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Open Session

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

(ACRS)

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RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE

+ + + + +

OPEN SESSION

+ + + + +

TUESDAY

MAY 2, 2017

+ + + + +

ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

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The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:33 a.m., John Stetkar, Chairman, presiding.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

JOHN W. STETKAR, Chairman

RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member

DENNIS C. BLEY, Member

MICHAEL CORRADINI, Member

WALTER KIRCHNER, Member

JOY REMPE, Member

MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:

CHRISTIANA LUI

ALSO PRESENT:

MARY DROUIN, RES

FELIX GONZALEZ, RES

DONALD HELTON, RES

STACEY HENDRICKSON, SNL*

JIM KNUDSEN, INL

ALAN KURITZKY, RES

CHRIS LAFLEUR, SNL

MARVIN LEWIS, Public Participant*

NICK MELLY, RES

STEVE NOWLEN, Consultant

JOSE PIRES, RES

SELIM SANCAKTAR, RES

ANDREA D. VEIL, Executive Director, ACRS

*Present via telephone

C O N T E N T S

Opening Remarks - John Stetkar, ACRS4
Project Status Overview - Alan Kuritzky, RES8
Draft Report - Format and Contents
Mary Drouin, RES71
Adiourn 110

PROCEEDINGS

2	8:33 a.m.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The meeting will now
4	come to order, or some semblance of such. This is
5	a meeting of the Reliability and PRA Subcommittee
6	of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
7	I'm John Stetkar, Chairman of the
8	Subcommittee meeting. ACRS members in attendance
9	today are Ron Ballinger, Matt Sunseri, Mike
LO	Corradini, Dennis Bley, Walt Kirchner and Joy
L1	Rempe. Christiana Lui of the ACRS staff is the
L2	designated federal official for this meeting.
L3	The Subcommittee will hear the staff's
L 4	presentation on the progress of the Level 3 PRA
L5	project, including the proposed format and contents
L 6	of the planned project report.
L7	A portion of this meeting will be
L8	closed in order to discuss and protect information
L 9	that is proprietary pursuant to 5 USC 552(b)(4).
20	The Subcommittee will gather
21	information what are you looking at me for? It
22	says it right here.
23	The Subcommittee will gather
24	information, analyze relevant issues and facts and
25	formulate proposed positions and actions as

appropriate for deliberation by the full committee. 1 2 The ACRS was established by statute and is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 3 This means that the Committee can only speak 4 5 through its published letter reports. hold 6 meetings to gather information to support 7 deliberations. 8 Interested parties who wish to provide 9 comments can contact our offices requesting time 10 after the meeting announcement is published in the 11 Federal Register. 12 That said, we also set aside some time for spur-of-the-moment comments from members of the 13 14 public attending to or listening to our meetings. 15 Written comments are also always welcome. 16 The ACRS section of USNRC public 17 website provides our charter bylaws, letter reports 18 and full transcripts of all full and subcommittee 19 meetings, including slides presented at the 20 meetings. 21 The rules for participation in today's 22 meeting were announced in the Federal Register on Tuesday, April 25th, 2017. 23 We have received no written comments or 24 25 for time to make oral statements from requests

members of the public regarding today's meeting. 1 2 We have a bridge line established for 3 interested members of the public to listen in to 4 the open session. 5 То preclude interruption of the meeting, this phone bridge will be placed in 6 the 7 listen-in mode during the presentations and 8 committee discussions. 9 We will unmute the bridge line at 10 designated time to afford the public an opportunity 11 to make a statement or provide comments. 12 At this time, I request that everyone 13 in the room please silence your phones, any other 14 devices, anything that can disrupt beepy proceedings, please. 15 16 A transcript of the meeting is being 17 kept and will be made available, as stated in the 18 Federal Register Notice. 19 Therefore, we request that participants 20 meeting microphones in this use the located 21 throughout the meeting room when addressing the 22 Subcommittee. The participants should first identify 23 24 themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and 25 volume so that they may be readily heard.

Make sure that the green light on your 1 2 microphone for any of the people up front, is on 3 before you're speaking. And please turn it off when you're not speaking, because it picks 4 up rustling the papers and other noises. 5 We'll now proceed with the meeting and 6 7 call upon Felix Gonzalez, had to make sure you were 8 here, to open the meeting. MR. GONZALEZ: 9 Good morning, and thank 10 you, Chairman Stetkar. I am Felix Gonzalez. the acting branch chief of the Probabilistic Risk 11 12 Branch in the office Assessment of Nuclear 13 Regulatory Research. Thank you again for 14 opportunity to brief this committee on the Level 3 15 PRA project. 2016, 16 Back in December we had 17 opportunity to brief you on the status of the low-18 power shutdown Level 1 PRA for internal events, dry 19 cask storage PRA, as well as the integrated site risk approach for -- and pilot obligation. 20 21 Today you will hear an update on the 22 project status, including milestones that we will be reaching in 2017, and details on the FAR and 23 seismic PRA analysis. 24

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1	challenges on the schedule due to several reasons
2	such as staff getting diverted to other projects,
3	we continue to advance in all areas of the Level 3
4	PRA project. And we are foreseeing that 2017 will
5	continue to be a good year in terms of reaching
6	some of our milestones.
7	With that, I will not steal anyone's
8	thunder. I will conclude my opening remarks and
9	turn it over to Alan.
10	MR. KURITZKY: Thank you, Felix.
11	Alan Kuritzky with the Division of Risk
12	Analysis in the Office of Research. I'm the
13	program manager for the Level 3 PRA project.
14	With me at the front table right now is
15	Mary Drouin. She is the principal technical
16	advisor for the project.
17	And there will be several other
18	presenters as the day wears on. We'll introduce
19	them as they come up front.
20	I wanted to also echo Felix's
21	appreciation to the Subcommittee. This is, I
22	believe, our eleventh time meeting with the
23	Subcommittee on this project.
24	We definitely appreciate the continued
25	interest and valuable feedback that we receive from

the Subcommittee and we look forward to a 1 2 productive meeting today as well. 3 Just to kind of echo again what Felix 4 mentioned in terms of what we're going to today, 5 in the open session I'll give a quick overview of the project status. 6 7 And then I'll turn it over to Mary and 8 she'll go over some of our expected plans for the 9 NUREG report that will document the overall study 10 and be released to the public later in the project. 11 When we move into the closed session, will cover both the fire and seismic -- the 12 Level 1 fire and seismic PRAs. 13 14 And I won't go into many details on 15 those in my overview, because we will be covering 16 that in detail in the closed session, but I will 17 mention something about their status. 18 Okay. Moving on to the project 19 overview, as we all know by now this project has -involves a lot of independent PRA models. 20 21 I think at one count I estimated about 22 20, for the sake of argument, 20 different PRA 23 models that go into this overall project. The list of items on this slide for the 24 25 outline doesn't cover every single one of those

1	models. It's not intended to, but it's essentially
2	ordered along the lines of the follow-up viewgraphs
3	I'm going to discuss.
4	So, you'll some of the the items
5	will be combined together. Reactor, at-power is
6	what we'll talk about first broken down by several
7	hazard categories. Then we'll move on to the
8	reactor, low-power shutdown. Followed by spent
9	fuel, dry spent fuel pool, dry cask storage and
10	integrated site risk modeling.
11	And at the end, I'll talk about a few
12	of the upcoming milestones for the project.
13	MEMBER BLEY: Alan, it's probably I
14	don't remember. The FTREX computer code you talk
15	about is where you're somehow mushing together all
16	the different models, it sounds like.
17	Is that something you've told us about?
18	Is that something that we ought to understand
19	what's going on there?
20	MR. KURITZKY: FTREX is a software
21	that's used by the industry in conjunction with
22	their CAFTA PRA software.
23	MEMBER BLEY: Oh, it's part of the
24	CAFTA package?
25	MR. KURITZKY: Right. For we're
	i e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

1	using the SAPHIRE.
2	MEMBER BLEY: Right.
3	MR. KURITZKY: So, we're not using,
4	actually, FTREX.
5	MEMBER BLEY: Oh. Well, you in the
6	seismic, you say you do.
7	MR. KURITZKY: Again
8	MEMBER BLEY: That's where you say
9	that's how you put the models together for
10	different units and for fire and seismic and other
11	things to put it all into one big model.
12	MR. KURITZKY: When
13	MEMBER BLEY: That's not true, I take
14	it.
15	MR. KURITZKY: When Selim comes up to
16	discuss the Selim Sancaktar comes up to discuss
17	the quantification of the seismic and the fire
18	models, and Jim Knudsen, they can let you know
19	specifically whether we're using I know we used
20	FTREX just experimentally early on in the project,
21	because it obviously increases it increases the
22	speed of quantification tremendously, but I don't
23	think that ultimately we ended up having to use it.
24	I think we're running SAPHIRE
25	MEMBER BLEY: For everything.

1	MR. KURITZKY: Yeah, just everything is
2	in SAPHIRE and
3	MEMBER BLEY: Well, that's why I was
4	kind of surprised. And this kind of said that's
5	what you used to put all the different pieces
6	together, so it's if that's not true, I don't
7	much care, but
8	MR. KURITZKY: Yeah. I think we may
9	have been implying there may be a
10	miscommunication in the slide, because the licensee
11	has done that, Southern Nuclear has used FTREX, but
12	I don't think that we have.
13	MEMBER BLEY: Read the first page of
14	the seismic report.
15	MR. KURITZKY: Okay. But, again, when
16	we get to that area later in the closed session, we
17	can address that head on.
18	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah, the implication
19	there that it wasn't seismic, it was that's where
20	you were putting all the pieces together.
21	MR. KURITZKY: No.
22	MEMBER BLEY: If that's not true,
23	that's fine.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That probably
25	explains why I didn't recognize the acronym from

the fire, because I haven't seen that in the fire 1 2 stuff. 3 By the way, you're going to hear that we tag team today. He's Mr. Seismic and I'm Mr. 4 5 Fire. So --6 MR. KURITZKY: As long as it's all 7 covered, that's good. 8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We've got you 9 covered. 10 MR. KURITZKY: Okay. Before I go into 11 the bar chart that kind of shows the general 12 project status, Ι want to just refresh the 13 Subcommittee members on this slide from a previous 14 presentation, because it kind of delineates how the 15 -- all the models in this study go through several 16 phases. 17 And for the lack of -just to 18 actually, to make it more convenient in referring 19 to it as we continue the presentation, I'm kind of 20 going to refer to the left side as Phase 1 and the 21 right side as Phase 2. 22 But whenever we develop an initial PRA 23 model, that's just the first step. We have a lot of 24 reviews that go on. Part of our quality assurance 25 panel, we have a lot of reviews.

We have internal reviews that include a 1 2 self-assessment. And then we have internal 3 technical reviewers. And have project we 4 management review. Once that model incorporates all those 5 review comments, it moves on into what I would call 6 7 the second phase, and that's where we get external 8 to the project-type reviews. 9 And that include PWR Owners Group-led 10 peer reviews to the PRA standards. It involves 11 reviews by a technical advisory group. And it also 12 incorporates feedback that we receive from the ACRS Subcommittee. 13 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, can you help us -- because we're going to talk a lot about fire 15 16 and seismic later, where are you on this review 17 cycle on those two particular elements, just so we 18 know? 19 MR. KURITZKY: Thank you for that 20 question. 21 The whole reason I brought this Phase 1 22 and Phase 2 thing is because the seismic and fire are on a little different track and it becomes 23 24 easier to discuss it when I can call it Phase 1 or

Phase 2 for them, because everything else has an

25

1	initial model and a revised model.
2	Fire and seismic because and, again,
3	to remind you from previous presentations, we based
4	our fire and seismic models largely on what the
5	licensee had done, what Southern Nuclear had done.
6	In the case of the fire PRA, that was
7	one of the preconditions for picking a site for the
8	study, was one that we were looking for an NFPA
9	805 plant that had a fire PRA model since we did
10	not have the resources, and accessed the plant to
11	do a full fire PRA.
12	Southern the Vogtle plant is not an
13	NFPA 805 plant, but it does have a fully peer-
14	reviewed fire PRA. So, it essentially accomplished
15	the same thing. So, we had the licensee's peer-
16	reviewed fire PRA to start with.
17	The fire PRA, we have a process of
18	essentially mapping the multi-thousands of
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah, we don't have
20	to get into
21	MR. KURITZKY: Okay.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We'll get into those
23	details
24	MR. KURITZKY: So, just
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm just trying to
į.	1

1	figure out where we are here.
2	MR. KURITZKY: All right. So, where we
3	are with that is, we
4	MEMBER BLEY: At this high level, I'm
5	going to sneak in a couple of questions from the
6	seismic work.
7	The impression I got is you used the
8	fire PRA. But on seismic, the impression I got
9	reading the report is you used your Level 1 your
10	Level 1 PRA and you took fragility data and hazard
11	data from Southern and incorporated that into your
12	model.
13	First thing, is that right?
14	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Second is, I ready very
16	often at this stage we're doing this, which implies
17	to me there will be a revised next stage to
18	incorporate some of the things that weren't done
19	thoroughly here.
20	MR. KURITZKY: Yes, but let so, the
21	short answer to the question is, we were on we
22	are right now in that
23	MEMBER BLEY: Can you say "yes" or "no"
24	to that?
25	MR. KURITZKY: I say "yes."

