Next Generation Nuclear Plant Phenomena Identification and Ranking Tables (PIRTs) (NUREG/CR-6944) - Volume 3: Fission-Product Transport and Dose PIRTs
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Manuscript Completed: October 2007
Date Published: March 2008
R.N. Morris – Panel Chair
M. Kissane (IRSN)
D. Petti (INL)
D. Powers (SNL)
R. Wichner (Consultant)
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
P.O. Box 2008
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6170
S. Basu, NRC Project Manager
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
NRC Job Code N6376
This Fission Product Transport (FPT) Phenomena Identification and Ranking Technique (PIRT) report briefly reviews the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) FPT mechanisms and then documents the step-by-step PIRT process for FPT. The panel examined three FPT modes of operation:
- Normal operation which, for the purposes of the FPT PIRT, established the fission product circuit loading and distribution for the accident phase.
- Anticipated transients which were of less importance to the panel because a break in the pressure circuit boundary is generally necessary for the release of fission products. The transients can change the fission product distribution within the circuit, however, because temperature changes, flow perturbations, and mechanical vibrations or shocks can result in fission product movement.
- Postulated accidents drew the majority of the panel's time because a breach in the pressure boundary is necessary to release fission products to the confinement. The accidents of interest involved a vessel or pipe break, a safety valve opening with or without sticking, or leak of some kind.
Two generic scenarios were selected as postulated accidents:
- the pressurized loss-of-forced circulation (P-LOFC) accident, and
- the depressurized loss-of-forced circulation (D-LOFC) accidents.
FPT is not an accident driver; it is the result of an accident, and the PIRT was broken down into a two-part task. First, normal operation was seen as the initial starting point for the analysis. Fission products will be released by the fuel and distributed throughout the reactor circuit in some fashion. Second, a primary circuit breach can then lead to their release. It is the magnitude of the release into and out of the confinement that is of interest.
Depending on the design of a confinement or containment, the impact of a pressure boundary breach can be minimized if a modest, but not excessively large, fission product attenuation factor can be introduced into the release path. This exercise has identified a host of material properties, thermofluid states, and physics models that must be collected, defined, and understood to evaluate this attenuation factor.
The assembled PIRT table underwent two iterations with extensive reorganization between meetings. Generally, convergence was obtained on most issues, but different approaches to the specific physics and transport paths shade the answers accordingly.
The reader should be cautioned that merely selecting phenomena based on high importance and low knowledge may not capture the true uncertainty of the situation. This is because a transport path is composed of several serial linkages, each with its own uncertainty. The propagation of a chain of modest uncertainties can lead to a very large uncertainty at the end of a long path, resulting in a situation that is of little regulatory guidance.