



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11545 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

October 29, 2010

Subject: Letter regarding transfer of information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® valves.

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is provided to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for information.

Control Components Inc. (CCI) is transferring information to affected nuclear plants regarding the potential for the disk stack to separate within certain Drag® valves. A disk stack is equivalent to a valve cage consisting of brazed disks. CCI does not have the capability to determine whether it must act under 10CFR21.

CCI has determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate within Drag® valves previously supplied. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under an accident condition. It is noted that CCI has never experienced this failure in its past.

Based on CCI's analysis, the lack of any failures in the installed population, and the low probability of failure; we have recommended that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to assure there is a force acting to compress the disk stack under all temperature conditions. The valves would be reassembled with the addition of shim kits if necessary, to assure there is compression for all conditions.

The CCI contact for more detailed discussion is:

Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Work Phone 1-949-888-4115
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

IE19
NRK

A copy of the letters sent to the nuclear facilities is included with this letter. The letter includes the information called for by the 10-CFR-21 regulation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Pickren', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachments: Information Transfer Letters



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Vice President, Operations
Arkansas Nuclear 1
1448 SR 333
New Orleans, AR 72801

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk-stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Entergy Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Arkansas Nuclear 1	591011-1		2	620-0008MU-V19/ CV-1207MU-15-POC	Seal Injection Valve
Indian Point 2	709091-1	709091-1-1/2/3/4	4	FCV-406A/B/C/D	Aux. Feedwater Control Valve
Palisades	201857-1	103077-010-1/2	2	CV-3001/3002	Containment spray flow control
Palisades	702031-1	702031-1-1	1	CV-0522A	Steam Supply Control Valve
Palisades	702031-2	702031-2-1	1	CV-0522B	Steam Supply Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	623521-1	623521-1-1/2	2	1/V10-89,V10-89B	RHR Service Water Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	672071-1	672071-1-1/2	2	SW-92A/B(V70-92A/B)	RBCCW Heat Exchanger SW Throttling Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Beaver Valley 2
Route 168
Akron, PA 15077-0004

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

FirstEnergy Corp					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Beaver Valley 2	200788-1	101184-010-1/2/3	3	2FWS-478/488/498	Feedwater Regulator
Davis-Besse 1	645141-1	645141-1-1/2	2	PV-ICS11A/B	Atmospheric Vent Valve
Perry 1	647771-2	647771-2-1/2	2	1E12F0003 A/B	Heat Exchanger Outlet



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Bellefont 1 & 2
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, TN 37902

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

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The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

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(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

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- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


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This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

TVA					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Bellefont 1	141940	16938-1-1	1	1MU-FV6	Letdown flow control
Bellefont 1	141960	16938-3-1/2/3/4	4	1MU-FV30A/B/C/D	Seal injection feed control
Bellefont 1	141970	16938-4-1	1	1MU-PDV19	
Bellefont 2	141980	16939-1-1	1	2MU-FV6	Letdown flow control
Bellefont 2	142000	16939-3-1/2/3/4	4	2MU-FV30A/B/C/D	Seal injection feed control
Bellefont 2	142010	16939-4-1	1	2MU-PDV19	



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Station Manager
Braidwood 1&2
35100 South Route 53
Suite 84
Chicago, IL 60407

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

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The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI’s recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Exelon Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Braidwood 1&2	706031-2	706031-2-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Byron 1 & 2 Braidwood 1&2	706031-1	706031-1-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Quad Cities 1&2	645341-1	645341-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-1/2-11402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve
Dresden 2&3	637271-1	637271-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-2/3-1402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Station Manager
Byron 1&2
4450 North German Church Road
Chicago, IL 61010-9794

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Exelon Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Braidwood 1&2	706031-2	706031-2-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Byron 1 & 2 Braidwood 1&2	706031-1	706031-1-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Quad Cities 1&2	645341-1	645341-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-1/2-11402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve
Dresden 2&3	637271-1	637271-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-2/3-1402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Operations Superintendent
Catawba Nuclear Station
4800 Concord Road
York County, SC 29745

