

Safety & Security Culture Policy Statement Workshop

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Organization of Agreement States

Combining Expectations

- Both are necessary
 - Need better definition of goal(s)
 - Must use a common sense approach
- Performance based
 - Already done for Health & Safety
 - Why not include Security – does it have to be so “prescriptive”?

Combining Expectations

- Challenges by States
 - Unfunded mandates?
 - Limited resources?
- Safety & Security are interconnected
 - Currently being done in most States
 - Is it really different?

Materials Area Attention

- Need to “Simplify Guidance”
 - Make it “un-burdensome”
- What is the relative risk vs benefit?
- Need uniformity based upon sound policy

Materials Area Attention

- Current level of understanding:
 - Need to be generic enough but address the various types of licensees
 - Is NRC only reacting to Congress at the expense of the States?

Moving Forward

- Questions to ponder:
 - If you are not secure are you not safe?
 - If you are not safe are you not secure?

 - If IAEA doesn't view safety & security differently, why should we?

Moving Forward

- Look at Vulnerability vs Actual Risk?
 - i.e. Portable gauges/GL's vs Table 1 licensees
- What actual data do we have for basing our decisions or success/failure?
 - i.e. how many devices have been stolen/attempted stolen before vs after the implementation of increased security requirements

Moving Forward

- Need to “Listen to the Stakeholder”
 - Presumption that NRC knows best
- Need to continue “Questioning Attitude”
- Need to continue to “Trust but Verify”
 - Don’t assume things are as they appear

Thank you!

Questions