



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION IV
1600 E. LAMAR BLVD
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

March 30, 2015

Mr. Lou Cortopassi, Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4
P.O. Box 550
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550

**SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF NRC INSPECTION MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 OVERSIGHT AND
TRANSITION TO THE ROUTINE REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS FOR
FORT CALHOUN STATION**

Dear Mr. Cortopassi:

This letter is to notify you of the transition of regulatory oversight of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350, "Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in an Extended Shutdown as a Result of Significant Performance Problems," process to the IMC 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program (ROP)" process. This transition will become effective on April 1, 2015. Based on current plant performance, FCS will be placed in the Licensee Response Column of the ROP Action Matrix. This letter provides the schedule for inspections that will be conducted at the facility through June 30, 2016. In addition, NRC inspections to monitor your continuing efforts to sustain improved plant performance and comply with the commitments identified in our December 17, 2013, Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) EA-13-243 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13351A395) will be conducted for the remaining CAL open items in coordination with their completion.

Background

By letter dated December 13, 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. ML113470721), the NRC informed Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) that FCS transitioned to increased regulatory oversight as prescribed by IMC 0350 based on the plant being in an extended shutdown with significant performance problems and a significant operational event involving a fire in safety-related electrical switchgear on June 7, 2011.

In accordance with IMC 0350, an NRC Oversight Panel was chartered to coordinate and oversee NRC activities needed to verify proper station safety performance prior to and following plant restart, and to ensure that agency focus and resources supported the review of OPPD improvement initiatives. Under the direction of the Oversight Panel, NRC staff completed inspection, assessment, and licensing activities and evaluated the effectiveness of OPPD's

actions to address the issues that resulted in the extended plant shutdown. The Oversight Panel assessed the effectiveness of OPPD's corrective actions based on inspection results. The Oversight Panel determined that there was no safety concern with restart of FCS and recommended closure of CAL EA-020 dated February 26, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13057A287). The Oversight Panel also recommended issuing a post-restart CAL in support of continuing performance improvement in a number of areas including the corrective action process (CAP). The NRC's decision to lift its restrictions on the restart of FCS, and basis for the decision, were described in a December 17, 2013, letter to OPPD (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A423). The letter addressed the CAL closure, Restart Checklist closure, coordination of the restart decision with other federal agencies, OPPD commitments, and continuation of enhanced NRC regulatory oversight of FCS after restart.

The NRC issued post-restart CAL EA-13-243 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A395) on December 17, 2013. This letter confirmed the commitments by OPPD in its report, "Integrated Report to Support Restart of Fort Calhoun Station and Post-Restart Commitments for Sustained Improvement," dated December 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13336A785). In the report, OPPD committed to take actions following restart of FCS to ensure the improvements initiated during the extended outage remain in place and performance continues to improve at the facility.

After the NRC lifted the CAL restriction on the restart of FCS, OPPD commenced startup and the unit reached criticality on December 18, 2013. Generator output breakers were closed on December 21 and the unit reached 100 percent power on December 26, 2013.

After startup, the NRC continued to implement its inspection program at FCS as directed by the IMC 0350 Oversight Panel. In addition to ROP baseline inspections performed by the residents and regional based inspectors, two NRC team inspections were conducted to assess the effectiveness of OPPD actions for implementing the CAL commitments and the effectiveness of the FCS CAP in identifying and resolving station problems. These post-restart inspection activities did not result in the identification of any Greater-than-Green safety or security issues.

At the time of restart, several of the ROP performance indicators (PIs) did not afford sufficient insight into plant performance because of the extended shutdown. Specifically, the Mitigating Systems Performance Indicators for Unplanned Scrams, Unplanned Power Changes, Emergency AC Power System Unavailability, High Pressure Injection System Unavailability, Heat Removal System Unavailability, Residual Heat Removal System Unavailability, and Cooling Water Systems Unavailability were affected. In the second calendar quarter of 2014, the PIs for both Unplanned Scrams and Unplanned Power Changes became valid. High Pressure Injection System Unavailability, Heat Removal System Unavailability, and Cooling Water Systems Unavailability PIs became valid in the fourth calendar quarter of 2014. Emergency AC Power System Unavailability and Residual Heat Removal System Unavailability PIs became valid starting in the first calendar quarter of 2015.

