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Information Notice No. 84-09, Revision 1: Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 84-09, Rev. 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 7, 1984 Information Notice No. 84-09, REVISION 1: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R) Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP). Purpose: This Information Notice is a revision to Information Notice No. 84-09 issued on February 13, 1984. Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement page which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section III of Information Notice No. 84-09. The revision on page 2 is indicated in comparative text and in the margin to highlight the change. Licensees should add the replacement page 2. No specific action or response is required as a result of this replacement. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: L. E. Whitney, IE (301) 492-9668 T. Wambach, NRR (301) 492-7072 Attachments: 1. Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Requirements, Replacement page 2 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices 8402090024 . Attachment 1 IN 84-09, Rev. 1 March , 1984 Page 2 of 9 III. Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were separated by a partial horizontal pyrocrete barrier suspended from the overhead. At the same facility, two auxiliary feedwater pumps were located adjacent to each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield coated on one side with fire-retardant material. The separation criteria of Appendix R, Section III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not meet the definition of a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. No alternative means of feedwater supply was designated. At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located within the same cabinet. At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity without a fire rated barrier. Appendix R, Section III.G.1, requires that fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage. Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be implemented outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown remains free of fire damage. The alternatives are: 1. Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling and associated circuits by a three-hour fire barrier. 2. Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed in the area. 3. Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems in the area. 4. Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in * the area under consideration. It should be note that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and cables within non-inerted containments.
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