later is that up front I think it would be good to highlight what you've done to advance the state of the art or how you've pushed the boundary of what's been done from prior risk assessments.

And I don't know if that's going to be in, or if it's in your draft document for the Level 3 or not, but, and the limitations just highlighted up front.

1 You know, we did something that hasn't been done before 2 in this evaluation. And also there's some limitations 3 associated with what we've done, whether it's due to 4 lack of information or methods or whatever. Okay. 5 MS. DROUIN: Good comment. That was not something that we had particularly addressed, 6 7 but good comment. And this is the kind of feedback, you know, we're looking for, you know, addressing some 8 9 things that, you know, we just hadn't really thought 10 about. 11 So today, you know, I'm just focusing on And Part 1 is three major sections to it, an 12 13 introduction, the summary of plant and site design, 14 and the summary of the approach. And this is probably 15 Part 1 in my mind very challenging of what is the level 16 of information we can put in here, you know, to be 17 informative. 18 Now, we have pushed the boundary in terms 19 of the amount of information we're putting here. 20 goes way beyond than what was in 1150. So did we go 21 too far? Did we go far enough? Those are all, you 22 know, the kind of questions. 23 So, at this point --24 MR. KURITZY: One second, Mary. 25 of the -- so I just wanted to mention that, as Mary

1 mentioned, we're pushing, some places we're including a lot more information that was in NUREG-1150. 2 3 I think, and Mary can correct me if I'm 4 wrong, that one of the reasons is because, unlike as 5 we mentioned before, 1150, I also have the NUREG/CR-4550 and 4551 supporting documents, which were all publicly 6 7 released. This is our essentially one document --8 MS. DROUIN: -- yes. 9 MR. KURITZY: So we're trying to put what 10 we can into it. 11 MEMBER CORRADINI: So here's my question 12 and don't answer it now. But somewhere in there, you decide where, it strikes me, as an engineer, I want 13 14 to see an example. I see a lot of generalities. 15 want to see an example that takes me all the way from 16 A all the way to B to C, Part 1, 2, 3, an example of 17 how I walk through this. 18 If that's in the summary of the approach, 19 which we had in Part 1, I missed it, because there is 20 -- and I don't think this is proprietary, but some sort 21 of methodological explanation by one example. 22 MS. DROUIN: I will --MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, I had -- I can't 23 remember the number. I had 36 internal events. 24 And 25 I took one of these, which led me to some sort of bridge

tree that led me to some sort of containment event tree that led me to some sort of consequence analysis. And here's an example case, non-proprietary, but some example case that shows the method. Without that, I don't see the benefit in any of this.

MS. DROUIN: I will tell you my initial reaction is that probably isn't going to happen. But it's certainly something that we can talk about on the team. That would be a real challenge to do to be honest.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, I think what Mike is -- we've been having kind of a side conversation here. I think what Mike is concerned about is that if this study is going to have benefit to the industry, to the public, if you will, and if the study has either applied methods that have been developed, you know, in the past whatever, 25, 30 years since the 1150 analyses were done, or as Joy mentioned, if this project by itself has extended some of those methods, where is that information available to the industry?

In other words, where is the distinction between the Southern Nuclear proprietary data, if you want to call it that, or details of the Vogtle plant-specific design configuration layout, which is not a methodological issue? It's not, you know, how do you do a seismic analysis or how do you link a Level

1	1/2/3 model together or how do you do an off-site
2	consequence analysis. That's not integral to the
3	details of the Vogtle plant design.
4	But where is that methodological
5	information documented so that it can be used as a
6	reference
7	MS. DROUIN: Well
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: as an industry
9	reference
LO	MS. DROUIN: Yes
L1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: without it being
L2	tied into the fact that I can't tell you about this
L3	methodology because I have to redact, you know, seven
L4	pages of it because it's got numbers that apply to Vogtle
L5	in it?
L6	MS. DROUIN: I think, you know, to me
L7	personally I would put that, you know, somewhere in
L8	Part 3 under your perspectives. And
L9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But this is, the way
20	that this is written now it's more of perspectives on
21	the results rather than
22	MS. DROUIN: Well, we haven't, you know,
23	talked about
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's not written yet.
25	But, I mean

1	MS. DROUIN: It's not yet
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: the way it seems to
3	flow is
4	MS. DROUIN: but, I mean, that was our
5	initial thinking.
6	But if we're going to try and bring
7	methodological, get that word out, approach insights
8	and what we've learned from that perspective, which
9	would be a complete departure from 1150 which did not
10	really do that and I'm not saying, you know, we can't
11	do that; we just hadn't thought about it then I would
12	probably try to do it in Part 3 and not overburden Part
13	1, which is more the introduction.
14	MEMBER CORRADINI: I don't care where you
15	do it. I just want to have some sort of it seems
16	to me somewhere in the public document there ought to
17	be something that describes the method.
18	If the method isn't advanced and this piece
19	of the method isn't advanced, so noted. If this method
20	is state-of-the-practice, so noted.
21	But at least people understand what you
22	did. And then buried under the hood, which they can't
23	see or need permission to see, are the details of the
24	methods. They've got the numbers that you can show

publicly.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It could even be you
2	know, we don't get into chapter numbers in a report.
3	It could even be a separate standalone report.
4	MEMBER CORRADINI: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Title of the report,
6	methods used in the NRC staff's Level 3 integrated PRA
7	report.
8	MR. KURITZY: So let me just make
9	MEMBER BLEY: You know, what comes to mind
10	to me thinking about it, the main report for 1150 kind
11	of did this.
12	If you go all the way back to WASH-1400,
13	the summary report, although it had some problems that
14	got them into trouble, but the idea of it kind of was
15	a map of how you'd go through all this stuff to see
16	how it all hangs together and what the methods were.
17	MR. KURITZY: Yes, so let
18	MEMBER BLEY: As a summary report, it seems
19	to me would cover the kind of things Mike is looking
20	for.
21	MR. KURITZY: Yes, I think it's a very good
22	comment. And Mary is right. We haven't necessarily
23	thought all the way through that.
24	But now that we have that feedback I think
25	one thing that we'll take back and consider is, you

