Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > General Communications > Information Notices > 1983 > IN 83-30
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 83-30 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 May 11, 1983 Information Notice No. 83-30: MISAPPLICATION OF GENERIC EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOP) GUIDELINES Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP). Purpose: This information notice is provided as notification of the potential misapplication of generic Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) technical guidelines to operating modes for which they were not designed and to conditions for which they do not apply. Description of Circumstances: On March 18, 1983, at the Summer Station, an inadvertent safety injection, (SI) occurred while the reactor was being cooled down. The licensee's EOP, based upon the Westinghouse Technical Guidelines, constrained the operators from terminating SI flow prior to achieving a reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure of 2000 psig. At the time of the SI, the primary system temperature was 340
F and pressure was 1000 psig while the main steam pressure was 100 psig. Consistent with their procedures, the reactor operators did not terminate SI flow until the RCS pressure reached 2000 psig. This generated a pressure differential across the steam generator tubes which exceeded the 1600 psi design differential pressure by about 300 psi. The problem arose because the generic technical guidelines, which include a 2000 psig constraint, were not intended for application during reactor cooldown, and the plant procedures did not differentiate for this condition. On March 19, 1983, a second inadvertent SI occurred at the Summer Station while the RCS was water-solid at 325 psig and 150 F. However, this time the reactor operator quickly identified the SI as being spurious and terminated the SI after approximately two minutes without waiting for the EOP termination criteria of 2000 psig RCS pressure to be reached. Since the RCS was watersolid, the plant's cold overpressure protection system (COPS) was in service and the power operated relief valve (PORV) was set to relieve at about 750 psig. However, because of the prompt operator action, SI was terminated before the PORV setpoint was reached. In this instance, because of the plant's operating mode, terminating SI prior to meeting the EOP termination criterion was appropriate. 8303040034 . IN 83-30 May 11, 1983 Page 2 of 2 The problem being highlighted by this notice is the misapplying of EOPs by not taking into account the operating modes for which the EOPs should be imposed. Although no written response to this notice is required, it is suggested that holders of operating licenses review the information in this Notice for applicability at their facilities. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or the technical contact listed below. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: I. Villalva, IE F. Jape, Region II (301) 492-9635 (404) 221-4182 Attachment: List of Recently Issued Information Notices .
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012