United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Information Notice No. 82-52: Equipment Environmental Qualification Testing Experience - Updating of Test Summaries Previously Published in 81-29

                                                                 SSINS No.: 
                                                                 IN 82-52  

                               UNITED STATES 
                       NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                            WASHINGTON, DC 20555 

                             December 21, 1982 

Information Notice No. 82-52:   EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION 
                                   TESTING EXPERIENCE - UPDATING OF TEST 
                                   SUMMARIES PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN  
                                   81-29 

Addressees: 

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or 
construction permit (CP). 

Purpose: 

This information notice is provided to inform licensees of the status and 
test results on the series of environmental qualification testing published 
in Information Notice 81-29 dated September 24, 1981. It is expected that 
licensees will review the information for applicability to their facilities.

Description of Circumstances: 

Information Notice 81-29 disseminated several adverse test results as they 
were brought to the attention of the NRC staff. Some of these results have 
now been evaluated by the involved testing organizations; others remain 
unresolved. 

The enclosed series of test summary reports (Attachment 1) will provide the 
latest status and progress of the environmental qualification tests 
described in IN 81-29. Other information notices relating to equipment 
environmental qualification matters that have been published during 1982 are 
also included in Attachment 1. Please note that information contained in 
Notice 4 through Notice 9 is not related to environmental testing and, 
therefore, will not be addressed in the future as part of the NRC Equipment 
Environmental Qualification Testing Experience Series. No specific response 
to this information notice is required. 

Since the purpose of this information notice is to provide a timely update 
of the adverse test results disseminated in IN 81-29, other test results 
that have been brought to the attention of the NRC during this period will 
be evaluated and considered for inclusion in the next information notice. 
The NRC does not intend to publish successful qualification test results, 
except for that equipment for which adverse test results have already been 
published. The results of those successful tests will only be published as 
they are voluntarily brought to the attention of NRC by industry. 
.

                                                           IN 82-52 
                                                           December 21, 1982
                                                           Page 2 of 2 

Questions regarding the details of the enclosed test summary reports should 
be directed either to the manufacturer of the component or the organization 
that performed the testing (cognizant design and/or test agency). Both are 
listed on each report. 


                              Edward L. Jordan, Director 
                              Division of Engineering and  
                              Quality Assurance 
                              Office of Inspection and Enforcement 

Technical Contact:  N. B. Le 
                    (301) 492-9673 

Attachments: 
1.   Series of Environmental Qualification Test Summary Reports 
2.   List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices  
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 1 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 1 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment:  Limitorque valve operator, type SMB, size 00 

Test Facility: Limitorque Corporation 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency:  Westinghouse Electric Corporation 

Failed Component: Valve operator drive motor (manufactured by Reliance 
Electric Co.) 

Type of Test: Environmental qualification of SMB class valve operators per 
IEEE 321-1974 (harsh environment) and IEEE 382-1972 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   This is an ongoing program. Failures were previously described in 
          IN 81-29. Further tests were performed and Westinghouse Electric 
          Corporation concluded that the present motor design will not 
          successfully pass the Westinghouse specified test parameters. 

Failure Mode: Previous reported failures have been evaluated by further 
testing. Failure mode is now attributed to the severe requirement imposed by
the Westinghouse specified temperature profile. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Limitorque Corporation is 
pursuing the modification of the motor. This effort is under way to qualify 
the motor actuator assembly to a higher temperature profile. 

Generic Implications: Limitorque has successfully repeated a previously 
conducted environmental accident profile test on the SMB valve operator to 
the less severe IEEE 323-1971 and earlier standards. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 2 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 2 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: ITT Barton Westinghouse lot 4 transmitters, group A 

Test Facility: Westinghouse - Forest Hills 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation 

Failed Component: Connector assembly 

Type of Test: Environmental qualification of ITT Barton Westinghouse lot 4 
transmitters, group A 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failures involved erroneous output during temperature ramps and 
          were previously described in IN 81-29. Further testing was 
          performed to evaluate failure mode. Satisfactory resolution of the
          failures has been established, according to Westinghouse. No 
          further actions are indicated by the test agency. 

Failure Mode: Problem encountered during high-energy-line break as described
in Summary report No. 1 has now been attributed to the inadequate contact in
the connector assembly that apparently is sensitive to elevated temperature.