know, we had the technical analysis approach plan that 1 we put together initially on how we were going to address 2 all these things. 3 That, which was a publicly available 4 document, since that time we have modified our 5 approaches in many ways. I think we can take an updated version of 6 7 that, now what do we actually do, and not -- that was 8 a document this thick. But we can take a condensed 9 version that focuses on, as Dr. Corradini said, working your way from Level 1 to Level 3. 10 11 MS. DROUIN: We have that. 12 MR. KURITZY: Yes, it's in ADAMS. 13 (Off mic comments.) Yes, 14 MR. KURITZY: it's publicly 15 available. It was one of the first -- actually, it 16 went over two different meetings because it was quite 17 And so we can use that updated to actually voluminous. 18 what we applied to kind of walk that through. 19 And I think it might work as an appendix 20 to Part 1, because we have the summary of approach 21 chapter there, which it kept it more high level to keep 22 the document and the flow manageable, but can then refer 23 to an appendix that then goes into more detail, you 24 know, using an example, more detail about how we did

the various pieces of the study --

1	MS. DROUIN: Yes, I
2	MR. KURITZY: including highlighting
3	those things that we have advanced or done differently.
4	MS. DROUIN: I agree with Alan. I think
5	it would be helpful if the subcommittee went back and
6	looked at that. You know, the trick would be how do
7	we par it, you know, slim it down, because it is like
8	a 400-page document. I mean, but there's because
9	that was laying out the template for, you know, the
10	whole project. And so there's a lot in there that can
11	be cut away.
12	But I think just getting some initial
13	feedback from the subcommittee of what you all thought
14	about that as a place, you know, as a starting point,
15	I think would be very helpful.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Do you remember? I've
17	been trying to find that. Do you remember roughly when
18	in geologic time that was done?
19	MR. KURITZY: Well, we okay, that was
20	one of the first things
21	MEMBER BLEY: Wasn't that before you'd
22	picked Vogtle?
23	MR. KURITZY: No, no, it was after Vogtle.
24	(Simultaneous speaking.)
25	MEMBER BLEY: It was after you'd picked

1	Vogtle, okay, because I remember a document before that
2	considered lots of things.
3	MR. KURITZY: We picked Vogtle in like
4	January or February of 2012 I think. And this was,
5	we presented to the ACRS subcommittee in December of
6	2012. And then I think we had to complete it in like
7	February of 2013 or something like that.
8	MEMBER BLEY: Thanks.
9	MR. KURITZY: But we updated that was
LO	one version. We have an updated version that we made
L1	public later, too.
L2	MEMBER BLEY: Might never have looked
L3	PARTICIPANT: Yes.
L4	MR. KURITZY: Which we can I mean,
L5	unfortunately, I just don't have the ADAMS number
L6	written down anywhere. But
L7	(Simultaneous speaking.)
L8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: At least one of us has.
L9	It's titled
20	MS. DROUIN: We'll take it as an action
21	item.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: technical analysis
23	approach plan for Level 3 PRA project.
24	MR. KURITZY: Right, Rev. 0b is the one
25	that we ended up

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Rev. 0b, okay.
2	MS. DROUIN: We'll send it to you.
3	MR. KURITZY: We briefed you on an earlier
4	version.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, send it to Chris
6	
7	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: so that we have a
9	
10	MR. KURITZY: Yes, yes, will do.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: stable version of
12	it.
13	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Mary, is Part 2 going
14	to be public as well?
15	MS. DROUIN: Everything here is what's
16	going to be public.
17	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay.
18	MS. DROUIN: This is the public NUREG.
19	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Then I agree with Mike's
20	comment that Part 1 and 3 ought to talk about methodology
21	at a very high level.
22	MS. DROUIN: Well, it does at a very high
23	level. That's what Section 3 does. But it's very high
24	level.
25	MEMBER KIRCHNER: But is it approach to

1	the project or is it approach to actually doing the,
2	you know, the risk analysis?
3	MS. DROUIN: Well, let's get through
4	MEMBER KIRCHNER: All right.
5	MS. DROUIN: So
6	MR. KURITZY: Yes, Mary is going to walk
7	through each of the sections there. So you'll see
8	what's involved.
9	MS. DROUIN: So, I mean, all I was planning
10	on doing in this presentation go ahead, go to the
11	next one was just to go through each section and
12	see what feedback, you know, we may have.
13	So, you know, Section 1, you know, talks
14	about the history and the background. It goes through
15	the objectives of the project, you know, what is the
16	scope, what issues are included and not included. You
17	know, we compare the scope to 1150. And it talks about
18	all the PRA elements.
19	And then 1.4 goes through the assumptions
20	and limitations. We may not have gotten into the level
21	of detail in terms of the limitations that, you know,
22	we heard about discussed today. And then 1.5 gets into
23	the document structure.
24	So, if you don't have any comments, then
25	we'll just move on to

(Off mic comments.)

MS. DROUIN: Section 2 goes through and it's divided up for the reactor, the dry cask storage, and the spent fuel pool. And it describes the site at a high level.

So there's a brief description for each structure system modeled. And it goes through and talks about the purpose and function, the configuration, the actuation, the success criteria and dependencies.

And we've been developing simplified schematics. Now, these schematics have no specific information in terms of labeling tied back to Vogtle.

And there's no plant layout on these schematics.

They're very similar to what was in 1150.

We have dependency diagrams that I think we're like 95 percent complete in doing all the dependency diagram.

So 2.1 is the Vogtle site. This is the kind of level of information, which is publicly available. And, you know, it's a high level description of the plant site and location. Go ahead.

These are the various systems for the reactor that, you can see there on the left these are all the front line systems we've described, and then

on the right-hand side, you know, all the support 1 2 systems. 3 And again, these are simplified 4 discussions. I think the most we have on any system 5 is maybe three-fourths of a page. Most of the time it's a couple of paragraphs. 6 7 Spent fuel pool, you're going to see the 8 same type of thing. We've got the spent fuel pool 9 cranes, the purification system, and the HVAC because those are the primary systems that were modeled with 10 11 lots of drawings. Dry cask storage, this is one where you've 12 13 really just kind of seen a brain dump at this point. 14 And we recognize we need a much better organization 15 But this is where we were. So we wanted to to it. 16 go ahead and send it on out to you. 17 So then Section 3 gets in the Okav. 18 summary of the approach. And this one was, you know, 19 very challenging because, again, with the size of this 20 project, really how much information. So we made the 21 decision to keep this a very high level discussion. 22 So that was deliberate. So 3.1, let's just go through each one of 23 them at a time. So here, you know, the overall approach 24

-- okay, I don't have the figure here.