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Duke Energy					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Catawba 1&2	922301022	18789-10- 1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8	8	1-SV-1/7/13/19, 2-SV-1/7/13/19	Steam generator power operator relief to atmosphere
McGuire 1&2	702811-1	702811-1-1/2	2	1/2NV459	Reactor Coolant Letdown Valve
McGuire 1&2	707811-1	707811-1-1/2	2	1/2NV238	Charging Pump control
McGuire 1&2	200051-1	100072-1-1/2, 227388-010-1	3	(1MV-480); 1NV-454 (1MV-480); 2NV-454(1MV-480)	Reactor Coolant Letdown Manual Throttle Valve
Oconee 1&3	200106-1	100145-1-1/2/3	3	1/2/3 MS-93	Steam to Emergency FW Pump Turbine
Oconee 1,2,3	202745-1	104754-011/021/031- 1	3	Not Defined	RCP Seal Bypass Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Director
Chinshan 1&2
Cheng-Hwa
Jhongjheng District, Taipei City
Taiwan

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.


1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Taiwan Power Co					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Chin Shan 1&2	200071-1	100093-1-1/2	2	E41-F008; E41-F008S	High Pressure Coolant Injection Test Valve
Chin Shan 1&2	590981-1	590981-1-1/2, 590982-1-1/2	4	F017A,B; F017 AS, BS	Residual Heat Removal valve
Chin Shan 1&2	700941-1	700941-1-1/2	2	E51-F022 & E51-F022S	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valve
Kuosheng NPS	200140-1	100209-1-1/2/3/4	4	1/2-EJ-HV-122/207	Residual Heat Removal Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Engineering Programmes Manager
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station
6322 North FM 56
Dallas, TX 76043

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation-causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

TXU Electric					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Comanche Peak 1&2	658841-1	658841-1/2/3/4, 658842-1/2/3/4	8	1/2-PV-2325 to 1/2-PV-2328	Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Control Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Vice President & Plant Manager
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
6588 Ontario Road
San Francisco, CA 93405

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Pacific Gas & Electric					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Diablo Canyon 1&2	201822-1	102993-010-1/2	2	FCV110A	Boric Acid (4%) Make-up Valve
Diablo Canyon 1&2	201822-2	102993-020-1/2	2	FCV111A	Primary Water Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Operatons Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 1
5501 N. State Route 2
Oakharbor, OH 43449

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

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- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
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- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

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
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(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

FirstEnergy Corp					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Beaver Valley 2	200788-1	101184-010-1/2/3	3	2FWS-478/488/498	Feedwater Regulator
Davis-Besse 1	645141-1	645141-1-1/2	2	PV-ICS11A/B	Atmospheric Vent Valve
Perry 1	647771-2	647771-2-1/2	2	1E12F0003 A/B	Heat Exchanger Outlet



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Dresden 2&3
6500 North Dresden Road
Chicago, IL 60450

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Exelon Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Braidwood 1&2	706031-2	706031-2-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Byron 1 & 2 Braidwood 1&2	706031-1	706031-1-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Quad Cities 1&2	645341-1	645341-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-1/2-11402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve
Dresden 2&3	637271-1	637271-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-2/3-1402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Duane Arnold Energy Center
3313 DAEC Road
Palo, IA 52324

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.


Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.



The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Alliant Energy					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Duane Arnold	42794-1	42794-1-1	1	CV 2315	High pressure coolant injection condensate recirc. to storage tank
Duane Arnold	44519-1	445191-1-1	1	MO-2515	Condensate recirc. to storage tank



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Power Plant
Highway US1
PO Box 439
Birmingham, GA 31513

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.


Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.



The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
E.I. Hatch 1&2	672421-1	672421-1-1, 672422-1-1	2	MPL 1/2E51-FO22	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valve
E.I. Hatch 1&2	557531-1	557531-1-1/2/3/4/5	5	1/2E11-F068A/B; E11-F068-SPARE	Flow Control/ Cooling Water



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Fermi Nuclear Power Plant
6400 North Dixie Hwy
Detroit, MI 48166

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

DTE Energy					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Fermi 2	708741-1	708741-1-1/2	2	P44F400A/B	Temperature Control



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant (Operated by ConEd)
Broadway & Beasley Avenue
New Orleans, NY 10511