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Satisfactory modification was 
made to the connector assembly and the transmitter was successfully 
retested, according to Westinghouse. 

Generic Implications: According to Westinghouse the test program is 
completed Final reports have been submitted to the NRR for review. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 3 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 3 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: D. G. O'Brien electrical penetration assembly, model K connectors

Test Facility: Sandia National Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: NRC/RES 

Failed Component: Conductors shorted at connector assembly 

Type of Test: Simulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) environmental test 
to examine methodology. 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failures were previously described in IN 81-29. Sandia is 
          currently running thermal expansion-compression tests on the 
          silicone grommet to better understand the seal behavior during 
          elevated temperature accelerated aging and LOCA environmental 
          tests. The Duke Power Company reran the environmental 
          qualification test of the D. G. O'Brien electrical penetrations at 
          Wyle Laboratory in the period March/May of 1982. The Duke Program 
          included testing model K as well as models C, D, E, F, and L 
          electrical penetrations. In the Duke test program, silicone 
          grommet and silicone interfacial seals were all thermally aged in 
          an unassembled state. The seal parts were then assembled (but 
          torqued) and irradiated; the seal was then torqued before LOCA 
          testing. 

Failure-Mode 

Update:   Test results are being evaluated by Duke. The model K exhibited no
          anomalies during the latest test according to Duke Power. However,
          some of the other models exhibited short circuits during the LOCA 
          test phase. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: This program is an ongoing 
program. Evaluation of test results by Duke Tower Co. is in progress. 

Generic Implications: Application of model K connectors is limited to the 
Catawba, McGuire, and Yankee Rowe facilities. The qualification test 
previously performed by D. G. O'Brien for the McGuire plant and the recent 
Duke rerun test program indicate that model K connectors have successfully 
passed test criteria. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1 
                                                           IN 82-52 
                                                           December 21, 1982
                                                           Page 4 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 4 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: Dresser safety valve, model 31709NA 

Test Facility: Combustion Engineering 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Seat surface 

Type of Test: Performance testing for PWR relief and safety valves 
Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failure to close/open at set points was previously described in IN
          81-29. Test program is now complete. EPRI has issued an interim 
          test report. 

Failure Mode: Problem appeared to be caused by steam from the blowdown 
operation. Scratches or marks were found on valve seat surface. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: The seat surfaces were lapped, 
the valve was reassembled, to allow the other tests to continue. No other 
corrective actions were indicated in the EPRI report. 

Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by 
NRR. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 5 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 5 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: Dresser safety valve, model 31739 A 

Test Facility: Combustion Engineering 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Seat surface 

Type of Test: Performance testing for PWR relief and safety valves 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failure to achieve rated flow with high back pressure was 
          previously described in IN 81-29. Test program is now complete. 
          EPRI has issued interim report which states that at one time 
          during test, the rated lift of the valves was not maintained at 
          pressure 6% above design set point. Seat surfaces were lapped and 
          other tests were performed. 

Failure Mode: Scratches on the seat surfaces and galled guiding surfaces 
were observed, according to the EPRI report. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Seat surfaces were lapped to 
minimize seat leakage to allow the other tests to continue. No other 
corrective actions were indicated in the EPRI report. 

Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by 
NRR. NRC is also currently reviewing information received from licensee 
owner groups in regard to a related matter identified at Oconee 1 and 2 
pertaining to the ring setting issue. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 6 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 6 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: Dresser power-operated relief valve (PORV), model 31533VX-30 

Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Valve bellows 

Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve test program 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failure of valve to close on demand during water tests was 
          previously described in IN 81-29. Evaluation test was performed, 
          and steam was found to have leaked past the valve pilot stem. 
          Valve was disassembled and bellows were found to have several 
          partially failed welds. Valve was reassembled with new bellows and 
          valve cycled successfully. Test program is now complete. EPRI has 
          issued an interim test report. 

Failure Mode: Valve malfunction caused by leakage through the failed welds 
in bellows. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No further action indicated in 
the report. 

Generic Implications: The EPRI report concludes that the partially failed 
welds in the bellow have no potential impact on valve operation. Interim 
test report on this valve is under evaluation by NRR. The damage was 
determined to have no potential impact on valve operation, according to 
EPRI. Interim test report on this test is under evaluation by NRR. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 7 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 7 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: Target Rock power-operated relief valve (PORV), model 80X-006-1 

Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve test program 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failure of valve to close after deenergization was previously 
          described in IN 81-29. Test program is complete and an interim 
          report has been issued by EPRI. Valves were disassembled after 
          each test and no damage was observed, according to the EPRI 
          report. 