25

I think it's

1 easier to talk to the figure. You know, but we talk about this in that, you know, we've got separate models 2 3 for each source. 4 And then for the reactor, for example, we 5 started with internal events, and it expanded. spent fuel pool and dry cask storage, we started with 6 7 a single integrated model for the Level 1/Level 2, and 8 it was expanded. So this is what I mean when we talk about 9 10 the overall approach, you know, how we started. so it's a very high level discussion. You know, we 11 weren't trying to get into details here. 12 13 Mary, in the interest CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 14 of time, I'm going to -- I, you know, not surprisingly 15 have a lot of nitpicky comments that we'll get to you. 16 mentioned You just that 17 recommendation I would make is that when you discuss 18 these various models, the figure is really good, but 19 when I read it, I was left with the impression that 20 there might be, I don't know, 20 disjoint, standalone, 21 separate models. 22 Now, one might think of them that way, if 23 you think about pushing a button and executing a version 24 of a model that's got some sort of date and time stamp

on it.

1 However, it's important for a high level 2 overview to understand that the model for internal fires 3 during plant power operation, the basic logic structure 4 of that model, may or may not be different than the 5 basic logic structure of the internal events at plant power operation model. 6 7 And what I mean by that is primarily event 8 trees and things like that, so that at a high level 9 I think it would be useful to say, well, you know, we took -- let's say, if you want to call the internal 10 11 events at-power model, the base, give it a name, Joe. 12 We took Joe, and here's what we did to Joe to adapt 13 it for these other hazards. You know, we used it 14 directly, or we only used the transient part of it, or we built a whole new standalone model. 15 16 MS. DROUIN: Okay. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Follow me? You know, 18 that we scrubbed it --19 No, good comment because I MS. DROUIN: 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: -- and started with a 21 blank piece of --22 23 MS. DROUIN: You know, we'll have to go 24 back and --25 That's important for CHAIRMAN STETKAR:

1	a high level because it sort of develops the philosophy
2	for approaching the problem that and that philosophy
3	may not be as disjoint, if you will, as some readers
4	might infer from the discussion in the report right
5	now.
6	In other words, you know, I'm going to do
7	the internal fire analysis, so I'll start with a blank
8	piece of paper and draw my own model. And I'm going
9	to do the seismic analysis, so I'll start with a blank
10	piece of paper and draw my own model. And somehow we're
11	going to fit all of those models together later on.
12	MR. KURITZY: Right. Good point
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And it's not
14	MR. KURITZY: siloing each of these
15	things.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's right, yes.
17	MR. KURITZY: And it's an integrated look
18	at these things.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
20	MS. DROUIN: No, good comment, because
21	when you're this close to it, I thought it communicated
22	that.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, no, it
24	MS. DROUIN: So
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, I'm sensitive to

1	the other
2	MS. DROUIN: we will go by
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: to the other
4	experience. So
5	MS. DROUIN: and really look at it a
6	lot better from that perspective, because I think that's
7	probably one of the key points to explain.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It is. That's the only
9	reason I brought it up this morning.
10	MS. DROUIN: And good point. So, when we
11	got into how we were going to explain this, what we
12	decided to do is that, when you look at the technical
13	elements of a PRA and whether you're applying it for
14	the reactor development or the spent fuel pool or the
15	dry cask storage, you know, they really all have a common
16	set of technical elements.
17	So we thought we'd have a dialogue, you
18	know, up front that went across all the technical
19	elements in the PRA and talk about it at a high level
20	of how we, you know, not trying to educate people on
21	how to do this, but this is what they meant in terms
22	of the study. So that's what was in Section 3.2.
23	So let's ahead and then we wanted to
24	get in and say, okay, how did we do this now in the

study. So 3.3 talks about, you know, the reactor risk

model. We organized it by plant operating state, the 1 2 risk level, and the hazard. So, when you read 3.3.1, which is the Level 3 4 1, we say, okay, we started with internal events model 5 based on the Southern Nuclear model that was converted We expanded it to address. So that's how 6 to SAPHIRE. 7 the dialogue, you know, is set up, and again, talking at a high level, not getting into the details of, you 8 9 know, what Dr. Corradini is looking for. 10 So then the same thing, you can go to the 11 The same type of thing, you know, how did we take all those technical elements and apply them 12 to create our spent fuel pool risk model, you know, 13 14 what were some of the key assumptions. 15 Like here we developed a prioritization 16 scheme, you know, to help us focus, you know, and the 17 criteria, you know, whether those three things that 18 we focused in on. And probably for sake of time, we 19 probably fell too much back on just referring you back 20 to Section 3.2 where we could probably develop better, 21 you know, discussion. Go ahead. 22 Dry cask storage, the same kind of thing 23 again, you know, how did we pull this model together. 24 Go ahead.

And then you've heard a lot about this from

1	Dan, so here, you know, the major way we approach our
2	site risk model.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: By the way, Mary, just
4	because of time here, I found it useful to say point
5	me back to Section 3.2
6	MS. DROUIN: Oh, okay.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: because that, to me,
8	that reinforces integration. It says I don't have a
9	separate spent fuel pool model standalone starting off
10	with a blank piece of paper. I want to know where it
11	differs from what was in 3.2.
12	MS. DROUIN: And that is what
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So, you know,
14	elaborating all of the information that's in 3.2,
15	repeating it essentially in 3.3 and 3 whatever 4 would
16	reinforce to me anyway this notion that they're
17	standalone models. So I found it useful to say, well
18	
19	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: we did the same stuff
21	that we talked about earlier.
22	MS. DROUIN: And that's what, you know,
23	the focus we were trying to show where we differed from
24	those technical elements in 3.4, 5, and 6.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right, right.

1	MS. DROUIN: I might not be saying the
2	sections right. Go ahead.
3	(Off mic comments.)
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's all right.
5	Let's go on.
6	MS. DROUIN: So this one is kind out of
7	sync. But we ended up putting it at the end because
8	it just seemed to disrupt the flow.
9	So, yes, we already talked about dry cask
10	storage and spent fuel pool, and then we come back to
11	the reactor. But it was just more we just felt it flowed
12	better from a reader not to have this huge, you know,
13	thing there on these other hazards.
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: If you remove the word
15	reactor from this, since the other hazards pretty much
16	affect the whole site, it would make a lot of sense.
17	MS. DROUIN: Right, but this I
18	understand. But this was applied just for the
19	reactors, this section
20	MR. KURITZY: Right
21	MS. DROUIN: because like aircraft
22	crashes was screened out for reactors. It's not
23	screened out for dry cask storage.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I understand. But
25	that's telling the story. That's