1	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
2	MR. KURITZKY: This is the block that
3	we're in right now. This is the block we're in
4	right now. We're actually on the internal
5	technical review phase
6	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
7	MR. KURITZKY: for both of them.
8	However, yes, to your question, Dr. Bley, but
9	there's there's more to it than that.
10	That was the initial input we got from
11	them. We then later, we got revised input from
12	them.
13	So, in the case of seismic, we they
14	didn't have a completed seismic PRA model when we
15	were starting our work. So, we were basing it on
16	our own internal model and doing our own work.
17	MEMBER BLEY: But they had all the
18	hazard and fragility
19	MR. KURITZKY: They had hazard and
20	fragility pieces.
21	MEMBER BLEY: And then they got updated
22	hazard.
23	MR. KURITZKY: Then they went and
24	completed their initial seismic PRA, and then
25	provided us after we finished our seismic model,

1	they provided us updated hazard and fragility
2	information and their draft seismic PRA.
3	MEMBER BLEY: But
4	MR. KURITZKY: So, then when we did the
5	
6	MEMBER BLEY: Let me
7	MR. KURITZKY: So, we did a second
8	version
9	MEMBER BLEY: Before you leave that
10	spot, the impression I got is you got that, but you
11	said; one, we don't think there's enough change to
12	bother changing our model, and; two, I got the
13	impression that Southern did not update all their
14	fragilities; is that true? Or did they, and you
15	just aren't going to do that, too?
16	MR. KURITZKY: You again, the
17	details of which fragilities got updated and which
18	ones might not have, I'll have to leave that to
19	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
20	MR. KURITZKY: the seismic team.
21	But in general, now my understanding is we actually
22	when we got the new information from Southern,
23	we did we redid we used the we changed our
24	hazard our hazard curves, and we also replaced
25	the fragility new, updated fragility

1	information.
2	SPEAKER: And this report is not quite
3	up to date.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Let me see. I think
5	where Dennis is going is that on the seismic part
6	of the study from Southern Nuclear when all is said
7	and done forget all of the interim, intermediate
8	stuff you used their seismic hazard for their
9	site and fragilities that they quantified for their
10	equipment structures, whatever.
11	MR. KURITZKY: Uh-huh.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But you you then
13	combined the hazard and the fragilities within what
14	I will call "the staff's Level 3 PRA model" to
15	develop the conditional failure probabilities and
16	the effects from the seismic.
17	Is that correct, or not? I just want a
18	yes or
19	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
21	MR. KURITZKY: That's my understanding.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: In the fire, it is
23	different.
24	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Substantially

1	different because from Southern Nuclear, you took
2	frequencies of fire damage states and simply
3	propagated them through the Level 3 the staff's
4	Level 3 PRA model.
5	You did not go back and recreate those
6	fire damage states by taking ignition frequencies,
7	evaluating fire growth severity, detection
8	suppression and parsing the fire in a compartment
9	into a variety of different damage consequences; is
10	that correct?
11	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
13	MR. KURITZKY: In general, yes. The
14	specifics I'll have to leave to the
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The specifics we'll
16	get into. I just want to make sure the what
17	we're trying to get to is the conceptual treatment
18	of fires and seismic are different.
19	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
21	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that remains
23	true today?
24	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.

1	MEMBER BLEY: And probably will.
2	MR. KURITZKY: Yes. Yes. That will
3	remain true. Regardless of how many revisions we
4	go through, that will always remain true.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Perhaps.
6	MR. KURITZKY: And, again, I apologize.
7	You know, again, the version of the report that you
8	have was an in-progress report. We wanted to make
9	sure we got you something that you could look at.
10	But even today if you look at a report
11	that we would produce today, it wouldn't match
12	exactly what you have.
13	And I don't know that report hasn't
14	gone through any review. So, there may be typos,
15	there may be things that aren't so clear. So
16	MEMBER BLEY: That's not unreasonable,
17	but I on the seismic side, that's the impression
18	I got. On the fire side, the impression John got,
19	if I may, is that it looked like you were done with
20	it.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well
22	MEMBER BLEY: That it was your final
23	shot. Excuse me.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: My impression was
25	that the fire analyses were done, but the report

1 needs some fixing. 2 say this in the public And I can 3 meeting: Volume 1, Volume 2 and Volume 3, at least the versions that we got, I don't care about typos, 4 they don't hang together. 5 There are places where Volume 6 1 7 where information is repeated. And the good news 8 is it's repeated consistently, the bad news is it's 9 just repeated. 10 some places, the information in 11 Volume 1 is consistent with Volume 3, but 12 In some cases, the information in Volume Volume 2. 1 is consistent with Volume 2 and not Volume 3. 13 14 some cases, they all seem somewhat different. 15 And we'll talk more about that in the 16 details, you know, once we get into the proprietary 17 session where Ι point specific can you to 18 information. 19 And the only reason I don't want mention it here is because 20 I don't know which 21 information in which volume of the report comes 22 from a particular source. I don't know which of it is Southern 23 24 Nuclear information, which is information that's

developed by, I'll call it, "the NRC staff

25

headquarters." I 1 in don't know what 2 information may have been developed bу other contractors to the NRC staff. 3 So I'll just leave it at that, but the 4 -- certainly the fire documentation needs cleaning 5 that it hangs together better or that a 6 7 reader better understands what you're trying to 8 present in each of those three volumes. 9 MR. KURITZKY: Thank you for that. 10 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I know it's a 11 work in progress. I'm not trying to -- but keep 12 that in mind as you go back and revise that documentation, because it -- quite honestly the way 13 14 to -- I started reading Volume 1 and I had to read 15 the report in reverse to figure out where I -- I 16 got to about page 10 in Volume 1 and then I had to 17 read Volume 3. 18 And then I got to, like, page 10-1/2 in Volume 1 and I had to go back and read Volume 2 and 19 figure out why is Volume 2 different from Volume 3. 20 21 And then I could finally read Volume 1 22 I had to figure out why is Volume So, 23 different from 2 or volume 3. it 24 doesn't hang together very well. And that's --25 And one more just kind of MEMBER BLEY:

1	general I was kind of surprised that none of the
2	draft material we saw, including some couple-year-
3	old backup reports, had any authors' names on it.
4	So, we don't know quite who did this stuff yet, but
5	I will hear today.
6	And looking at the agenda, I see you
7	have Stacey here to talk on the fires, but I don't
8	see anybody parallel to her to talk on the seismic.
9	Is she going to talk about the human
LO	modeling for seismic, or is Selim going to handle
L1	that?
L2	MR. KURITZKY: I think Stacey will be
L3	on the line the entire time.
L 4	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
L5	MR. KURITZKY: Now that Stacey is
L6	listening, I can just take this opportunity and
L7	say, "Stacey, you actually were you are actually
L8	muted from your line, too, so you will not be able
L9	to speak on"
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, she can speak.
21	We will pick it up and open the line.
22	MR. KURITZKY: Okay.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Stacey, if you want
24	to say something, just start talking and we'll see
25	that it works.

1	(No response.)
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And now we don't
3	know whether Stacey is not there or it's not
4	working.
5	(Laughter.)
6	MEMBER REMPE: Is there anyone else on
7	the line?
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah, we'll try
9	that.
10	If anybody is out there listening in,
11	just please say something to so we can make sure
12	that our process works here.
13	(No response.)
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, that also
15	the null set doesn't really prove anything.
16	MR. KURITZKY: And, also, it wouldn't
17	necessarily prove anything, because Stacey is on a
18	separate line. She's on a separate line.
19	MEMBER BLEY: Separate line. So, she
20	should be able to talk.
21	MR. KURITZKY: Right. Right. But she
22	if someone else on the other line speaks,
23	doesn't mean it's Stacey.
24	MEMBER BLEY: We'll have to make sure.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's the way our

1	process works. If anyone speaks, it is supposed to
2	start coming through. No need to
3	MS. HENDRICKSON: Hi.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: There we are.
5	MS. HENDRICKSON: So, this is Stacey.
6	I'm on the line.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Good. Thanks.
8	MS. HENDRICKSON: Sure.
9	MR. KURITZKY: Okay. So, now to get
10	back to Dr. Bley's question.
11	So, Stacey would be the person to talk
12	to about details at HRA. However, initially Selim
13	will talk about the HRA for the seismic, in
14	general, what we've done. But if there is more
15	detailed HRA guts-type stuff, then Stacey will be
16	available, too.
17	MEMBER BLEY: Is the author of the 2014
18	report model adjustment for human error
19	probabilities and seismic PRA here or on the line,
20	or is that Stacey?
21	MR. KURITZKY: I don't know. That may
22	be Selim. Selim is in the audience.
23	Selim, are you the author of that
24	document? Yes. He shook his head yes. So, he
25	will be available at the front table. Okay.

MEMBER REMPE: Before you leave 1 2 slide, remind us -- it's been a while since we last 3 how you interact with the folks from 4 Southern Nuclear in this whole process. 5 MR. KURITZKY: Okay. Southern Nuclear -- this is meant to just show the various review 6 7 cycles, but Southern Nuclear primarily supplied us 8 a tremendous amount of information that goes into 9 the initial -- the modeling, as well as they have 10 hosted us on many, many site visits with large 11 numbers of people. And so, that's how we got the 12 basic information from them. In terms of our information whenever we 13 14 have a -- generally when we have the report in, in 15 this phase right here, this -- after the internal 16 reviews and review the model when it goes -- ready 17 to be sent out to the TAG and to do the 18 review, we generally send that down to Southern 19 Nuclear also. 20 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. That's what I was 21 wondering. 22 MR. KURITZKY: Actually, we send 23 down to Southern Nuclear actually when we're doing 24 the management review. 25 We actually send it to Southern Nuclear

1	before we actually send it out
2	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
3	MR. KURITZKY: to the PWR Owners
4	Group.
5	MEMBER REMPE: That's what I was trying
6	to find out.
7	MR. KURITZKY: So, during that phase.
8	MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. So, since Joy
10	asked general questions, can you go back a slide?
11	MR. KURITZKY: Yeah.
12	MEMBER CORRADINI: That list, are they
13	individually following that pathway, or are they
14	doing it as a group?
15	MR. KURITZKY: Who is they?
16	MEMBER CORRADINI: I've got reactor,
17	at-power, internal events; reactor, at-power,
18	internal fires; reactor, at-power, high winds.
19	Are each one of those proceeding
20	through I've got it right here. Are each one of
21	those proceeding through the blocks, or are they
22	first gathered together and then proceed through
23	the blocks?
24	MR. KURITZKY: No, actually let me
25	go

1	MEMBER CORRADINI: I'm still confused.
2	MR. KURITZKY: So, it for internal
3	events, it's its own internal events, Level 1,
4	goes by itself. Internal flood went by itself.
5	For Level 2 and 3, internal event and
6	internal flood were combined. So, you had a single
7	Level 2 internal event/internal flood model that
8	went through this process. Same for Level 3.
9	Okay. Seismic fire and high winds were
10	all individual for Level 1. They went through this
11	process individually for Level 1.
12	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
13	MR. KURITZKY: When they go to Level 2
14	and Level 3, they will all be combined.
15	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. So, then if
16	somebody asks for progress, each one of them has
17	their own progress through the block diagram.
18	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
19	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
20	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan I'm trying
22	to keep this at the appropriate level you said
23	you combine it all when it goes through Level 2 and
24	Level 3.
25	Without going into excruciating

T	details, do you lose information from the Level I
2	models by doing that?
3	In other words, just because a core
4	damage sequence goes to hot pressure with maybe
5	feedwater available to one steam generator, doesn't
6	necessarily mean that operator actions in the Level
7	2 models or the timing of the sequence will be the
8	same if it's caused by a fire or a seismic event
9	or, you know, high wind damage compared to a plain
10	vanilla reactor trip.
11	MR. KURITZKY: So, let me clarify a
12	little bit.
13	I say that they are combined together,
14	but I mean that it's like a single task that we're
15	doing. But, in fact, they are will have
16	separate Level 2 results and Level 3 results for
17	high wind or
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. So, you do
19	keep the
20	(Simultaneous speaking.)
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thanks.
22	That's good enough.
23	MR. KURITZKY: In the SAPHIRE model,
24	you can turn off whatever event that you want so
25	that it's

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
2	MR. KURITZKY: it's separate it's
3	separatable.
4	Okay. So, moving on to the project
5	status, and this goes along to what Dr. Corradini
6	was just saying, the when we look at the status
7	at this level, and, I mean, theoretically we could
8	make it much more detailed, which we could have
9	many more bars and we could show progress of each
LO	individual one.
L1	But for communication purposes, we felt
L2	it was better just to collapse them into a more
L3	manageable number here that fit on one viewgraph.
L4	So, what you're seeing here is the
L5	project status collectively of the model
L6	development and the documentation, as well as all
L7	the review and revision cycles. And in addition,
L8	you notice that there's no PRA level on the column
L9	or the row labels.
20	So, Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 models
21	are all included here on their weight average based
22	on our assessment of what percent of the total
23	level of effort is associated with the Level 1
24	model versus Level 2 versus Level 3.
25	So, essentially, in order to get a bar

that is moving far to the right, you have to really be involved with all the Level 2 and 3 by this time to -- or otherwise you would be more on the left side of the row.

So, many of the ones that you see just on the left side where they don't look like they have as much progress, is because we haven't really moved into Level 2 and Level 3 for those yet. So, they might be very far along under Level 1, but we haven't done Level 2 or 3.

For the reactor, at-power, internal events and floods, the Level 1, 2 and 3 models — and I'll go into the details of these. That's exactly what the following slides are going to go into, the details of where we are with each of these.

But for the reactor, at-power, internal events and floods, all the Level 1, 2 and 3 models have been completed. Where I'll call that Phase 1 model, has had the peer review and other reviews.

We're into Phase 2 right now and some of those are complete, some of those are still being reviewed, but -- so, you see a lot of progress for that, because we've done Level 1, 2 and 3 models for all those.

1	Dry cask storage was one thing
2	combined. So, it took Level 1, 2 and 3 all under
3	one study at one time. So, that also is fairly far
4	along.
5	Most of the other ones up to now focus
6	primarily on the Level 1. We haven't really moved
7	much into Level 2 and 3 space for the other
8	hazards.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: What's the
10	difference between the first two bars?
11	MR. KURITZKY: The first bar is
12	internal just they're both reactor, at-power,
13	but the first bar is internal event and floods, and
14	the second bar is all the other hazards, which is
15	internal fire, seismic events, high winds
16	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
17	MR. KURITZKY: and other hazards.
18	MEMBER CORRADINI: Thank you.
19	MR. KURITZKY: It's just kind of an
20	arbitrary breakdown.
21	And the takeaway from this slide is
22	we're roughly a little over halfway done. And I
23	would mention that the reason that a lot there's
24	many reasons why we're only halfway done, but one
25	of the reasons that we do have quite a bit of work

1	to do, as shown on this diagram, is because of all
2	the review cycles that we go through.
3	And because of some changes in how
4	we're going to deal with some of the review, we may
5	scale back some of that review and revision cycles.
6	And so, we actually might be more further along
7	than might be implied by this figure.
8	MEMBER BLEY: My memory fails at times.
9	On the Level 1, the internal events work and
LO	floods, I seem to recall that you actually
L1	industry participated in the peer review. They did
L2	a
L3	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
L 4	MEMBER BLEY: one of their peer
L5	reviews on the work.
L 6	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
L7	MEMBER BLEY: Are they going to do that
L8	on the fire and seismic, too?
L9	MR. KURITZKY: That's a very good
20	question and I'm going to talk to that in one
21	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
22	MR. KURITZKY: On the next slide we'll
23	hit the first part of your question. And then the
24	next slide will hit the second part of your
25	question.