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Entergy Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Arkansas Nuclear 1	591011-1		2	620-0008MU-V19/ CV-1207MU-15-POC	Seal Injection Valve
Indian Point 2	709091-1	709091-1-1/2/3/4	4	FCV-406A/B/C/D	Aux. Feedwater Control Valve
Palisades	201857-1	103077-010-1/2	2	CV-3001/3002	Containment spray flow control
Palisades	702031-1	702031-1-1	1	CV-0522A	Steam Supply Control Valve
Palisades	702031-2	702031-2-1	1	CV-0522B	Steam Supply Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	623521-1	623521-1-1/2	2	1/V10-89,V10-89B	RHR Service Water Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	672071-1	672071-1-1/2	2	SW-92A/B(V70-92A/B)	RBCCW Heat Exchanger SW Throttling Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corp
Lianyungang 1&2 (Tianwan 1&2)
#28 Haitang Road (M)
Lianyung District, Lianyungang
Jiangsu Province, China 222 042

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corp. (JNPC)					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Lianyungang 1&2 (Tianwan 1&2)	103222773500		8	1/2 LAB 10/20/30/40 AA212	Bypass Feedwater Control



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Director
Kori Nuclear Power Site
216 Kori
Jangan-eup
Gijang-gun, Busan 619-711
Korea

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.


Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be



created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Kori 1	202243-1	103601-010-1/2	2	1-VIA-4345/4346	Compressed Air IE System
Kori 2	200813-1	101233-010-1	1	2-PCV-135	Low Pressure Let Down
Kori 2	200813-2	101233-020-1	1	2-HCV-218	Seal Injection Control
Kori 2	615101-1	615101-1-1	1	FCV205	Normal Charging Flow Control Valve
Shin-Kori 1&2	201259-207	101941-207-1/2, 101941-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	NF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Shin-Wolsong 1&2	201260-207	101942-207-1/2, 101942-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Ulchin 5&6	200062-5	100111-50-1/2, 100249-50-1/2	4	5/6-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Steam Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Yonggwang 3&4	542471-2	542471-2-3/4	4	3/4-542-VAF-0045/0046	Aux Feed Water Control Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Director
Kuosheng NPS
60 Pa-Tou
Yeh-Liu Village
Wanli Hsiang, Taipei County
Taiwan

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.


Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be



created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Taiwan Power Co					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Chin Shan 1&2	200071-1	100093-1-1/2	2	E41-F008; E41-F008S	High Pressure Coolant Injection Test Valve
Chin Shan 1&2	590981-1	590981-1-1/2, 590982-1-1/2	4	F017A,B; F017 AS, BS	Residual Heat Removal valve
Chin Shan 1&2	700941-1	700941-1-1/2	2	E51-F022 & E51-F022S	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valve
Kuosheng NPS	200140-1	100209-1-1/2/3/4	4	1/2-EJ-HV-122/207	Residual Heat Removal Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Operations Superintendent
McGuire Nuclear Station
13339 Hagers Ferry Road
Charlotte, NC 28078

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2 List of Plant Valves

Duke Energy					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Catawba 1&2	922301022	18789-10-1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8	8	1-SV-1/7/13/19, 2-SV-1/7/13/19	Steam generator power operator relief to atmosphere
McGuire 1&2	702811-1	702811-1-1/2	2	1/2NV459	Reactor Coolant Letdown Valve
McGuire 1&2	707811-1	707811-1-1/2	2	1/2NV238	Charging Pump control
McGuire 1&2	200051-1	100072-1-1/2, 227388-010-1	3	(1MV-480); 1NV-454 (1MV-480); 2NV-454(1MV-480)	Reactor Coolant Letdown Manual Throttle Valve
Oconee 1&3	200106-1	100145-1-1/2/3	3	1/2/3 MS-93	Steam to Emergency FW Pump Turbine
Oconee 1,2,3	202745-1	104754-011/021/031-1	3	Not Defined	RCP Seal Bypass Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager (Unit 2)
Nine Mile Point 2
348 Lake Road
Baltimore, NY 13126

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
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Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

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- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

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(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves



Constellation Energy					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Nine Mile Point 2	702661-1	702661-1-1	1	2ICS*PCV115	Turbine Coolant Pressure Control
Nine Mile Point 2	200027-1	100041-1-1	1	2WCS-FV135	RWCU System Reactor Flow Reject



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Site Vice President
North Anna 3&4
1022 Haley Drive
Mineral, VA 23117-0402

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
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2. Dave Lewis
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Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

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Control Components Incorporated