Based on two unplanned scrams in the first quarter of 2014, the Unplanned Scrams PI turned White in the second calendar quarter of 2014. The NRC completed a supplemental inspection in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," in January of 2015. Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC determined that OPPD had effectively evaluated

the cause and extent of condition for the scrams and implemented appropriate corrective actions. As a result, the Oversight Panel concluded that this item is closed. The results of the 95001 supplemental inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05000285/2015008 issued on March 12, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15071A115).

Two issues of low to moderate safety significance (White) were dispositioned since plant restart in December of 2013. The issues involved the failure to provide adequate tornado missile protection for plant structures, systems, and components; and the failure to properly implement high energy line break and environmental qualification design requirements. For both of these issues, OPPD either modified the plant or implemented compensatory measures that adequately addressed all the identified deficiencies prior to plant restart in December of 2013. The Oversight Panel determined that since these issues were identified and resolved by OPPD during the extended shutdown, under increased NRC oversight per the IMC 0350 process, that these issues would not be used for future plant performance assessment inputs and, as such, they are considered closed. The tornado missile protection issue was dispositioned on April 25, 2014, in NRC IR 05000285/2013017, (ADAMS Accession No. ML14115A411). The high energy line break and environmental qualification issues were dispositioned on November 25, 2014, in NRC IR 05000285/2013018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML14329B361).

Since plant restart, the Oversight Panel has continued conducting periodic public meetings with OPPD to discuss licensee performance and NRC inspection and assessment results. During each of these meetings, members of the public were given an opportunity to ask questions and provide comments. In addition, each of these meetings was video-taped, transcribed, or documented in public meeting summaries and placed on the NRC's Public Web site. The following public meetings between the NRC and OPPD were conducted:

- February 27, 2014, in Blair, Nebraska (Meeting Summary, ADAMS Accession No. ML14065A253)
- May 13, 2014, in Omaha, Nebraska (Meeting Summary, ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A289)
- June 3, 2014, Commission briefing in Rockville, Maryland (Meeting Transcripts, ADAMS Accession No. ML14156A005)
- September 25, 2014, in Omaha, Nebraska (Meeting Summary, ADAMS Accession No. ML14276A543)
- October 1, 2014, in Rockville, Maryland (Meeting Transcripts, ADAMS Accession No. ML14297A383)
- December 2, 2014, in Rockville, Maryland (Meeting Summary, ADAMS Accession No. ML14344A087)

The next public meeting is currently scheduled to be conducted in Omaha, Nebraska, on April 9, 2015.

Basis for the Transition of Fort Calhoun Station to the Routine Reactor Oversight Process

In accordance with the IMC 0350 process, the Oversight Panel assessed the transfer of FCS oversight to the routine ROP using the following criteria:

- Verification that OPPD has established an effective long-range improvement program,
- OPPD is sufficiently implementing its corrective action program,
- OPPD has demonstrated safe plant operation, and
- OPPD has adequate controls in place to address the plant-specific issues that caused the significant performance decline which led to invoking the 0350 process.

On March 18, 2015, the Oversight Panel concluded that OPPD had satisfied these four transition criteria. The following provides a summary of key items considered by the Oversight Panel.

Verification that OPPD has established an effective long-range improvement program

On December 17, 2013, the NRC authorized plant restart and issued post-restart CAL EA-13-243 detailing commitments that OPPD made to ensure improvements realized during the extended shutdown remain in place, and performance continues to improve at the facility. The NRC has conducted a significant number of inspections with respect to the various CAL items and has concluded that OPPD has been effectively implementing its performance improvement initiatives. Additionally, OPPD has developed long-term actions to sustain performance improvement focused in the areas of configuration control, risk management, refueling outage activities, backlog reduction, system health, work management, fundamentals and behaviors, corrective action program, and workforce development.