1	Okay. So, moving on to reactor, at-
2	power, internal events and floods, all three PRA
3	levels, 1, 2 and 3, as we were just discussing,
4	they've all been through the PRA the PWR Owners
5	Group-led peer review based on the PRA standards,
6	the ASME/ANS PRA standards. So, that essentially
7	is the Phase 1 into the Phase 2.
8	The Phase 2 is incorporating all that
9	feedback from the TAG, from the peer review, from
10	the ACRS Subcommittee. And those substantial
11	updates to the Level 1, 2 and 3 models are in
12	various stages of completion.
13	Level 1 is completed the whole Phase
14	2 work is completed and has been signed off. So,
15	Level 1, at-power, internal event model is done.
16	Okay. The internal flood one is
17	essentially done. There's a little bit of more
18	documentation that has to be cleaned up. However,
19	the lead for that work is also the lead for our
20	low-power shutdown effort.
21	And right now we're rushing and trying
22	to get that low-power shutdown effort into its
23	review phase. And until that happens, that person

Once that's moved off his desk, he'll

1	go back and wrap up the internal flood. So, that
2	will hopefully happen in the next about a month
3	or so.
4	MEMBER CORRADINI: So, I have a
5	question.
6	You said you're 50 percent done,
7	approximately kind of like reactor construction.
8	I'll let you define what "done" is, right?
9	MR. KURITZKY: And we can go bankrupt
10	before we're done, also.
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: So, there's a lot of
12	similarities.
13	How many person how many person-
14	hours to get to 50 percent?
15	MR. KURITZKY: I couldn't pull that out
16	of my pocket, but it's been it's been a lot of
17	person-hours. A lot more than we anticipated for a
18	couple of reasons. One is
19	MEMBER CORRADINI: 1,000? 20,000?
20	50,000? What? I'm looking for a number. And the
21	reason I'm asking a number is, how much of that is
22	learning on the job versus essentially
23	MR. KURITZKY: That's
24	MEMBER CORRADINI: the more
25	experienced of your team that knew what to do, but

were teaching younger members or different members 1 2 of the team to do it. 3 So, I'm curious about --Yeah. you 4 MEMBER BLEY: And are getting the training benefit you had hoped for? 5 KURITZKY: That's 6 MR. Yes. good 7 question. When we brief the office directors, 8 maybe even the Commission, we have a slide that 9 goes over all the resource things. They're not 10 what we generally put in a public presentation. 11 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Fine. 12 KURITZKY: MR. However, to directly 13 answer your question is, yes, a large percentage of 14 it is because of the learning curve and 15 training aspect, because that is one of the main 16 objectives of the study. And that's an objective 17 that we feel we have accomplished -- done very well 18 in accomplishing. 19 We've trained a lot of people across 20 the board, both junior people who have gotten hands 21 -- inexperience -- hands-on experience doing PRA. 22 Even mid-level people who may have been involved in reviewing PRAs or reviewing applications of PRAs in 23 24 past have now gotten involved in actually

constructing PRA models.

1	And even senior people who have done a
2	lot of PRAs in the past, have gotten work in maybe
3	some areas that they may not have worked on before
4	like spent fuel pool or Level 3, et cetera, or a
5	different hazard.
6	So, yes, we have we've spent a lot
7	of effort in training up people. It's been a big
8	resource cost, but it also has helped us very
9	strongly accomplish one of the main objectives of
10	the study.
11	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
12	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Alan, could you just
13	elaborate on your generic flowchart? Do the same
14	people do the internal review on the second phase
15	on the right-hand side?
16	MR. KURITZKY: Ideally, yes. Being a
17	fluid organization like
18	MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, they're learning
19	on the left part of that is on the left side,
20	the training you mentioned. And then you come back
21	after you've had external review and then go
22	through it again?
23	MR. KURITZKY: Right.
24	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Do you bring in any
25	new people there with different eyes or a different

look?

MR. KURITZKY: No. The idea there is - the reason we have that second -- this -- this
second internal review phase is really because of
substantial changes in this after these external
reviews.

If there was not that much that changed after these external reviews, we would not feel inclined to even go through a second set of internal reviews. We just have the authors update the model here and probably management could sign off on it.

But to date, there's been substantial changes that have occurred for all the ones that have gone through that external review phase. So, we felt it was appropriate to have another technical -- to have the technical reviewer go through it again also.

We want the same, actually, technical reviewer on both cases, because it's a lot more work when somebody is coming at it brand new.

The other person knows what they reviewed initially. Hopefully when they get the revised model, it's been pointed out to them what are the major areas of change, they can focus on

1 those and then we move forward. 2 As it turns out, on occasion, somebody 3 who was involved in the review in, I'll call it, 4 Phase 1 has since moved on to some other project, 5 may have left the Agency, just may be too busy to take on that duty at that time. 6 7 And so, in some cases we are forced to 8 use a different reviewer. And we do lose some efficiency there, because that person is coming to 9 10 it cold and has to do a longer effort to review the 11 product. 12 Ιt gets the advantage of new eyes, 13 certainly, but it's also -- obviously, costs a lot 14 more in terms of resources. 15 in general, MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, 16 you see substantive changes on the right side where 17 the three -- where the three come from that middle 18 review? 19 MR. KURITZKY: Yes. We, up to date, 20 have seen substantial changes. 21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. 22 MR. KURITZKY: And not to point fingers 23 anywhere, but somebody in this room is responsible 24 for a lot of those changes, but I'm not going to

say where they're sitting.

1	MEMBER BLEY: Is it near him?
2	MR. KURITZKY: He's close to the
3	hammer. He's close to the hammer. Getting warm.
4	Getting warm.
5	MEMBER BLEY: Perhaps the need for them
6	came from elsewhere, though.
7	MR. KURITZKY: Yes. Quite honestly,
8	all the comments were extremely valuable. That's
9	why I mentioned in the beginning, the feedback we
10	received from the Subcommittee members has been
11	extremely valuable in improving the quality of the
12	models.
13	Of course it takes longer to get the
14	study done, but it has been extremely valuable. We
15	would not want you to hold back on our account.
16	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
17	MR. KURITZKY: Like that would ever
18	happen.
19	(Laughter.)
20	MR. KURITZKY: Okay. So, going back to
21	the internal event/internal floods, as I mentioned,
22	the Level 1 models are essentially done now, both
23	phases signed off.
24	Level 2, we've completed the revised
25	model and main report and that's now undergoing the

second phase of technical review.

In parallel, the Level 2 team is also fixing up and finalizing some supporting documentation, but that, hopefully, will, in the next month or so, we hope to have the Level 2 for the internal event/internal flood locked down on some final version.

For the -- and for the Level 3, we actually provided the source term to the Level 3 team quite some time ago. But because of other, higher priority work, they haven't really had a chance to work much on it up until now.

Now, they're engaging a lot more strongly. So, we hope to have that work moving forward more rapidly going forward. And hopefully in a few months' time we'll have the level -- the revision to the Level 3 internal event/internal flood model completed also.

The only other thing I want to mention in terms of internal events was -- it's something that we briefed the Subcommittee on, I think, a couple of meetings ago and that was the expert elicitation that we held for interfacing systems LOCA.

As we discussed in previous meetings,

ISLOCA has the potential to be a big contributor in 1 it's 2 risk even though frequency of is 3 generally low, because the consequences can be very 4 high. 5 And in our case, we had some data we 6 were using that ended up giving values for 7 frequencies that were way higher than we would 8 expect. 9 We decided to do an expert elicitation 10 to come up with a better handle on the frequencies 11 of those events. 12 And completed that we expert 13 elicitation and we've incorporated the findings of 14 that expert elicitation into our internal event 15 So, the final model. internal event, Level 16 model, includes the results of that expert 17 elicitation. 18 So, now moving on to internal fires and events --19 and this gets to the other 20 question that you had earlier as to, you know, 21 where do we stand in terms of fires and seismic 22 events in the revisions? 23 So, in this case, as I was mentioning 24 early on, we had models for both internal fires and

seismic events that we completed a couple years

1 ago.

We then received either a whole new model from Southern Nuclear, or new information in terms of seismic.

And so, the information was substantially -- was different enough that we felt we had to go redo the models.

So, we had to redo the fire model, redo the seismic model and now we have those revised models. And so, I called them Phase 1. And so, it's not the revised like on the other side of that diagram, it's still -- it's a revised on the left side of that diagram.

And so, now those models are going through internal review -- in fact, if I just go back here, they're right now in this phase here doing the internal technical review.

When that's completed, both of those cases, hopefully by the end of this month, will move to management review. And then we'll be ready to go to the major review section here in the middle.

So, in both cases, you're going to hear a lot more details about where we are with those of course in the closed session. So, I'm not going to

1 belabor them.

One thing that has just dragged out the fire PRA -- oh, and that comes back to something previously, Dr. Bley, you mentioned -- you were saying -- or Chairman Stetkar was mentioning the fire -- your understanding was the fire PRA, the model was done, but we're just working on the documentation.

In the case of the fire PRA, we thought the model was done for some time, but we keep working with the HRA because we're getting results that we're not comfortable with. We believe --

MEMBER BLEY: This is fire?

MR. KURITZKY: For fire. That there's -- the way either conservatisms in the application of the HRA or the way the approaches work in a broad sense may not really make sense in a specific context.

And so, we're having some uncomfortableness with the results coming out of that. So, we're constantly then relooking at different ways to approach that to see if we can get what we would believe to be more realistic results.

I think at this point, we've pretty

1	much come to the realization that we're going to be
2	where we're going to be and we're ready to just
3	call it quits and document it, but
4	MEMBER BLEY: I'll ask Selim about
5	this, but let me read it to you right now: In the
6	current the version of the seismic report I was
7	given, it says that "Fragility analyses using the
8	2012, the older PSAJ for Vogtle, is used even
9	though the 2014 was based on new information.
10	That's because these are time-consuming analyses
11	and may not need to be repeated to account for the
12	2014 update." [as read]
13	So, it reads to me as if you didn't do
14	anything with the new fragilities.
15	MR. KURITZKY: Yeah, we again,
16	actually, that will be a question you should ask
17	Jose
18	MEMBER BLEY: I will.
19	MR. KURITZKY: Pires when he comes
20	up.
21	MEMBER BLEY: Oh.
22	MR. KURITZKY: And he'll present
23	MEMBER BLEY: He's fragilities, too?
24	MR. KURITZKY: Yes.
25	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
	NEAL R. GROSS

1	MR. KURITZKY: He'll present before
2	Selim and he'll talk about the hazards and the
3	fragilities.
4	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
5	MR. KURITZKY: And he can talk to you
6	directly about that.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
8	MR. KURITZKY: So, I don't want
9	MEMBER BLEY: Because that seems to
10	contradict what you just said.
11	MR. KURITZKY: Right. I don't want to,
12	you know, I don't want to say anything I'll
13	just Jose respond to that.
14	MEMBER BLEY: Fair enough.
15	MR. KURITZKY: Okay. So, again,
16	seismic and fire are both going through internal
17	technical review right now.
18	And we also have just recently started
19	kicked off the Level 2 work for these other
20	hazards for fires and seismic and we already
21	recognize one challenge that we're going to have to
22	face.
23	Because we directly linked the Level 1
24	and Level 2 models, we end up with a lot of Level 2
25	accident sequences.

Even for the internal event and flood models, we were having trouble doing the quantification step because there were SO many sequences that were jamming into the -- into our software, into SAPHIRE.

And so, we know that once we start to incorporate these other hazards into the model, that we're going to have a real issue, particularly the fire.

We have 210 fire entries. So, when those things get jammed into the overall model, it's going to be -- and then linked to the Level 2, we're going to have a sequence explosion that we're just -- that we're not going to be able to put it all in there and turn the crank.

There's going to have to be some approach to come up with, a simplified approach or type of structure approach or systematic some approach to quantify the model other than iust turning the crank on the whole thing.

MEMBER BLEY: Let me ask a -- I have a fault tree implementation question. And I expect in some of especially the seismic scenarios, maybe fire, maybe some others especially in Level 2, that rare event assumptions no longer hold and you have

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1	to look at likelihood of success as well as
2	likelihood of failure, which often blows up PRA
3	computer codes.
4	Are you having trouble with that?
5	MR. KURITZKY: We had that has
6	initially, we've run across that has caused us
7	some trouble. Right now we are
8	MEMBER BLEY: But you are accounting
9	for it.
LO	MR. KURITZKY: You can specify event
L1	types, and one of those is to put in success
L2	events. And so, when we've had cases where there
L3	are very high failure problems, we had to
L 4	incorporate that aspect.
L5	MEMBER BLEY: Something over 0.1, yeah.
L 6	MR. KURITZKY: Right. You don't want -
L7	- we obviously aren't doing it for all the events,
L8	or we would we would bring the whole thing
L9	crashing down, but we have done it selectively for
20	where we felt we needed and we've had to play with
21	it a little bit to make it all work out.
22	So, it's something we the more we do
23	that, the more we have to be careful about
24	reviewing the concepts and making sure everything
25	is working appropriately.

Τ	So, yes, it's a challenge we faced. So
2	far we've been able to overcome it. As we move
3	further along in the seismic work, particularly as
4	it goes into Level 2, I don't know again, that's
5	one big that's the biggest challenge that we're
6	facing right now with that. And our Level 2 team
7	is already looking at ways to come up with a
8	practical way to quantify.
9	Moving on to the high winds and other
10	hazards, these also are studies that went through
11	the PRA
12	MS. DROUIN: So, you had raised the
13	question about the peer reviews on the internal
14	fire and seismic?
15	MEMBER BLEY: I was waiting, yeah.
16	MS. DROUIN: Unfortunately, the PRW
17	Owners Group budget was slashed severely. So,
18	they're having to cut back on the peer review
19	efforts to be providing this and right now that's
20	on hold.
21	MEMBER BLEY: Both fire and seismic?
22	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
23	MEMBER BLEY: You're looking for
24	volunteers or anything?
25	MS. DROUIN: Well, they can support us

1	in a limited way. The big thing on doing the
2	industry peer review is the lead for the peer
3	review work.
4	MEMBER BLEY: Right.
5	MS. DROUIN: And that has to come from
6	someone who has experience and done it.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Right.
8	MS. DROUIN: And that person, they pay
9	for his labor, his travel and that's quite
10	expensive. So, if we could pay for that, we could
11	do it, but it's not in our budget also to pay for
12	that.
13	I mean, they could pay for the other
14	peer reviewers, because it would just be covering
15	the cost of their travel and their lodging. Would
16	not be paying for their labor, but for the lead.
17	And that
18	MEMBER BLEY: So, we potentially have a
19	gap in the peer review process
20	MS. DROUIN: For this, yes.
21	MEMBER BLEY: because of budgeting.
22	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
23	MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Do we have a full
24	committee meeting coming up on any of this?
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No.