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(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Dominion Generation					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
North Anna 3&4, Surry 3&4	117320	15628-1-1/2/3/4	16	620-0017/3-SP- PCV13A1/3MS- PV13A1,	Modulating atmospheric dump
				620-0017/3-SP- PCV13B1/3MS- PV13B1,	
				620-0018/4-SP- PCV13A1/4MS- PV13A1,	
				620-0018/4-SP- PCV13B1/4MS- PV13B1,	
				620-0021/3SP- PCV13A1/3MS- PV13A1,	
				620-0021/3SP- PCV13B1/3MS- PV13B1,	
				620-0022/4SP- PCV13A1/4MS- PV13A1,	
				620-0022/4SP- PCV13B1/4MS- PV13B1	



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Station Manager
Oconee Nuclear Station
7812 Rochester Hwy
Charlotte, SC 29672

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant-system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report:

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base; the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Duke Energy					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Catawba 1&2	922301022	18789-10-1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8	8	1-SV-1/7/13/19, 2-SV-1/7/13/19	Steam generator power operator relief to atmosphere
McGuire 1&2	702811-1	702811-1-1/2	2	1/2NV459	Reactor Coolant Letdown Valve
McGuire 1&2	707811-1	707811-1-1/2	2	1/2NV238	Charging Pump control
McGuire 1&2	200051-1	100072-1-1/2, 227388-010-1	3	(1MV-480); 1NV-454 (1MV-480); 2NV-454(1MV-480)	Reactor Coolant Letdown Manual Throttle Valve
Oconee 1&3	200106-1	100145-1-1/2/3	3	1/2/3 MS-93	Steam to Emergency FW Pump Turbine
Oconee 1,2,3	202745-1	104754-011/021/031-1	3	Not Defined	RCP Seal Bypass Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
New Orleans, MI 49043-9530

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.


(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has



been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the “old design” to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Entergy Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Arkansas Nuclear 1	591011-1		2	620-0008MU-V19/ CV-1207MU-15-POC	Seal Injection Valve
Indian Point 2	709091-1	709091-1-1/2/3/4	4	FCV-406A/B/C/D	Aux. Feedwater Control Valve
Palisades	201857-1	103077-010-1/2	2	CV-3001/3002	Containment spray flow control
Palisades	702031-1	702031-1-1	1	CV-0522A	Steam Supply Control Valve
Palisades	702031-2	702031-2-1	1	CV-0522B	Steam Supply Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	623521-1	623521-1-1/2	2	1/V10-89,V10-89B	RHR Service Water Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	672071-1	672071-1-1/2	2	SW-92A/B(V70-92A/B)	RBCCW Heat Exchanger SW Throttling Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Vice President, Engineering
Palo Verde 1,2,3
5801 South Wintersburg Road
Tonopah, AZ 85354

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

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(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

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(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

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- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
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
CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred...

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Arizona Public Service Co.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Palo Verde 1,2,3	922501043	21408-1,4,7	12	1/2/3JSGAHV184, 1/2/3JSGBHV185, 1/2/3JSGBHV178, 1/2/3JSGAHV179	Atmospheric dump



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

General Plant Manager
Perry Nuclear Power Plant 1
10 Center Road
Akron, OH 44081

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

FirstEnergy Corp					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Beaver Valley 2	200788-1	101184-010-1/2/3	3	2FWS-478/488/498	Feedwater Regulator
Davis-Besse 1	645141-1	645141-1-1/2	2	PV-ICS11A/B	Atmospheric Vent Valve
Perry 1	647771-2	647771-2-1/2	2	1E12F0003 A/B	Heat Exchanger Outlet



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Station Manager
Quad Cities 1&2
22710 206th Avenue North
Chicago, IL 61242

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Exelon Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Braidwood 1&2	706031-2	706031-2-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Byron 1 & 2 Braidwood 1&2	706031-1	706031-1-X	16	1AF005A-H (8 Valves); 2AF005a-h (8 Valves)	Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
Quad Cities 1&2	645341-1	645341-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-1/2-11402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve
Dresden 2&3	637271-1	637271-1-1/2/3/4	4	MO-2/3-1402-4A&B	Crane retrofit-Core Spray System Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Executive Director
Ringhals Nuclear Power Station
SE-43022 Vaeröbacka
Stockholm
Sweden

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

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
CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Vattenfall AB					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Ringhals	202334-1CH	103763-010-1/2/3	3	20415-FCV478/488/498	Feedwater Control Valve
Ringhals	202334-2CH	103763-020-1	1	20334FCV122	Charging Valve
Ringhals 3	202224-1CH	101879-010CH-1/2/3	3	FCV 478/488/498	Feedwater regulator



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Manager, Station Operations
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
5000 Pacific Coast Hwy
San Clemente, CA 92672

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.