Currently, the NRC has reviewed and closed 146 of the 166 items associated with the post-restart CAL, resulting in 7 of the 10 performance improvement areas being considered closed.

The following provides the status of these improvement areas:

- Organizational Effectiveness, Safety Culture, and Safety Conscious Work Environment is closed (8/8, 8 of 8 items completed)
- Problem Identification and Resolution is closed (14/14)
- Performance Improvement and Learning Programs is closed (11/11)
- Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use is open (5/15)
- Site Operational Focus is closed (2/2)

- Procedures is closed (10/10)
- Equipment Performance is open (25/34)
- Programs is open (66/67)
- Nuclear Oversight is closed (1/1)
- Transition to the Exelon Nuclear Management Model and Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet is closed (4/4)

Although not all of the post-restart CAL items are closed, the Oversight Panel concluded that completion of the remaining items should not delay transfer of FCS to the routine ROP under IMC 0305. The few items currently open pertain to long-term actions such as performing a design basis reconstitution that is scheduled for completion in 2018. The NRC will continue to perform CAL follow-up inspections as the licensee completes these improvement initiatives.

OPPD is sufficiently implementing its corrective action program

In July of 2014, an NRC team performed an inspection to assess the effectiveness of OPPD actions to address CAL commitments, and to assess the effectiveness of CAP implementation. Overall, the team concluded that OPPD had effectively implemented several of the improvement initiatives described in the December 17, 2013, CAL; however, a significant number of deficiencies were identified involving the licensee staff's ability to evaluate and resolve problems effectively and consistently using its CAP. The results of this inspection were documented in NRC IR 05000285/2014009 issued on September 18, 2014, (ADAMS Accession No. ML14361A455).

Based on the results of NRC inspection activities, the Oversight Panel unanimously concluded on September 4, 2014, that OPPD was not sufficiently implementing its CAP and should remain under the IMC 0350 oversight process. Specifically, the Oversight Panel concluded that the ability of the licensee to effectively evaluate and resolve problems in a consistent manner was of concern. The Oversight Panel recommended that OPPD remain under the IMC 0350 process until such time the licensee fully evaluated the areas of concern, identified and implemented corrective actions for program improvements, and had measures in place that adequately monitor and manage the effectiveness of program improvement initiatives.

OPPD conducted a number of self and external assessments to determine the causes of inconsistent implementation of the CAP. These assessments resulted in OPPD taking immediate and long-term actions to improve CAP performance. An NRC team inspection in January 2015 assessed the effectiveness of OPPD actions to improve performance of the CAP. Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had made significant progress in improving station CAP performance. Station management has adopted a new set of standards for CAP implementation and is

holding the staff accountable to the standards. Station processes for communicating, tracking, reviewing, and resolving issues placed in the CAP have been improved. In addition, the inspection team noted that FCS management and staff are more aligned on the importance of the CAP. The results of this inspection are documented in NRC IR 05000285/2015008, dated March 12, 2015.

OPPD has demonstrated safe plant operation

Since the December 2013 plant restart, control room operators have consistently demonstrated safe plant operation. Operators have effectively controlled the plant during transient conditions and reduced power or shutdown the plant on a number of occasions based on conservative decisions to place the unit in a safe condition. In each of the following examples, plant operators performed without error or incident:

- On January 9, 2014, control room operators declared the raw water system inoperable after identifying a stuck open intake structure sluice gate resulting in a Technical Specification required shutdown.
- On January 12, 2014, during a reactor start up, control room operators inserted a manual scram to shutdown the reactor due to a control rod that failed to move properly.
- On March 17, 2014, control room operators responded effectively to an automatic reactor scram following a loss of main turbine generator stator water cooling.
- On April 15, 2014, control room operators declared the control room air conditioning system inoperable resulting in a Technical Specification required shutdown. Plant shutdown was halted at 36 percent power when air conditioning was restored to service.
- On June 20, 2014, control room operators reduced power to 30 percent in response to potential Missouri River flooding conditions.
- On December 17, 2014, control room operators responded effectively to an automatic reactor scram following the failure of an auxiliary transformer sudden pressure trip relay.

