

August 2, 2007

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-07-007

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of possible safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u>
Brunswick Steam and Electric Plant Unit 1 Southport, North Carolina Docket/License: 50-325/DPR-71	Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency X Not Applicable

SUBJECT: UNIT 1, 'B' RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER MOTOR OPERATED SUPPLY VALVE FAILURE

DESCRIPTION:

On July 26, 2007 the licensee declared the Unit 1, 'B' loop of the Residual Heat Removal System, an Emergency Core Cooling System, inoperable when two Residual Heat Removal Service Water pumps would not operate during a surveillance activity. The Residual Heat Removal Service Water pumps are a support system to the "B" loop Residual Heat Removal System.

The licensee determined that the 'B' loop Residual Heat Removal Service Water pumps motor operated supply valve, 1SW-V105, failed in the closed position. The closed valve caused a low suction pressure condition on the Residual Heat Removal Service Water pumps, preventing the pumps from starting. The licensee inspected valve 1SW-V105 and found that two valve disc-to-stem taper pins had become dislodged. Following repairs to the valve, the licensee restored operability of the 'B' loop Residual Heat Removal System.

The licensee plans to continue inspection and repair of all potentially affected valves in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water systems. As part of this effort the licensee inspected a valve in the Unit 2, 'A' loop Residual Heat Removal System on August 2 and found that the subject taper pins were intact. The licensee secured the pins in place.

The reactor continued to operate at rated thermal power during this condition.

The licensee determined that this condition did not meet NRC reporting requirements.

The NRC resident inspector was informed of this event and has continued to monitor the licensee's actions.

Region II received initial notification of this plant condition via routine communication processes from the licensee to the resident inspectors on July 30, 2007. The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of 12:30 p.m. on August 2, 2007.

Based on an assessment of this event using the deterministic and conditional risk criteria in Management Directive 8.3, it was determined that further inspection was warranted. On August 2, Region II initiated a special inspection to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the valve failure.

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