1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Edison International					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
San Onofre 2&3	34254-1	34254-1-1/2/3/4	4	2HV-4762/3, 3HV-4762/3	Auxiliary feedwater bypass
San Onofre 2&3	36995-1	36995-1-1/2/3, 100142-10-1	4	2PV-0201A/B, 3PV-0201A/B	Letdown pressure regulating



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Site Manager
Shin-Kori 1&2
Hyoam-ri
Jangan-eup
Gijang-gun, Busan, Korea 619-711
Korea

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be

created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALV E QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Kori 1	202243-1	103601-010-1/2	2	1-VIA-4345/4346	Compressed Air IE System
Kori 2	200813-1	101233-010-1	1	2-PCV-135	Low Pressure Let Down
Kori 2	200813-2	101233-020-1	1	2-HCV-218	Seal Injection Control
Kori 2	615101-1	615101-1-1	1	FCV205	Normal Charging Flow Control Valve
Shin-Kori 1&2	201259-207	101941-207-1/2, 101941-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	NF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Shin-Wolsong 1&2	201260-207	101942-207-1/2, 101942-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Ulchin 5&6	200062-5	100111-50-1/2, 100249-50-1/2	4	5/6-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Steam Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Yonggwang 3&4	542471-2	542471-2-3/4	4	3/4-542-VAF-0045/0046	Aux Feed Water Control Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Site Manager
Shin-Wolsong 1&2
Bonggil-ri
Yangbuk-myum
Gangnam-gu, Gyeongsangbuk-do 780-840
Korea

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be

created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Kori 1	202243-1	103601-010-1/2	2	1-VIA-4345/4346	Compressed Air IE System
Kori 2	200813-1	101233-010-1	1	2-PCV-135	Low Pressure Let Down
Kori 2	200813-2	101233-020-1	1	2-HCV-218	Seal Injection Control
Kori 2	615101-1	615101-1-1	1	FCV205	Normal Charging Flow Control Valve
Shin-Kori 1&2	201259-207	101941-207-1/2, 101941-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	NF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Shin-Wolsong 1&2	201260-207	101942-207-1/2, 101942-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Ulchin 5&6	200062-5	100111-50-1/2, 100249-50-1/2	4	5/6-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Steam Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Yonggwang 3&4	542471-2	542471-2-3/4	4	3/4-542-VAF-0045/0046	Aux Feed Water Control Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
St. Lucie 1 & 2
6395 S. Ocean Dr
Jensen Beach, FL 34957

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.


1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

FPL Group Inc.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
St. Lucie 1	310801-1	310801-1-1/2/3	3	V2553/4/5	Charging pump bypass
St. Lucie 2	23944-1	23944-1-1	3	V2553/4/5	Charging pump bypass
St. Lucie 2	25589-1	25589-1-1/2/3/4	4	1-MV-08-18A/B, 1-MV-08-19A/B	Modulating vent



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Site Vice President
Surry 3&4
5570 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883-0315

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.


1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Dominion Generation					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
North Anna 3&4, Surry 3&4	117320	15628-1-1/2/3/4	16	620-0017/3-SP-PCV13A1/3MS-PV13A1,	Modulating atmospheric dump
				620-0017/3-SP-PCV13B1/3MS-PV13B1,	
				620-0018/4-SP-PCV13A1/4MS-PV13A1,	
				620-0018/4-SP-PCV13B1/4MS-PV13B1,	
				620-0021/3SP-PCV13A1/3MS-PV13A1,	
				620-0021/3SP-PCV13B1/3MS-PV13B1,	
				620-0022/4SP-PCV13A1/4MS-PV13A1,	
				620-0022/4SP-PCV13B1/4MS-PV13B1	



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Director
Ulchin Nuclear Power Site
84-4 Bugu-ri
Buk-myeon
Gangnam-gu, Gyeongsangbuk-do 767-890
Korea

