



LIC-12-0092
July 6, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference: Docket Number 50-285

SUBJECT: Part 21 Notification - Identification of Defect

Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), Omaha Public Power District (OPPPO), is providing written notification of the identification of a defect.

The attachment to this letter provides the information required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4). In addition, the attachment discusses the relevance of this issue to the Fort Calhoun Station.

No commitments to the NRC are contained in this submittal.

Should you have questions or comments, please contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David J. Bannister".

David J. Bannister
Site Vice President and CNO

Enclosure
DJB/epm

c: E. E. Collins, Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV
L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager
J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

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10 CFR 21.21 NOTIFICATION

General Electric, CR105X300 Auxiliary Contactors

This notification follows the format of and addresses the considerations contained in 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4).

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

David J. Bannister, Site Vice President and CNO
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station
444 South 16th Street Mall
Omaha, NE 68102-2247

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Facility:

Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station
Highway 75 – Five Miles North of Fort Calhoun
P.O. Box 550
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550

The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect:

General Electric, CR105X300 auxiliary contactor.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The auxiliary contactor was manufactured by General Electric Company and supplied by Nuclear Logistic Incorporated, as an auxiliary part of a General Electric CR305 contactor.

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

On February 10, 2012, during the monthly testing of Diesel Generator 1 (DG-1), speed was raised from 500 RPM to 900 RPM. At approximately 750 RPM the generator field did not "flash," a term used to describe the normal voltage buildup in the field of a generator. Initial troubleshooting identified that the auxiliary contacts on the 2CR contactor did not close. This caused the field flash failure. The failure of the auxiliary contacts on the 2CR contactor prevented the diesel generator from performing its designed safety function.

- (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.**

On June 13, 2012, the evaluation of the failed auxiliary contactor was completed. The responsible company officers were formally notified on June 13, 2012.

- (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.**

On February 10, 2012, during routine monthly testing, the DG-1 field failed to flash. Trouble shooting identified that one of the two auxiliary contacts for the 2CR relay was open preventing flashing of the DG field.

From May 29, 2011 to May 30, 2011, DG-1 was started successfully ten times following installation of the 2CR assembly.

A failure analysis of the 2CR assembly was performed by an independent contractor. The analysis concluded that the failure of the auxiliary contactor to close was due to galling on the support that attaches the CR105 auxiliary contactors to the CR305.

The 2CR contactor is not installed in DG2. This contactor assembly is not installed in any other equipment at the Fort Calhoun Station.

- (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.**

Fort Calhoun Station will evaluate and obtain a suitable replacement for the 2CR contactors.

- (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.**

None.