Failure Mode: Not determined 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No corrective actions were 
indicated in the report. 

Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by 
NRR. Information indicates that there are presently no valves of this design
in operating plants, but they are planned for use in some plants under 
construction. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1 
                                                           IN 82-52 
                                                           December 21, 1982
                                                           Page 8 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 8 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: Control Component Incorporated (CCI) power-operated relief valve 
(PORV) 

Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve program 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failures of valve to close during prescribed steam tests were 
          previously described in IN 81-29. Closure delay times from 2 to 40
          seconds were observed under various tests. Valve was disassembled 
          and no internal damage was observed that might affect the ability 
          of the valve to open or close on demand. Test program is complete 
          and EPRI has issued an interim test report. 

Failure Mode: Not determined 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No corrective actions were 
indicated in the report. 

Generic Implications: The interim test report is under evaluation by NRR. 
Information indicates that the CCI PORV is being or will be used at McGuire 
1 & 2, and Catawba 1 & 2. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 9 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 9 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: Crosby safety valve 3K6 

Test Facility: Combustion Engineering 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) 

Failed Component: Not determined 

Type of Test: Steam, low and high ramp rate, high back pressure test 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failures involving valve oscillations and closures outside of set 
          points were previously described in IN 81-29. According to the 
          test report, galled guiding surfaces and damaged internal parts 
          were found. Damaged parts were either refurbished or replaced 
          before continued testing. Test program is complete, and an interim 
          test report has been issued by EPRI. 

Failure Mode: Not determined 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: The report indicated that 
scratches or marks were found on surfaces; the scratched surfaces were 
lapped before reassembly for continued testing. No other corrective actions 
were identified in the report. 

Generic Implications: The EPRI interim report is under evaluation by NRR. 
Information indicates that the Crosby safety valve 3K6 is being used or will
be used at St. Lucie 1 & 2 and Fort Calhoun. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1  
                                                           IN 82-52  
                                                           December 21, 1982 
                                                           Page 10 of 11 

           Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 10 

                        Test Summary Report No. 2 

Equipment: ASCO solenoid valves, NP-1 series 

Test Facility: ASCO/Isomedix Inc./Wyle Laboratories 

Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Automatic Switch Co. (ASCO) 

Failed Component: Viton elastomer seals in NP-1 series valves 

Type of Test: Radiation simulation for design-basis event (DBE) 

Description of Failure(s): 

Update:   Failure involved material deterioration at high radiation exposure
          and was previously described in IN 81-29. Detailed information is 
          now available in ASCO Report No. AQR-67368/Re. 0, dated 8-82. This
          report concludes that the ASCO solenoid valve, NP-1 series 
          containing Viton dynamic seals should not be used in application 
          where the valves may be required to shift position following 
          exposure to total gamma radiation doses in excess of 20 megarads. 

Failure Mode: Solenoid valve will not shift position upon receipt of a 
specified-operating signal (65 V DC or 0.080 amps) following a total gamma 
radiation exposure in excess of 20 megarads. 

Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Each licensee should review its 
system requirements to determine whether or not Viton elastomers are 
acceptable for its application. ASCO has recommended that Viton elastomers 
be replaced with ethylene propylene (EPDM) elastomers on valves required to 
operate under accident conditions following a DBE. Please note that NRC is 
in the process of proposing a bulletin requesting each licensee to assess 
the design of each facility and determine if equipment with Viton parts 
should be replaced with EPDM parts or other equally qualified parts, as 
recommended by ASCO. 

Generic Implications: The described failure is confined only to the ASCO 
NP-1 series where Viton elastomer seals are used, and not NP-8300 as was 
previously reported in IN 81-29. 
.

                                                           Attachment 1 
                                                           IN 82-52 
                                                           December 21, 1982
                                                           Page 11 of 11 

            Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No.11 

                       Related Information Notices 

Information Notices relating to equipment environmental qualification 
matters that have been published during 1982 are: 

     IN 82 - 03     Environmental Tests of Electrical Terminal Blocks. 

     IN 82 - 11     Potential Inaccuracies in Wide Range Pressure 
                    Instruments Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants. 

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