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be

created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Kori 1	202243-1	103601-010-1/2	2	1-VIA-4345/4346	Compressed Air IE System
Kori 2	200813-1	101233-010-1	1	2-PCV-135	Low Pressure Let Down
Kori 2	200813-2	101233-020-1	1	2-HCV-218	Seal Injection Control
Kori 2	615101-1	615101-1-1	1	FCV205	Normal Charging Flow Control Valve
Shin-Kori 1&2	201259-207	101941-207-1/2, 101941-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	NF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Shin-Wolsong 1&2	201260-207	101942-207-1/2, 101942-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Ulchin 5&6	200062-5	100111-50-1/2, 100249-50-1/2	4	5/6-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Steam Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Yonggwang 3&4	542471-2	542471-2-3/4	4	3/4-542-VAF-0045/0046	Aux Feed Water Control Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Vandellos Apartado De Correos
27-43890 L'Hospitalet de l'Infant
E-43890
Spain

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
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Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

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Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

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(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

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
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(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Endesa					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Vandellos 2	672611-1	672611-1-1/2/3	3	FCV-478/488/498	Feedwater Regulator



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Plant Manager
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant
320 Governor Hunt Road
New Orleans, VT 05354

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details; or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.


1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: dlewis@iminuclear.com

Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.


CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves that cannot be ruled satisfactory at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure adequate Disk Stack compressible load.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Entergy Corp.					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Arkansas Nuclear 1	591011-1		2	620-0008MU-V19/ CV-1207MU-15-POC	Seal Injection Valve
Indian Point 2	709091-1	709091-1-1/2/3/4	4	FCV-406A/B/C/D	Aux. Feedwater Control Valve
Palisades	201857-1	103077-010-1/2	2	CV-3001/3002	Containment spray flow control
Palisades	702031-1	702031-1-1	1	CV-0522A	Steam Supply Control Valve
Palisades	702031-2	702031-2-1	1	CV-0522B	Steam Supply Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	623521-1	623521-1-1/2	2	1/V10-89,V10-89B	RHR Service Water Control Valve
Vermont Yankee	672071-1	672071-1-1/2	2	SW-92A/B(V70-92A/B)	RBCCW Heat Exchanger SW Throttling Valve



We Solve Control Valve Problems®

October 29, 2010

Director
Yonggwang Nuclear Power Site
514 Gyema-ri
Hongnong-eup
Yeonggwang-gun, Jeollanam-do 513-880
Korea

Subject: Transfer of Information concerning Control Components Inc. (CCI) Drag® Valves.

Dear Plant Manager;

Executive Summary:

CCI routinely reviews its quality practices and engineering protocols in the design and manufacturing of its severe service valve products. In connection with a routine review, a question was raised regarding the integrity of disk stacks in CCI Drag® valves and the potential for disk stack separation. A disk stack is a cylindrical stack of disks, brazed together which determines the flow characteristics of the valve. Although there have been no failures with respect to disk stacks in the past, CCI performed an analysis that was inconclusive in determining if a safety hazard could potentially exist. In accordance with nuclear industry practice, CCI is notifying plants with certain installed valves to allow the site to perform its own analysis. This notification is only applicable to Drag® valves installed in nuclear power plants. Valves in other applications are not affected by this notification. With over 25 years of service in the nuclear power industry, CCI has received no reports of any such failure.

By way of background, on October 20, 2010, CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack within CCI Drag® valves to separate if the integrity of the brazing is questioned allowing movement of the disks. CCI has analyzed numerous valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might affect the functioning of the valve under certain conditions. Please note that CCI has never experienced this failure mode on this type of valve in the past.

CCI is providing this transfer of information notice so that the licensee may determine whether it must act under 10CFR21. The details of the transfer of information are included in Attachment 1. CCI does not have the ability to determine whether a safety hazard is created or could be

created by a failure of the disk stack as CCI is not aware of plant system details, or the basis of the associated Safety Analysis Report.

The valves of concern are in high temperature applications where differential thermal expansion of the valve body relative to the internal disk stack could occur. If the initial compression of the disk stack inside the valve body is insufficient, then the load on the disk stack may not be enough to prevent separation of the disks if the integrity of the brazing is questioned. Under these conditions, the individual disks could move laterally relative to each other, preventing the valve from opening, closing or modulating correctly. The lateral load causing a shift could occur due to flow through the valve and/or maximum seismic forces. CCI's analysis is not able to completely eliminate this potential occurrence if the integrity of the brazing is questioned because of the uncertainty of the compressive load on the disk stack.

Because CCI is unable to quantify all of the variables associated with potential disk slippage, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) was performed. With the knowledge of the CCI Drag installed base, the PRA estimated the risk associated with a separation causing a failure to operate on demand. This analysis resulted in a mean estimate of 2.26E-07 failures per hour in operation.