OPPD has adequate controls in place to address the plant-specific issues that caused the significant performance decline which led to invoking the 0350 process

On December 17, 2013, the NRC issued a letter, "Fort Calhoun Station Closure of Confirmatory Action Letter," (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A423) documenting the basis for the NRC's determination that it had completed the necessary inspection, assessment, and licensing activities to thoroughly evaluate the issues identified as contributors to the longstanding degradation in overall station performance as described in CAL EA-13-020, dated February 26, 2013. This assessment of OPPD's actions was based on resident, region-based, and headquarters inspections, supplemented by

review and input from headquarters technical staff. The NRC inspections were performed individually and by teams, with results documented in reports that are publicly available. These reports include:

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORTS (issued every 6 weeks since entry into MC 0350)
- NRC IMC 0350 SECURITY IR 05000285/2013405 issued on April 24, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13115A087 (associated with Greater-than-Green security findings)
- NRC SPECIAL IR 05000285/2013-012 issued on May 24, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13144A772 (associated with the improper design specifications involving the raw water pump anchor bolts)
- MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 TEAM IR 05000285/2013008 issued on July 16, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13197A26 (focused in the areas of safety culture, corrective action program, engineering programs, regulatory processes, and nuclear oversight)
- NRC IMC 0350 IR 05000285/2013010 issued on July 11, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13192A501 (focused in the areas of operations and emergency preparedness)
- NRC IMC 0350 SECURITY TEAM IR 05000285/2013407 issued on August 1, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13213A498 (associated with follow-up inspections for the Greater-than-Green security findings)
- MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 TEAM IR 05000285/2013013 issued on April 3, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14094A052 (focused in the areas of significant performance deficiencies, engineering and maintenance programs, and operability process)
- MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 TEAM INSPECTION AND FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION REPORT 05000285/2013017 issued on April 25, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14115A411, (focused on resolution of tornado missile protection deficiencies)
- MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 TEAM INSPECTION AND FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION REPORT 05000285/2013018 issued on November 25, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14329B361, (focused on resolution of high energy line break and environmental qualification deficiencies)

After startup, NRC inspection activities under IMC 0350 oversight continued. Overall results of these inspections indicate that OPPD's performance continues to improve. No Greater-than-Green safety or security findings were identified. The results of these inspections are documented in the following reports:

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORTS - IR 05000285/2014002 issued on March 19, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14078A666; IR 05000285/2014007 issued on May 14, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14134A410; IR 05000285/2014003 issued on July 29, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14211A602; IR 05000285/2014004 issued on November 13, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14317A777; and IR 05000285/2014005 issued on February 12, 2015, ADAMS Accession No. ML15043A423
- SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORTS – IR 05000285/2014404 issued on May 2, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14122A355; and IR 05000285/2014403 issued on July 17, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A184
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/186, “INSPECTION OF PROCEDURES AND PROCESS FOR RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL AIRCRAFT THREATS,” REPORT 05000285/2014406 issued May 21, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14141A336
- NRC POST-APPROVAL LICENSE RENEWAL IR 05000285/2014008 issued on June 13, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14164A638
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2201/004, “INSPECTION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERIM CYBER SECURITY MILESTONES 1-7,” REPORT 05000285/2014405 issued on June 25, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14176B202
- NRC CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER FOLLOWUP INSPECTION AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION TEAM IR 05000285/2014009 issued on September 18, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14261A455
- NRC CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER FOLLOWUP INSPECTION AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION TEAM IR 05000285/2015008 issued on March 12, 2015, ADAMS Accession No ML15071A115

Transition of Fort Calhoun Station to the Routine Reactor Oversight Process

After evaluating station performance in the areas discussed above, the Oversight Panel concluded that your staff's performance with respect to each area, was acceptable and further increased regulatory oversight under the IMC 0350 process was no longer necessary. As such, on March 19, 2015, the Oversight Panel issued a memorandum to me and the

Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) recommending termination of the IMC 0350 process for FCS. On the basis of this recommendation, I have consulted with the Director of NRR and the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs and determined that termination of increased regulatory oversight under the IMC 0350 process is warranted and that regulatory oversight of FCS should return to the routine ROP.

