United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Information Notice No. 84-09, Revision 1: Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)

                                                            SSINS No.:  6835
                                                            IN 84-09, Rev. 1

                                UNITED STATES
                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
                           WASHINGTON, D.C.  20555

                                March 7, 1984


Information Notice No. 84-09, REVISION 1:  LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC 
                                              INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION
                                              SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR   
                                              50, APPENDIX R) 


Addressees: 

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or 
construction permit (CP). 

Purpose: 

This Information Notice is a revision to Information Notice No. 84-09 
issued on February 13, 1984.  Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement
page which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section 
III of Information Notice No. 84-09.  The revision on page 2 is indicated in 
comparative text and in the margin to highlight the change.  Licensees 
should add the replacement page 2.  No specific action or response is 
required as a result of this replacement. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office. 

                               Edward L. Jordan, Director 
                               Division of Emergency Preparedness and 
                                 Engineering Response 
                               Office of Inspection and Enforcement 

Technical Contacts:  L. E. Whitney, IE 
                     (301) 492-9668 

                     T. Wambach, NRR 
                     (301) 492-7072 

Attachments: 1.  Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire 
    Protection Safe Shutdown Requirements, Replacement page 2 
2.  List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices 




8402090024 
.

                                                            Attachment 1 
                                                            IN 84-09, Rev. 1
                                                            March   , 1984 
                                                            Page 2 of 9 

III.  Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown 

At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were 
separated by a partial horizontal pyrocrete barrier suspended from the 
overhead.  At the same facility, two auxiliary feedwater pumps were located 
adjacent to each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield 
coated on one side with fire-retardant material.  The separation criteria of 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not 
meet the definition of a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1.  No alternative 
means of feedwater supply was designated. 

At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located
within the same cabinet.  At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation
valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity
without a fire rated barrier. 

Appendix R, Section III.G.1, requires that fire protection features shall be
provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.
These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of
systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from 
either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire 
damage. 

Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be 
implemented outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant 
train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown remains free of fire damage.  The alternatives are: 

1.  Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling and associated 
    circuits by a three-hour fire barrier. 

2.  Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated 
    circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automatic 
     fire suppression systems installed in the area. 

3.  Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated 
    circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening 
    combustibles and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression       
    systems in the area.  

4.  Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent 
    of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, 
    and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in 
*   the area under consideration.  

It should be note that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide 
additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and 
cables within non-inerted containments. 
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, November 12, 2013