United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Crystal River 3 Reactor Trip from Approximately 100% Full Power (Generic Letter 80-18)


GL80018                                                  
                                                         
                                 UNITED STATES 
                         NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
                            WASHINGTON, D.C.  20555 

                                 March 6, 1980 
                                              TO ALL OPERATING B&W REACTOR 
LICENSEES 

As you know, on February 26, 1980, the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear 
Station (CR-3) experienced a reactor trip from approximately 100% full 
power. The initiating event was a failure in the power supplies for the 
non-nuclear instrumentation.  As discussion of the event was presented by 
the Florida Power Corporation (FPC) in a meeting attended by representatives 
of your company in Bethesda, Maryland, on March 4, 1980.  FPC also discussed 
the planned corrective action that would be taken at CR-3.  The sequence of 
events presented by FPC and the planned corrective actions at CR-3 are 
attached to this letter as Enclosures 1 and 2 respectively. 

Representatives from all other B&W operating plants were also present at the
March 4, 1980 meeting.  Each licensee addressed the history of non-nuclear 
instrumentation problems at his facility, the susceptibility of his plant(s)
to the CR-3 event, and any corrective action that has been, or will be, 
taken. 

On a related matter, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79-27 was
issued subsequent to a similar event at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit No.
3, on November 10, 1979.  This bulletin requested your review of certain 
matters relative to the Oconee event, and its implication on the operation 
of your facility, does not relieve you of your responsibilities to provide 
the information requested by IE Bulletin 79-27. 

Because of the implications of the CR-3 event, and potential adverse effects
on the public health and safety that could result from future events of this
type, we believe that certain information in addition to that requested in 
IE Bulletin 79-27, should be promptly provided to the NRC concerning your 
facility.  In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54 (f), you are requested to provide
us with information in response to Items 1 through 5 of Enclosure 3, 
submitted under oath or affirmation, no later than close of business March 
12, 1980. Information in response to Items 6 and 7 of Enclosure 3 should be 
submitted no later than close of business March 17, 1980.  The information 
provided in your responses will enable us to determine whether or not your 
license should be notified, suspended, or revoked. 

This letter confirms the oral request for this information expressed at the 
March 4, 1980 meeting by Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director, Division 
of Operating Reactors. 

                                      Harold R. Denton, Director 
                                      Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Enclosures:  As stated 
.

                                                       Enclosure 3


Information requested by COB, March 12 and March 17, 1980

1.   Summarize power upset events on NNI/ICS that have previously occurred 
     at your plant.

2.   Specifically review the Crystal River event, and address your plant's 
     susceptibility to it in general.

3.   Set forth the information presented by your representative(s) in the 
     meeting on March4, 1980.

4.   Address information available to the operator following various NNI/ICS 
     power upset events, including a discussion of:

     - how the operator determines which information is reliable

     - what information is needed to bring the plant to cold shutdown

5.   Address the feasibilty of performing a test to verify reliable 
     information that remains following various NNI/ICS power upsets.

6.   Address each CR-3 proposed corrective action in terms of applicability 
     to your plant.

7.   Expand your review under IE Bulletin 79-27 to include the implications 
     of the CR-3 event.  Inform us of your schedule for completion of this 
     expanded review as discussed on March 4, 1980.

In addition to the above, Florida Power Corporation should address:

1.   Sequence of events for the CR-3 trip

2.   Proposed corrective actions at CR-3

3.   Discuss the impact, whether it be beneficial or detrimental, of NRC 
     Short Term Lessons Learned and Bulletins and Orders requirements.
     
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