1	MR. KURITZY: Right. Actually, your
2	comment is very much on point, because when Mary and
3	I were looking over this, originally it didn't say
4	reactor. And so it looked like it was okay at the end.
5	And then we had the discussion, and we
б	realized, hey, but it really doesn't apply for spent
7	fuel pool or dry cask storage
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's a work in
9	progress. You could address all of the other hazard
10	risk models and say where do those other
11	MS. DROUIN: Yes, we could. We could come
12	in
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: hazards apply within
14	the scope of this particular study.
15	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
16	MR. KURITZY: Right.
17	MS. DROUIN: Yes, we could. And then for
18	ones that weren't screened out for like dry cask
19	storage, we could point them back.
20	So that's, you know, a good thought to think
21	about. We hadn't thought about that. I'll be honest.
22	But it just did not seem to flow, and it seemed to
23	be better here.
24	So, again, what this goes through, it lists
25	all the 30 hazards. It lists them with the definition

1 of what that hazard, you know, means. I felt that was very important to explain, you know, in words the 2 3 definition of that hazard. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mary, one question I 5 had on this is it does have that laundry list and explain Where in the overall report is the 6 what it is. 7 documentation for why I today screened out a particular 8 hazard from the reactor at-power model, if you will? 9 Okay. MS. DROUIN: There is a separate 10 technical report. 11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okav. Thanks. 12 MS. DROUIN: But one of the things -- you 13 can get feedback on this. But one of the things I 14 thought of adding in this section would be another table 15 or the same table adding another column, excuse me, 16 that said whether or not it was screened and based on 17 which criteria was it screened. 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That might be useful 19 at a high level. I think details you don't want to 20 get into in this report. 21 MS. DROUIN: No, the details would be, but 22 iust --CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But at least which ones 23 24 were -- I think you do list which ones were retained, 25 but it's been a few days since I read this one.

1	at least the basis for their screening, the particular
2	criteria, was it quantitative, was it qualitative, was
3	it, you know
4	MS. DROUIN: Yes, so, if you go to
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, it's that big one.
6	MS. DROUIN: you know, that table there
7	
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, yes.
9	MS. DROUIN: I thought of adding another
10	column
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That might be useful.
12	MS. DROUIN: that just had a
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Think about it. It's
14	just
15	MS. DROUIN: you know, the screening
16	criteria, why it was
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It could get busy if
18	you screened it out for some plant operating states
19	and kept it in for other hazards.
20	MS. DROUIN: I know. So
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You know, just think
22	about it. But
23	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
24	MS. DROUIN: It's what we're thinking
25	about. Okay. Go ahead.

1	So, for Part 1, this is just Part 1. So,
2	you know, this is the I can't emphasize. This is
3	an initial draft. It's not gone through you're
4	seeing the first cut without any kind of review among
5	the teams or anything. So we'll be starting that pretty
6	soon.
7	And, you know, the other thing, you know,
8	we're thinking about is when to initiate a public review
9	on this NUREG. And we're talking with publications
10	on this. You know, we're going to be writing this NUREG
11	as information comes in. So we're trying to get Part
12	1 done and behind us.
13	So do we maybe get our public review on
14	Part 1 now, or do we just wait until this whole NUREG
15	is done? So just things we're thinking about. And
16	I think that's my last slide. Yes.
17	MEMBER BLEY: I've been going back and
18	forth, so I might have missed your description of this.
19	But what does public review mean to you guys?
20	MS. DROUIN: The NUREG would be sent out
21	for public review and comment
22	MEMBER BLEY: For comment.
23	MS. DROUIN: just like we did
24	MEMBER BLEY: Just a normal
25	MS. DROUIN: NUREG-1150.

1	MEMBER BLEY: release for comment.
2	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
3	MR. KURITZY: Just to amplify a little bit,
4	our plans for the NUREG are, I guess, like two-fold,
5	besides internal, obviously, comment. But it's to go
6	out for a public review and comment period and also
7	to put together an August expert panel that will also
8	review the NUREG.
9	Unfortunately, budgets have been whittling
10	down. The scope of that, we had grand plans initially.
11	And with every successive year of budget shrinkage,
12	our plans have been whittling down. But nonetheless,
13	we still want to have at least a set of maybe domestic
14	and international August experts to look over the NUREG
15	and give us comments on this.
16	MEMBER BLEY: An actual formal review by
17	
18	MR. KURITZY: Yes
19	MEMBER BLEY: But only of the public
20	document.
21	MS. DROUIN: Right. That's an important
22	thing. This would be, for the people who were involved
23	in 1150, this would be like the Kastenberg report.
24	They only looked at 1150.
25	So how does this NUREG, you know, stand

1 on its own merits, you know, as a public document and 2 a useful, informative document. I think having this outside August review to me is a critical part of the 3 4 program at the end. 5 MEMBER BLEY: I'm just kind of hanging between the two. 6 The things that are proprietary 7 aren't the results. They're the data that goes into 8 getting to the results. So, in the public document, 9 you can't have the actual quantification results. 10 that true? 11 MR. KURITZY: Yes. We will provide the 12 approach and the results. The gray area, and this is 13 going to require some iteration or interaction between 14 Southern Nuclear and the NRC, is in the insights, 15 because the insights become more difficult to express 16 if you don't bring in certain plant design information. 17 They wouldn't make sense, or you wouldn't be able to 18 describe them. 19 So, but without the insights, 20 that's the main purpose of a PRA. So our default 21 position will be to be fairly open about the insights. But we will want to work with Southern Nuclear. 22 23 there are areas where they think maybe we're getting 24 a little too, digging into proprietary information,

then we may try and reword things a little bit

1	differently.
2	But the insights are going to be the main
3	focus of the report
4	MEMBER BLEY: The design is public
5	information. The FSAR is valid. That defines
6	MR. KURITZY: Actually, FSARs I don't
7	believe are public anymore. So that's why Mary
8	MEMBER BLEY: Is that true?
9	MR. KURITZY: said the drawings scrub
10	out all the plant identification information on the
11	various components. They're almost like, to some
12	extent, generic drawings of various systems. So
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: But if I go back to the
14	older plants, the FSARs all have that information.
15	MR. KURITZY: Yes, but I think they pulled
16	them back, though. I think you can't I don't think
17	the public can get access now. They're not like in
18	the, well, not in the public document
19	MEMBER CORRADINI: But if I have a paper
20	version, I have it.
21	MR. KURITZY: If you right. Well,
22	post-9/11 there was a lot of stuff that was already
23	out in the domain. But we went back and reclassified
24	
25	MEMBER CORRADINI: In the PDRs

