

August 12, 2008

MEMORANDUM TO: Allen L. Hiser, Chief
SG Tube Integrity and Chemical Engineering Branch
Division of Component Integrity
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Donald G. Harrison, Chief
Balance-of-Plant Branch
Division of Safety Systems
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Michael L. Scott, Chief
Safety Issues Resolution Branch
Division of Safety Systems
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Jack W. Foster, Chief */RA/*
Operating Experience and Generic Issues Branch
Division of Risk Assessment
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT: GENERIC ISSUE MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
REPORT (FY 2008, Q3)

Enclosed please find the Generic Issue Management Control System (GIMCS) report for the third quarter of FY 2008. For your convenience, the following table summarizes the status of the open Generic Issues (GIs) and the subsequent paragraphs provide a narrative summary of the current status of these GIs. The enclosure provides the related GIMCS report details.

CONTACT: Asimios Malliakos, RES/DRA
301-415-6458

Status Summary of Active Generic Issues During Q3 of FY 2008						
GI No.	Title	Current Stage	Status	Planned Closure	Months Open	Regulatory Impacts
163	Multiple Steam Generator Tube Leakage	Regulatory Office Implementation		07/2009	192	NUREG-1430, NUREG-1431, and NUREG-1432; GL 2006-01; PWR Technical Specifications
186	Potential Risk and Consequences of Heavy Load Drops in Nuclear Power Plants	Implementation and Verification	Active	12/2008	110	NUREG-1774; Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), Section 9.1.5
189	Susceptibility of Ice Condenser and Mark III Containments to Early Failure from Hydrogen Combustion During a Severe Accident	Regulatory Office Implementation		09/2010	82	Title 10, Sections 50.34 and 50.44, of the <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> (10 CFR 50.34 and 50.44)
191	Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump Performance	Regulatory Office Implementation		06/2009	141	Regulatory Guide 1.82, Rev. 3; NUREG-0800; GL 1985-22; Bulletin 2003-01; GL 2004-02
193	BWR ECCS Suction Concerns	Technical Assessment	Active	03/2011	73	To Be Determined
199	Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States for Existing Plants	Safety/Risk Assessment	Active	06/2009	37	To Be Determined

The following three GIs—GI-163, GI-189, and GI-191—have exited the Generic Issues Program. The responsibility for their implementation and verification was transferred to NRR in accordance with SECY-07-0022, “Status Report on Proposed Improvements to the Generic Issues Program,” dated January 30, 2007, (ADAMS Accession No. ML063460239). Their status will continue to be tracked and reported in GIMCS until completion by the program office.

Reactor Generic Issues

GI-163, Regulatory Office Implementation, Multiple Steam Generator Tube Leakage (pages 1–4 of the GIMCS report): As of September 30, 2007, all pressurized-water reactor (PWR) licensees have modified their technical specifications in response to NRC Generic Letter 2006-01, “Steam Generator Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications,” and in accordance with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-449. The NRC staff has completed the relevant task items defined in the Steam Generator Action Plan. The target date for issuing a memorandum to the Executive Director of Operations (EDO) documenting the resolution of GI-163 and the supporting technical bases is July 30, 2009.

GI-186, Implementation and Verification, Potential Risk and Consequences of Heavy Load Drops in Nuclear Power Plants (pages 5–7 of the GIMCS report): In April 2008, the NRC staff participated in two public meetings with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to discuss the implementation of a nuclear industry initiative and associated guideline documents. Also in April 2008, NEI submitted the guidelines for reactor vessel head drop analyses and the guidelines for establishing single-failure-proof crane equivalence for reactor vessel head lifts. On May 16, 2008, the NRC staff issued a letter to NEI providing preliminary endorsement of these guidelines with exceptions regarding the load drop analysis acceptance criteria. In a letter to NEI dated May 27, 2008, NRC clarified criteria for acceptable interim analyses and requested a schedule for completion of a complete guideline document. The staff plans to brief the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on the implementation of recommendations in October 2008 and to issue a closure memorandum to the EDO in December 2008.

GI-189, Regulatory Office Implementation, Susceptibility of Ice Condenser and Mark III Containments to Early Failure from Hydrogen Combustion During a Severe Accident (pages 8–12 of the GIMCS report): In late February and early March 2007, the NRC staff received industry proposals for design modifications that incorporate security insights. On the basis of industry proposals, the staff expects nearly all affected units to complete implementation of proposed modifications by January 2010. The staff expects to close this GI with a memo to the EDO by September 30, 2010.

GI-191, Regulatory Office Implementation, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump Performance (pages 13–18 of the GIMCS report): Planned strainer modifications are now complete at all PWRs. These modifications typically increased strainer size by one to two orders of magnitude. NRC believes these modifications have significantly reduced the risk of strainer clogging. However, most PWRs have asked for and received additional time to complete certain specified corrective actions (most often, testing and analyses). The NRC has generally granted such requests based on the modifications and interim measures that have reduced the risk of strainer clogging. Very recently, testing results have led some licensees to conclude that additional modifications are needed to fully address GI-191. The NRC expects these licensees to commit to near-term comprehensive testing of a complete suite of modifications that can be shown to fully resolve the issue. Further, the NRC expects the licensees to install any necessary additional modifications as soon as practicable.

GI-193, Technical Assessment, BWR ECCS Suction Concerns (pages 19–22 of the GIMCS report): The Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) provided references to two research reports from the Lappeenranta University of Technology laboratory in Finland that have information relative to this GI. Although the NRC staff obtained and evaluated the information from Finland and found it somewhat relevant, it deemed the information not entirely applicable to domestic boiling-water reactors (BWRs). In 2008, NRC envisions contractor support for the ongoing evaluation phase of this GI along with a request for plant configuration details from the BWROG. Although the initial screening evaluation was performed about 5 years ago, reexamination and “rebaseline” may be appropriate in light of the literature searches conducted and new understanding obtained from those and other sources. This reevaluation appears warranted especially in light of the effort and schedule anticipated to address the interdisciplinary, state-of-art issues raised by this GI, including application of computational fluid dynamics, consultation with pump experts, and application of PRA capability.

GI-199, Safety/Risk Assessment, Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States for Existing Plants (pages 23–26 of the GIMCS report): Currently, the staff is collecting and analyzing seismic hazard information from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and other sources and seismic risk information from Individual Plant Examination of External Events analyses. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reported that it had calculated mean seismic spectra for the 28 sites using Regulatory Guide 1.165 and would calculate results for the remaining sites. With these results, EPRI would have an up-to-date understanding of the seismic spectra at each site. The staff plans to review this information and, if it is acceptable, use this information in the GI-199 Safety/Risk Assessment.

Thus, six reactor GIs remain to be resolved.

Nonreactor Generic Issues

At the end of the reporting period, no nonreactor GIs remain to be resolved in FY 2008.

I will continue to keep you informed of the staff’s progress in resolving the remaining reactor GIs and any future GIs, as well as any major problems that may surface during their resolution.

Enclosure:
As stated

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