1 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. So, we can't write 2 a letter about it. 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No. No, not in the near future, but -- no. 4 But, again -- and thank 5 MR. KURITZKY: 6 you, Mary, because that was the question -- I knew 7 a question that Dr. Bley had and I there was 8 couldn't remember what it was when I got to fire 9 and seismic. So, thank you. 10 And I'm going to talk about that later 11 in this presentation when we get to the upcoming 12 milestones and stuff, because as Mary mentioned, we 13 have a gap in our review. 14 That phase right now that was in the set here, this peer review, we refer to it now, 15 16 you'll see in this slide, the technical adequacy 17 review, which we were relying on these PWR Owners 18 Group-led peer reviews to the standards to 19 accomplish. 20 Now, we're going to lose that. We are 21 debating -- we are discussing essentially how to 22 address that. 23 I think what might be the solution is 24 that we may just have to rely more on our technical 25 advisory group reviews, have to do a more formal

1	review using the standard possibly. So, we'll get
2	
3	MEMBER BLEY: That's in-house people?
4	MR. KURITZKY: That's in-house people -
5	- mostly in-house people. We have two members
6	from outside. We have EPRI and Westinghouse have
7	provided experts for that panel for that group.
8	Okay. So back to the high winds and
9	other hazards. Most have been through the
10	standard-based reviews.
11	The "other hazards" report has already
12	now incorporated all the feedback from the TAG,
13	from the peer review, et cetera, and it's a
14	screening analysis and it has now been completed
15	and it's going through it's final review. So, it
16	essentially is in this phase right here.
17	So, once we go through the internal
18	review of that and project management review, it
19	will be finalized.
20	And as for the high winds, that is also
21	right now ready for its update, because we have the
22	feedback from the peer review and the TAG. Most of
23	that feedback has been incorporated into revision
24	of the report.
25	The model had not changed. However, we

also have employed -- applied research associates to do a high-wind walkdown at Vogtle, as well as provide some follow-up analyses.

And so, we have some new wind fragility information and wind hazard information that we want to incorporate into the model. So, we are going to change the model.

And because of plant diversion and double-booking, essentially, we haven't been able to work on that yet. But starting this month, we're going to start moving forward on the revision to the high wind PRA model. And so we hope to in the next couple of months, have that one.

MEMBER BLEY: Let me ask you -- I'm just thinking about the last thing you said. When you bring in the industry group for the peer review, these are all people who are not associated with the project in any way. So, they're really fresh eyes.

MR. KURITZKY: Correct.

MEMBER BLEY: And seeing the TAG review -- well, the TAG has been involved all the way through this process, I assume. So, they are much closer to the work than bringing in the outside group.

1	Is that true, or are they not quite
2	close to it?
3	MR. KURITZKY: It's
4	MEMBER BLEY: Well, I don't know how
5	you'd really interact with the TAG.
6	MR. KURITZKY: Right. It's true
7	it's more true in some cases, less true in other
8	cases. We don't have a hard
9	MEMBER BLEY: So, you get some benefit,
10	but you don't have as much independence.
11	MR. KURITZKY: Right. We don't have an
12	actual rule that says a TAG has to be completely
13	independent on the project to do the reviews.
14	And, in fact, since the TAG has had
15	somewhat of a rotating membership some of the
16	people involved in the TAG were part of the
17	project, some of the people on the project on
18	the TAG are now still having to do reviews or other
19	work for us. They may recuse themselves from other
20	TAG activities for that part of the project, they
21	may not, depending on the nature of it.
22	Up to now, the TAG reviews haven't been
23	as quite as formal. So, going forward, like I
24	said, we'll probably have to make them more formal.
25	To the extent we can keep those reviews

using only people that are independent 1 2 project work up to that point, we will. 3 Unfortunately, in some of the areas, the staff has very little expertise and so --4 Yeah, that's what I was 5 MEMBER BLEY: Do you have people with seismic and 6 going to say. 7 fire PRA experience who are not already involved in 8 the project? 9 MR. KURITZKY: Yeah, that's an issue. 10 There might be some. Again, what we'll probably 11 have to do, we might use -- the TAG has done this 12 in the past, they've reached out to other people in the Agency that were not involved in the project 13 14 just to supplement their expertise. 15 They also, theoretically, we could get 16 -- to the extent our budget will allow, could get 17 some contractor support for them if we needed some 18 independent person to supplement their review. 19 So, that's all the stuff that has to be 20 worked out. We haven't reached that bridge yet, 21 going to be coming up Ι 22 mentioned shortly, we're going to come up to it 23 very soon and we're going to have to work out 24 exactly how we're going to go forward with those

technical adequacy reviews.

1	MEMBER BLEY: Thanks.
2	MR. KURITZKY: Also, the last thing
3	I'll just point out that ultimately we do plan to
4	have an independent review, expert review of the
5	NUREG report, which will be the public available
6	information.
7	It will not be a detailed technical
8	review that we have for these models here, but it
9	will be another layer of review that will be
10	independent.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Not likely at that
12	stage you're going to go back and make substantive
13	changes to the models.
14	MR. KURITZKY: No, we even if they
15	identify things, it's not likely that we would do
16	that.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We need to be
18	cognizant we have a heck of a lot of material to
19	cover today and I'd like to get done by about 6:00,
20	if not earlier.
21	MR. KURITZKY: We'll do our best.
22	Okay. So, moving out of the reactor,
23	at-power and to low-power and shutdown, this you
24	were briefed on in December the Subcommittee was
25	briefed in December on this.

1 We really haven't gotten that much 2 further along than we did in December, because 3 we've been redoing a lot of the HRA work. 4 We recognize that there was a lot more 5 documentation that needed to be done to support the HRA work. 6 7 Some of the events -- there's a lot of, 8 obviously, operative actions involved in a lowpower shutdown modeling and we recognized that a 9 10 lot of them were not consistently documented. 11 we were doing a much more detailed relook 12 documenting those events. Unfortunately, in doing that, we also 13 14 recognized that there was some applications of 15 assigning values to perform shaping factors that 16 weren't quite done consistently either. 17 therefore, we're actually changing some of the 18 And accordingly, they're also going to have ACPs. 19 to redo the dependency analysis because of that. 20 though it's primarily So, even 21 documentation issue, we are going to go ahead and 22 requantify the low-power shutdown model again once 23 we have the updated ACPs and dependency analysis. 24 honestly, we're pretty much

where we thought we were back in December, we're

1	pretty much along the same point right now, but we
2	do have to have that wrapped up in the next month
3	or so.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Alan, just and
5	make this short, please do you have a plan for
6	performing the internal fire analyses for shutdown?
7	MR. KURITZKY: Right now we don't have
8	an exact plan for that.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thanks.
10	That's all I need.
11	MR. KURITZKY: Okay. Also, while the -
12	_
13	MEMBER BLEY: Same question on seismic.
14	MR. KURITZKY: Same answer. And high
15	wind, for that matter.
16	Okay. So, while we're completing the
17	HRA for the low-power shutdown Level 1 model, we
18	are in parallel working on the Level 2 aspects of
19	the low-power shutdown model.
20	We have completed the MELCOR model for
21	low power and shutdown. We've also completed the
22	bridge trees and the plant damage state trees and
23	have identified the perspective list of
24	representative sequences that we'll then use for
25	the deterministic modeling used in the MELCOR

So, work on the Level 2 is working 1 model. 2 parallel to completing the Level 1. 3 The last thing I want to mention on low-power shutdown is something I think we alluded 4 to in the December briefing. 5 And that was that we 6 going to perform expert elicitation, 7 specifically a phenomena identification and ranking 8 technique, a PART-type panel, to identify the key 9 areas to focus on in a low-power shutdown PRA if 10 you were somewhat limited in resources and 11 schedule, just like we are with this study. 12 In order to meet the timeliness of this project, we informally met with a TAG member, kind 13 14 of informal expert elicitation with our TAG, our 15 technical advisory group, to come up with their 16 idea of what we should focus on. 17 But in the meantime, we've had Pacific 18 Northwest National Laboratories organize and lead a 19 PART overall for this. 20 They have just recently completed that 21 work and provided us their report. We are looking 22 at it internally. Because some of the information in that 23 24 report involves Vogtle-specific information and is

report will

proprietary,

that

25

remain

probably

1 internal. 2 because some of the information 3 from this study in terms of the approach and some of the more generically applicable findings, 4 think we can produce in a public report. So, we're 5 going to actually go through and hopefully produce 6 7 a NUREG/CR that we can then release publicly about 8 that PART. I'm not 9 MEMBER BLEY: sure if I'm 10 surprised. It seems an odd time to be dealing with a PART. You didn't do it first, so you're doing it 11 12 after you have preliminary results. Yeah. Well, the PART is 13 MR. KURITZKY: 14 completed already. We've completed the PART. 15 MEMBER BLEY: Before the modeling. 16 MR. KURITZKY: No -- you are correct. 17 the idea that we'd have initial was was 18 from the results PART while we're doing the 19 modeling -- while we still had time to change the 20 modeling. it became evident that 21 the But as 22 contractual aspects of getting it going were taking 23 longer than we had hoped, so we -- as I mentioned, we did an informal expert elicitation with the TAG. 24

Many of the people on the PART were the

1 people that were in our informal same expert 2 elicitation that we did internally. 3 So, we had the --MEMBER BLEY: You might not want to 4 talk about this in the open session, but at some 5 in 6 Ι'd be interested seeing if 7 learning things now that are surprises that would 8 have been really good to know before you started. 9 MR. KURITZKY: Right. So, this I can 10 say in the open session: The findings, really, of 11 that PART were nothing -- there was nothing that --12 really out of the ordinary. 13 There was а ranking of the plant 14 operating state in terms of what would be the most 15 important ones to focus on broken down in a number 16 of categories, both contribution to core damage 17 versus release. Because obviously in some cases 18 you have containment open and so there could be 19 different relative importances. 20 And then it was also broken down by 21 hazard category, internal events, internal flood, 22 internal fires and seismic. So, have we the 23 ranking of the various plant operating states. 24 The results were kind of as expected. 25 Those cases where you have limited -- or reduced

1	RCS inventory were the ones that were the most
2	important. Particularly things like mid-LOOP
3	operation over in the levels near the vessel head
4	flange. Those were the ones that were coming out
5	of
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Those are the
7	traditional things that everybody has always looked
8	at since the first PRAs are done.
9	Later PRAs have identified that those
10	aren't always the case. So, you know, just
11	anyway
12	MR. KURITZKY: Right.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: we need to get
14	through this.
15	MR. KURITZKY: But that's why we held
16	the PART. And the experts that we
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Who had the
18	unlimited numbers of low-power and shutdown studies
19	and rely on the first ones that were done 25 years
20	ago that identified mid-LOOP as a problem?
21	My whole point is other studies and
22	other people have identified other plant operating
23	states as important to both core damage and
24	releases that are not the usual suspects, because
25	it all depends on the plant how they run an

outage at the plant and things like that. 1 2 So, just having a PART reconfirm the 3 fact that loss of offsite power and station 4 blackout are always most important to Level results and that mid-LOOP operation is always most 5 important to shutdown results has been shown to be 6 7 not true at plant-specific PRAs. 8 So, you know, the -- we can go on. That's -- just go on. I just wanted to get that on 9 10 the record. 11 MR. KURITZKY: And sort of respond to 12 that on the record, too. So, we -- and that's true 13 and we understand that. 14 And our PART came up with a certain 15 And if we had paneled a different PART, ranking. 16 I'm sure the ranking wouldn't actually match up 17 exactly the same. And, again, as you mentioned, it 18 can be very plant-specific. 19 This one was done for Vogtle. 20 it might not match for another plant with different 21 procedures. So, recognize the limitations we 22 there, but thank you. 23 Okay. So, moving on from the reactor 24 world into the spent fuel pool world, this is an 25 area of the project that has languished a little

because of personnel being involved with 1 bit 2 multiple activities, but we have recently shuffled 3 the lineup a little bit. We now have a lead for this that has a 4 little more availability. We also have secured 5 support from Sandia National Laboratories to help 6 7 accelerate the work on this -- in this area. 8 We had previously constructed a MELCOR 9 model to continue to shake it down and make 10 necessary modifications to it. 11 We also went through a process of 12 categorizing all the potential initiating events into different 13 spent fuel pool PRA 14 through a number of criteria. 15 The important was most one 16 essentially it was the time for draindown, 17 quickly the fuel would be uncovered. 18 And with that, realistically, the Tier 19 are the ones that have the 20 draindown, are really the ones that we're 21 going to have time to focus on ourselves. 22 we'll probably just focus on the Tier 1 events. And in the Tier 1, the large seismic 23 24 events are really the main drivers there. So, most 25 the work has been done on the large seismic

1 events. 2 We have for those events, defined leak 3 rates and locations. The leak rates are pretty much consistent with the previous NRC spent fuel 4 5 pool study though the rates themselves have been 6 adjusted somewhat to account for the Vogtle-7 specific spent fuel pool wall thickness sizes. 8 MEMBER CORRADINI: So, if I might just 9 ask, so the difference between this and the spent 10 fuel pool study is just the geometric arrangement 11 specific to Vogtle, but the approach is similar to 12 what we've seen in the past? I don't want to state --13 MR. KURITZKY: 14 I have not been detailed -- heavily involved in the spent fuel pool study. We haven't presented on it 15 16 yet, but I think, in a large part, that is correct. 17 think we're borrowing, in a large 18 part, on the same approaches that we used for the 19 previous one. 20 Don, do you want to speak? 21 MR. HELTON: Don Helton, Office of 22 Nuclear Regulatory Research.

and models are very similar. Obviously the overall

approach is different, because with the spent fuel

Deterministically speaking, the methods

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pool study we were looking at a particular seismic 1 2 event. 3 MEMBER CORRADINI: Sure. Here, we're looking more 4 MR. HELTON: 5 broadly. CORRADINI: 6 MEMBER Okay. So, the 7 initiators may be different, the holes may be in 8 different places, the rates, et cetera, but you're 9 making it geometrically similar to Vogtle. 10 given а geometric configuration, the analysis 11 technique would be similar. 12 **HELTON:** In that would MR. we be 13 relying on the MELCOR code to do the accident 14 progression analysis, yes. 15 MEMBER CORRADINI: Yes. MR. HELTON: And max to do the offsite 16 17 consequence analysis. 18 I point out -- I don't MEMBER BLEY: 19 know where you stand on this now. In the spent 20 fuel pool study, the human reliability analysis was 21 a paste-on after the fact that ignored all of the 22 conditions that would have been generated by 23 earthquake that would have led to such a problem in 24 the spent fuel pool and you better do something 25 much more appropriate this time around.