1	MR. KURITZY: doesn't mean that, you
2	know, black-suited troops are going through the country
3	and pull back every electronic and paper version. So,
4	yes
5	(Off mic comments.)
6	MR. KURITZY: there is a lot of that
7	information that's out there. But yet it still may
8	be
9	MEMBER BLEY: But actual like simplified
10	schematics of systems and how they operate, that might
11	not, that might be proprietary.
12	MR. KURITZY: Well, specific drawings for
13	Vogtle with their actual component IDs and stuff
14	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
15	MR. KURITZY: could be proprietary.
16	But there are all kinds of textbooks and manuals out
17	there on general Westinghouse
18	MEMBER BLEY: For similar systems.
19	MR. KURITZY: Right, that you would see
20	almost identical layout of the system. So
21	MS. DROUIN: So
22	MEMBER BLEY: This becomes tricky for you,
23	though, when you have a review of the public document
24	in which the reviewers can't go back and see if the
25	results are justified

1	MR. KURITZY: Right.
2	MEMBER BLEY: It's pretty tricky.
3	MR. KURITZY: It is a little bit tricky.
4	MS. DROUIN: Well, you know, if you go and
5	you look at the schematic that we have in here, this
6	is to the same level that is in NUREG-1150, which is
7	publicly. You know, what you don't see is you won't
8	see the plant-specific labeling of anything. That's
9	
10	MEMBER BLEY: But the simplified
11	schematics that show here are two clean water pumps.
12	That's okay as long as you don't say it's CP-32A.
13	MS. DROUIN: We've followed with what's,
14	you know, in NUREG-1150.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Well, that may be okay.
16	MS. DROUIN: And so that's why we felt this
17	was okay, because it's, you know, it doesn't have the
18	plant-specific labeling, and it doesn't show where it
19	is in the plant. So there's no layout
20	MEMBER BLEY: Layouts, okay.
21	MS. DROUIN: included anywhere in here.
22	So
23	MEMBER BLEY: That may be okay, yes.
24	(Off mic comments.)
25	MEMBER REMPE: So earlier I mentioned some

of the comments I plan to give to Don. There's another one that you might want to consider that up front it might be good to highlight the insights about future activities, because, you know, you advanced the state-of-the-art in certain areas, and you saw, well, it would have been good if we could have also done this or something else should be done in the future. And I think those things, having them up front really would help his document. And you might think about that --MS. DROUIN: Oh, if I had had my druthers, this all Ι would have made virtual reality I mean, truly, I looked into that. documentation. And it's incredible what you can do in that realm. But that's beyond NRC. MEMBER REMPE: But just to have a little, you know, a few highlighting, and then ultimately, if some point you guys do a brochure at the end of this project, it will make it easier to do that brochure if you've got those things up front instead of digging through all the different sections and missing some of the highlights. MR. KURITZY: Right. And that's a good point. And we actually -- each of the, what we call

again, Tier 3 internal reports, have a chapter or

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section, appendix, whatever that identifies all the

It goes a little bit to what Dr. Bley was asking about before where we identify things that, a, either need to be done and if it's in a Phase 1 report, things that we might still do in Phase 2, or if it's a Phase 2 report or even some of the things identified in Phase 1 are things we're not going to do in this project, but they're things that we think are good candidates for future work.

Each of the reports internally has that.

And that's going to be actually -- I don't remember the layout. But there's either going to be a section in the, either, maybe not in front, but it's going to be part of, somewhere in the back where we have the insights or perspectives or something, we're going to have the list of things that we propose for candidates for future work.

MEMBER REMPE: I think that's helpful.

MS. DROUIN: The other thing, you know, we talked about it at the previous subcommittee meeting, that one of the things we're thinking about is right now we're calling it a roadmap report. And it would walk you through the NUREG. It would have a lot of links in it. It would have like frequently asked

1	questions with links to where in the report.
2	But, you know, that's kind of I think
3	it would be a very useful document. But we just may
4	not have the resources and time to do something like
5	that. But I think it would be a vast improvement on
6	the documentation part of this project.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I have two technical
8	things that I wanted to wait until the end and
9	unfortunately I did. I did not read the Level 3 stuff.
10	I ran out of time. I'm assuming, and correct me if
11	I'm wrong, that you used LNT to evaluate off-site risk.
12	MR. KURITZY: That was our base case.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
14	MR. KURITZY: We may have I can't
15	remember. Keith will let you know
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's stop.
17	MR. KURITZY: Yes.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I did not see any
19	discussion of that as a potential limitation in the
20	consequence analyses up front in this report.
21	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. I'll just put
23	that on there.
24	MR. KURITZY: Okay.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The second one, and

this is kind of philosophy, is in this report and in other reports that I did read, there is this distinction between large early release, large late release. There's a quote that says the analysis was sufficient to determine whether large early release or large late release occurs.

Do we want to maintain that artificial distinction in the context of this study? It was an artificial back fit because people did not have full scope Level 2/Level 3 PRAs. So it was applied as a crutch back in the 1990s for somebody to get quick and dirty answers because they didn't have this.

So the whole question that I have is do we want to perpetuate that artificial notion, or do we just want to say we did a full scope Level 3 PRA and some things led to early fatalities and some things led to late releases, and here's the risk from all of that stuff.

Somebody else -- and then some of the lessons learned might be do our current notions of artificial distinctions between large early, late, small, whatever the heck it is, still fit given what we've learned from this study.

In other words, the way I read this report it goes in saying I want to know a large early release

frequency because that is something that is inherently 1 determined by physics. 2 MR. KURITZY: 3 So --4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I'm challenging 5 that notion to say do we just want to do a full scope Level 3 PRA, and then reexamine whether the notions 6 7 that we've established over the last 20 years on large early release frequency, whether those notions still 8 seem to be relevant. 9 10 So, a good point. MR. KURITZY: And in 11 interest of time and my limited knowledge, I'll leave most of that discussion to Don. 12 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. 14 MR. KURITZY: But I just wanted to point 15 out that one of the things we are trying to do with 16 this project is to go ahead and compare how things or 17 see how things compare to what was done, for instance, 18 in NUREG-1150 or how things compare to the safety goals. 19 So some of those interim metrics that 20 theoretically if everybody always done Level 3 PRAs 21 from the beginning and never did Level 1s and 2s by 22 themselves might not have been important, but if you 23 regulate to LERF and CDF. And so some of these interim 24 metrics might have value and for different people might

get value from them.