Based on the compression analysis performed, the lack of any failures in the installed fleet, and the low probability of failure, CCI recommends that at the next regularly scheduled refueling outage an inspection be performed to determine the height of the trim with respect to the valve. CCI will issue a technical bulletin to provide details of how to measure the height of the valve trim and perform any required corrective actions.

CCI Recommendations:

A CCI representative will contact the site beginning Monday, November 1, 2010. CCI's recommendation is to disassemble and inspect the valves at the next scheduled refueling outage. The inspection would involve measuring the trim height above the body/bonnet interface and reassembly with shims, if necessary, to assure a disk stack compressible load. CCI will prepare shim packages, if needed, that will assure compressive loads upon reassembly with gaskets.

CCI will offer technical discussion for the purpose of clarification to assist with the plant's determination under 10CFR21. Arrangements for a CCI Field Service technician can be made to assist in this activity in accordance with existing procedures for scheduling field service.

CCI Contacts:

The Contacts listed can arrange for a conference call to discuss any questions that arise and assure that knowledgeable personnel are available to respond to your needs.

1. Greg Black
VP Global Engineering
Mobile 1-949-282-3970
Fax: 1-949-858-1878
Email: gblack@ccivalve.com

2. Dave Lewis
Aftermarket Manager, Americas
Mobile 1-949-439-9603
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Plant Valves:

The impacted valves at your plant are shown on Attachment 2. This Attachment lists the valve tag numbers, serial numbers, CCI part number, and application when noted on the Top Assembly Drawing provided by CCI for the original supply.

Sincerely,



James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President - IMI Nuclear
Work 949-888-4047
Mobile 949-632-1993
Fax 949-858-1878

Attachment 1. Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21
Attachment 2. List of Plant Valves

Attachment 1: Summary of Information for Transfer of Information per 10CFR21

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

James Pickren
Control Components Incorporated
President- IMI Nuclear
22591 Avenida Empresa, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a potential defect is Drag® control valves manufactured by CCI. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected valves and the locations of those valves in your facility.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Control Components Incorporated

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

CCI determined that under certain calculated conditions there is the potential for the disk stack to separate (valve cage consisting of brazed disks) within CCI Drag® valves supplied to your facility. CCI has analyzed the valve assemblies and has been unable to rule out disk separation that might impede the valve plug opening, closing or modulating under certain conditions.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

This notice covers CCI Drag® supplied for safety related applications that require the valve to open, close or modulate as part of its safety function. A list of all valves that have been supplied by CCI is shown in Attachment 2.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has

been or will be taken to complete the action.

- CCI has issued a Transfer of Information to all affected utilities on 29 October 2010 since CCI is unable to make the determination if a reportable condition exists under 10CFR Part 21.21.
- CCI will issue a Technical Bulletin to all affected utilities to provide guidance on inspection and maintenance requirements to insure adequate compressive loading of the disk stack. This will be issued by 5 November, 2010.
- CCI has revised its design and assembly requirements to insure that there is adequate compressive loading on all future valve designs.
- CCI will discontinue sale of valves manufactured with the "old design" to the nuclear industry and will design all spare parts and parts kits sold in the future so as to assure there will be no separations to impede operation.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

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(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

Attachment 2: List of Plant Valves

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd					
PLANT NAME	AFFECTED VALVES				
	CCI P/N	CCI SERIAL NO.	VALVE QTY.	VALVE TAG NO.	VALVE APPLICATION
Kori 1	202243-1	103601-010-1/2	2	1-VIA-4345/4346	Compressed Air IE System
Kori 2	200813-1	101233-010-1	1	2-PCV-135	Low Pressure Let Down
Kori 2	200813-2	101233-020-1	1	2-HCV-218	Seal Injection Control
Kori 2	615101-1	615101-1-1	1	FCV205	Normal Charging Flow Control Valve
Shin-Kori 1&2	201259-207	101941-207-1/2, 101941-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	NF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Shin-Wolsong 1&2	201260-207	101942-207-1/2, 101942-227-1/2	4	1/2-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Ulchin 5&6	200062-5	100111-50-1/2, 100249-50-1/2	4	5/6-527-V-0007/0008	AF Turbine Steam Drip Leg Level Control Valve
Yonggwang 3&4	542471-2	542471-2-3/4	4	3/4-542-VAF-0045/0046	Aux Feed Water Control Valve