MR. HELTON: So, the HRA is a 1 2 the study this time as opposed to part of an 3 additional piece. MEMBER BLEY: Excellent. 4 5 MR. KURITZKY: Okay. Thank you, Don. Moving on to the dry cask 6 All right. 7 PRA, this, again, is something that storage 8 briefed the Subcommittee on in December as fuel 9 expansion and we're essentially done with 10 model. 11 We were going through a revision of the 12 consequence analysis to make it more Vogtle-That's been redone. 13 specific. 14 Because it changed the results a lot, we also sent it back to NMSS, our technical review 15 16 team, and they've re-reviewed it and it's now back 17 and going through project management review. So, 18 it will soon be ready for its technical adequacy 19 review, whatever that entails. The last technical item we have is the 20 21 integrated site PRA. Again, one that we briefed 22 the Subcommittee back in December on. 23 As said then, developed we we 24 approach based on the results and insights from the 25 single-source did models. And we pilot

applications using our internal event, Level 1 model; and an internal event and flood, Level 2 model. We are now doing a pilot application using our Level 1 seismic model.

Also something that came out of the discussion with the Subcommittee back in December was some concern that if we focus entirely on the insights and results of the single-source models, we may miss something that could be important to multi-source scenarios or modeling that just wasn't a part of the single-source modeling.

So, what we have done recently is held a -- kind of a brainstorming session with selected members of our technical advisory group, as well as our big contractor in the area, Energy Research Incorporated, to look at different approaches that we could take to increase our assurance that we haven't missed something important.

number of items And so, а were we're identified that going to pursue, things experience looking operating databases for events that have affected more than one source at a site, looking at operator actions in the singlesource models that might be negatively impacted by something occurring at a different source located

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at that site. So, a number of other areas that we're pursuing to try and get more confidence.

We're also looking to things that we screened out from the single-source models to look at them again now in the perspective of could they be more important from either a frequency or a consequence point of view in a multi-source context.

So, those are some of the approaches that we're going to follow going forward and try and raise that assurance level that we haven't missed anything important.

And just a few of the key milestones. We discussed some of this coming up now. Again, as Barry mentioned, the technical adequacy review is one that's open because the PWR Owners Group can no longer support us on the peer reviews. So, we're kind of debating how we're going to, you know, fill that gap.

Again, as I mentioned, we may end up relying more heavily on the technical advisory group. No decision has been made yet, but one will be forthcoming soon because we have -- as you can see from this viewgraph, there are a number of parts of the study that are getting ready to move

into that phase.

The Level 1 seismic and fire studies are going into that phase probably by the end of this month, as well as the dry cask storage. So, we have to kind of decide how we want to move forward with that.

Coming up in June, we should also hopefully have a complete redo of the Level 2 model for internal events and internal floods. And also, the other hazard screening evaluation should be totally signed off by then.

About a month later, we hope to have the low-power shutdown, Level 1, internal event model ready for its next stage review, whatever that entails.

And the last thing I want to mention is just as has been the case throughout the -- since the beginning of the project, there were certain challenges that have been essentially chronic that have plagued us all along.

Diversion of key staff, the biggest one. Just people get pulled off on higher priority work. And so, they have to put this aside. And so, we have trouble maintaining momentum in some cases.

Also, we've had the same 1 issue 2 some of our contractor staff who have had to work 3 on multiple things. And so, we haven't been able 4 to necessarily maintain momentum as much we'd like. Technical adequacy reviews is the thing 5 we just mentioned about the fact without the PWR 6 7 Owners Group we have to figure out how to plug that 8 gap. 9 And any project of this size and as 10 technically detailed as this one, it's obvious 11 you're going to have certain technical issues that 12 are going to come up and hit you and cause you to strain or cause challenges for the schedule. 13 14 Right now by coincidence, I think, HRA 15 has been one of the number of the areas that has 16 just been hitting us. Whether it be low-power 17 shutdown or fire, it's been one that's been causing 18 us to have to redo some of our work. 19 nonetheless we are as 20 mentioned at the beginning of the meeting, we are 21 making headway in all areas of the study and will 22 continue to hopefully put points on the board. 23 The last thing I want to mention is

just to acknowledge all the support we've had from

different organizations supporting

the

all

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project.

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First and foremost, Southern Nuclear, as we mentioned earlier, has been a tremendous support to us in terms of all the information they provided us and all the support they've given us both onsite and offsite.

The PWR Owners Group even though they're having budget trouble now, but they did a wonderful job supporting us and funding these peer reviews to the standards that were performed in the previous couple years.

Westinghouse and EPRI, as we mentioned, have supplied someone to our technical advisory Most of the technical -- main technical group. have been involved in this offices in the NRC another, either project in one way or we could people rotation that use for the on project team or being on review panels or doing review of documentation just providing or information and feedback to us.

In terms of contractors, the National Laboratories, which involved Idaho National Lab, has been our prime laboratory we've gone to. We've also gotten substantial contributions from Sandia National Laboratories and Pacific Northwest

1	National Laboratories.
2	And going forward, we get to the more
3	overview the expert review of the NUREG, we'll
4	be leaning towards Brookhaven National Laboratory
5	to run that for us.
6	In terms of commercial contractors,
7	Energy Research Incorporated has been our prime
8	contractor. They have been involved in many areas
9	of the study and given us tremendous support there.
LO	And they've also subcontracted out to
L1	Applied Research Associates and IESS who also
L2	support us in specific area. So, it's been a huge
L3	team effort and we appreciate everybody's
L4	contributions. And that's it.
L5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Great. Thank you.
L 6	Let's transition to Mary. And, Mary, I notice you
L7	have 33 slides here, which at the rate we typically
L8	go, is about two-and-a-half hours. So, if you can
L9	kind of hit the highlights
20	MS. DROUIN: A lot of the slides you're
21	not meant to have any discussion.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okie-dokie. Thanks.
23	Let's see if we can keep it to a half an hour or by
24	10:15 or so.
25	MS. DROUIN: Okay. I'm going to try

through the NUREG report, exactly 1 walk you 2 where we are. 3 You know, with many projects, you wait until the very end to write the report, and you're 4 5 out of time and out of money. So, we're trying not to have that occur 6 7 on this project. So, we are actively writing the 8 NUREG now and -- so that when the project 9 finished, our documentation -- as the technical 10 work is concluded, the documentation is concluded 11 almost at the same time. 12 So, I'm just going to quickly kind of 13 remind you, you know, what was the purpose, 14 different types, and the kinds of improvements that 15 we're thinking of, because that was one of the 16 objectives, was to improve documentation. 17 But the bulk of my talk is going to 18 focus on the NUREG report going through the goals 19 and challenges, how we're organizing it and where 20 we are on particularly Parts 1 and 2, and then 21 ultimately the overall status. 22 So, when you think about the purpose of 23 the documentation, you know, you want us to be 24 transparent, you want it to be user-friendly.

somebody pick this up and follow it and understand

it, you know? Is it accessible? Is the information everything, you know, retrievable, understandable and how well have we communicated? So, all of these things have presented a tremendous challenge in this report.

When you look back at 1150, you know, 1150 might have been five plants, but it was just one, you know, reactor, Level 1, and just internal events. So, this thing is, as using Alan's analogy, this Rubik's cube that we've been faced with.

So, we have two levels of documentation. Now, the first one is going to be the publicly available NUREG report. It's in red here, because that's what I'm going to focus on.

And then the other is the non-publicly available technical reports, which you're very much aware of. You've been reading the FAR and the seismic.

Also, in terms of documentation we have these working files. And we had created at the very beginning of the project, all these forms and templates to try and identify all the different types of documentation. We wanted to capture decisions that were made.

A lot of times these things are lost in 1 2 And then when you come back five years a study. 3 afterwards, it's hard to recreate because decisions 4 were made and that was not documented, like, for example, you know, the list of issues, assumptions 5 and their bases, decisions and their bases. 6 7 And then, you know, we have a lot of 8 computer code input and output files and databases, 9 et cetera. So, just to give you a little bit of a 10 flavor of the types of documentation we have. 11 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Mary, may I ask a 12 I was going to ask Alan earlier. question? 13 So, when you go through this review 14 process, in a generic sense, what are you learning? 15 Alan, you kind of inferred that there were areas 16 where you didn't like the results or the results 17 weren't what you expected. 18 When you go through this do loop of 19 reviews and such, what -- can you share and would 20 this report document what you learned -- what were 21 the key learning things from this process in terms 22 of was it how you handled human reliability, was it 23 how you constructed the fault trees, you didn't 24 have enough data?

Is that going to somehow factor into

1	the documentation so that you extract lessons
2	learned from going through these
3	MS. DROUIN: Well, it's documented
4	MEMBER KIRCHNER: processes?
5	MS. DROUIN: in a more, I would say,
6	implicit way. We certainly are creating, like, a
7	list of issues. This thing gets into the lessons
8	learned, the issues we had. And so
9	MEMBER KIRCHNER: That's not going to
10	be publicly available, is it? Is there a way to
11	capture that for the
12	MS. DROUIN: No, those kinds of things
13	
14	MEMBER KIRCHNER: say, the layperson
15	and PRA world?
16	MS. DROUIN: There will be. Let me get
17	to another slide, because one part of the NUREG
18	document is future research.
19	So, some of these more key things will
20	be documented in the NUREG of what you may want to
21	do down the road in the future.
22	MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, the issues and
23	problems you encounter then rework through with
24	your process.
25	These are going to then those open

items -- not open items, but those areas that were 1 2 problematical will then be identified as future 3 research areas? Some of them will, but I 4 MS. DROUIN: don't want to mislead you and tell you that every 5 single little problem that we encounter is --6 7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: No, I'm not asking 8 that. In general, though, I would guess that you 9 find certain -- pick something, fire analysis, you 10 find certain aspects of analyzing that particular 11 set of problems, this is a dominant contributor or 12 impacts risk frequency, whatever. Are there those kind of lessons learned 13 14 when you capture --15 MS. DROUIN: Those --16 MR. KURITZKY: If I could -- so, yes. 17 Those type of things -- in each of the interim 18 reports that Mary was referring to, we will -- we 19 identify things that are insights and things that we've learned. 20 21 Whether it came during the initial work 22 itself, like, for instance, the issue about fire HRA, that didn't -- that wasn't so much the 23 24 review, it was more just the results didn't 25 well with us and we have to look into why. But

1	even but from the review, there may be other
2	things that we pick up.
3	So, all those things that we come up
4	with as insights that we feel drive the results
5	either rightly or wrongly, or other things that we
6	run across in terms of limitations, those get
7	documented in the interim reports.
8	And when we go and do the NUREG report,
9	most of that information, actually, we do want to
10	put in the NUREG report.
11	I mean, if there was something that
12	gets to the level of technical detail that it
13	involves a lot of Southern Nuclear proprietary
14	information, then we would have to sanitize it.
15	But in most of the cases, these things
16	would be more general I don't know what the word
17	general sizeable or whatever.
18	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Generic.
19	MR. KURITZKY: So, we can
20	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Application of PRA.
21	MR. KURITZKY: Right. So, we can put
22	those into the NUREG report.
23	MEMBER KIRCHNER: That's what I was
24	searching for.
25	MR. KURITZKY: But I think our

1	intention
2	MEMBER KIRCHNER: When it doesn't sit
3	well with you, can you give a non-closed example of
4	what category if things didn't sit well with you?
5	MR. KURITZKY: Right.
6	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Was it your modeling
7	approach? Was it lack of data? Was it
8	MR. KURITZKY: I would say this one
9	example that and we're going to get into it in
10	the close session, but I think I can say something
11	about it now, is when we applied the general time-
12	dependent HRA modeling techniques and we're using,
13	I think, the human cognitive HCR/ORE, human
14	cognitive response whatever the O-R-E is. I
15	don't remember exactly right now.
16	But we applied that and we come up in
17	some cases for a particular event where the failure
18	probability is extremely high, which is
19	understandable, because the event has to occur
20	relatively quickly.
21	There are some reasons why we believe
22	there's more time available for the operator to do
23	it than the modeling would apply.
24	And so, we think you're dealing with a

broad rush where you could -- or more focused,

nuanced look would show that maybe it's not as time 1 2 critical to the extent that the model is telling 3 us. addition to dependency of 4 Ιn actions on that one, we also believe that when we 5 apply our dependency model, it might give a certain 6 7 level of dependence even at a very low dependent 8 level. 9 Ιf you say "low dependence," the 10 failure probably is still substantially higher than 11 the independent fire probability. 12 And in these cases, we feel that there might be reasons why the first action would be 13 14 totally distinct from the second action. It really 15 shouldn't apply to dependence even though our model 16 makes us do it. 17 there's examples where the broad 18 application of our HRA method is forcing us to put 19 numbers in that we don't necessarily believe are 20 entirely accurate. And so, that's an example. 21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you. 22 MS. DROUIN: Okay. When you look 23 the NUREG report, one of the things that we're 24 doing that -- and when we set up the whole outline 25 for this, we did go look at 1150 as a starting

point and how could we improve on, you know, what 1 2 was in 1150, you know? What was good about 1150, what was bad, and, you know, what we might want to 3 4 do differently. So, two of the things is that we're 5 including a much more detailed discussion of the 6 7 design and operation of the plant. 8 When start thinking about the you 9 results, part the report, you of know, 10 understanding those reports, putting them 11 context really means you need to understand the 12 plant. 13 And you also need to understand 14 approach that we used to build that model. So, 15 that's another thing we're doing in this is a much 16 more detailed -- it's still a high-level discussion 17 of the approach. 18 So, all the details are down in the 19 technical reports, but, you know, we are putting in a description of the approach that was used kind of 20 21 focusing in on the key assumptions that were made 22 in building each of the individual models and the 23 integrated model. The other thing we're going to try and 24

do is to have an index of key words at the back of

the document. Whether or not we'll be able to make that electronic, I don't know at this point, but we are talking about doing that.

The other thing we've discussed about pursuing is having a separate volume that is a detailed roadmap to all the volumes. So, you don't have to go to the beginning of each report.

And in part of that volume, we are thinking about trying to maybe have a part that has these frequently asked questions we think people might ask. And then that would point you where to go find this type of information. So, those are the things that we're thinking about right now.

So, now we're getting directly into the What are goals and challenges? NUREG report. You to make sure you have you want sufficient information to look at the design and operation, the technical approach, the major results, major insights and perspectives, potential uses and then potential future work, getting back to the discussion we just had, you know, because we're having to make some key discussions on the scope of things we can't do or things we found and we can't fix, because it's just too late, or a lot different reasons. So, documenting that,

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know.