1 So, but whether or not these distinctions 2 make sense in the modern world, well, I'll leave to Don. 3 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, they might, but 5 they're artificial boxes that people have struggled in terms of throwing things into those artificial boxes. 6 I'm just challenging whether that box should be a 7 8 fundamental element of this study. In other words, I've defined the box. 9 So 10 a priori, I'm going to make sure that I dump things 11 into that artificial box. And to me, that's not the 12 intent of this study. 13 The intent of this study is to do a full 14 scope risk assessment, and then perhaps go back from 15 that full -- what have we learned about that artificial Does it still seem to make sense? 16 17 MEMBER BLEY: John's emphasis of 18 artificial bothers me a bit in his discussion. I know 19 he's making a point. 20 The history of where they came from is of 21 interest and was less than arbitrary when it was, artificial when it was done. But it does make sense 22 23 that it would be good not to preset the problem in that 24 direction, but to go back and see if those things are,

in fact, generalizations or if they do end up appearing

to be artificial in the end. 1 2 MR. KURITZY: Don is here. Just, I know 3 we're running late. But if you could just very quick 4 5 MR. HELTON: Just one aspect, sorry, Don Helton, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. 6 7 one part of that I wanted to clarify just for the public part of the record, and then we can talk later as you 8 9 want. 10 The Level 2 PRA for this project for each 11 of the different at-power, shutdown, whatever, and for each of the different hazards develops a full Level 12 13 2 and develops a set of release categories that are 14 not LERF or non-LERF determinant. 15 They are things like containment failure 16 at a certain time, interfacing systems LOCA, that these 17 types of release categorizations that are not LERF and 18 non-LERF. 19 then, once we have those release 20 categories, in terms of their source terms 21 frequencies, then ask the question, okay, now which of these would meet a particular definition of LERF 22 23 for the point of calculating that intermediate value 24 that is of interest to some people. 25 But I just wanted to clarify that the models

1	do not set out with developing a LERF and non-LERF output
2	that is an outcome after the full release categorization
3	has been done.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And, Don, thanks for
5	that clarification. That was the point that I was
6	trying to make, that this study, as it's been
7	structured, does not a priori make those distinctions.
8	And, therefore, since we are talking about
9	this high level report, kind of an overview of the
10	philosophy, if you will, of the study, I'm kind of
11	challenging whether or not we ought to give the
12	impression that this study does a priori make those
13	distinctions and that was a focal point for either the
14	construction of the analyses or a fundamental element
15	of bending the results, if you will.
16	MEMBER BLEY: And your comments were on
17	the Level 1 report as such.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, this
19	MEMBER BLEY: Because the Level 2 report
20	doesn't imply
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, I'm talking about
22	this public NUREG report
23	MEMBER BLEY: Yes, okay.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: which covers
25	everything, the whole study.

1	MS. DROUIN: But I didn't think we had made
2	that distinction. I mean, did you find that
3	distinction in there?
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I did.
5	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's why I brought
7	it up.
8	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I'll make sure, you
10	know, you get our more detailed comments through the
11	pipeline that we've been using.
12	MS. DROUIN: Right. And that was going
13	to be my last question. Because of sake of time, are
14	we going to receive comments on this
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We'll
16	MS. DROUIN: from various member?
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, we'll work that
18	out the way that we've done in the past. And we can
19	discuss that more in the closed session.
20	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Any more questions or
22	comments for Alan and Mary? If not, what I'd like to
23	do now, because we're going to end the open session,
24	is there anyone in the room who'd like to make a public
25	comment? If there is, please come up to the microphone

1	and do so. I'm not hearing a stampede.
2	If there's anyone on the bridge line who'd
3	like to make a comment, please just speak up, identify
4	yourself, and do so. The bridge line should be open.
5	I'm not hearing any of that.
6	MR. LEWIS: Marvin Lewis, a member of the
7	public.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Marvin, Mr. Lewis,
9	thank you. We hear you. Please make a
10	MR. LEWIS: Okay. They took a few seconds
11	more to open up the line, but I'm glad somebody did.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, we got you.
13	MR. LEWIS: Okay. Look, I appreciate you
14	looking into this. I appreciate you looking into this
15	a lot. However, I do have a problem with this. Can
16	you hear me? There's an awful lot of static on the
17	line.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, you're breaking
19	up a little bit. I don't know why.
20	PARTICIPANT: We are hearing you, though.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, he was fading in
22	and out a little bit. So stay close to whatever
23	microphone or phone you're using. And we'll see how
24	it works.
25	MR. LEWIS: Is this any better?

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That is well, so far.
2	Keep going.
3	MR. LEWIS: All right. Look, hydrides
4	have been ignored. A few people have pointed them out.
5	I think somebody on the ACRS actually pointed out
6	hydrides and spent fuel containers have not been looked
7	at sufficiently in various analyses. I just hope that
8	you guys are at this point thinking of that and starting
9	to look at them. Thank you.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks, Mr. Lewis.
11	And we heard you loud and clear. Are there any other
12	members of the public on the line who'd like to make
13	a comment? If so, identify yourself.
14	MR. LEWIS: Can I have a second bite of
15	the apple?
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You may if yes,
17	certainly.
18	MR. LEWIS: All right. The other part is
19	I'm glad somebody mentioned WASH-1400 at the very
20	beginning. And I hope that you understand that we're
21	just not after, the public is just not after cosmetic
22	numbers. We are after reality hopefully. And
23	hopefully, the PRAs will look strongly at reality and
24	not just make up funny numbers. Thank you.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you very much.

1	And again, just to make sure, are there any other members
2	of the public who'd like to make a comment?
3	If not, as we always do at subcommittee
4	meetings, I like to go around the table and see if any
5	of the members have any final comments you'd like to
6	make. Ron?
7	MEMBER BALLINGER: No, thank you.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Matt?
9	MEMBER SUNSERI: No, thank you.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Margaret?
11	MEMBER CHU: No, thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mike?
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: No.
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dennis?
15	MEMBER BLEY: Nothing additional.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Jose?
17	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: No.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Walt?
19	MEMBER KIRCHNER: No, thank you. Thank
20	you.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And Joy?
22	MEMBER REMPE: No additional comments.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. With that, we
24	will end the open session of the meeting. Let's try
25	to take a ten-minute break and come back at 10:45 for

	119
1	the closed session.
2	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
3	off the record at 10:35 a.m.)
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#### Full-Scope Site Level 3 PRA

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reliability and PRA Subcommittee

October 4, 2017 (Open Session)

Alan Kuritzky
Division of Risk Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
(301-415-1552, Alan.Kuritzky@nrc.gov)

#### **Outline**

- Open Session
  - Project status overview
  - Documentation NUREG, Part 1
- Closed Session
  - Level 2 PRA
    - Internal events and floods
    - Internal fires, seismic events, high winds
    - Shutdown
  - Level 3 PRA internal events and floods
  - Spent fuel pool PRA