Based on no Greater-than-Green Findings or Performance Indicators currently in effect, FCS will transition to the Licensee Response Column (Column I) of the ROP Action Matrix consistent with IMC 0305 effective April 1, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects assigned to inspection findings will be assessed consistent with the normal process in IMC 0305 to identify the presence of substantive cross-cutting issues at the station. For example, during the 2015 mid-cycle review, the staff would assess cross-cutting aspects assigned to inspection findings over the previous four quarters. Based on OPPD improvement initiatives in the cross-cutting areas of human performance, problem identification and resolution, and safety conscious work environment, no substantive cross-cutting issues are being identified. Additionally, inspection planning and routine public meetings will be conducted as described in the ROP Action Matrix.

Inspection Schedule Under the Reactor Oversight Process

The enclosed 18 month inspection schedule is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. Follow-up inspections for the remainder of the open items associated with the post-restart CAL will be conducted in coordination with your completion of those activities/ improvement initiatives specific to each item. Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 recognizes that up to 200 hours of direct inspection may be required for licensees which are transitioning out of the IMC 0350 process.

If circumstances arise which cause us to change the inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact Michael C. Hay, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch D, Division of Reactor Projects, at 817-200-1147 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plan.

Summary

In summary, this letter is to inform you of the following four actions:

- Termination of the IMC 0350 process at FCS and the disbandment of the IMC 0350 Oversight Panel,
- Transition of FCS oversight to the routine ROP under the Licensee Response Column of the Action Matrix, starting on April 1, 2015,
- Cross-cutting aspects assigned to inspection findings will be assessed using the normal process outlined in IMC 0305 during future mid-cycle and end-of-cycle review meetings to assess for potential substantive cross-cutting issues, and

L. Cortopassi

- 10 -

- NRC follow-up inspections will be implemented for the remaining open items associated with CAL EA-13-243, dated December 17, 2013.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Marc L. Dapas". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Marc L. Dapas
Regional Administrator

Docket No. 50-285
License No. DPR-40

Enclosure

cc: Electronic Distribution

Fort Calhoun

Inspection / Activity Plan

04/01/2015 - 09/30/2016

Unit Number	Planned Dates Start	Planned Dates End	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site
1	11/16/2015	11/20/2015	EXAM - INITIAL OPERATOR EXAM		4
			X02544	INITIAL EXAM FC(02/2015)	
1	12/14/2015	12/18/2015	X02544	INITIAL EXAM FC(02/2015)	
1	04/21/2015	05/02/2015	71111.08 - INSERVICE INSPECTION		1
			IP 7111108P	Inservice Inspection Activities - PWR	
1	04/27/2015	05/01/2015	RS 13 PI - RADIATION SAFETY		2
			IP 71124.01	Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls	
1	04/27/2015	05/01/2015	IP 71124.03	In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation	
1	04/27/2015	05/01/2015	IP 71151-OR01	Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness	
1	04/27/2015	05/01/2015	IP 71151-PR01	RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences	
1	08/03/2015	08/07/2015	EP-2 - HAB EXERCISE INSPECTION		5
			IP 7111404	Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes	
1	08/03/2015	08/07/2015	IP 7111407	Exercise Evaluation - Hostile Action (HA) Event	
1	08/03/2015	08/07/2015	EP-3 - EP PERFORMANCE INDICATORS		2
			IP 71151-EP01	Drill/Exercise Performance	
1	08/03/2015	08/07/2015	IP 71151-EP02	ERO Readiness	
1	08/03/2015	08/07/2015	IP 71151-EP03	Alert & Notification System Reliability	
1	09/01/2015	09/30/2015	ISFSI - ROUTINE INSPECTION (1 WEEK IN THE MONTH)		1
			IP 60855	Operation Of An ISFSI	
1	10/19/2015	10/23/2015	EB2-05T - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION		4
			IP 7111105X	Fire Protection - NFPA 805 (Triennial)	
1	11/02/2015	11/06/2015	IP 7111105X	Fire Protection - NFPA 805 (Triennial)	
1	11/16/2015	11/20/2015	RS 24 - RADIATION SAFETY		2
			IP 71124.02	Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls	
1	11/16/2015	11/20/2015	IP 71124.04	Occupational Dose Assessment	
1	11/16/2015	11/20/2015	TSB 52B - BIENNIAL PI&R INSPECTION		4
			IP 71152B	Problem Identification and Resolution	
1	12/07/2015	12/11/2015	IP 71152B	Problem Identification and Resolution	
1	07/18/2016	07/22/2016	RS 5678 - RADIATION SAFETY - TEAM		4
			IP 71124.05	Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation	
1	07/18/2016	07/22/2016	IP 71124.06	Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment	
1	07/18/2016	07/22/2016	IP 71124.07	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program	
1	07/18/2016	07/22/2016	IP 71124.08	Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation	