And then we have the major challenge is, you know, just the amount of information because of the size of this project and looking at, you know, the proprietary concerns, having to capture that, you know, what do we include and what we don't include in here.

So, again, it's just a very complex model that has a lot of facets to it. So, trying to figure out, you know, how to catch that and go back and, you know, make sure that this thing is user-friendly and it's traceable and all that good stuff.

So, we had shown this slide before. This is right now the general outline that we're looking at for this NUREG report.

It may be different volumes. Right now it's shown as three volumes, but, you know, that -- it could turn out that Part 1 is more than one volume. It's all going to depend on the size of this.

But right now we are focused on Part 1 and you'll hear at the very end we're almost done with writing Part 1 and we're starting hopefully in the next several weeks to start on Part 2.

1	So, let's get right away I'm not
2	going to go through Section 1, you know. It's the
3	introduction and objectives and scope and all the
4	type of introductory material.
5	MEMBER BLEY: If you're almost done
6	with Part 1, when are you going to share that with
7	us?
8	MS. DROUIN: I would tend to say to
9	share oh, sorry, when you said "Part 1," I
LO	heard, "introduction, Section 1."
L1	Probably, you know, this summer. Early
L2	summer.
L3	MEMBER BLEY: Great.
L 4	MS. DROUIN: I mean, we haven't
L5	discussed that yet, but I would
L6	MR. KURITZKY: Actually, I'll have to
L7	correct Mary on that, because we're not meeting
L8	with you in early summer, but the next time will be
L9	
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: A, you're right. We
21	don't have to meet. And; B, we can always well,
22	I won't say "always," but oftentimes we can find a
23	hole for a meeting especially if it's a half a day,
24	for example.
25	MR. KURITZKY: Yes. What we'll do is

1	we'll discuss later about what the next things we
2	want to present to the Subcommittee.
3	We'll obviously leave it to you to
4	decide what you would like us to talk to you about.
5	MEMBER BLEY: I expect it's not
6	something I'm going to want to read in two days,
7	you know, that I want to go at it slowly, but okay.
8	MR. KURITZKY: You want to enjoy it
9	before bed every night.
LO	(Laughter.)
L1	MR. KURITZKY: It will help put you to
L2	sleep.
L3	So, in any case, yeah, we can discuss
L 4	later what kind of schedule for providing that
L 5	information and what are the topics that we want to
L 6	discuss.
L7	We have on the calendar already a
L8	meeting scheduled for, I think, October 20th, was
L9	the next one we had. So, we can discuss later what
20	you might want us to cover.
21	And then if there is some preliminary
22	meeting or something else you want, then we can
23	discuss that, too.
24	MS. DROUIN: Okay. So, in Section 2,
25	which is a summary of the plant design and

operation, we have a description of the site, the 1 2 reactors, the spent fuel pool, the dry cask storage 3 and all of the systems and structures associated with that. 4 5 So, for each one, you know, we're trying to provide the purpose and function, the 6 7 configuration of it, you know, the actuation 8 both what initiates it, but what also may trip the 9 system -- the success criteria and dependencies. 10 So, we have developed a simplified 11 schematic and a simplified dependency diagram for 12 every system and structure, but we do not provide 13 actual system layout nor plant-specific 14 labeling, because that brings in the proprietary 15 And we have removed all that kind of stuff 16 from the NUREG report. 17 so, the next -- this one is just 18 level of example of the detail of 19 description. I picked the shortest one so it could fit on the slide. 20 21 Of course when you get into the other 22 systems, the system description, you know, is a lot 23 lengthier. 24 The next slides, again these are just 25 I was not going to discuss them, examples.

1	just to give you a feeling for the level of detail
2	that's going in these schematics.
3	This is the reactor one for the overall
4	the next one, there's the auxiliary feedwater
5	system to show it to you.
6	Here's an example of a dependency
7	diagram for the high-pressure injection system.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mary?
9	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: On the dependency
11	diagrams, this one shows what we typically call a
12	support-to-frontline dependency.
13	Are you going to show support-to-
14	support also, I assume?
15	MS. DROUIN: There are ones for that,
16	yes.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
18	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So, it will be for
20	every system?
21	MS. DROUIN: For every system. For
22	every system.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sometimes people
24	don't show those support-to-support
25	MS. DROUIN: No, no, we have the

1 support-to-support. 2 (Simultaneous speaking.) 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Here, I just wanted 4 MS. DROUIN: Yes. 5 to show you just one of the many ones on spent fuel pool because, you know, I -- you know, coming into 6 7 the study like me, for example, spent fuel pool was 8 just a pool with a bunch of fuel in it. And it's a 9 lot more complex than that. So, this is just to, 10 you know, show that -- but there will be quite a 11 few more schematics on the spent fuel pool. 12 I'm kind of glad you said MEMBER BLEY: 13 that, because I sometimes get the impression people 14 only think about tearing a hole in the pool and 15 don't worry about the connected stuff. 16 MS. DROUIN: Right. Right. 17 And then on the next one, which is the 18 cask storage, this is just one. dry There's 19 probably a good 30 drawings of the dry cask storage 20 schematics in the report. 21 So, that was iust quick 22 of Section 2 on the summary of plant 23 And at this point, you'll hear it again design. 24 later, but I**'**ll just go ahead and give you a

preview, you know, Section 2 is pretty much written

at this point in time. We just have a few minor 1 2 cleanups to do. So, now on the summary of the approach, 3 it is divvied up into several different sections. 4 Section 3.1, which is the overall approach -- and 5 it's more of a high-level discussion of how 6 7 constructed the various individual models. 8 And then going into Section 3.2 is 9 where we talk about all the different technical 10 analyses done across the study. 11 And for each technical analysis, we're 12 going to try and give you, you know, the purpose and the objective, the major steps associated with 13 14 the analysis and what the output and products of 15 that analysis are. So, then Sections 3.3 through 3.6 16 17 through each of the major sources; the reactor, the 18 spent fuel pool, the dry cask storage and the site 19 -- the integrated site. 20 And what we try and do here is we have 21 our overall approach we've already discussed, we 22 have all the technical analyses, and now what we're doing in these sections is how did all of that pull 23 24 together to build the various reactor models? 25 you see here is a little And what

1	figure that I'm sure you can't read it. I can't
2	even read it on my copy, but under, like, for
3	example, Section 3.3, it's going to be organized by
4	plant-operating states. So, under Reactor you're
5	going to have at-power and low-power.
6	And then under the At-Power, you'll
7	have level 1, 2, and 3. And under each level, you
8	know, the various hazards.
9	So, it will go into each of the
10	assumptions that were done made in constructing
11	this is not getting into the assumptions on the
12	technical analyses, but the assumptions of how we
13	approach the problem.
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It would be just
15	to make sure I understand, it would be like what we
16	were discussing before like on seismic analyses.
17	You took the hazard and fragility from this
18	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: point. On the
20	fire analyses, you took other information
21	differently at that level.
22	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
24	MS. DROUIN: So, now just to give you -
25	- in Section 3.1, this is a figure that tries to

1	show at a high level the overall approach.
2	So, if you look and you see that blue
3	box, you know, we built a reactor, at-power,
4	internal events Level 1 PRA model. And we built an
5	internal flood, at-power, Level 1. Those two were
6	integrated together to give a Level 2. And then
7	that went over to a Level 3.
8	So, I'm not going to walk through this
9	whole figure, but this is showing the construction
10	from the beginning all the way until we finally get
11	to an integrated risk model.
12	So, 3.1, this figure will be in 3.1,
13	and then there will be quite a bit of discussion
14	explaining, you know, walking through this figure
15	and how we approach the problem.
16	MR. KURITZKY: And, Mary, if I could
17	interrupt for one second, this goes back to a
18	question earlier on that I think Chairman Stetkar
19	had about the when we do the Level 2 and combine
20	things together.
21	Because we actually do in this case,
22	we did a Level 2 model for the internal
23	event/internal flood sequences and cut sets
24	combined together. It was a single Level 2 model.
25	When we get to fire and seismic and

these other hazards in that lower blue box, we're 1 2 going to actually have -- there will be a separate Level 2 quantification because things are going to 3 -- might be different when looking -- in a fire 4 scenario versus a seismic scenario. 5 So, those individual aspects, hazard-6 7 specific aspects will be accommodated in the -- on 8 the model. we're only going to, you know, we'll do 9 10 it as a collective task, so to speak, but they're 11 actually going to be separate submodels in there as 12 we're doing that, that are going to be hazard-13 specific. 14 MS. DROUIN: Yes. And the report will 15 talk to that. 16 MR. KURITZKY: Okay. 17 MS. DROUIN: Okay. Then we move into 18 Section 3.2 and what this figure is trying to show 19 is across all the sources, whether it's, you know, 20 your reactor, your spent fuel pool, your dry cask 21 storage, all the different technical analyses that 22 are performed. 23 So, we are going to have a discussion 24 on each one of these technical analyses. But from 25 level, more generic approach, you know, hiqh

like, for example, everybody does data analysis, 1 2 How did we approach the data analysis on you know. 3 this project? 4 And there might be nuances, you know, 5 depending on the reactor source that we will capture here, but that's what we're trying to do in 6 7 Section 3.2. 8 And the next slide just shows an 9 example of here's what we've written up on 10 parameter estimation analyses, you know, the kind 11 of level of detail we're getting into. 12 But, you know, I don't want to because this is so little, that there's not a lot 13 14 here, because there's a lot of technical analyses, 15 you know, that are done. Then you get into Section 3.3 and this 16 17 is just to give you some examples, you know, of the 18 type of high-level assumptions that we're going to 19 be talking about, you know, in this report. 20 You know, for example, when you're 21 looking at the licensee, the Level 1, at-power, you 22 know, we went in and we assumed that the Southern 23 Nuclear model adequate. was And then we transferred it to SAPHIRE. 24 25 And then based on feedback from our TAG

and other reviews, we modified it. So, that's kind 1 2 of the approach. 3 And I'm not trying to say this will be the only assumption that will be written up on the 4 Level 1, internal events, but these are the, 5 know, types of assumptions, you know, that we're 6 7 talking about, you know. 8 We assume the licensee seismic hazard 9 and fragility analyses were adequate based on staff 10 reviews, we mapped the fire sequences from 11 Vogtle fire PRA into a manageable number, you know, 12 so, I won't, you know, go through all et cetera. 13 of these assumptions. 14 So, then we get to the summary of the 15 This results. is the real, you know, 16 challenges, we might thought about, you know, 17 write the design, and particularly the to up 18 approach, and capture that, this part is going to 19 be really challenging.

> And so, we're starting to think about it right now, because we have a Level 1 study that's wrapping up.

> And so, we're going to be ready to start writing, you know, Part 2 of the NUREG this summer, you know, come June.

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1	So, first of all, you know, the
2	quantitative results, you know, what are those
3	going to include?
4	So, it will include, you know, for
5	example, like, core damage frequency and then the
6	relative contributions including importance
7	measures.
8	We're only planning right now to report
9	the mean with the 95th and 5th percentile
10	contributions, you know, and perhaps a
11	distribution.
12	We are not, at this point in time,
13	proposing to show any median values or point
14	estimates. Now, how we plan to present these
15	results, there's a lot of options available to us.
16	So, if we first look at and I'll
17	come back to that in a minute, but let's quickly go
18	through each source.
19	When it comes to the site risk, you
20	know, all we're talking about reporting are the
21	health effects from each source.
22	You know, you cannot report, you know,
23	cost, you know, what are the different operating
24	states, because that becomes meaningless when
25	you're talking about operating states for the

reactor versus the spent fuel pool versus the dry 1 2 cask storage in an integrated manner. 3 And the same thing with, you know, the 4 PRA levels. They take on different meaning 5 depending on the source. So, in terms of the results that we'll 6 7 be reporting for, the site risk, that will stay 8 more likely at the health effects level. 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mary, I was just 10 thinking I -- I'm a little slow. Before you said 11 you were going to present means, 5th and 95th. 12 Those are certainly important. 13 MS. DROUIN: Right. 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Why did you -- point 15 estimate is meaningless, so that -- why did you 16 decide not to publish the medians? 17 Many people, you know, to understand 18 that there's a 50 percent probability that it's 19 less than its value, a 50 percent that it's lower, most folks who read this are not familiar with the 20 21 nuances of skewed distributions and why the mean 22 might be closer to, you know, the 80th percentile, 23 for example. 24 MS. DROUIN: You know, this --25 know, now I'm revisiting all these discussions back

1	in 1150 on this.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Just
3	MS. DROUIN: But I'll tell you my
4	reason is that this is an NRC regulatory report.
5	NRC does not deal with medians. All of our
6	decisions are based on means.
7	So, in terms of this being used yes,
8	to the general public or to certain people a median
9	might have some interest, but
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, to me it would
11	have some interest, for example
12	MS. DROUIN: And
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: you know. To
14	know that the mean is
15	MS. DROUIN: And I wasn't going to say
16	your name in particular.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 30 percent higher
18	than the median is sort of interesting.
19	MS. DROUIN: But it
20	MEMBER BLEY: You'll still see that
21	without it, but
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You will.
23	MEMBER BLEY: I kind of agree it's
24	nice to see the picture
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The point estimate

1	is only confusing and is
2	MS. DROUIN: Right.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: irrelevant,
4	obviously.
5	MS. DROUIN: But it's something
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's on the record,
7	I made a comment.
8	MS. DROUIN: we can think about.
9	Okay.
10	So, the point okay. Then we go to
11	the reactor risk, you know. Okay. So, now for,
12	you know, each of the levels for each, you know, we
13	have results for each hazard and across hazards.
14	And the same thing for Level 2 and Level 3.
15	For low-power shutdown results, we're
16	only talking about Level 1, 2 and 3 for internal
17	events, because more qualitative analyses are being
18	done for the others.
19	But for all of these, whether it's the
20	at-power or low-power shutdown, you know, we're
21	talking about being able to provide, for example,
22	you know, accident sequence contributions, SSC
23	contribution from your basic events, you know,
24	where that's appropriate.
25	We may not have an integrated model for

1	at-power and low-power shutdown. That isn't yet to
2	be, you know, we haven't determined whether or not
3	we're going to have that.
4	So, going to the next slide
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: When you say you
6	might not have an integrated model, you will have
7	results that are internally consistent with one
8	another regardless of how you do the bookkeeping.
9	MS. DROUIN: We may not have an
10	integrated quantitative model.
11	MR. KURITZKY: Let me just clarify,
12	too. We will have in our SAPHIRE model platform,
13	we will have the internal event the low-power
14	shutdown model in there also with the at-power
15	model for internal events, but we are not likely
16	going to have a fully quantified low-power shutdown
17	model for the other hazards beyond internal events.
18	So, it just wouldn't be so, we're
19	just not going to have the full spectrum of hazards
20	in an integrated low-power shutdown power, because
21	you're probably not going to have all the fully
22	quantified results for the other hazards for low-
23	power shutdown.
24	MEMBER BLEY: So, fire and seismic
25	won't be there for low-power shutdown.