#### Level 3 PRA Project Status Overview

October 4, 2017


Alan Kuritzky
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#### Outline of Presentation

- Reactor, at-power, internal events and floods
- Reactor, at-power, internal fires and seismic events
- Reactor, at-power, high winds and other hazards
- Reactor, low power and shutdown
- Spent fuel pool
- Dry cask storage
- Integrated site
- Path Forward




## Generic Process for PRA Model Development



## **Project Status**

Combined status of model development, project reviews, and project documentation



# Reactor, At-Power, Internal Events and Floods

- Completed ASME/ANS PRA standard-based peer review of Level 1, 2, and 3 PRAs, led by PWR Owners Group
- Completed substantive update to Level 1, 2 and 3
   PRAs to address peer review and other comments
  - Level 1 internal flood report nearing completion
  - Level 2 internal event and flood PRA undergoing internal technical review
  - Level 3 internal event and flood PRA report being finalized (prior to internal technical review)
- Completed expert elicitation for interfacing systems LOCA

# Reactor, At-Power, Internal Fires and Seismic Events

- Completed initial revision of Level 1 fire and seismic PRA models and documentation based on new input from SNC
- Both models and documentation have been updated to incorporate internal technical review comments
- Revised fire PRA is undergoing project management review; revised seismic PRA is in the queue for project management review
- Level 2 modeling for internal fires and seismic events is on-going
  - Leveraging internal event Level 2 PRA
  - Hazard-specific adjustments made to bridge tree and plant damage state (PDS) modeling
  - Working on impacts to system performance, human reliability analysis (HRA), and containment event tree

# Reactor, At-Power, High Winds and Other Hazards

- Completed ASME/ANS PRA standard-based peer review, led by PWROG
- Completed substantive update to "Other Hazards" report to address peer review and other comments
  - Currently undergoing final project management review
- Performed substantial update of high wind PRA to address peer review and other comments, as well as incorporate additional information obtained from high wind walkdown and follow-on analyses
  - Currently undergoing internal technical review

#### Reactor, Low Power and Shutdown

- Completed initial LPSD Level 1 PRA model for internal events
  - Currently incorporating feedback from internal technical review
- Work continuing on LPSD Level 2 PRA
  - Completed bridge tree and PDS modeling and quantification
  - Completed MELCOR analyses
  - Working on containment event tree and HRA
- Performed a Phenomena Identification and Ranking Technique (PIRT) expert elicitation to identify ranked list of focus areas for LPSD PRA
  - Contractor report completed (contains proprietary information)
  - Work initiated on a NUREG/CR (for public release)

#### Spent Fuel Pool PRA

- Level 1 analysis is nearly complete for most of the initiating events under consideration
- Continuing work includes:
  - Human reliability analysis: method has been defined and is being exercised for the events of interest
  - Accident progression analysis: preliminary results are under investigation
  - Documentation is ongoing

## Dry Cask Storage PRA

- Completed initial Level 1/2/3 model and documentation for all hazards
- Revised consequence analysis to be Vogtlespecific
- Completed internal technical review (NMSS)
- Currently undergoing project management review

### Integrated Site PRA

- Developed an approach for an integrated site PRA model using single-source PRA model results and risk insights to prioritize the systematic identification and modeling of multi-source accident scenarios and inter-source dependencies
- To provide additional confidence that potentially important multi-source accident scenarios are not missed, this approach is coupled with the use of systematic techniques to search for and prioritize potential multi-source accident scenarios that may not be captured by relying only on results and insights from individual single-source PRA models.
- Completed pilot applications of the approach for:
  - Reactor Units 1 & 2, at-power, internal events, Level 1 PRA
  - Reactor Units 1 & 2, at-power, internal events and floods, Level 2 PRA
  - Reactor Units 1 & 2, at-power, seismic events, Level 1 PRA

## Key Upcoming Milestones

- Complete updated reactor, at-power, other hazards report (October 2017)
- Dry cask storage, Level 1, 2, and 3 PRA ready for technical adequacy review (October 2017)
- Reactor, at-power, Level 1, internal fire PRA ready for technical adequacy review (November 2017)
- Reactor, at-power, Level 1, seismic event PRA ready for technical adequacy review (December 2017)
- Complete updated reactor, at-power, Level 2, internal event and flood PRA (December 2017)
- Reactor, LPSD, Level 1, internal event PRA ready for technical adequacy review (December 2017)

## Acknowledgements

- SNC
- PWR Owners Group
- Westinghouse
- EPRI
- NSIR, NRO, NRR, NMSS, Regions, TTC
- National Laboratories (INL, SNL, PNNL, BNL)
- Commercial Contractors (ERI, ARA, IESS)
- ACRS

### Acronyms and Definitions

ANS American Nuclear Society

ARA Applied Research Associates

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

ERI Energy Research, Inc.

HRA Human reliability analysis

IESS Innovative Engineering & Safety Solutions, LLC

INL Idaho National Laboratory
LOCA Loss of coolant accident
LPSD Low power and shutdown

PDS Plant damage state

PIRT Phenomena Identification and Ranking Technique

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratories

PRA Probabilistic risk assessment
PWR Pressurized-water reactor

PWROG PWR Owners Group

SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

TAG Technical Advisory Group



Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reliability and PRA Subcommittee

October 4, 2017 (Open Session)

Mary Drouin

Division of Risk Analysis

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

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# **NUREG** Report

- User friendly
- Accessible
- Retrievable
- Understandable
- Informative

# Goals and Challenges

- Contains sufficient information to understand:
  - Design and operation of the plant
  - The technical approach
  - Major assumptions
  - Major results
  - Major insights and perspectives
  - Potential uses
  - Potential future work
- Major challenges
  - The level of detail of information in the report recognizing concern regarding propriety information
  - The significant amount of information what to and not to include so as not to overwhelm the reader but remain informative
  - How to represent the information in an efficient, effective, and understandable manner for a "four dimensional" PRA model that addresses multiple sources, multiple hazards, multiple operating states, and all three PRA levels

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#### Part 1

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Summary of Plant and Site Design
- 3 Summary of Approach

#### Part 2

- 4 Summary of Reactor Risk Results
- 5 Summary of Spent Fuel Pool Risk Results
- 6 Summary of Dry Cask Storage Risk Results
- 7 Summary of Integrated Site Risk Results

#### Part 3

- 8 Overall Risk Perspectives
- 9 Perspectives on Reactor Risk
- 10 Perspectives on Spent Fuel Pool Risk
- 11 Perspectives on Dry Cask Storage Risk
- 12 Perspectives on Integrated Site Risk
- 13 Comparison to Previous Studies
- 14 NUREG-XXXX as a Resource Document
- 15 References