This report does not include INPO and OUTAGE activities.
 This report shows only on-site and announced inspection procedures.

Fort Calhoun
 Inspection / Activity Plan
 04/01/2015 - 09/30/2016

Unit Number	Inspection Activity	Planned Dates Start End	Title	No. of Staff on Site
1	EB1-17T - FCS PERM PLANT MODS & 50.59 INSPECTION IP 7111117T	07/25/2016 08/12/2016	Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications	3

This report does not include INPO and OUTAGE activities.
 This report shows only on-site and announced inspection procedures.

L. Cortopassi

- 10 -

- NRC follow-up inspections will be implemented for the remaining open items associated with CAL EA-13-243, dated December 17, 2013.

Sincerely,



Marc L. Dapas
Regional Administrator

Docket No. 50-285
License No. DPR-40

cc: Electronic Distribution

DISTRIBUTION:

See next page

DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\REPORTS\Reports Final\FCSTransition to ROP 2015.docx
ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML15089A085

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUNSI Review By: MCH : AT		ADAMS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Publicly Available <input type="checkbox"/> Non-Publicly Available		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Non-Sensitive <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive	Keyword: NRC-002
OFFICE	BC:PBD	DDRP	DDDORL	DDRS	RA	
NAME	MCHay	TWPruett	LLund	AVeget	MLDapas	
SIGNATURE	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	<i>[Signature]</i>	
DATE	3/18/15	3/18/15	3/18/15	03/19/15	<i>[Signature]</i> 3/30/15	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Letter to Lou Cortopassi from Marc L. Dapas, dated March 30, 2015

**SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF NRC INSPECTION MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 OVERSIGHT AND
TRANSITION TO THE REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS FOR FORT
CALHOUN STATION**

Executive Director for Operations (Mark.Satorius@nrc.gov)
Deputy Executive Director, Reactor & Preparedness Programs (Michael.Johnson@nrc.gov)
Director, Office of NRR (Bill.Dean@nrc.gov)
Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)
Director, Division of Inspection and Regional Support (Scott.Morris@nrc.gov)
Director, NSIR (Jim.Wiggins@nrc.gov)
Deputy Director for Reactor Safety Programs (Jennifer.Uhle@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
DRP Deputy Director (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Tony.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (Max.Schneider@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Brian.Cummings@nrc.gov)
Administrative Assistant (Janise.Schwee@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Robert.Hagar@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/D (Jan.Tice@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/D (Brian.Parks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Geoffrey.Miller@nrc.gov)
Project Manager (Fred.Lyon@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)
Congressional Affairs Officer (Angel.Moreno@nrc.gov)
RIV/ETA: OEDO (Michael.Waters@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Chairman (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Vice Chairman (Louise.Lund@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Nathan.Sanfilippo@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Markley@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)
ROPreports