Risk Evaluation for a B&W Pressurized Water Reactor, Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment: Evaluation of Generic Issue 57 (NUREG/CR-5789, SAND91-1535)
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Manuscript Completed: February 1992
Date Published: September 1992
J. Lambright, E. Klamerus, S. Daniel
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-5800
Operated by Sandia Corporation
J. Lynch, S. Ross (Subcontractors)
Science and Engineering Associates, Inc.
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110
Division of Safety Issue Resolution
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Nuclear power plants have experienced inadvertent actuations of fire protection systems (FPS) under conditions for which these systems were not intended to actuate. They have also experienced advertent actuations with the presence of a fire. These actuations have-often damaged plant equipment.
A review of the impact of past occurrences of both types of such events on nuclear power plant safety has been performed. Thirteen different scenarios leading to actuation of fire protection systems due to a variety of causes were identified. These scenarios ranged from inadvertent actuation caused by human error to hardware failure and includes seismic root causes and seismic/fire interaction. A quantification of these thirteen scenarios, where applicable, was performed on a Babcock and Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactor (lowered loop design). This report estimates the contribution of FPS actuations to core damage frequency and to risk.