1	MR. KURITZKY: Unlikely to have a
2	quantified model to the detail of the other
3	aspects.
4	MEMBER BLEY: Oh.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: All we're going to
6	really be interested in seeing, we as soon as
7	you figure out how you're going to do fire and
8	seismic in enough detail so that we can understand
9	what you're really going to do, not conceptual,
10	we'd like to hear about that.
11	MR. KURITZKY: We'll come back to you
12	with that.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And not, you know,
14	not after all of the decimal points are in there,
15	but how you're really going to do that.
16	MR. KURITZKY: Yeah. In this case,
17	it's less the decimal points, it's more the dollar
18	sign to begin with.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. Well, it's
20	MS. DROUIN: And time.
21	Okay. Next slide. Okay. For
22	MEMBER BLEY: Let me at least state an
23	assumption.
24	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
25	MEMBER BLEY: And the assumption is you

1	will at least acknowledge the potential
2	significance of what's not in the model.
3	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
4	MEMBER BLEY: Rather than just saying
5	it's not there.
6	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
8	MS. DROUIN: For the spent fuel pool,
9	you know, we're looking at fuel damage frequency,
LO	you know, reactor release frequency and the health
L1	effects, you know, for the combined hazards and
L2	combined operating states. For the dry cask
L3	storage, though, we're looking at just the health
L4	effects.
L5	Now, for both of them, you know, we
L6	would be able to provide, you know, accident
L7	sequence contributions and SSC contributions, you
L 8	know, where appropriate.
L9	Okay. These next several slides are
20	just to show you all the different options that are
21	available to us, you know.
22	We haven't, you know, they all look
23	great. We can't, you know, do them all. So, it's
24	going to be, you know, which one do we think is the
2.5	most informative in communicating information.

You know, on the first one, you know, 1 2 you could do a bar chart. The light blue is at-3 The dark blue, I don't know why it didn't 4 show up, is, like, low-power shutdown. So, we could do something like that. 5 There's all different versions of pie 6 7 charts, you know, we could do. You know, those are 8 three there. 9 On the next slide, you can take these 10 pie charts and you can expand them out to show, you 11 know, here's -- on that one percent, you know, 12 here's its relative contribution. So, a lot of 13 neat things you can do there. 14 Then we got these things, you know, 15 that are -- the top one, this is what you saw in 16 1150, the line charts, you know, which are showing 17 your -- here, the main and the 95th and the 5th 18 percentile. 19 You can do a type of sample chart. 20 Those were also in 1150. And then you have, you 21 know, what we call the curve charts. Those were 22 also in 1150. 23 So, this is just a quick, you know, 24 table just kind of showing you the disadvantages --25 I don't know if it's disadvantages, but what each

1	one of them can do, you know, if you look at, you
2	know, the bar chart, pie, line, curve and sample
3	chart, you know, the different things you get from
4	these different presentations.
5	So, we may do all of these. We may do
6	some of them. I don't know yet. We're only right
7	now starting to explore the different ways.
8	So, you know, the questions are, you
9	know, do we just provide numerical results on
10	figures, no figures at all, just some tables? Of
11	course neither one of those, I think, will go down
12	that route.
13	So, I'm sure we're going to have a
14	combination of figures and tables and what exactly
15	would be that combination. That's what we're going
16	to struggle with
17	MEMBER BLEY: Do you want some
18	thoughts?
19	MS. DROUIN: Absolutely. That's why
20	we're, you know, you don't have to give them to us
21	today.
22	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah, I will think about
23	these. But one thing I will say for sure, if you
24	go back to page 30, you need some of this kind of
25	information to convey the uncertainty.

1	MS. DROUIN: Right.
2	MEMBER BLEY: And tables don't at
3	least for me, tables don't do it.
4	MS. DROUIN: I agree.
5	MEMBER BLEY: Any of these pictures
6	kind of does it for me and I think you're going to
7	need a mix. But, you know, for some that top one,
8	the line charts, really lets you see comparisons.
9	We'll think about it and get back to
10	you, but at least some of this kind of information
11	is essential because it doesn't communicate from
12	tables, at least for some of us.
13	MS. DROUIN: I agree. We're going to
14	have to have figures and tables.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Tables don't
16	MS. DROUIN: But, you know, the
17	challenge is not just only what figure, but, like,
18	if you look at that line chart, you know, here,
19	this is reactor, you know, at-power showing the
20	different hazards for at-power and low-power
21	shutdown.
22	Now, we may not have that, as we showed
23	earlier, for low-power shutdown. So, if what do
24	we put, how much information relative in terms of
25	comparison, you know?

1	I mean, we could just have, okay,
2	here's a figure for internal events and that's, you
3	know, and then a figure for it's when we start
4	combining some of this stuff, what kind of
5	combinations do we want to do?
6	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah. And I think
7	this is just off the top of my head. In cases
8	where you haven't done all the work yet, some hint
9	of what it might be based on judgment of the team,
10	might be worthwhile if you can make that clear.
11	I'm thinking of a few phase studies
12	that were done where that was tried and then tested
13	against final results later on, and it helped.
14	We'll think more about it and talk to
15	you more later, because this is just popped at us
16	and
17	MS. DROUIN: Right. So, I wasn't
18	looking for an answer today on this. But for
19	y'all, you know, we absolutely welcome your input
20	on the type of figures
21	MEMBER BLEY: Well, this isn't enough
22	help. Just for me, that doesn't that doesn't
23	get to what it's really the nuances of these
24	different presentations that
25	MS. DROUIN; Yes. Yes.

1	MEMBER BLEY: what they convey. And
2	we'll think about that and maybe jot some notes on
3	it.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: One other quick
5	comment on bar charts are I can read them,
6	but I often get fooled.
7	This will be a public report. They
8	don't convey the information that ought to be
9	conveyed, you know.
10	People tend to look at it and forget
11	the fact that that's a logarithmic scale on the y-
12	axis and that the if you really plotted those
13	things, you would see huge, huge differences in
14	those heights.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Of course that happens on
16	the probability curves, too.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It does. It does,
18	too. It does, too.
19	MEMBER BLEY: You might think
20	something you haven't shown us, you might think
21	and I've seen people do this, of having, whether
22	it's a bar chart or pie chart or whatever or curve,
23	both a logarithmic semi-log one and a linear one
24	so you really do pop these things at you that, you

know, we're seeing detail in this logarithmic kind

25

1	of display, but really this one sticks way the hell
2	up over the other one. Just think about it. Play
3	with it.
4	MS. DROUIN: Yeah.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: One of the displays
6	well, again, play with it. The I found it
7	quite effective to display curves, probability
8	distribution functions, but density functions on
9	a logarithmic scale and plot
LO	MS. DROUIN: Yeah. I didn't show that
L1	one.
L2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: and plot them,
L3	because
L 4	MS. DROUIN: I didn't show that on
L 5	here.
L 6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: there you can
L7	visually see the uncertainty, for example. And one
L8	contributor spans maybe five orders of magnitude
L 9	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: versus something
21	else that's very peaked and show, then, how the
22	means stack up.
23	MEMBER BLEY: But you're still fooled
24	by the
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You're still fooled

1	by the logarithmic. You can't get away from that.
2	You can't.
3	MEMBER BLEY: You can do both.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You can do both.
5	MS. DROUIN: But I think y'all
6	appreciate, you know, this is going to be a
7	challenge to figure out how to present these
8	results.
9	So, last one, so where are we? And
10	I've kind of told you where we are, you know. On
11	part 1, Section 1, introduction is complete.
12	Section 2 is complete. And section 3 is 90 percent
13	complete and we expect to be complete by the end of
14	May.
15	Part 2 on the summary of results, we're
16	initiating that right now. And that's why, you
17	know, how we're going to display these results
18	critical, you know. We need to be making some of
19	these decisions and it doesn't mean we can't revise
20	them.
21	And I'm sure as we start writing the
22	Results section, you know, that we'll probably have
23	an iterative process on deciding what to do here.
24	Volume 3 we didn't really talk about.
25	I talked about it at a previous presentation, but

1	this is where, you know, it's going to talk about,
2	you know, the perspectives and uses. Future
3	research, for example, would be in this section.
4	So, I'm not real sure when we're going
5	to start working on Part 3. Hopefully maybe
6	sometime this summer, start really giving it some
7	serious thought.
8	So, that's all I was I believe that
9	was the last slide.
10	MR. KURITZKY: Sorry, Mary, let me
11	this is to Dr. Kirchner. I think this volume
12	Part 3, Volume 3, is probably where some of the
13	information you were asking about
14	MS. DROUIN: Yes.
15	MR. KURITZKY: will probably show up
16	in that volume.
17	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mary, thank you for
19	the heroic effort. I said, "Let's try to finish by
20	10:15," and you're like
21	MS. DROUIN: And you let me do it.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 18 seconds early.
23	Now, this will end the open session of
24	today's meetings. So, what I'd like to do first is
25	ask if we have any members of the public in the

1	room who would like to make a comment. And if so,
2	please come up to the microphone and do so.
3	(Pause.)
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Not seeing the
5	stampede, I will ask are there any members of the
6	public on the bridge line who would like to make a
7	comment? And if so, please speak up, identify
8	yourself and make a comment.
9	MR. LEWIS: Marvin Lewis, member of the
10	public.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Hello, Mr. Lewis.
12	MR. LEWIS: Oh, wonderful. Okay.
13	Thank you for the welcome.
14	Yes, PRA Level 3, finally I seem to see
15	the light and understand what you're talking about
16	as the consequences.
17	Here's my problem with it, though. I -
18	- there as guy named Hartman down at Three Mile
19	Island Number 2, who was a technician, and
20	subsequently gave testimony in Three Mile Island's
21	Number 2 hearings.
22	What his job was, is he measures the
23	leakage. And he used a tank. He could bubble
24	hydrogen through it and the hydrogen was used to
25	control some oxidation or corrosion, whatever you

want to call it, but that's -- his boss told him to 1 2 do it -- in fact, ordered him to do. 3 And he went on the record with that was to bubble the hydrogen through the tank to increase 4 the volume of the water in the tank so that the 5 readings would look like there was a minimum -- or 6 7 allowable leakage instead of greater 8 allowable leakage. 9 And of course if the readings had been 10 taken without bubbling hydrogen through the tank, the reactor would have been off and there would 11 12 have been no Three Mile Island Number 2 accident back in '79. 13 14 Well, this is my problem: I look at 15 these things, I see all these writings, I see all 16 numbers being presented from one to 17 I see the licensee come in with numbers and 18 numbers and numbers and I see the staff going 19 through the numbers. 20 And then at the end, the work product 21 does not have the actual name of the engineer or 22 technician running out the numbers or feeding 23 through the computer or getting the numbers from 24 whatever source they're getting the numbers to.

So, although it looks like a beautiful

25

1	presentation and of course it meets the
2	requirements and the regulations and the rules, I
3	don't see where these numbers come from except
4	perhaps from the licensee unchecked
5	unquestioned.
6	Now, that's my feeling on it. I do not
7	know how close to the truth I am. I hope I'm not,
8	but that's the way I feel about it. Thank you.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Great. Thank you
LO	very much for that comment. I appreciate that very
L1	much.
L2	Are there any other members of the
L3	public on the line? If so, please identify
L 4	yourself and make a comment.
L 5	(Pause.)
L 6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Not hearing any, to
L7	close out the public section, as we usually do, I'd
L 8	like to go around the table and see if any members
L9	have any final comments that you'd like to make.
20	And I'll start with Ron.
21	MEMBER BALLINGER: No further comments.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you.
23	Matt.
24	MEMBER SUNSERI: I have no comments.
25	Thank you.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dennis.
2	MEMBER BLEY: Nothing beyond what I've
3	said. Thanks.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Walt.
5	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you, no.
6	Nothing at this point.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And, Joy?
8	MEMBER REMPE: I just wanted to thank
9	everyone for their presentations and hard work and
10	no comments.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I'd like to echo
12	that. Thank you very much. With that, we are
13	going to close the open session, recess, and we
14	will come back in closed session at 10:35.
15	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
16	went off the record at 10:19 a.m.)
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Full-Scope Site Level 3 PRA

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reliability and PRA Subcommittee

May 2, 2017 (Open Session)

Alan Kuritzky
Division of Risk Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
(301-415-1552, Alan.Kuritzky@nrc.gov)

Outline

- Open Session
 - Project status overview
 - Draft report Format and Contents
- Closed Session
 - Fire PRA
 - Review of SNC fire PRA
 - NRC scoping study
 - Scenario mapping and quantification
 - Seismic PRA
 - Seismic hazard and fragilities
 - PRA model and quantification




Level 3 PRA Project Status Overview

May 2, 2017


Alan Kuritzky
Division of Risk Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
(301-415-1552, Alan.Kuritzky@nrc.gov)

Outline of Presentation

- Reactor, at-power, internal events and floods
- Reactor, at-power, internal fires and seismic events
- Reactor, at-power, high winds and other hazards
- Reactor, low power and shutdown
- Spent fuel pool
- Dry cask storage
- Integrated site
- Path Forward




Generic Process for PRA Model Development



Project Status

Combined status of model development, project reviews, and project documentation



Reactor, At-Power, Internal Events and Floods

- Completed ASME/ANS PRA standard-based peer review of Level 1, 2, and 3 PRAs, led by PWR Owners Group
- Completed substantive update to Level 1 and 2
 PRAs to address peer review and other comments
 - Level 1 internal flood report nearing completion
 - Level 2 internal event and flood PRA undergoing internal technical review
- Performing substantive update to Level 3 PRA to reflect revised source terms and address peer review and other comments
- Completed expert elicitation for interfacing systems LOCA

Reactor, At-Power, Internal Fires and Seismic Events

- Completed initial revision of Level 1 fire and seismic PRA models and documentation based on new input from SNC
- Performed additional human reliability analysis to address internal consistency of human error probabilities for internal events and internal fires
- Currently resolving internal technical review comments for both studies
- Recently initiated Level 2 modeling for internal fires and seismic events

