Risk Evaluation for a Westinghouse PWR, Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment: Evaluation of Generic Issue 57 (NUREG/CR-5789, SAND91-1534)
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Manuscript Completed: October 1992
Date Published: December 1992
J. Lambright, M. Bohn, S. Daniel
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-5800
Operated by Sandia Corporation
D. Brosseau (Subcontractor)
7301A Indian School Road, NE
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110
Division of Safety Issue Resolution
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Nuclear power plants have experienced actuations of fire protection systems (FPSs) under conditions for which these systems were not intended to actuate, and also have experienced advertent actuations with the presence of a fire. These actuations have often damaged nearby plant equipment.
A review of the impact of past occurrences of both types of such events, a quantification of the risk of FPS actuation, a sensitivity study of the quantification of the risk of FPS actuation and risk calculations in terms of person-REM have been performed. Thirteen different scenarios leading to actuation of fire protection systems due to a variety of causes were identified. A quantification of these thirteen scenarios, where applicable, was performed on a 3-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). These scenarios ranged from inadvertent actuation caused by human error to hardware failures, and include seismic root causes and seismic/fire interaction. This report estimates the contribution of FPS actuations to core damage frequency and risk, proposes physical modifications to reduce the risk from the dominant contributors, and estimates the values and impacts of the proposed modifications.