#### **Appendix**

- Appendix A Glossary
- Appendix B Project Organization
- Appendix C Quality Assurance
- Appendix D Results of External Reviews

#### Section 1 -- Introduction


- 1.1 Background
  - History of project
- 1.2 Objective
  - Stated objectives from SECY papers
- 1.3 Scope
  - Issues included and not included
  - Compared to NUREG-1150
  - PRA elements
- 1.4 Assumptions & Limitations
  - High level across the project
- 1.5 Document Structure

# Section 2 – Summary of Plant Design and Operation

- Description of site, reactors, spent fuel pools, dry cask storage
- Brief description provided for each structure and system modeled
  - Purpose and function
  - Configuration
  - Actuation
  - Success criteria
  - Dependencies
- Simplified schematic provided for structures and systems
- Dependency diagram provided
- No actual system layout provided nor plant-specific labeling

## Section 2.1 – Vogtle Site

High level description of plant site and location





# Section 2.2/2.3 – Reactor Plant Design

#### Includes descriptions, schematics and dependency diagrams

Front Line Systems	Support Systems
Accumulators	AC and DC electrical
High pressure injection/recirculation	Nuclear service cooling water
Low pressure injection/recirculation	Component cooling water
Primary operated relief valves	Auxiliary component cooling water
Residual heat removal	Circulating Water
Main feedwater	Turbine plant closed cooling water
Auxiliary feedwater	Turbine plant cooling water
Reactor protection	Instrument air
Containment spray	
Containment cooling	
Containment isolation	

# Section 2.4 – Spent Fuel Pool Storage

#### 2.4.1 Overview

- High level discussion of spent fuel pool (SFP) structure and associated systems
- 2.4.2 Spent Fuel Pool Cranes
  - Cranes used to move fuel assemblies within the pool and for transporting new fuel containers
- 2.4.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System
  - System removes the decay heat from the SFP
- 2.4.4 Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Heat, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
  - System provides ventilation and filtration and maintains suitable atmosphere for personnel and equipment

# Section 2.5 – Dry Cask Storage

- Dry Cask Storage (DCS) System
- Multipurpose Canister (MPC)
- Transfer and Storage Overpacks
- Dry Cask Storage Operating Stages
- Dry Cask Storage Process
- SFPs and Cask Loading Pit
- Cask Washdown Area
- Cask Transfer Facility
- Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
- Vertical Cask Transporter
- Alternate Cooling Water System
- Supplemental Cooling System
- Forced Helium Dehydration System
- Automated Welding System
- Low Profile Transporter
- Mating Device
- Other Plant Dry Cask Storage Supporting Systems

# Section 3 – Summary of Approach

- Section 3.1 Overall Approach
- Section 3.2 Technical Analyses
- Section 3.3 Reactor Risk Model
- Section 3.4 SFP Risk Model
- Section 3.5 DCS Risk Model
- Section 3.6 Site Risk Model
- Section 3.7 Other Hazards

# Section 3.1 – Overall Approach

### Basic approach

- Separate models for each source (reactor, SFP, DCS)
- For reactor, started with internal events and expanded
- For SFP and DCS, a single integrated model was constructed that addressed the risk from significant hazards

## Section 3.2 – Technical Analysis

#### For each technical element

- Purpose/objectives of analysis
- Major steps associated with analysis
- Output/products of the analysis

#### Technical elements

- Plant Familiarization
- Screening analyses
- Initiating event analyses
- Structural analyses
- Human reliability analyses
- Quantification analyses
- Consequence analyses

- Hazard and fragility analyses
- Uncertainty analyses
- Systems analyses
- Accident progression analyses
- Parameter estimation analyses
- Source term analyses

## Section 3.3 – Reactor Risk Model

- Organized by plant operating state, risk level, and hazard
- Level 1, at-power conditions
  - Internal events model based on SNC model that was converted to SAPHIRE
  - Expanded to address other hazards while leveraging the work performed by SNC
  - Where work on particular technical element was needed, followed guidance in Section 3.2
- Level 2 & 3, at-power conditions
  - Based on guidance in Section 3.2
- LPSD Level 1, 2 and 3
  - Ranked risk significance of plant outage types, plant operating states and initiating event categories to focus analysis

## Section 3.4 – SFP Risk Model

- Single integrated Level 1 and Level 2 model was constructed
- Prioritization scheme developed to focus the SFP PRA model
  - Speed of the accident
  - Amount of sloshing
  - Significance of the hazard
- SFP model involved seismic hazard with fuel uncovery from sloshing
- Model followed the technical elements as described in Section 3.2

## Section 3.5 - DCS Risk Model

- Single integrated Level 1 and Level 2 model was constructed
- Level 1 and Level 2 model based on NUREG-1864 and expanded
  - Modeled in detail all known hypothetical hazards/events that had the potential to challenge systems and result in radionuclide release
  - Screened hazards/events based on previous experience
- Level 3 model followed the guidance in Section
   3.2

## Section 3.6 – Site Risk Model

- Assumed risk dominated by dependencies among risk sources and significant contributors from individual risk sources
- Developed scheme to logically combine important accident scenarios from the individual radiological sources
- Only evaluating consequences
- Used a systematic scheme to identify and prioritize potential scenarios that might be missed by solely relying on results and insights from the individual single-source models

# Section 3.7 – Reactor: Other Hazard Risk Models

#### Over 30 other hazards identified, examples

Aircraft	Coastal erosion	Damn failure	Fog
High temperature	Landslide	Meteor	Pipeline accident
Soil shrink-swell	Storm surge	Transportation	Volcanic

#### Developed criteria for screening

- 1. The hazard does not result in a plant trip (manual or automatic) or a controlled manual plant shutdown while at power and does not impact any SSCs that are required for accident mitigation from at-power transients or accidents.
- 2. The hazard cannot occur close enough to the plant to affect it.
- 3. The hazard is included in the definition of another analyzed hazard.
- 4. The hazard has a significantly lower mean frequency of occurrence than another hazard.
- 5. The current design-basis hazard has a mean frequency less than 1x10<sup>-5</sup> per year, and the mean value of the conditional core damage probability is assessed to be less than 1x10<sup>-1</sup>.
- All other hazards were screened from detailed analysis

## **NUREG REPORT Part 1-- Status**

- Initial draft is complete
- Starting the review process:
  - Internal reviews staff review then management review
  - TAG review
- Need to decide when to initiate "public review"
  - When entire NUREG is written or in pieces?