Reactor, At-Power, High Winds and Other Hazards

- Completed ASME/ANS PRA standard-based peer review, led by PWROG
- Completed substantive update to "Other Hazards" report to address peer review and other comments
 - Currently undergoing internal technical review
- Performing substantial update of high wind PRA to address peer review and other comments, as well as incorporate additional information obtained from high wind walkdown and follow-on analyses performed by ARA

Reactor, Low Power and Shutdown

- Initial LPSD Level 1 PRA model for internal events nearing completion
 - Major update to HRA documentation (some HEPs changing)
 - Need to re-perform HRA dependency analysis
- Work continuing on LPSD Level 2 PRA
 - Completed MELCOR model development
 - Completed bridge tree and plant damage state (PDS) modeling
 - Completed provisional PDS quantification and selection of representative accident sequences (for deterministic modeling)
- Performed a Phenomena Identification and Ranking Technique (PIRT) expert elicitation to identify ranked list of focus areas for LPSD PRA
 - Recently received contractor report (internal)
 - Planning to also prepare NUREG/CR

Spent Fuel Pool PRA

- Initiated contract with SNL to speed progress
- Continuing to construct and shakedown accident progression model (MELCOR)
- Screened several initiating events
- For large seismic events (primary event of concern):
 - Defined leak rates and locations
 - Continue to refine modelling assumptions

Dry Cask Storage PRA

- Completed initial Level 1/2/3 model and documentation for all hazards
- Revised consequence analysis to be Vogtlespecific
- Completed internal technical review (NMSS)
- Currently undergoing Level 3 PRA management review

Integrated Site PRA

- Developed an approach for an integrated site PRA model using single-source PRA model results and risk insights to prioritize the systematic identification and modeling of multi-source accident scenarios and inter-source dependencies
- Completed pilot applications of the approach for:
 - Reactor Units 1 & 2, at-power, internal events, Level 1 PRA
 - Reactor Units 1 & 2, at-power, internal events and floods, Level 2 PRA
- Currently performing a pilot application of the approach for Reactor Units 1 & 2, at-power, seismic events, Level 1 PRA
- Recently held a brainstorming session with TAG members on addressing known limitations of using single-source PRA models to identify and prioritize multi-source accident scenarios

Path Forward (1 of 2)

Key upcoming milestones

- Reactor, at-power, Level 1, seismic event PRA ready for technical adequacy review (May 2017)
- Reactor, at-power, Level 1, internal fire PRA ready for technical adequacy review (May 2017)
- Dry cask storage, Level 1, 2, and 3 PRA ready for technical adequacy review (May 2017)
- Complete updated reactor, at-power, Level 2, internal event and flood PRA (June 2017)
- Complete updated reactor, at-power, other hazards report (June 2017)
- Reactor, LPSD, Level 1, internal event PRA ready for technical adequacy review (July 2017)

Path Forward (2 of 2)

- Schedule challenges
 - Diversion of key staff
 - Contractor staff availability
 - Technical adequacy reviews
 - Resolution of key technical issues

Acknowledgements

- SNC
- PWR Owners Group
- Westinghouse
- EPRI
- NSIR, NRO, NRR, NMSS, Regions, TTC
- National Laboratories (INL, SNL, PNNL, BNL)
- Commercial Contractors (ERI, ARA, IESS)

Acronyms and Definitions

ANS American Nuclear Society

ARA Applied Research Associates

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

ERI Energy Research, Inc.
HEP Human error probability
HRA Human reliability analysis

IESS Innovative Engineering & Safety Solutions, LLC

INL Idaho National Laboratory
LOCA Loss of coolant accident
LPSD Low power and shutdown

PDS Plant damage state

PIRT Phenomena Identification and Ranking Technique

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratories

PRA Probabilistic risk assessment

PWROG PWR Owners Group

SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company

SNL Sandia National Laboratories
TAG Technical Advisory Group



Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reliability and PRA Subcommittee

May 2, 2017 (Open Session)

Mary Drouin

Division of Risk Analysis

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

(301-415-2091, Mary.Drouin@nrc.gov)

Outline

- Documentation
 - Purpose
 - Types
 - Improvements
- NUREG Report
 - Goals and challenges
 - Organization
 - Part 1 examples
 - Part 2 plan and options
- Status

Purpose of Documentation

- Transparency of work
- User friendly
- Accessible
- Retrievable
- Understandable
- Communication

Documentation

- Two levels of documentation
 - Reports
 - Publicly available NUREG report
 - Non-publicly available detailed technical reports
 - Working files
 - Variety of "forms" created to document information; for example
 - List of issues
 - Assumptions and bases
 - Decisions and bases
 - Computer code input/outputs files, databases, etc.

Example Improvements

- In the NUREG report
 - More detailed discussion of the design and operation of the plant
 - High level discussion on the approach
 - Discussion on key assumptions
 - Include index of "key words"
- Volume that provides a detailed roadmap to both the NUREG and all the technical reports
 - Option include "frequently asked questions" with pointer/links to specific location in the report(s)



NUREG Report

Goals and Challenges

- Contains sufficient information to understand:
 - Design and operation of the plant
 - The technical approach
 - Major assumptions
 - Major results
 - Major insights and perspectives
 - Potential uses
 - Potential future work
- Major challenges
 - The level of detail of information in the report recognizing concern regarding propriety information
 - The significant amount of information what to and not to include so as not to overwhelm the reader but remain informative
 - How to represent the information in an efficient and understandable manner for a "four dimensional" PRA model that addresses multiple sources, multiple hazards, multiple operating states, and all three PRA levels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NUREG-xxxx, "An Assessment of Site Risk for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2"

Part 1 (Volume 1)

Introduction and Summary of Approach and Plant Description

Part 2 (Volume 2)
Summary of Results

Part 3 (Volume 3)
Perspectives and Uses

Executive Summary

- 1. Introduction
 - 1.1 Background
 - 1.2 Objectives
 - 1.3 Scope of Risk Analysis
 - 1.4 Assumptions and Limitations
 - 1.4 Structure of NUREG
- 2. Summary of Plant Design and Operation
 - 2.1 Site
 - 2.2 Reactor Units
 - 2.3 Spent Fuel Pool
 - 2.4 Dry Cask Storage
- 3. Summary of Approach*
 - 3.1 Overall Approach
 - 3.2 Technical Analyses
 - 3.3 Reactor Risk Model
 - 3.4 Spent Fuel Pool Risk Model
 - 3.5 Dry Cask Storage Risk Model
 - 3.6 Site Risk Model
- *Approach addresses the different hazards and operating states

4. Reactor Risk Results*

- 4.1 Level 1
- 4.2 Level 2
- 4.3 Level 3
- 5. Spent Fuel Pool Risk Results*
 - 5.1 Level 1/2
 - 5.2 Level 3
- 6. Dry Cask Storage Risk Results*
 - 6.1 Level 1/2
 - 6.2 Level 3
- 7. Site Risk Results*
 - 7.1 Level 1
 - 7.2 Level 2
 - 7.3 Level 3

Appendices (Volume 4)

- A. Glossary
- B. Project Organization
- C. Quality Assurance
- D. Results of Independent Expert Review and Public Review

- B. Overall Perspectives
 - Significant accident sequences
 - Significant contributors
 - Important design and operational features
 - · Significant uncertainties
- 9. Reactor Risk Perspectives*
- 10. Spent Fuel Pool Risk Results*
- 11. Dry Cask Storage Risk Results*
- 12. Site Risk Results*
- 13. Comparison to Previous Studies
 - 13.1 Reactor Safety Study
 - 13.2 NUREG-1150
 - 13.3 IPE/IPEEE Results
- 14. NUREG-xxxx as a Resource Document
 - 14.1 Guidance for Enhancing the Technical Basis for the Use of Risk Information
 - 14.2 Guidance for Improving the PRA State-of-Practice
 - 14.3 Identifying Safety and Regulatory Improvements
 - 14.4 Supporting Knowledge Management
- 15. Potential Future Research

^{*}Results are presented for the different hazards and operating states

^{*}Same subset of perspectives as listed for Section 8

Section 2 – Summary of Plant Design and Operation


- Description of site, reactors, spent fuel pools, dry cask storage
- Brief description provided for each structure and system modeled
 - Purpose and function
 - Configuration
 - Actuation
 - Success criteria
 - Dependencies
- Simplified schematic provided for each structure and system
- Dependency diagram provided for each system
- No actual system layout provided nor plant-specific labeling

Example System Description – Accumulator Injection System


The accumulators provide a means for the passive injection of borated water into the reactor vessel to preserve fuel integrity in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Each of the four accumulators discharges through a separate line into a cold leg of the reactor coolant system (RCS). Each discharge line contains two check valves and one motor-operated valve (MOV) which is normally open with power removed at the motor control center (MCC). Each MOV receives a confirmatory safety injection (SI) signal to open. Each accumulator contains borated water and is pressurized with a nitrogen blanket. The nitrogen pressure is used to propel the accumulator contents into the cold leg when RCS pressure drops below the accumulator pressure (approximately 650 psig).

A simplified schematic and an associated dependency diagram are shown in Figures 2-4 and 2-5, respectively, in Section 2.3.


Example Schematic – Reactor Systems




Example Schematic – Auxiliary Feedwater




Example Dependency Diagram – High Pressure Injection



Example Schematic – Spent Fuel Pool



Example Schematic – Dry Cask Storage




Section 3 – Summary of Approach (1/2)


- Section 3.1 Overall Approach
 - Discussion of the construction of the various individual models
- Section 3.2 Technical Analysis
 - Discussion of the supporting technical analyses (e.g., systems analysis) for the different sources, hazards, and risk levels
 - Purpose/objectives of analysis
 - Major steps associated with analysis
 - Output/products of the analysis

Section 3 – Summary of Approach (2/2)


- Section 3.3 thru 3.6 Key assumptions for the construction of the models
 - 3.3 reactor
 - 3.4 spent fuel pool
 - 3.5 dry cask storage
 - 3.6 integrated site
- Organized by plant operating state, risk level, and hazard



Section 3.1 – Overall Approach



Section 3.2 -- Technical Analyses



Example Description – Parameter Estimation Analysis

Parameter estimation analysis quantified the frequencies of the initiating events, as well as the equipment (and structure) failure probabilities and equipment unavailabilities of the modeled systems (i.e., basic events). The estimation process included a mechanism for addressing uncertainties and has the ability to combine different sources of data in a coherent manner, including the actual operating history and experience of the plant when it is of sufficient quality, as well as applicable generic experience. For the basic events, the needed parameters estimated (e.g., failure on demand) and the required data was identified and their boundaries were established consistent with the systems analysis. The various equipment (components) were grouped into a homogeneous population for parameter estimation based on their design, environmental and service conditions. Both generic and plant-specific data was collected consistent with the defined component boundary conditions and the component groups. Plant records were reviewed to obtain the data necessary to perform the parameter estimation. The estimations were based on an integration of both generic and plant-specific data.

Examples of Key Assumptions (1/3)

- Assumed licensee Level 1 at-power reactor internal events PRA model was adequate as a starting point
 - Model was transferred onto the SAPHIRE platform and modified based on the feedback from the ACRS, ANS/ASME PRA Standard peer review, and internal reviews
- Assumed licensee seismic hazard and fragility analyzes were adequate based on staff review
- Fire scenarios
 - Mapped fire sequences from Vogtle fire PRA into manageable number of fire scenarios based on similar plant response to fire

Examples of Key Assumptions (2/3)

- Level 1 low power shutdown model implemented a prioritization scheme based on containment status, time to boiling and event frequency to determine plant operating modes
- Low ambient temperature hazard
 - Assumed risk is dominated by human error versus equipment failure
- Airborne pathway
 - Focused on airborne radiological releases only, e.g., only airborne releases are passed to the offsite consequence analysis
 - Past experience indicates that airborne releases generally dominate relative to other pathways

Example of Key Assumptions (3/3)

Dry cask storage

- Modeled in detail all known hypothetical hazards/events that had the potential to challenge systems and result in radionuclide release
- Screened hazards/events based on previous experience

Integrated site risk

 Assumed risk dominated by dependencies among risk sources and significant contributors from individual risk sources

Part 2 – Summary of Results

- Challenge regarding which results to report and how to present results
- Quantitative results would include
 - "Risk" results (e.g., core damage frequency), relative contributions including importance measures
 - Mean values with 95% and 5% and distribution (not proposing to show medians or point estimates)
- Several options available

Quantitative Results—Site Risk

- Health effect results from each source
- No similarities of plant operating states among risk sources
- No similarities in PRA level quantification among risk sources

Quantitative Results – Reactor Risk

At-Power Results


- Level 1
 - For each hazard (i.e., internal hazards, seismic, high winds) and across hazards – core damage frequency
- Level 2
 - For each hazard and across hazards radionuclide release frequency (RRF) and conditional containment probabilities
- Level 3
 - For each hazard and across hazards health effect results (fatalities, population dose)
- LPSD Results
 - Level 1, 2, and 3 results for internal events
- For each of the above, would provide accident sequence contributions and SSC contribution, where appropriate
- May not have an integrated model for at-power and low power shutdown conditions


Quantitative Results – SFP and DCS Risk


- Spent Fuel Pool Risk
 - Fuel damage frequency, RRF, and health effect results for combined hazards and combined operating states
- Dry Cask Storage Risk
 - Health effect results for combined hazards and combined operating states
- For each of the above, would provide accident sequence contributions and SSC contribution, where appropriate

Presentation Options (1/3)

(numbers are meaningless, only for illustration)









Presentation Options (2/3)

(numbers are meaningless, only for illustration)




Pie Charts




Presentation Options (3/3)

(numbers are meaningless, only for illustration)






Sample Chart



Curve Chart



Presentation Options – Advantages and Disadvantages

Item	Bar	Pie	Line	Curve	Sample
Hazards	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	X	\checkmark
Plant States	\checkmark	X	\checkmark	X	X
Mean Value	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
% Contribution	X	\checkmark	X	X	X
95%/5%	X	X	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Distribution	X	X	X	\checkmark	\checkmark

Numerical Presentation Options

- Just provide numerical results on figures?
- No figures, just provide in tables?
- Provide a combination of figures and tables?
 - What would be the combination?

NUREG REPORT Status

- Part 1 (Volume 1) -- Introduction and Summary of Approach and Plant Description
 - Section 1 Introduction Draft complete
 - Section 2 Summary of Plant Design and Operation –
 Draft complete
 - Section 3 Summary of Technical Approach Draft 90% complete
- Part 2 (Volume 2) -- Summary of Results Initiating
- Part 3 (Volume 3) -- Perspectives and Uses To be started