United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Information Notice No. 85-56: Inadequate Environment Control for Components and Systems in Extended Storage or Layup

                                                           SSINS No. : 6835 
                                                           IN 85-56        

                                UNITED STATES
                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
                           WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

                                July 15, 1985

Information Notice No. 85-56:   INADEQUATE ENVIRONMENT CONTROL FOR 
                                   COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS IN EXTENDED 
                                   STORAGE OR LAYUP 

Addressees: 

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a 
construction permit (CP). 

Purpose: 

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to problems 
which can occur if equipment is improperly stored or laid up during 
construction or extended plant outages. Addressees also are reminded that 
programs for proper storage and preservation of materials and components are
required by NRC regulations (10 CFR 50, Appendix B), even though not 
specifically addressed as license conditions. It is expected that recipients
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and 
consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at
their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice 
do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required. 

Description of Circumstances: 

Licensee event reports, 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports, and NRC inspection reports 
contain many instances where materials and components have been seriously 
degraded due to improper storage, protection, or lay up, both at facilities 
under construction and facilities with operating licenses. A number of 
representative examples are described in the following paragraphs. 

A recent NRC inspection at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 disclosed that the cooling
water heat exchanger for the high pressure core spray diesel generator had 
water standing irk the tube side of the unit. The heat exchanger had been 
delivered to the site and had been "stored in place" in 1977, but was not 
yet in service. The source of the water is unknown, but it has been 
hypothesized that the heat exchanger had been inadequately drained after a 
manufacturer's hydro-test in 1976. The site construction organization had no 
program for inspection or surveillance of equipment in storage. Significant 
corrosion damage was observed on the copper alloy tubes and the carbon steel 
tube sheets and water boxes. 



8507110108 
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                                                              IN 85-56     
                                                              July 15, 1985 
                                                              Page 2 of 3  

Corrosion damage similar to that described above was found during an NRC 
inspection at Hope Creek. In that instance, the two heat exchangers were 
supplied for the engine cooling system for the plant emergency diesel 
generators. The heat exchangers had been received onsite sometime before, 
and stored in place. They had not yet been placed in service. 

In November 1984 the licensee for H. B. Robinson Unit 2 notified the NRC 
that, while preparing for restart after a 10 month outage, numerous pinhole 
leaks had been detected in the stainless steel service water piping. Further
examination of the piping disclosed other corrosion pits that had not 
penetrated through the wall. Temporary repairs were accomplished by the use 
of about 800 welded sleeves. The licensee has submitted plans for future 
complete replacement of the affected pipe. The corrosion has been attributed
to microbiological growth in the stagnant water that was in the system 
during the extended outage. Proper layup of the system could have precluded 
damage. Information Notice No. 85-30 provides additional information on this 
phenomenon. 

At Palo Verde, the licensee reported in June 1984 that corrosion attack had 
been found on internal surfaces of two Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pumps. The
pumps had not been operated. In December 1984, the licensee reported that 
the corrosion had been caused by contaminated water inadvertently left in 
the pumps after prestartup flushing of the system. 

Discussion: 

The cases cited above are a small sample of the wide variety of instances 
where improper storage or layup has resulted in significant damage and 
extended plant outages. Many of the events are related to balance-of-plant 
equipment and are not reportable to the NRC. They do, however, often cause 
extended outages. The Robinson service water piping damage extended the 
plant outage for 4 months, and additional down time will be required in the 
future to install the replacement pipe. 

At Palo Verde, it required extensive work and 6 months time to finally 
resolve that the pumps were still serviceable. 

10 CFR 50.34(a)(7) requires that each applicant for a construction permit 
shall provide a description of the quality assurance program to be applied 
to the construction of the facility, in accordance with the requirements of 
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) requires a description of how 
the requirements of Appendix B will be satisfied during the operation of 
each nuclear power facility. Among the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion 
XIII addresses storage, cleaning, and preservation of materials and 
equipment. 
.

                                                              IN 85-56     
                                                              July 15, 1985 
                                                              Page 3 of 3  

No specific action or written response to this information notice is 
required. If you need additional information about this matter, please 
contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or
this office. 


                                   Edward L. Jordan Director 
                                   Division of Emergency Preparedness 
                                     and Engineering Response 
                                   Office of Inspection and Enforcement 

Technical Contact:  J. B. Henderson, IE
                    492-9654

Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
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